 Thank you. Good morning, and I'm happy to be here again after a couple of years of the previous seminar like that one. And I am happy to see the moving and the changing composition of the audience. It's interesting also for us to see how the composition of this workshop does change with time. Well, what I will be talking about is global scenarios for nuclear energy and the future innovative nuclear energy systems. Of course, when we say innovative, there is already something behind that, an hypothesis. Whoever talks of innovation thinks of development, thinks of progress, and has a kind of perception of the needs. And I have not to hide, and no one of us will hide, that we will be presenting you some relatively specific point of view. It's not a general truth that we'll be discussing with you. But our point of view inside a well-precised community, which is the community of nuclear energy development. And I think that this should be kept in mind because you can have a kind of surrealistic impression that outside, for example, in this country, if you ever talk of nuclear, you will not be the most welcome person, for example. And this happens in most of the OECD countries. Certainly in Europe, there are important countries that, by the way, are not present among the audience, like Germany, that certainly have made the decision that they're completely opposite of what we will be discussing today. So I think that it is important for you to keep that in mind. That they say, work in progress is controversial. And whatever we say here in this room is a specific point of view that you have to take with a lot of criticism. And it's a matter of discussion, of course. This is why I have been selecting for the lecture today and tomorrow two specific issues that are related to the potential nuclear energy development for the future. I could have chosen the fact that nuclear energy is seen or presented, even this morning, as a way of mitigating the effects of climate change. Very controversial. And I think that is a lot to be said in terms of society. So it's a point of view that will not be really the best suited for a workshop like this one. I didn't take that one. The other one, which is more probably much less controversial, is the fact that one has to make evolving the energy mix in any of our countries, whatever you're coming from Europe, from Asia, from Africa. The overall energy mix to ensure the security of supply of energy for a growing demand has to be thought in terms of how can I mix different sources of energy. Nuclear, of course, has a place in all of that. However, again, this would be a more related discussion of the changing energy mix. I would not be certainly the best suited person to make it. You need a politician. You need people that have energy policy among their specialties to discuss the evolution of the energy mix in any of your countries. And again, I didn't choose that. I make the hypothesis on the contrary that there is an expansion of nuclear energy demand. What are the issues that will be the most important that will oblige to make innovations? And I've taken two issues that probably all of you understand very well. One is the issue of the resources. And the other one is the issue of the waste management. So today, I will be focusing on the resources and tomorrow on the waste management. Remember, this is even in the frame of any hypothesis that there is a need for an expanding nuclear energy and how we can cope with a number of the issues that are important there. Now, where are we today? I think that you have heard this is the third time that we present to you the same arguments but different sources. But we are using more or less the same type of arguments. Well, I'm using the words of the World Nuclear Association here again. I'm talking inside a community, which is the community of the nuclear development personnel, experts, and so on. So using the world nuclear association words, they say that the rate on new grid connection will have to increase significantly to support global economic growth, alleviate energy poverty. Vladimir has been talking of that and provide enough clean energy to meet agreed climate change targets. This is what I was indicating to you. I will not enter. Take that as a statement that you can discuss. You have to discuss it. You have to have good arguments, pro and cons, these type of statements. However, if you want to achieve a vision for a substantial role for the nuclear energy in the energy system, it is required to have, and this was indicated by Ciraio just a few minutes ago, a continued long-term operation of the existing fleet on nuclear power plants. This is an essential point because whatever will be the innovation, the first field of innovation will be to consolidate the performance of the existing fleet of nuclear power plants. We will be talking of very unusual type of things during this week, but remember that the key point, if ever you will be continuing a working career in nuclear energy, will be the improvement and the operation of the existing fleet. We will not be talking much of that today. However, this is a key point. The other point is to have a, I think that is indicated over there, the deployment of new nuclear plants, and this will be certainly quote-unquote a mixture of one side the continuity in terms of light-water reactors, which are large light-water reactors. There is a growing interest for small modular reactor. I will be saying a word on them tomorrow, talking of fuel cycles and advanced reactors. You will hear at least, you will hear a lot on fast reactors, and