 Now, I turn to Jeffrey Frieden. We know Jeff, even if it was not last year here, if I understand well. I was teaching. He was teaching. Sometimes we have to teach. He teaches very, very brilliantly at his professor of government, his chair, if I'm not misled, of the Harvard Department of Government. And he, of course, is one of the most important and well-known professor in our domain. So he has the floor. We will be very, very keen on having your own judgment. Well, thank you, John Claude. I mean, I take the opportunity to take into account your questions and the expectation that we could answer them one in five minutes. I'm going to avoid that by invoking my own comparative advantage, which is political economy, that is the intersection of politics and economics. And I want to focus on a couple of issues that I think are central. They are, I absolutely agree with the previous speaker about the importance of what's happening in West Africa and developing a world more generally. But again, given my comparative advantage, I'm going to focus on some of the problems that face us in the developed countries in the OECD and especially the US. The end of cheap money has very, very broad and deep implications, as John Claude has indicated. And the most direct is that it creates a whole series of sources, new or, in most cases, renewed sources of financial instability as markets reequilibrate. We saw bubbles in market after market over the course of the last 15 or 20 years, with very, very low or even negative real interest rates. That era is coming to an end that will lead to, I think, a whole series of possibilities of financial difficulties as rebalancing takes place. It's not surprising, as John Claude has indicated, I think that many of these problems will surface in the non-bank sector, in the non-bank financial institutions. There is, in the regulatory literature, a concept of regulatory dialectic, which is that the markets innovate, regulators try to run behind the markets, try to figure out how to strike a balance between innovative activity on the one hand and safety on the other. But of course, the regulators are usually running after the markets rather than the other way around. The regulators catch up eventually, usually in times of crisis, when the riskier, the financial institutions have collapsed. They impose a whole series of new regulations, and then in the next round, the private sector tries to find their way around them. And that's what's happening in this instance as well. And so I think that we face the unfortunate prospect of a new round of zombie financial institutions and zombie firms that will exercise, or at least have the threat of exercising a serious drag on economic growth. So that's the first problem, I think. What are the, not just where is the financial instability gonna come from, and not just what will the policy response be, but because there are such powerful pressures, political pressures, to keep essentially insolvent financial institutions and non-financial institutions alive to try to avoid a further crisis, will we have another, I would say, Japanese style or other series of zombie banks and institutions with the resultant drag on economic growth? Second problem is more general, and that is the constraints on economic policy in the current period. Monetary policy has been practically, or was practically the sole tool of economic policy for much of the most recent period, especially after the great financial crisis. Then the pandemic hit, and virtually every developed country and many developing countries spent, I think, dramatic amounts of money, and I think justifiably so to keep their economies going in the face of a global pandemic. What that means is that fiscal policy in most countries is now heavily constrained by a very large public debt burden coming out of the global financial crisis and the pandemic. In an ideal world, we would have a monetary policy that was accompanied by a fiscal policy to try to, in this case, because we understand that the monetary policy that's necessary in the current circumstances is going to be restrictive, we would have a fiscal policy that would try to cushion the blow, especially for some of the more vulnerable segments of the population. But as is in the first instance in the previous periods, monetary policy had carried too much of the burden. Now we would hope that there could be some sharing of the burden of economic policy shift with fiscal policy, but most countries find their fiscal policy opportunities or their fiscal policy possibilities tightly constrained by the existing burden of public debt. So I think we face a very difficult time in the making of economic policy where monetary policy has no choice, but I think seems to have no choice but to focus on fighting inflation and fiscal policy or the fiscal policy that could dampen or soften some of the blows of that restrictive monetary policy is tightly constrained. Final point, and this is a bit of, if you will, political speculation, is to think about some of the political implications about what's going on. We are in only the very beginning of a period of restrictive monetary policy after three decades at least of the great moderation in which interest rates were extremely low and growth was reasonable. In that context, as restrictive monetary policies kick in, they will slow growth as they already have in some countries more than the US, but in other countries, eventually that will kick in, that after all is the purpose of restrictive monetary policy. I think that from a political standpoint, we can anticipate substantial pressure arising to take the breaks off monetary policy. That is the, now we could argue about whether these, whether this is justified and there are current debates going on in the US as to whether it's worth the candle to raise interest rates at a time when, or what the appropriate balance is between concern over inflation and concern over employment, we find ourselves in a sort of a sweet spot now where employment is doing very, very well, but that won't continue forever. And when there is a clear trade-off between fighting inflation on the one hand and creating jobs or avoiding unemployment on the other, I think there will be political consequences. So to be very specific, I think that this will almost certainly in countries that face increasing recessions in the context of tight monetary policy, that this will provoke a resurgence of populist pressure from segments of the population that believe that central banks and the bankers that they are in league with, at least in the view of some, are doing what they can to impoverish the working population and that they should be taken under control by the political system. So that I think that the prospects, the medium-term prospects, political prospects also presage a great deal of controversy over the appropriate measures to be taken. So those are my thoughts about the intersection of the economic events that we're experiencing and some of the political and policy dilemmas that we'll face moving forward. Thank you. Thank you very much, indeed, Jeff. I only note, en passant, that inflation is also triggering populist reaction that are very violent. And I interpret the dialogue between the present of the US and the president, the chair of the central bank as the president of the US telling more or less, you are responsible for inflation. I count on you to do the job. I see that you're nodding. We will discuss that, of course. So thank you so much.