 If there were any surprises from today's hearings, it was the extent of agreement among the members who attended the hearing across party lines about some of the challenges that the U.S. faces in building effective Syria policy and the very strong sense that what's needed is an integrated strategy that treats ISIS, the Assad regime, and the moderate Syrian opposition as connected in the approach the U.S. needs to develop to make any kind of significant headway in moving Syria toward an end of the conflict. Even if the opposition and the regime are able to reach a point where they can sit around the table and hammer out what the general elements of a political transition will look like, there will still be enormous questions to be answered on all kinds of details about how that transition will unfold and how to deal with the challenges it will confront. And that, I think, would be an appropriate focus for a second generation of the day after project. I'm not naive about the likelihood that a Geneva process will begin anytime soon. In my testimony, in my comments, I tried to make clear that the only way to get back to a Geneva process is by changing conditions on the ground in ways that will create incentives for the Assad regime to return to the negotiating table. Now, if we were to talk about a Geneva process in the event that those conditions existed, then I think we would have an opportunity to explore what the different elements of a solution might look like until we know whether the U.S. and its partners are willing to engage in support of the opposition at a level that will truly change the conflict dynamics and truly create incentives for the Assad regime to negotiate. I don't think we will find our way back to a Geneva process.