you will hear something on molten-salt reactor, I think during the week, and this interesting as an example. Now, to meet the goals of the projected energy demand and to meet the goals of alleviating the consequences of the climate changes, they, the World Nuclear Association thinks that there should be of the other 100 gigawatt electrical or new nuclear built by 2050, with nuclear generation supplying 25% of the global electricity demand. Where all this figure come from? Well, they come from studies in which the hypothesis has the most important part, of course, but studies that there is a kind of overall convergence on this figure, but it was already said that today, oops, it's not what I wanted. Yeah, there is 11%, it was indicated just now of the world electricity is generated by more or less 450 nuclear power reactors, 60 more are under construction and additional 150, 160 are planned, I think that the figures that Chiraya was giving are more or less this one. Also, this is some figures that you have to have in mind, I think at least the order of magnitude, which is relatively important that the, what I'm indicating here was already indicated in 2016, for example, the nuclear plant supplied of the order of 2,470 terawatt hour of electricity which was an increase with respect to the previous year and it was, as it was also indicated before, there is some continuous increase of generation of electricity coming from nuclear. It is also the classical subdivision of the role of nuclear in the electricity generation. You see here, but this is what is, I think once more, this is figures that you will see for the third time in different colors or different pies, but I think that the order of magnitude are important to keep an eye on what we are talking in terms, as we will see in terms of resources and issues related to that. If a significant increase in nuclear energy demand that could be expected in the long term, it's an hypothesis. If this is so, there is an issue which is a very crucial one is the uranium resources and the availability of the infrastructures. Of course, this is in a frame that will be a requirement for enhanced safety. So have an eye on resources essential and it's easy to talk of new reactors with fuel cycles such and such and make a picture on a blackboard, but this means infrastructure. And this is not something that pop-ups from the earth like mushrooms, is something that needs a very strong and oriented development of the industry in a particular country. And I'm talking in particular about Asian countries and countries in Africa. And of course the fuel cycle choices will have impacts and one has to have a view, global view on their characteristics in order to see how much they will cost and what are the associated safety issues, not only of the reactors, but the overall fuel cycle. Now, let me enter a little bit closer to the topic and look to development scenarios. Now, as I said, innovation means that we are talking of development and when we talk of development, we want to see what is the impact of particular options. And now one can have a very global view and look at the world as a unique family and look at the kind of uniform development of the world or one can be a little bit more realistic and trying to subdivide in regions the world because not all the development will be the same in different energy, in different world regions. This is a subdivision, which the one that you have in this cartoon here is subdivided in four regions. It is something that I have not taken out of my mind but in several studies of international organization, this type of subdivision of the world is presented. The four regions of the world that I'm indicating to you from one side, what are called the OECD countries, essentially North America, US and Canada, Western Europe, what was used to be Western Europe and some of the Pacific, country, Japan and Australia there. These are in red. You recognize easily that. In yellow, there is what used to be Eastern Europe, that is essentially around the Russian Federation and the new independent states, taken as a region and there is good reason for doing that. The third region is Eastern Asia. Here they are, you see in particular the two countries that are key for the development of nuclear today. It was already mentioned this morning, I mean India and China. The other countries of the world that for good or not, they are put there together and just not to multiply the regions at infinity and they includes countries that are that different as Central and South America, Latin America and Africa. But let put in green all over this region altogether there. As I say for good or bad reasons, but just put them together. It just also related to the status of development of nuclear more or less in these areas. And these four regions make sense probably. Now, numbers. There have been a number of studies of the IEA and they have been mentioned both by Vladimir and the International Energy Agency that have been predictions of what will be the nuclear energy growth and some institutions related for example on the international pattern for climate change, the IPCC and the IEA ACA in Vienna, which is a knowledgeable institute in this field. Well, putting all of that together, you end up having in front of you curves like this one which gives the word nuclear energy demand as it is seen looking in the magic ball up to 2200. Look, this is 200 years from now, 180 years from now. One can dare to make these type of things looking to growth of the population for example and looking to the trends of energy