 So one year ago, as Barry indicated, we were all preparing many of us for a historic election in the United States. The first female president. Oh, well we got a historic election, but it's not what many of us expected. And since then, of course, we have seen in one, nine months, not even fully a year since he actually took office, we have seen the United States pull out of the Paris Climate Accord. We've seen a lecture to NATO. We've seen America first being touted before 150 delegates at the United Nations. And we are now seeing, as of just yesterday, Senator Jeff Flakes from Arizona saying this new normal cannot be tolerated. So can it? What are not just the personality and psychological implications of Donald Trump presidency, but more importantly, what are the political and policy implications of the Donald Trump presidency? And so I'm looking forward to a great discussion this morning from each of our panelists. I've been told they have officially only five minutes to give their scene center from where they see policy and politics. And we will be starting with Anne Anderson. She is the former ambassador, the Irish ambassador to the United States, to Ireland in the United States, just coming back here to Ireland this summer. Then we'll be followed by Larry Donnelly, who is often my partner in crime talking about politics. And he's also the NUI Galway Law Lecturer and a regular political columnist with the journal.ie. And then of course we'll be having also John Isle, who is a long time journalist, former journalist for a variety of publications and now the head of communications with Goodbody and of course the very own IIEA. Chief Economist Dan O'Brien will be also speaking, and fellow columnist, the Sunday Independent as well. So I look forward to hearing each of their positions and insights on one year of Donald Trump. Take it away, Anne. Thanks Gina. And it's good to have the opportunity to tune out some of the daily noise and think a little bit about what's happening. We only have five minutes, as you said. So I just wanted to touch on three themes. One, populism, two issues around America First, as you mentioned, and sovereignty, and three issues for the media since I gather this is a session that's much focused on the media. And I'll keep it short, but I want to frame it around two speeches and an opinion poll, because that's a kind of handy frame of reference for me. The two speeches that I would identify as being very significant were the ones that Trump made on the day of his inauguration on the 20th of January, and then the big speech at the United Nations on the 19th of September. I'll come to the opinion poll later. These were very important speeches because of course they were very carefully crafted and calibrated. Nothing improvised about them. And I guess they had quite a resonance for me too, because I was there, all the ambassadors were on the podium for the inauguration we were all invited. And given my long, long experience at the UN, of course I was particularly attuned to the UN speech, so both of the speeches were ones, of course, that I listened to very carefully. Now, populism, obviously he was a populist candidate. This is not an accusation, this is a badge of honour that Donald Trump the candidate wore, President Trump wears. He channeled the populism that is there. He also helped to focus it. He was an enthusiastic advocate of it. And we saw it right through the campaign. But it was still, I must say, quite striking on the day of the inauguration. And you always expect a degree of transition between the candidate and the president. And of course the inauguration speech is traditionally the big, unifying, binding up the rules speech. It was not that kind of speech. Many of you will remember the American carnage speech. And what was so interesting there, surrounded by all the great institutions of state and the representatives, that he took direct aim at Washington, the elite, the end of the swamp in politics. And this was to be the day, the 20th of January, when the people were back taking control. And we have seen the outworking of that populism in so many ways over recent months. And that taking on of Washington, and you mentioned the flake speech yesterday, I'm sure we'll come back to that later. But it has been, and the echoes of that are right across the political spectrum. We see populism in Europe, of course. It was very interesting to see the Democratic Party, for example. Again, you see the grassroots questioning the establishment of the party, the ascendancy of the Bernie Sanders wing. So how populism continues to play out through the 2018 election, through the 2020 election, would obviously be very interesting. Second point then, America First sovereignty, particularly the UN speech. Again, of course, who should be surprised about America First? It was a theme right through the candidacy. We heard it in the inauguration speech. But somehow it was particularly startling there in the UN context. After all, this is an organization that is built on common purposes, common values, universal declaration of human rights, and so on. The whole theme of President Trump's address was the primacy of sovereignty. And I couldn't count how many times the word sovereignty was mentioned throughout the speech. And as I say, in this particular context, it is rather startling. Because throughout all my years at the UN, and many of you will know, normally when you hear people reaching for sovereignty at the UN, it's countries like China, Russia, or others who are accused of human rights violations. And this is their shield against those accusations. So it was an inversion of everything that we are normally used to at the United Nations when you hear the US come and talk in this way about sovereignty. Normally they're with us, the Western countries, in acknowledging sovereignty, but placing all the emphasis on universality of values and so on. So this is clearly going to continue to play out in terms of American leadership and the international order. Third and final point then before Gina points me to the clock. The question of the issues that are there for the media, and as I mentioned, an opinion poll, it's not obviously on par with the big set piece speeches, but I was quite struck by a political opinion poll last month where one of the questions was trust in the media and how do you believe the media are treating Donald Trump. Put aside what the Republicans and the Democrats think, because that's fairly predictable. But among independents, 44% of them thought the media were fabricating stories about Donald Trump. 31% among independents thought that they weren't. Now, this is quite extraordinary and tells us something about how the whole fake news accusation is truly taking hold. In the media there's no doubt they helped to put Donald Trump in the White House. The disproportionate amount of publicity that he got was certainly a factor. Maybe there's a degree of atonement now. It's hard to know what's going on. We know how siloed the US media is. On Fox News obviously President Trump could do no wrong. In much of the mainstream media, including your former CNN people, it's a constant drumbeat of criticism and so on. Now, one may absolutely say it's well deserved. He gets the coverage that he deserves. But of course this is grist at the middle of his supporters, feeds this narrative about the president as victim and you know the lone hero that's kind of going to slay the liberal media. So I think it's really something for the media to reflect about because this level of distrust in the media is certainly corrosive of any democracy. So it's a big issue to think about. I leave it to that, Gina. Very nicely, very good setup in terms of the populism, that idea of things that you would say not in a setting of the United Nations and yet it's being said and yet who are you playing to and what's the role of the media. Thank you very much for that and I appreciate that. Let's now turn to Larry Donnelly. As I said, political commentator extraordinaire as well as the columnist for the Journal.ie and the law lecturer at MUI. Larry. Thanks, Gina. I think anybody who would have read my columns before the election last year might dispute your characterization of me as extraordinaire given how boldly I predicted Hillary Clinton was going to win. And I suppose what I'm going to talk to you about is what think tanks are going to have to get through in order to get through if you get what I'm saying. And there's three points that I'd like to make. The first is Trump the candidate versus Trump the president. And I think there are big differences between the two on a number of different levels. I think the only two certainties when it comes in particular to the international order with respect to President Trump has been unpredictability and has been his doing politics poorly. And I think politically he's done things poorly here. His administration has done things poorly both substantively