 Okay, I'm Jay Feidell, this is Think Tech Community Matters, and we're talking to our old friend, Brad Glosserman, with, let's see, what are you now? You're a visiting professor at Tama University, the Center for Rulemaking Strategies, and you're also a senior advisor at Pacific Forum CSIS. You're in Japan, and we're talking to you about an article you wrote, Brad, called Worrying Indicators in Japan and Elsewhere, About Democracy by Brad Glosserman. Welcome to the show, Brad. That's good to have you here. So can you give us a summary of the article? I mean, what you were getting at, what you said, and why? Prime Minister, who has really looked at changing and updating the Japanese constitution hallmark of his administration, reflect Japanese character, really Japanese and major in his, says Japan will never, will not use war as an instrument of state policy, and will not possess the means to fight and prosecute a fourth largest in the world. And these have a self-defeat ground, self-army, a navy, and an air force. And they'd like to just essentially, because this has been so contentious, some of the other things what they'd really like to do is wait on. No, no, no, this is very interesting. Yeah. And so the Japanese constitutional reform is generally taking a shorthand for just for form of this article nine. In fact, however, there are an entire array of issues that would be addressed in any reform process, such as the role of the emperor within the country, privacy rise, the role of environment, the role of women. It is a long, consequently, a politically fought process that constitutional reform is taking and was going to really democracy in the 1930s, when Japanese democracy first happened in the 30s, and somehow or other this would be destabilizing danger. People who also have been in a number of surveys, thinking it came across or was reacquainted in the last couple of years, which a certain degree of, you know, embraced. Yeah, well, you know, we've spent our lives, you know, on the assumption, I have anyway, on the assumption that Japan became pacifist after the war, that it had force-worn weapons and had force-worn war in general, and that it was a sort of a very good, successful experiment in democracy that the U.S. created after the war. And there was no issue about it. It was inculcated deeply into the current Japanese culture. But your saying is that there are a certain percentage of people, maybe a lot, of people who are tired of that and want to move to something else. No, pacifism is largely anti-militarism. The Japanese who are prepared to dissent, the Japanese under the age of 20 or 29 or so, and then some representative democracy, you know, a good idea. Yeah, okay, well, conversation is good. But would you agree with me that there's a dynamic here? There's a change, a sea change, maybe a slow sea change, but a change of some kind is happening. It's not necessarily in Japan. I mean, I guess you could say, unlike, you never see the... I'm wondering about external forces, though, Brad. I mean, you're talking about it sort of an internal thought process within the country and the generations moving on. But what about external forces? What about what's happening in China, which could be very intimidating? What's happening in North Korea likewise could be intimidating? What's happening in the U.S. could be kind of amazing to the Japanese now. How much effect do these, you know, global events have on the thought process you're describing in Japan? These are 127,000 people shrinking. They've noted the weapons they force swarming them. They don't have a UN Security Council seat, you know, largely stagnant for two-plus decades, you know, and the Chinese are flexing their muscles, and they've got the historical isn't the prime minister. And so the Japanese, a larger set of cultural trends and social trends have been reinforcing what's called Uchi-Yuki, which is sort of an inward-looking perspective. But I think in my sense, and this is a longer discussion that you and I have had at various moments, is that the Japanese really want to be left alone in the world. They want the status that they've earned. They want the perks that they're building. They pretty much would like to be able to do their own thing without interference. The Switzerland-of-Europe hypothesis, which I've heard of Asia hypothesis, which I offered. The Japanese know that they're possibly can't. Yeah, now that relationship is affected certainly by this current administration, and I want to talk to you about that. You know, we have our problems. I mean, some people feel that democracy is sliding down, you know, sliding down the side here, referring to an article which you and I have both looked at that is in The Guardian, and also a short book by Yale history professor Tim Snyder. We've talked about that. There are people in this country who have thought it through, and in their view, think that democracy is in great risk right now here. And I wonder if there's a connection between the problems we are having with the way the government is working, the failure of the checks and balances that the founders designed in the first place, the