demand in the past. They are not fantasy but based on the extrapolations, reasonable extrapolation coming from the past. If you look into the requirement, you see that there is an increase from the present situation that was indicated to you before, 2004 or 500 terawatt hour electrical, which is at the very beginning of the curve here, going up to 2050 that was also indicated which indicates the need of having three times as much nuclear energy as today which is at this point here and going up towards the end of the century of the order of seven, eight times what is the situation of today. What is interesting now is all of that, how it can be split, all this prediction taking into account the four big world energy, world regions that I've indicated before. You see something which is extraordinary interesting. Here is the OECD country that today makes the major part of the nuclear energy which is installed. In these countries, even with whatever the projection hypothesis for the future, the role of nuclear will not increase that much. And this is something that makes fairly curious the fact that these are the countries where we are talking more of innovation where really much innovation is not needed. The situation is not very different. However, with the factor of two increase is the area of Russia and countries over there. Well, the real problems will come and the need for innovation will be crucial is Asia from one side and Africa and Latin America from the other side. These are the regions of the world where really the innovation will be, if any, essential to keep nuclear expanding as required. And these are numbers I think that you will be finding in the documents on the website. Some of these figures are not that stupid, not so fantasy. These are, for example, the increasing of a factor of two and a half or three from now to 2050. This is something to be kept in mind because it's something that if you look clearly at the indication coming from China and India, this is not that stupid this type of figure. Of course, how can we say that we will be doubling on tripling this or potentially installed nuclear energy capacity? This, of course, depends very much on the hypothesis. If you are interested, both the panel for climate change and the YASA provide a lot of very interesting and serious reasoning to arrive to these figures there. There I am. If we now look at, as I said, well, these are the projections. This is something that you can agree more or less, but I think there are elements to support these figures. Now, which type of reactors we can respond to the increased requirement for an expanding nuclear energy? Now, the reference is, of course, to keep PWRs as they are because this is what most of the reactors that are all over the world. The classical PWR were with 4.2% uranium enrichment and the burn-up of 50 gigawatt-day per ton. This is a very classical PWRs, relatively modern from the point of view of today. And this is the reference. We try to respond to the expanding nuclear energy requirement with only this type of reactors. And one can say, well, where I will be taking the uranium from and one can take what is known from uranium resources and if one does that way and one looks at how the uranium resources will be available, how much resources will be available and up to what time they will be available to respond to this increase in the expanding nuclear energy demand. Well, the resources will be exhausted a little bit more than a century from now. But this is also not the real picture because any industry that wants to plan for a reactor to start and they plan, let's say, 10 years before the start-up of the reactor, they want to know what will be the resources available not at the moment in which there is the initial conceptual design, but they want to know what will be available at the moment that the reactor will be entering into operation. So there is a notion of committing the uranium resources that has to be taken into account. And this means that, in fact, in planning new reactors, you have to take into account this delay that makes the date of the exhaustion of the resources even closer. And here is the pictures. Taking into account different hypotheses on the availability of resources in uranium. So the curve that you have here here is taking into account the conventional resources, I'm sorry, here are the conventional resources which corresponds to the order of 17 megatons of uranium. And this is looking at the curves that we had before of the increase in demand of nuclear energy if we respond only with PWRs in open cycle. This is the curve of the exhaustion of the resources. Well, we will be arriving of the order of this time at the exhaustion of the conventional resources. If one takes non-conventional resources more than twice as much of what is the conventional ones, and so the order of 40 billion here, the same type of curve will end up in having the exhaustion of the uranium resources by 50 or 60 years later. This is another way of looking to the same problem. Here are the identified resources, the speculative plus prognosticated resources and you will see here the 16 and something that was indicated there. Unconventional resources, first phase in particular, different type of higher cost resources in uranium and here the sea water all over there. And now look at what will be the uranium which is consumed here at the uranium that is committed as I indicated to you before. And here you have the committed uranium. You will see that even very soon from now one will have to think. Whoever decides to go to an