and from a communications point of view, which is a huge element of politics in 2017. Economically, as opposed to Trump the candidate, arguably Trump has done the bidding or been more susceptible to the needs of the markets, etc. and largely ignored the people who were less well off, the so-called people who inhabit that broad amorphous entity known as Middle America. And internationally, despite the America First rhetoric, despite the fact that he was going to pull back and not going to engage in any more unnecessary wars, he's arguably been something of a bully on the international stage and if not get an interventionist, certainly a would-be interventionist. And I think when it comes to Trump the candidate versus Trump the president, the key question becomes what do the soft Trump voters make of this? That is not the base, not the people who are at the rallies, but the people who voted for Trump. Not because they loved him, I thought he was a wonderful person, but because they didn't like Hillary. They wanted to give the system a kick. They didn't like where they were at in life. They wanted to change things and shake things up. What do they make of all this? That's the key political question. The second point I want to make is with respect to the separation of powers, the famous separation of powers in an American context. And I suppose the relative weakness of the executive branch coupled with the robust legislative and judicial branches in the United States, all a part of what I still think is the founders of America's genius design have curtailed the president in some respects, as some of us thought they would. However, probably in different ways than we thought they might. I think in terms of his legislative agenda, I think again it's worth coming back to the fundamental difference between the legislature, the Congress in the United States, versus parliamentary systems in Western democracy. And that's because the big difference, as I would see it, is that the legislators there are not constrained in any real way by the party whip. So as such, they are really activists. They're anything but supine as the point has been made, particularly about Dahl and Shannadair and under the last government. So as such, the few moderates left in the Congress have helped to thwart Trump's plans on Obamacare and, until very recently, on tax policy. On the flip side, and this would have been fascinating from a political science point of view, Trump has chosen not to pursue policies where Democrats might agree with him more. Trump has chosen policies on things like rebuilding American infrastructure and amending and scrapping trade deals aggressively where conservative Republicans would recoil. So it's a funny dynamic going on in terms of the legislature. As for the judiciary, we all know that a lot of federal judges have struck down the so-called Muslim ban. And here's where I have to draw a lesson between what I tell my students to do. That is, your personal opinion shouldn't be your legal opinion. Personally, and absolutely abhor the ban, I think it's contrary to what America stands for. I think the law is pretty squarely on the president's side in this. And I think that the judges are adopting what I would regard as a pretty selective approach to precedent and it made some legally incorrect decisions. I expect that the Supreme Court will side with the president ultimately on this. And if anything, I think the judges rather define decisions, show that they're drawing something of a line in the sand when it comes to the president and that they are people too. I don't think they would have been very impressed with President Trump's way over the top attack on the first judge to strike down the ban. Third point, and here's where I'm afraid it gets grim in my humble opinion for the broader world order. I don't believe that Trump came from nowhere. I think he's a symptom of a broader malaise when it comes to America and its people's attitude to the rest of the world. Poll after poll show that the overwhelming majority of Americans self-define as isolationists and believe their country's best days are behind it. Trump is a reflection of the turnback-to-clock conservatism that I believe is now the ascendant school of thought in the U.S. and it isn't confined to middle America. The two parties in the D.C. establishment have had their heads in the sand about this for a long time because it's against their own self-interest and they would argue bad for the world. At any rate, if Trump doesn't give this very large sway to the electorate what they want and there's no doubt in my mind that they brought him to the White House I don't think any other Republican would have defeated Hillary Clinton then they'll look for another messenger who will, I think, do what they want. As such, I think America, vis-a-vis the international order will change significantly in the future, Trump or no Trump. Perhaps the only hope for the status quo and for the foreign policy establishment and the D.C. establishment more broadly is that Trump implodes and fails so badly with extreme consequences that enough Americans change their mind on this fundamental issue. And that, in my view, is one of the major reasons why they're up to get him so badly. Again, that's my humble opinion. Thank you. Thank you, Larry Johnnelly, for your humble opinion and that bleak picture of isolation and some over-goblism. Thank you very much. But it does strike a chord with what Anne was just talking about in terms of populism and someone rising to the front and being that personification of these sentiments. It's very interesting. Thank you very much, Larry. Let's now turn to John. I, ladies and gentlemen, John. I'd like to start by thanking Larry for that helpful formulation of separating a legal opinion from a personal opinion. Because what I'm going to do is pick up where both Anne and Larry left off in talking a little bit about radical politics that we've seen emerging in the United States and how these politics almost don't matter at all to the U.S. economy and to how markets are performing that. So, notwithstanding my personal opinion about what's happening in Washington, the state of the U.S. economy actually looks quite healthy. In fact, the global economy as a whole is strong. It's growing and it looks as if the crisis years or the years in which we've had to apply crisis thinking are behind us. Not only is the U.S. GDP growing at, I think the last number was 2.2 percent on an annualized basis, but you see Chinese economic indicators are coming in ahead of expectations. Eurozone is growing again. Obviously some problems in the U.K., but emerging markets also are performing strongly. So this sort of economic backdrop helps the United States and provides, I think, a significant contrast to what's happening politically. What exercises people in the media and exercises them, I think, on an emotional level about what's happening in the White House and in Washington more broadly. So just I wanted to sort of take everybody through a little bit what is happening in the U.S. economy in terms of the economic indicator, the market cycle, maybe a little bit how this is reflected in the policy of the Federal Reserve. And then I'll get to the almost part about where politics actually might matter. So first thing to say, again, GDP, as I said in the U.S., is growing quite strongly at 2.2 percent, which on a relative basis compared to where we were coming from eight years ago is to be welcomed. Employment trends are very good. There was a small drop-off due to the hurricane impact in Texas and Florida last month, but the overall trend in employment at job creation is very, very strong. Unemployment in the United States is down below 5 percent. This will start showing up presumably in wage growth and overall increase in living standards. Business sentiment is likewise robust. The manufacturing and services PMIs are both on growth trends and at very high levels, and showing no sign of the United States moving into a recessionary territory or even a general slowdown. And then finally, the consumer is coming back into focus in the United States. The consumer is, of course, the driver of the economy there. Consumer debt is low, and consumer behavior indicates that the economy still has some way to go on this growth trajectory. So the markets, as we see, the stock markets in the United States are at all-time highs. In fact, reaching all-time highs on a regular basis, I believe this year alone, we've had 50 or 60 days where we've ended at an all-time high level. Some people believe that there is a correction lurking behind these all-time highs. Our good body, which is one plagiarizing from our Chief Investment Officer, Herman Swords, is that we may have as much as two years left in this market cycle. He bases this view on the strength of the U.S. economic indicators, the strength of the global economy generally, accommodative central bank policy, and then finally the