way there are bubbles and polarized groups in this country. We've lost a lot of ground, a lot of people think. So since we are a very strong ally for Japan, and Japan and the U.S. have a very strong historical relationship, how much does this affect, you know, what are the common denominators here? Does what is happening here affect them? Should we find common denominators that make us question democracy in general? Friday. Now we're getting into sort of, if you will, rhetoric and tactics. At the same time, you still walk the law in regard to attending these multilateral meetings and to using them as ways of advancing. Well, you know, I just want to point out that China is a very successful economy. It's obvious. And they have manifest destiny kind of aspirations these days, one Belt, one Road and all that. They want to be influential in every continent you can think of. That must be threatening. But the other aspect of it is that their system is not democratic. And in fact, we have Richard Hornick. He's a, he used to run Time Magazine in China a long time, and elsewhere. And he, he's speaking with us, I've seen him at the China Seminar here in Honolulu. He's speaking with us next week. And then the proposition is that Xi Jinping is into mind control. And he's trying to establish a kind of profile, a profile for every citizen, based on all the data they have about every citizen. It's very invasive and allows some citizens, you know, the right to take the speed train and other citizens not, based on how faithful they are to the administration. And so what you have is, you know, it's actually less in terms of civil liberties, less in terms of human rights than it was a few years ago, because Xi Jinping, with the success of his economy, feels somehow that he can cut back on, you know, on civil rights. So, this all suggests to me anyway, and I'd like your opinion about it, that these days, the question of civil rights, human rights, falls second to whether the country is successful from an economic point of view. And there are some people that think that democracy is too much tumultuous. It's too many bureaucrats, too much obstruction, too much difficulty in getting things done. Xi Jinping can do it overnight. In the U.S., we have a conversation and it takes forever. And this is not only Hawaii, of course it is Hawaii, but it's other places in the country and certainly it's in Washington. So the question is, you know, in the 21st century, given what we see in China now, Japan sees in China now, given the comparison with the system in the U.S., are we evolving to another kind of form of democracy, lesser democratic democracy, lesser libertarian democracy? And is it happening right around us right now? I mean, of course, that's a dystopian vision and it's possible, Jay. But I mean, I think, number one, the mechanisms of control and surveillance are new. I mean, the fact is that you couldn't do what Xi Jinping wants to do now, except in the past, right? You couldn't do in the past because you didn't have the processing, the storage, the sensors, everything to do the things in real time that the surveillance technologies permit. I mean, 20 years ago, I remember reading reports about precisely that and people were poo-pooing that as a, you know, 1984, although it was 1999 scenario, to take the Chinese system because the Chinese offered to them on the sheet. And because what they're offering in steams in some ways is just a better story. The Chinese are telling a better narrative. And the United States, I mean, unfortunately, what's happening is, you know, if you go to Southeast Asia, nobody wants to be in China's pocket, but there's nowhere else to go. The United States is, I mean, the rhetoric of the current administration right now is, we're not interested in offering you material support because what we really want to do is take more of your money because our trade deficit is bad, right? We're pulling out of TPP because, you know, we don't like, it's a bad deal. And the president has told you that the fundamental problem is that we are running trade deficits with countries and he wants them to invest in the United States. So, by definition, what he's saying is he's not going to offer you economic support. He wants to actually take the money of these countries. China's saying, no, no, no, we have all this extra money. And, you know, we want to share the largest. We see win-win solutions. Now, there's an element of hoo-ha to all of this. I mean, there's extraordinary self-interest. But nonetheless, it's, you know, you're pushing on an open door. Everybody wants choices and everybody understands, too, that there are when, as these deals tend to be over time, they realize that when the Chinese offer to build you a bridge and it falls apart in five years, this is frequently the case. You suddenly realize, well, great, I don't have a bridge, but I still have that debt, and when Americans are the Japanese building infrastructure, that doesn't seem to be a problem. When the Chinese are building that bridge, what they're basically doing is sending you Chinese concrete and they're sending you Chinese workers. And then the