 As we have seen, the creation of international law very much depends on the existence of an agreement between states. International law comes to existence as a result of consent of several subjects. Reciprocity is at the heart of the creation of international law. In a very classical way, a new obligation results from the acceptance of an offer. Moreover, the sovereign equality of states is repugnant to the idea that one of them could impose legal obligations on the others absent their consent. And this would indeed be tantamount to an imperial legal order, and it is completely alien to the fundamentals of the international legal order. However, why would it not be possible for a state to bind itself vis-à-vis other states by its own will? If imposing obligations on others without their consent is impossible, what about imposing obligations on oneself through what can be called a unilateral act? Well, that issue arose in the nuclear tests cases, a dispute between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and France on the other. The case was decided in 1974, at a time France was still conducting atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific Ocean. The main firing site was the Mururoa Attle, some 6,000 km to the east of the Australian mainland. Australia and New Zealand claimed that those atmospheric tests were not consistent with applicable rules of international law, and they requested the court to order France not to carry out any further such tests. France contested the jurisdiction of the court. It decided not to appear in the proceedings and simply asked the court to remove the case from the list. By two separate judgments of 20 December 1974, the court decided that the claims by Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object, and that it was therefore not called to give any decision thereon. As you see, such outcome was very much favourable to France, but it also came with a legal cost for France. And let me explain why. The court reached its conclusion following some public statements made by the highest authorities of the French Republic, President Giscard d'Estaing, then also Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, together with the French Foreign Affairs Minister and the Minister of Defence. All of them had made consistent and public declarations, according to which the ongoing atmospheric tests by France would be the very last of this type conducted by the Republic. The court considered that when it is the intention of the state making such declarations to become bound according to its terms, I quote, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the state being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration, end of quote. And the court went on, an undertaking of this kind, if given publicly and with the intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations is binding in these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quipro quo, nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other states is required for the declaration to take effect. Since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the state was made, end of quote. Of course, not every unilateral act or declaration imply an obligation. Everything depends on the intention conveyed by the language used and the surrounding circumstances irrespective of the written or oral form of the undertaking. To know whether a unilateral declaration is a binding undertaking can only be decided on a case-by-case basis, but the nuclear test cases made clear that there is no inherent impediment for the creation of new international obligations through unilateral acts of states. And as a matter of fact, the court famously stressed the following and I quote, one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in particular in an age when this cooperation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential, just as the very rule of Pactas Un Cervanta in the law of treaties is based on good faith. So also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration. Thus, interested states may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them and are entitled to require that the obligation thus created be respected, end of quote. So said the court, France is legally bound to respect its promises. The logical consequence of taking the French declarations as binding unilateral undertakings was to consider that the objective of both applicant states had in effect been accomplished. France had promised not to carry out any further nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Sensation of those tests was at the heart of the request by Australia and New Zealand and cessation was legally guaranteed by the French undertakings. Therefore, the dispute brought before the court had disappeared and there was no reason for the court to adjudicate any further. Of course, had Australia or New Zealand claimed reparation for the possible environmental pollution resulting from the nuclear fallout, the court would still have had to decide on that reparation claim. But because they did not make any reparation claim, the case was simply dismissed by the court.