strength of earnings of the corporations, which is really what drives the market. So we have strong earnings going through from the corporate sector as well as earnings upgrades, which is something we haven't seen regularly through the recovery. So supporting all of this underneath it is a federal reserve that is being very cautious in terms of its rate-out policy, trying not to make the mistake of killing the recovery before it's properly got going. And even though the Fed has started its hiking cycle again, and I believe we're expecting another rate hike this year and maybe two or three next year, the ECB is very far away from increasing interest rates. The Bank of Japan still remains very accommodative, and even though quantitative easing is going to be withdrawn, it's just going to be a smaller level. So we'll have central bank support for this global growth for some time to come. And then finally the last bit is the tax cuts. This is very much in the news now, the so-called tax reform agenda in Washington. Looks less like tax reform than maybe tax cut at any cost. That may be jeopardized now. The news overnight, I think, was of Bob Forker and Jeff Flake in the Senate have turned on the president now which maybe complicates things in terms of passing new tax legislation. But we, in good body, don't really see the tax cuts as essential to the continued growth of the economy or the performance of the markets. We see it as a possible upside surprise. So the economy and the markets are likely to just continue moving in a positive direction. And to get to my caveat, which is about whether politics matter or not, on a day-to-day basis they don't seem to, apart from microvolatility. But where I think personally, this is more my personal opinion, the risks of the type of politics coming out of the White House in particular, but in the Republican Party more generally, and I'm showing my colors here, I think long-term have the potential risk of degrading the United States' credibility of a world stage more generally. So the direction and consistency of American policies, those things matter. They matter to trade relations and with the protectionist rhetoric, especially coming from the Republican side, which may align perfectly well with populism and the expressed opinions of what they're called and turn back the clock conservatives, where I think we'll have a deleterious effect in the long-term on whether local institutions and American trading partners can trust the word of the White House. And I think once that credibility is squandered, it's very hard to turn back. So that would be the almost part of the politics don't matter to the economy. Thank you very much, John. And that was actually a touch on what my first question would have been on that one is, what is that long-term impact? Because they talk about economies that are built with the trajectory of the former administration, and then what happens when you change things over time, what it means to be so reported to more of that. And so as we go from economy to the chief economist for the IEA, let's forward to having you, Dan O'Brien, bring it on home for us. Thanks, thanks, Gina. So look, I want to do three things in terms of less focusing on the individual and more focusing on the outcomes. One, looking at the U.S. economy, which John has already done. Another, looking at the relationship between Europe and the U.S., the economy, and how the policy arrangements work, and then looking at America and the world more globally. Looking at the U.S. economy, it's still a cancerous quarter of the world, a global economy, so it's extremely important for everyone. As John said, it's doing well. My key point on it is if you look at the real economy data, whether it's GDP, labor market spending, consumer spending, you don't see any inflection points from last year or the inauguration this year. So the change in regime doesn't appear to have had any effect on the functioning of the world's biggest economy one way or the other. And that really shouldn't surprise. The U.S. President and Mary has alluded to it. The executive power in the U.S. is much more constrained, and most prime ministers in Europe have a lot more power over the economy than U.S. presidents. Interest rates are set by the Fed. Congress is much more controlled over budgets than European parliaments tend to, and of course it's a federalized country in each state has its own budget and does a lot of economic policy stuff. So no real surprise that the president, the change in regime has not really affected, it's not affected the U.S. economy in any way, one way or the other. In terms of Europe and the U.S., the integration of the two continents, they are by far the most integrated economic big continents in the world. People tend to think of China as being a big player, but the integration in terms of trade and investment across the Atlantic is many multiples of, say, Europe or China, U.S. and Asia. So it's an extremely important part of the world economy and still accounts for just under about half of the world economy, and that's reflected in very deep institutional relationships between Washington and Brussels. Again, I would contend that there's actually been very little change. If we look at something like TTIP, it was going nowhere, it's still going nowhere. If we look at the tax disputes, there were big tax disputes between Washington and Europe before the current administration. They haven't escalated. They're still there. It's not as though things have got much worse. The border tax, that idea was on the table, not the President's but his party, that would have triggered a trade war with Europe. That was taken off the table. So the relationship with Europe, and this was for a President who was pro-Brexit, hostile to the EU and questioning a NATO, all of those things have pretty much gone, and the relationship across the Atlantic is remarkably similar, and there's been much more continuity than many people would have expected. And just one, again, looking at data, huge volume of stuff shipped back and forth across the Atlantic. You run those numbers over the past two years. Again, no inflection point around the election or the inauguration. Trade across the Atlantic, billions every week hasn't really changed. It's continued. There's no up or down or real change. Finally, more change on the global picture. Although one of the promises in the election was that China would be labelled a currency manipulator on day one, that didn't happen, and that would have triggered a trade war with China. But there have been more changes, certainly around pulling out of TPP, the long and difficult arrangement around Asia to create a free trade area. The US has pulled out of that, and also the renegotiation of NAFTA, the trade agreement between Mexico and Canada. A lot of similarities with Brexit there in terms of trying to unscramble that egg, and that's ongoing and certainly a sign of retrenchment and less involvement in the world. Reflected also, it's been mentioned the Paris Accords and the Iran deal, pulling back from things, and these are manifestations of that. The big point to my mind is the WTO. It's the multilateral organisation par excellence in the world. When countries get into disputes over the way the trade system works, people go to its court. It's very much like it's to the world trade, what the European Court of Justice is to the European Union. Not a lot of people follow it. It's a pretty arcane body, and a lot of stuff goes on there. It's complex and technical, but it is a vital institution in terms of keeping the multilateral trading system open. Here again, the U.S. has not been appointing people to its main, most important court, and that's viewed as, if that continues, then the capacity of that court to act and to fulfil its function will be degraded. I wonder, does that reflect more a... rather than a proactively wrecking multilateral institutions, is it a form of neglect that the institutional capacity in the White House simply isn't there to do all of these things one way or the other? So to conclude, the much less has changed, in my view, under the current administration than one might have expected, although clearly that leadership role is gone and in a vacuum there are real questions to ask whether or not the international system can continue to function over the longer term without a leadership player. Fascinating. All right, so Dan, Larry, Anne, and John, thank you very much for your initial thoughts. I think we've got a great scene set. In the short term, in spite of the tweets, in spite of the carnage, in spite of the Rocket Man, in spite of all the things that we get upset about on a daily basis, in the short term anyway, a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing. Anne. No, I think that's too reassuring perspective. I mean, I know that... The markets are still going on. You were talking very much, yeah, but... The institutions are going around, Tim. We