Chinese companies are going to actually, you know, drawing over the Chinese, the companies that are, you know, subsidiaries or associates. So, for example, they're not eating local food. They're having Chinese cooks come over and make their food and cook. They're having Chinese companies provide all of the entrements of that. So, you see, it's an extraordinarily colonial and extractive process. You know, there's no other counter. And when the Chinese are offering to build you a railroad, what you find is not only because they want the right-of-way that a company's six foot or 10 or 12 foot wide track, they want no half kilometer on each side of the media line. So, they're taking an extraordinary amount. And again, there's nobody there to push back. So, be really careful about talking about the extraordinary attractiveness of the Chinese model. And really, what you're looking at is just kind of an absence of competition. So, it requires some money. It requires some vision. It requires some work. But it's not. I would be very careful about the assertion that somehow or other the world is changing and the Chinese are the absolute beneficiaries of this. And it is, they are the beneficiaries, but it's primarily because they're not being forced to compete. Yeah, well, we left the field. Essentially, we left the field. We dropped TPP. We don't care about multilateral trade anymore. And we make these grand statements that sometimes aren't true. And so, the question is, if Xi Jinping sees this, and I think he clearly does, as a vacuum, he moves right into the vacuum. And this affects everybody who's watching, including Japan, including many other countries. Well, what you see is the Japanese pushing back. And you see the Japanese extraordinary, I mean, taking Prime Minister Abe is taking some really great efforts, I think, to assert himself and to seize that vacuum or to fill the vacuum that has been created. And this has got limited capabilities to do that. The best thing he can do is be working with the United States and Australia and crafting the South Korea into their great interests. But I can't tell you how many people are sort of saying, but you're going to have to go it alone. The opportunity is there, and it doesn't require an extraordinary vision to see it. To see it. To see it is none of that. We only have a minute or two left, Brad. I just want to ask you one question. What is your advice to this administration in dealing with what we've been talking about, in dealing with the dynamic we spoke about, in dealing with the long-term trends, in dealing with this rethinking, perhaps, of our system of government? What is your advice, and Japan's system of government, what is your advice to Washington? It's obvious. And it's not merely my own. And I think quite rightly, it may not be America alone, but it is certainly going to be America left behind. Other people that are moving, and people who I've heard a number of folks say, well, you know, just wait until this moment is passed, and then the United States can step back in. The region will change. And so I think that there is no shortage of individuals in Washington and in part to be in this direction you understand. But is it work here? The problem is that the executive, top levels of executive leadership, fundamentally different terms, and that they don't seem to understand the way that there is a larger system in order that flows from American lead, where the benefits on certain expenses are not immediately visible. If you look for a quick and immediate accounting, you will not appreciate all the gains that the United States has and the position that it's in. The interesting spot to be in. But there's a time factor, isn't there? In other words, if we are isolating ourselves, leaving the stage and all that, there are things that happening, that are happening, that may not be easily reversible in going forward. So every day that goes by, how important is the time factor here? Last question. A couple of years ago, the orders and courses that work on Japanese society were, encouraging it, if you will, to turn inward and deterrence back on the world. What I recognized the United States and Australia in particular was, A, to recognize that and scale expectations back accordingly so that you don't find yourself in a position where you're overextended and over, you know, what you want to do is take every change you can to grab the pan and pull it out and force it into engagements in ways that exploit those opportunities and allow it to play to its strengths and reinforce its outward tendencies. We're in a position now where it's up to Japan and Australia and Singapore and other countries, like mighty countries, Europe, et cetera. So they have to now take that where your temper expectations of the United States. And at the same time, you pull the U.S. out and oblige it to engage and make sure, you know. Thank you, Brad Glosserman. It's been a wonderful discussion. I really enjoyed it. I hope we can do this again soon. Brad Glosserman, the time of university, the Center for Rulemaking Strategies, and a Senior Advisor at Pacific Forum CSIS. Thank you so much, Brad. Aloha.