maybe need to make a distinction between the economics and the politics because, I mean, both John and Dan were talking very much from an economic perspective. But to say that the European-U.S. relationship is fundamentally unchanged under Donald Trump seems to me to be overly reassuring. So from where you sit as a former diplomat? You know, I mean, there were concerns during the Obama period. There was the pivot to Asia, and people felt there was... Maybe it was a benign neglect. We kept being told by the Obama administration, it's not a pivot away from Europe. It's a pivot to Asia. But it felt like less attention, less love, like any long-term relationship. We felt, you know, we're like the old married seer we're being taken for granted, and they're being seduced by the newer partners in Asia and elsewhere. But that was different from the... I do think that there is, politically speaking, at least there is a brittleness that has entered the relationship between Europe and the United States. I mean, I watched the video recently again in preparation of this, of when he presented his lecture to NATO. And you can see the cutaways of the other leaders who were there. There was not comfort. Those micro expressions that tell all. There's a feeling of apprehension. There's the unpredictability. And there is that... Beneath everything, there was that sense of a kind of joint leadership in terms of values between the US and Europe. And, as I say, I spoke about the kind of shock of that speech of the United Nations. And, you know, the shock of the... Of course, it wasn't unexpected that he walked away from the climate change agreement. But in so many areas, there is the feeling that we, together, we were the kind of authors of so much of the international order. We were the guarantors. I mean, when you hear something like, for example, the Commission of Human Rights in the United Nations, I mean, I remember when we were up for membership of the Commission and we were competing against the United States, and Susan Rice, the American ambassador, got up to make this ringing speech to the rest of the UN membership about how the US is necessary in these major international institutions. It's a sign of the seriousness of purpose. Without the US voice, these institutions would be so much diminished. And people nodded, and they voted for the United States. And now we have, well, will we or will we not stay in the UN Human Rights Commission? The idea that they would just easily turn their back and walk away from these institutions that have been built up over decades, that, yes, they have problems, they have challenges, but we can only face those issues together with the United Nations. So for Europe to lose that partner in setting a tone and trying to establish a leadership in the international order, to me, it's something very serious and it is creating concerns. That's the concern. And if I can push you just a little bit since you're no longer officially the ambassador, although I know you have diplomatic elements that you need to keep in check potentially, that's the concern. What would you suggest is the response? Well, I mean, for so long, Europe has been having this debate about whether Europe didn't need to step up more to the place. I mean, of course, part of the response is to work, not just with the president, but with members of the administration. Although, you know, a somewhat disempowered secretary of state is not necessarily the ideal partner to be working with. So part of the answer, obviously, is to continue to work with not just the president, but the White House team, the Congress, and so on. To go around President Trump. Well, I mean, there's no... This is a person that, the idea that somehow he is somebody, you know, that other people are putting the strings of this puppet, that totally underestimates President Trump. He is undoubtedly putting a very, very clear personal imprint on this administration. So the idea that you can just circumvent him is not real. It makes no sense for anybody to operate on that hypothesis. But nevertheless, a president is surrounded and you work with the president and with the executive and Congress and so on. But also, you maybe, you know, this, if Europe can get its act together, maybe this is the moment that should be empowering for Europe. I remember years ago when I was ambassador to the EU, and Chris Patton was the commissioner for external relations. I remember him, just a phrase stuck in my mind when he was around the table with the council members one stage. He said, he's so fed up. He said, America gets to do the cooking and Europe gets to do the washing up. In other words, the sense that, you know, we were always out there with the humanitarian aid and so on, but when it came to the real stuff on the Middle East and so on, it was, America was really shaping the outcomes. So, I mean, for so long Europe has been feeling, listen, we need to get into the kitchen and, you know, be the, at least the co-chef. So now, I mean, maybe part of the answer is, part of it is, you know, our indispensable partner, the United States, seeing how best we can work and influence, but maybe part of the answer, also, is thinking how if there is something of a vacuum being created, well, who would we rather fill that vacuum? Do we want Russia? Do we want China? Or do we want the European imprint to be more clearly there? Okay, thank you, Anne. I'm going to continue with politics and we'll turn over to Larry now, talking about the idea that you're an American, obviously, but you've also been living here in Europe. What is that suggestion that you would say in terms of policy that Europe can do? I know there's a lot of focus in the next discussions on Brexit, but how can Europe come together in the light of this? Or is this an opportunity or is it not? Well, I think one way or the other, I think Europe is going to have to come forward more dramatically. I mean, for the reasons that I outlined at the beginning, I mean, in the sense that Trump, I believe, is merely a reflection in some ways. Scary as this might sound, but he's a reflection of a viewpoint that's very much taken hold of the United States. And if you want to look at what Trump's animating impulse always has been, is that the U.S. is getting a raw deal on the global stage. And an awful lot of Americans agree with that point of view. So that's why I think the recalibration of America vis-a-vis the world is going to happen one way or another. So, yes, I think that there is a way for Europe. Europe is going to have to stand up and there is going to have to be a cohesive approach to all this. What the exact nature of that approach is, I'm not so sure, but what I would urge and people immediately assume that America taking more of a back step in terms of its place in the world immediately assume that that's necessarily a bad thing. I don't say that it necessarily is a bad thing. And I think we only have to look at decades of ill-begotten wars and conflict in the Middle East to see why that's a reality. So I think that there is a place for the European Union. I think there is an emphasis on the shared European values that are so strong and still permeate the Union despite disagreements across it. I think that there is an opportunity to promote those and push those, if not as an antidote to the United States but just as a different approach and alternative to some of what the United States has pursued in terms of its foreign policy in recent years. All right, Larry. So Dan, then the U.S. is getting a bad deal. We're getting a bad shake out of all these multilateral agreements economically. Is that valid? And if so, what should the U.S. be doing and what should Europe be doing in response of that? Take Donald out of it and just, is he echoing what's true? Well, I think just moving away from the economics and looking at the NATO piece, for example, you know, most of the members of NATO for many years have committed to spending 2% of their GDP on defense and very few of them have. And it's been a long-time gripe of both this president before he was president. Yeah, they singled out 23 out of 25 aren't they in their fair share? Absolutely. And, you know, other presidents have constantly, I've been following European affairs for 20 years and this has been an issue for all of that time. The Americans feel here we are, we are spending huge amounts of money defending you, you're one of the richest parts of the world and you're not paying your share. And that is a perfectly valid criticism the Americans make of how Europe has done things. So adding pressure to Europeans to come up and pay for their own defense seems to me to be a perfectly reasonable position to put forward. And maybe this president now that Europeans are, as Anna said, this is a more unpredictable president. They maybe see that they will have to stump up. They can't depend on the U.S. as much as they did in the past anymore. And if that happens it may be no bad thing. Interesting. So keeping along the lines really quickly on politics as it relates to the policy then and it looks like his rhetoric is strong. His rhetoric is divisive. His rhetoric is startling to the diplomatic words that we're all supposed to use. But it doesn't seem to make a blip on the economy. It's not really, it's pissing us all off and we're talking about it on radio and we're writing about it and all of that. But maybe is it going to have an effect? I think it's a short term and long term question isn't it? Let's take them. So in the short term it actually, like rhetoric doesn't really affect things. Okay, so maybe you have a situation where a central bank governor like Mario Draghi said something and it has a direct impact because he carefully calibrates his speech to indicate something to the market so he's taken seriously. But I think Donald Trump has just been tuned out. So you had an initial, I think right after the election, there was an initial stock market rally in anticipation, maybe some of the things that would be coming through like infrastructure spending, you know, that fiscal stimulus, tax cuts, the end of the bounding care, whatever it was. He's policy failure so far as a president, right? But what the markets are telling you is actually either the anticipation of failure was priced in or it was never that significant to the upward motion of the market. In the first place. Now, the markets are right until they're wrong, right? And this is how it works. Let me go back and we recalibrate. Yeah, exactly. And likewise, events are insignificant until they're significant. So the question isn't necessarily whether when Donald Trump shoots his mouth off, does that make a difference? What matters is what events can make a difference. So how much trouble can he actually get us into or how much trouble will he actually get us into? If we're going to look at the negatives, right? So do I think it's a problem for markets if European countries start spending more on NATO? No, of course not. That may or may not be an outcome of Trump's isolationism. But say, looking at the Korean Peninsula, nobody wants that to get volatile, right? But again, there's been a lot of firing of words. Of course, yeah. But there hasn't been a real firing. I mean little things, but nothing to date. No, no. But again, as I said, it's not a problem until it's a problem. And then, of course, everybody scatters for the exit. So we speak in a really theoretical or speculative way about this stuff because we don't know what the big event will be that might put it into all of our optimism in the markets or on the economy. But those events are out there. Whether they happen or not depends on Trump's efficacy as a leader and how robust... How would you say he's doing so far? Do you want the elite... Efficacy? No, I want the personal opinion. Come on. The personal opinion, I think it's an unprecedented fiasco. It's a chaotic regime that's barely staffed any of its departments. Just on a formal basis. Let's just forget about whether I agree with the policies or not. He hasn't populated the government departments with sufficient people to actually get worked up. Oh yeah, you get a state department that's still under vacancies. Very basic measure. Things aren't happening. So the capabilities of the government to actually get things done or influence the world for good or bad are being degraded all the time. So just the maintenance level of managing an effective government is not there. And anyone who's worked in a large-scale organization knows you just have to fill certain positions. You have to have a head of HR. You have to have a chief operating officer. All of these things. And that isn't happening. But the other thing is, you know, he seized on this kind of populist feeling in America and he stoked it. I grew up in the United States. I've lived over here half of my life. What always fascinates me about going back is the caricatured image many Americans have of what the rest of the world is actually like. Especially Americans who've gone nowhere else except in the United States. And so there's a whole politics that's been developed behind a veil of ignorance. To appeal to that. Exactly. And so what you'd hope from a president is a bit of leadership and saying, hang on, I've been out in the world. I've spoken to other people in the world with the representatives of the people of the rest of the world. And here's what's actually happening out there. Instead, Trump takes us as lodestar the uninformed opinions of the people who elected him and says, right, okay, I'm going to reinforce that. I'm going to encourage you in thinking. And then I'm going to develop policies that somehow reflect it. When those policies get out into the real world, they won't work the way everybody expects. My over simplistic message that I'm using to sell to my base isn't going to sell in reality. And let's take that nugget. Thank you very much, John. To Anne, when you talk about, it's not just populism that's happening in the United States or isolationism that's happening in the United States, like at Austria, look at the other countries that are starting to pull in, being Angela Merkel didn't get what she expected and the rise of other parties that are looking inward. We talk about what to do with populism and what's the message that resonates that can appeal but can also have real applications. Is there a balance there? It's a number of factors, obviously, and anybody who's read JD Vance and the Hillbilly Elegy and so on have a good sense of what's happening in America. But the larger picture is the disappointment with globalization and the fact that the liberal model and the globalization, it is working to the benefit of some, but not to the benefit, this is the perception, certainly, the benefit of everybody and the growing inequality in so many of the economies is certainly feeding this feeling of total disillusionment and if you look at, I mean, instead of turning the accusation on the rest of the world and accusing the rest of the world of freeloading on America, which is the consistent theme, I mean, it's much more relevant, I think, to look inwards as to what's happening in the United States and yes, there is the growth, there is unemployment less than 5%, but the fruits of the prosperity are being so unevenly shared and the inequality is growing more and more by the day and most commentators believe that if this mooted tax legislation gets through that it will add to that inequality, it'll improve things for the corporations. They still want to get rid of a state tax. I mean, as Gary Cohen said, there is supposedly said only morons pay it state tax in the United States because you don't get to pay it over more than, you know, you can leave five and a half million as an individual to your successors before you get to pay a state tax. If you take that away, of course it's going to feed the inequality. But in the United States, it's the feeling of the swades of the country, the de-industrialization, they haven't been left behind, but it's a failure, of course. I mean, you can't canoot like and back the tide of globalization. That is the 21st century. But the fact that America has not invested in its education to equip people to do something else, the fact it hasn't equipped in its infrastructure, certainly in some of these forgotten states, the fact that the inequality gap is getting wider by the day, all of that is feeding into globalization. So this easy scapegoating, it's the rest of the world, freeloading on us that has resulted in this situation, that is sheer irresponsibility. Sheer irresponsibility, Larry Donnelly. Globalization, business-wise, I think the economists would argue, were intrinsically connected. So why are we still resisting that? Or why are many in the United States still resisting that from how they feel, I guess, in their pocketbooks? But what is their message or is it education? What's the solution around that? Or do you even see there's a need for one? I think you answered the question that people, the purported benefits of globalization, the much touted benefits of globalization, broad swathes of America are not feeling that, they're just not feeling it in their pocketbooks. They're not feeling the benefits of it. It's because the good jobs that used to be there are no longer there. I'll probably get killed by economists on my right and left here. One of the things about the United States is that it didn't have to, it could have still been an active free trader, it didn't have to enter agreements, for instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement, that while jobs were moving, there's no question about that, it didn't have to effectively accelerate the rate of that job, the rate of these, the factors of jobs moving south, et cetera. And whether that's, and economists can debate the speed of that detraction, et cetera, but the perception is that it did, and that's the political perception that Trump has fed on. And the other thing that I think is alive in the United States, and this is a coastal issue as well as a Middle America so-called issue. If you look at the rising costs of living in the United States, particularly in the Northeast and on the West Coast, which is driven by a tiny percentage of the population, it is now the case that people on an income that in this country would be very, very significant are no longer well-off or no longer comfortable. They're hurting, they're struggling as well. So when I was talking earlier about the people who have been left behind, there is this portrait of the steel worker in Pennsylvania or the coal miner in Ohio, whatever it might be. It's actually broader than that. And I think that Trump's success is indicative of the fact that it's broader than that. So the trouble, I think, the difficulty is not just confined to people who work with their hands for a living, live paycheck to paycheck. It's even bigger than that. Gina, could I just come in? Please, I was going to go to you next. Jump right on in, Jim. One of those things, America is a remarkably closed economy. People talk about globalization destroying jobs in the Midwest. America is the most closed economy of the big, rich economies. Why is that? Well, because it's just so big, it tends to be the bigger the economy you are. Because they're just selling with themselves. Exactly. So the bigger it's a smaller economy, the more open you tend to be because you can't make cars and all that sort of stuff. Right, you've got to live on that. But the United States is a very closed economy. The reason things have not gone well in some parts of the United States. But doesn't it also work that we have problems with in the United States with our manufacturing focus, whereas the education point from Ann Anderson, if we could get people excited about IT skills or training or thinking about skilling the future and turning that clock back. That's exactly the point I would make, that it's domestic policy failures to adapt to the inevitable change that goes on in all economies. If you look, this is the idea that jobs are disappearing everywhere. If you look at every developed country in the world, more people are working now than ever before. Not even that. And there's a big jobs gap in need for IT skills. Well, there is, absolutely. But the U.S. is one of the only countries in the rich world where the share of the adult population working is falling. Greece is the other one. Everywhere else, actually more adults are working than ever before. So what's going on? It can't be about this globalization piece because Europe is much more globalized. If globalization was destroying jobs and making things much worse, then Europe would be in a much worse position than the U.S. But in many ways it's the U.S. So my point would be it's domestic policy failures at state and federal level in the U.S. that have not addressed how to deal with economic change for people rather than globalization causing all of this. Okay. And so, John, how does that dialogue need to be changed? I mean, I think that conversation has to happen on a deep cultural level, but I'm not sure the United States political discourse is appealing to have it. Because it doesn't serve the purpose of the two political party system to get elected or what's the reason? So when I was listening to Dan talk there, I just started thinking like the United States is having a crisis of masculinity, I think. He's talking about... But he's the personification of masculinity. What do you mean? The people who work with them, well, that's exactly it. It's a reaction to that crisis. So the people who work with their hands, so the self-image of the American man is not somebody who's a healthcare worker. That's where the jobs go at this. I think about my... MedTech, let's blend them both together, yeah. Yeah, exactly. So I was thinking I was thinking about my own father there who's retiring at age now, but his career trajectory is like a little microcosm of the American economy over the last 40 years. He started in banking. He became a bomb trader. He was flushed out of Wall Street in 1990 during that recession and then retrained and became a fiber optic technician for 20 years, stopped that and became a geriatric nurse for the end of his career. Wow. Retraining. But the rest of America is not doing that. So that's one guy. But the American man hasn't done that. So to do the J.D. Vance caricature, the American man has done from... He lost his job in 1990, maybe retrained once, and now he's on OxyContin. Hmm, yeah. So addressing that is how do you reconfigure an entire national self-image? How do you remodel your self-efficacy so that you turn from someone, oh, we made trucks. We made airplanes. The United States still does this, but it's not. Well, in the way we make trucks, is that the way we make trucks? Exactly. It's not the manufacturing thing. You can see that Trump touches it like he has a sixth sense for understanding this stuff. So getting rid of environmental regulations is the way of saying that we're going to be men again driving our cars. I do think it's gender. I'm sorry to get ahead in this direction, but I think the conversation is a cultural one, and when people try to have it, and it was personified in the presidential race, wasn't it? You look at the gender divide in terms of we voted for whom and how Hillary Clinton was portrayed by the Republicans as well. It became a high-regender election. And not that Hillary Clinton is exactly a really far-left wing feminist, I think, just completely in the middle of the road Democrat, actually, and quite hawkish and in all the ways that you'd expect a man to be. Sorry, I've gone down a bit of a rabbit hole here, but I guess my ultimate point is... But the tangent of how this personified and what's at the crux of the populist and the turn-back-to-claw conservatives that's impacting or not impacting the economy that is also impacting the way our allies are Europeans, especially since we're here and your allies are feeling that credibility deterioration, that lack of trust, that who do we turn to when we want a negotiation? It does seem all very tied together. It doesn't, did you? I have a bit of optimism about this, which is that demographics will ultimately overtake this impulse. The question is, what will be left by the time that happens? So I think, you know, you look at the crisis of the white men, white men in the United States, and then you look at the minority demographics and you see that, okay, electorally speaking, the numbers, I know the Democratic Party has been saying this for decades, but eventually the numbers work out. Maybe Larry has something to say. He does, he's tucked my sleeves. I know I've been the prophet of doom and gloom all day. Let's go, let's move that optimism. Let me continue on in that vein. That had been the equation, John's equation had been the equation that fueled optimism, relentless optimism in the Democratic Party for some time. However, it has to be taken on board what happened in 2016 when arguably the most anti-immigrant, anti-Latino presidential candidate, at least in living memory, ran for the presidency of the United States. He received almost 30% of the Latino vote. And before people start saying that was all Cubans, Cubans are a tiny, tiny percentage of that overall Latino vote. And the reality is, I was saying to Dan before, there's been some great political science coming out of the United States in this election, it's one good consequence of it. And there's been a lot of theorizing and one of the theories that has gained some currency is that what if it is the case that the Hispanic American community is actually much more like the Irish American community than the African American community? If that's the case, then the Democratic Party's whole calculus and their whole formula for success needs to be majorly and seriously rethunk. On that optimistic note, Dan, or Larry, I want to ask you though, does that mean because they voted we're in, but we don't want others in? We want the prosperity that we have. There's lots of reasons. There's also the theories behind it. There's a theory that they're more socially conservative. There's all sorts of reasons for it. Okay, all right, fair enough. I want to give you guys a chance though, because there's a lot of great topics going on here, a lot of great themes about the globalism, about what the allies can or can't do, what the economy that is happening or isn't being affected in the short term, you have been potentially in the long term. What's the situation for the internal domestic policies that need to be changed? And I'd love to hear if any of you have a question raising from where you're sitting right now that you'd like to ask any of our panelists. And I think we have roving mics. Yes, we do. Look, there's a roving mic right behind us. Anyone? Yes, sir. Francis Jay, this is my name. Thanks very much for a really interesting discussion. Just a couple of questions. There's always been, I think, in American history, there's always been a populist and nativist strand. I mean, there was no nothing party, great name in the 19th century. There was huge isolationism in the 1920s. So how different is this? Is it just Trump's personality? Larry was saying that it's Trump didn't come out of nothing. Is this trend deeper in his view than it has been in the past? And my second question is obviously parallel to Trump. Over the last 30 years, there seems to have been more and more polarization within the United States. The Democratic States, I mean, I remember I lived in the States when I was a kid and California was more a Republican state. Now it's a one-party state. The Eastern West Coast, maybe Chicago and Illinois, Democrat, but it just seems more and more polarized. And I'd like to know what you're thinking is on where that's going to lead and why some of the people who seem to have been the biggest victims of globalization seem to be trending more and more Republican. I mean, I'm thinking of West Virginia again, classic Democratic state. Now it's one of the strongest Republican states in the nation. Okay, thank you, Francis. Three parts, if I can remember, we've got, is it a blip every 20 years? Is it also something that's happening that's dividing stronger than ever? And is it something that you're going to see continue to trend flipping over to Republicans? We've got the Latinos that are Republicans. Now we've got the out-of-work coal miners in West Virginia that are Republicans. Are there any different cuts left, Larry Dongley? I'll try to take those both quickly. I'm not a historian. All I can do is hope that on the first point that you're correct that this is a blip rather than a long-term trend. At the moment, I'm a little bit pessimistic, as you can probably tell. But we can only hope that it is a blip and that a whole series of factors will take over, including government policy as Dan has alluded to, will ameliorate some of those issues. As for the second point in the polarization on the issues, I think there's no doubt that there has been two polls emerging. I would suggest to you that that's in large part a role of the money, the role that money plays in American politics. The money's special interests are on the polls. They're on the hard right and the hard left on both issues, and they help to drive things to a great extent. The second thing I would suggest to you, and this is inward-looking as a Democrat, the Democratic Party used to be a... You have a crazy system in the United States. We have 320 million people, and you have two political parties. Objectively speaking, if someone was to land in from the moon and look at that, they would say this is crazy. So if you're going to only have two political parties, then you need to have bigger tents. And what I'd suggest to you in recent decades is that the Democratic Party's tent has shrunk. You mentioned West Virginia. Mike Dukakis won West Virginia in 1988. Donald Trump won it by 40 points in 2016. In a large part, I would suggest to you that's because the Democratic Party's tent has shrunk and it's become dominated by people who think that Manhattan cocktail parties or San Francisco cocktail parties, and not about the people who work with their hands for living, who might also go to church every week and own a gun. So that's my take on it. Thank you, Fred. Does anybody else have a question or comment? Can I just make a brief comment on that? Just a very brief comment on that. The first part of it, that populism, there's always been that vein, there's always been a strain, there's no authority, and so on. What I think is somewhat concerning now is the legitimation of some populist sentiments and making them more mainstream, more acceptable. And I think that's a real change from what we've seen before, and that's something I think that to be. And a flaming of that, an encouragement in many ways from the top. Yes. From the top. Yes. Well... Can I put words in your mouth, please? I'm sorry. Excuse me. The kind of... Some of those populism is fueled by many factors, and it has many manifestations, but certainly there are strains of racism and sexism and misogyny and so on that are clearly in the form of populism that we're encountering today. And those sentiments are always knocking around in any community, fueled by what? But the fact that they are now more respectabilized, given more voice, more center stage, is something that I think is concerning. Yes, ma'am. Sorry. What's your name? Sorry. Hi, my name's Ruth Kennedy. I'm a broadcaster with a number of outlets here in Dublin. Just on the... Yes, I knew that. Just as a question for Larry Donnelly or anyone else on the panel. With regard to... You started to touch on race or perceptions of race in the US with regard to elections and Democrats' calculations and so on. It would appear to me that the Republicans are just an awful lot more successful at using data science in two ways to further their aims. One is in partisan gerrymandering and the other is in targeting of advertising. And working in the media, I'm interested in what happens in other countries. And PBS Frontline did an interview with Donald Trump's social media guru who started out as one guy with a laptop with a small business and he ended up with a staff of, I think, 300. And he targeted ads using data science, using Facebook, down to the individual voter. And the blend between media and advertising as we all know, church and state has become completely blurred or in fact it's vanished, so the mainstream media still exists. But in actual fact, what people perceive to be the media is actually a targeted Facebook ad that comes to them and their neighbor gets something different. But to the partisan gerrymandering, the Republicans are using data science in an incredibly successful way. I think there's a case at the moment in Wisconsin where it relates to the division between the numbers of people who vote and the actual whole of seats. It's so huge. And gerrymandering, growing up in the 70s and 80s in Ireland, gerrymandering is at best considered to be a fraud and the worst considered to be an enormous injustice against a particular group of people. In the States, I believe it's not illegal. And there is a case, am I right? Just wondering if you have anything to say to that with regard to race and partisan gerrymandering. So let's talk about cocktail parties is one thing. In actual fact, underneath the surface there is this incredibly laser focused, targeted use of data science to do something that's legal. But in actual fact, I think in 2020 they're reviewing the issue that the party that's in power is allowed to actually crack and pack districts in order that they can maximize their vote to an astonishing degree. Okay, fascinating question. I'll just take a quick and let everyone else come in on it. In terms of gerrymandering, I think first of all, you're right. If there's one thing I could change about American politics, I suppose two things, money first and then. But gerrymandering would definitely be one of them. The way that the congressional districts are constructed effectively with the duplicity of both parties, Republicans more so as you say, but are such that it pays people to move away to the right and way to the left based on the composition of their districts. So Barack Obama and others are starting to do work on this. And indeed, there is litigation and there is definitely a racial component of it. From a strategic point of view, however, what I would say is I would continue to point to the ills of bringing people to the right and the left because I don't believe that you will get the majority of Americans and you have to move hearts and minds on this. I don't believe the race appeal will move the hearts and minds of the majority of Americans. I think it has to be a bigger, broader argument about the ills that have been done to the American system because when it comes to those voting rights issues, a lot of white Americans, as I'm speaking frankly, turn off when they hear things that it's wrong for somebody to be asked to produce identification when they're voting. Most white Americans anyway think that that's absolutely logical and natural and not an imposition whatsoever. So politically speaking, to make that move, I think it has to be a broader, bigger argument than simply a race-based one, even though on the merits I agree with you. There's a lot that could be discussed about that particular, the data and the gerrymandering, and the way that elections are run in the United States and I would love to give more time to that. Unfortunately, we don't have... I can take one more question. I want to give everyone an opportunity to give a final thought. Yes, ma'am. Hi, Ann. I just referred to the legitimization of misogyny and racism that is sort of happening under the Trump regime and John there referred to the crisis in masculinity in America. And, of course, there's a crisis in masculinity everywhere, I think, but the fact is both these... I see the men's and herds not as you said. These two things I think show the huge discrepancy between how Trump is viewed as far as I can see in America and how we view him here in Europe. We here tend to think, oh, my God, isn't Trump awful? Whereas there is no indication and especially not from that poll that you mentioned at the outset, Ann. And I just wondered, I wanted to ask you, in fact, who exactly was polled? The 44% who thought he is the victim of fake news all the time. Am I right? I believe those were the impediments. Yes, yes. Ann, go ahead. If you want, if you wouldn't mind. I'm going to jump in. Can you just let me finish the point? Because you're wearing work clothes. And also the whole idea of the masculinity in crisis. It's interesting that probably here in Europe we think of masculinity. That Trump is, in fact, morphing into Harvey Weinstein and that he is massively represents the masculine in crisis. Whereas probably in America he has seen as somebody who is addressing masculinity in crisis, as you say, by his environmental policies and bringing back all the carment, the manufacturing and all those things. So there is, what I'm trying to say is, I think here we don't have a clue what Trump stands for in America actually and that we think that the next election is a foregone conclusion. If he lasts that long, he certainly won't be re-elected. But I think on the basis of that poll you quote, and the building up and how corrosive of democracy such ideas are, that in fact this is by no means given and that that's how we should be thinking now. Ann, if you would, I'm going to frame that as our last point and I'm going to start with Ann then as you were directing it to her. But let's talk about that and have the panelists get their reaction. Is this a blip, as you see it, or is this a reflection of something more and the new normalcy? If you would sort us off with that. Well, I mean, the chances must be quite high that President Trump will be re-elected. I mean, there is always an advantage to an incumbent. I think in the last 50 years only Carter and the Elder Bush lost the race to be elected a second time. So there's a huge inbuilt advantage for the incumbent. On the other hand, there's no question that Trump base is very loyal and he scores low in opinion polls but he largely holds on to that 40% or so that brought him to the White House. And there is absolutely no sign irrespective of anything the President says or does. There's no sign of the faith of that 40% being impacted in a very significant way. So the outcome of the next presidential election, obviously, is going to... But also, I should say, there's no sign of the President really making any serious attempt to enlarge his base. I mean, so much of what he says and does is obviously connecting to that base, resonating with the base, but not pushing his appeal outside the base. So the outcome of the next election very much depends on that base remaining solid, getting out to vote, and, of course, who the Democrats can put up and if the people at the margins and the independence can be attracted to who the next Democratic candidate is going to be. But, I mean, the questions of race and sex, they're pervasive, really. And, I mean, if we look at other issues like that, dominating the headlines in the states over the last few weeks when so much else important was going on, I mean, the question of the athletes taking a kneel and so on. Many people saw that as racist because the quote-unquote sons of bitches that President Trump was referring to were almost all black. He would say it wasn't racist. It's just people who were refusing to respect the flag. But many people would see it as a coded kind of racism. There are many other issues that, you know, they're coded sexism, they're coded racism. But these issues resonate with people and they're very real and very significant. But, as I say, the outcome and the direction there is a big advantage to the incumbent. But, and so far, President Trump shows every sign of keeping his base rock solid. Pretty rock solid. And if that continues, it will be a very big challenge for the Democrats in 2020. Larry Donnelly, final thoughts from you on the solid base. Thank you, Anne. The soft support that you mentioned. I don't think it's a blip. I think it's something that's bigger than Trump, but I think that that's the case. I think that the reelection, Trump's reelection chances will depend in large part, obviously, on what happens next few years and also who the Democrats put against him to run. And the other thing is, I think we could have a long discussion about who Trump's base actually is because I think we get a variety of perspectives about who they are. My one thought would be they are not conservative Republicans. They are different. They are much harder to classify. And I agree with their larger number. Can you continue from optimism to optimism? No, I think pessimistic. I think the way we think in the Western world, I think this is just an American thing. I think the trend in the Western world is towards greater anger, alienation, polarization, intolerance of the other side's position. And you see that in elections in Europe, in Austria as far as Beeld as Australia, which incidentally is at 26 years of economic growth. So I don't think it's about economics necessarily. That there is, you know, a collective consciousness change going on just as nationalism rose in the late 19th century or the Western world became more socially liberal in the 1960s. It seems to me there is a darker, moved change in the way we collectively think. And that is going and continues to go in a direction that I personally slightly fear of a lot. Okay, so we have optimism, optimism, optimism, and now, John. I'll just bring it back to the economics. What we haven't really talked about is how the financial crisis and the Great Recession have affected politics generally. So an event that happened 10 years ago is resonating still today. And I think what is animating politics is not so much the people's living standards aren't where they were before the crisis, because they are objectively. You know, the GDP has come back as we know in Ireland and so forth, but nobody feels like they are where they should be. I think that's a big problem in America. I think it's a problem here as well, and clearly in other places in Europe, Germany is one of them. Why am I not feeling like my life is better than it was 15 years ago? I know from my own circumstances that I don't really feel like that. Things felt a lot better in 2005. And we all know it was in the lead, but it doesn't matter. We experienced it, we felt it. And so that activates people because part of the problem of liberal democracy and market capitalism is that we're on this upward trajectory. It's a very teleological way of looking at the world, like the best-selling communism. We're all sort of going toward this imagined future, where our lives get materially better all the time. And if you've lived most of your adult life in a situation of relative uncertainty, whether that's from the trauma of having gone through a significant economic shock, like the financial crisis, or the fact that your wages are stagnated, I think you start looking around for other causes that aren't in the economic data. And you say, well, what is it? Is it because my position as a man has declined relative to women? Is it because we let more refugees into the country in the last decade? Is it because of these bad trade deals that we've struck with other countries that have allowed China to prosper and become an economy nearly as large as the United States, when I always thought we'd be number one? What happened to that? So the weird number one idea in America is a very powerful one. And we're sort of flirting with number two now. And I think that has consequences. And one of the expressions that I'm trying to imagine, even having this conversation where it couldn't have been elected. And I don't think we would. I think it would remain subterranean feeling. But because Trump has been elected, we've all had to confront this. So what has actually happened now that we've got this surprise, this sort of black swan political event that we really couldn't have predicted to three years ago? Where did it come from? And it came from something real. It's not some strange affiliation. So I'd agree with Larry, this is a trend. I'll wrap this up with, and he put it in a numeric way, that we are now flirting with number two. I think if we take it as a different sort of connotation, what are the causes that brought us to number two? And how do we respond to those? And how do we change the education, the discussion, and get people motivated around a hope and something that will give them an economic reality that is different than what they have today?