expanding nuclear energy using only PWRs with the characteristics that I indicated over there, I'm planning and so I want to know what will be needed in future. So this is what is the committed uranium resources. You will arrive in thinking of the needs of going to unconventional resources in less than 40 years from now while if you take just the consumption as we indicated before, we arrive to the level of thinking of unconventional resources by the 2100 here. So you see this is a crucial problem for someone, you have to present politicians and planners that are looking to the development of nuclear energy. These type of things is the first thing that they will be looking into. Now, there are other issues related to the utilization of resources and the use of a very simple open cycle approach for the fuel cycle. So if this one through fuel cycle is used with the current PWR, one will be also accumulating. A spent fuel will be accumulating, building up worldwide in a very important way. This is what will happen in terms of spent fuel. But in this spent fuel there are transuranics like plutonium and other transuranics and these will be amounts that will become very soon, very, very sizable and how to dispose of all of that, of all this radioactivity that will be accumulating in the spent fuel. And the other issue on the other side, this is at the end after having operated the reactor, you look at the spent fuel. What about taking out from the Earth the resources? And this is an interesting curve that gives you the number of uranium mines that are all large size, 4,500 tons per year and the number of new mines that should be opened if we have to feed the PWRs well through cases. And this is, if you look into this area and here in the number of mines that have to be opened. This is an enormous number of new mines that should be opened knowing that in any case it will be ending up in opening new mines for unconventional sources so unknown cost related to these mines. So it's clear that using only PWRs, one through cycles, one will have certainly a number of major problems in terms of resources. So here comes evidently the innovation and one can think of the use of the type of reactors that as Rico Fermi was indicating will allow to use more than 1% of the uranium which is in the mined uranium. As you know it will be discussed in detail by others during this workshop but many of you I heard the work in this field so it's not any news for you. It's fast reactors that could allow to increase quote unquote the resources using their characteristic of breeding. Now at that point one can imagine to improve the simple scenario uniform by the way scenario that I was indicating before first of all going back to the four world regions and applying a specific hypothesis related to the subdivision that was made. First of all one can say well we have seen that the demand of nuclear energy in this area of the world the red the yellow one the demand for new nuclear energy is relatively modest and certainly a very strong requirement for reactors having a large breeding is not the real priority. And one can think also of other connected issue I just indicate one to you. If you make breeding in a faster reactor I think that most of you know how it works. You put around of the core some blankets of uranium you get neutrons over there because they are leaking out and from these neutrons you will get reaction with the uranium and the second step of the reaction you will get some plutonium so you will be getting plutonium of a very pure nature out of the blanket and this is something that is not very palatable in many of our countries in particular in the OECD countries I don't think that many of countries in our areas will be keen to have very pure plutonium produced in blankets so the idea is well we can keep a much more conservative approach using fast reactors, yes but just in order to keep maintaining what it does exist not increasing the amount of uranium the so-called break-even fast reactors and this is very probably what could be thought in many of the OECD countries so the hypothesis is well we subdivided in these four regions but we will be deploying fast reactors yes in these regions there are the technology already present in both of these regions in particular in Russia which is the leading country for fast reactors at present but we will be thinking of implementing them only break-even fast reactors or iso generators with a pretty ratio close to one and the deployment should be relatively soon 2040, technology is there Asia and the other countries there they cannot think of an hypothesis like that but what we need fast reactor is to supply new resources to support a further deployment of nuclear energy so they are on the other opposite direction they will be deploying certainly high performance breather reactors starting maybe later both massively deploying in Asia by 2060 massively deploying in other regions of the green area by 2080 for example and let's take all these hypothesis with the starting point using the data as they are available today now here is what will happen this will be the transition from a scenario the one that I've been giving to you only based on the one through PWR fuel cycle to a fully closed fuel cycle by the deployment of fast systems so here is the deployment of innovative system a massive deployment in time of course of innovative systems and here are some results which are presented for discussion now first of all let's look at the nuclear energy production share in Asia with PWR and breather fast reactors now the breather fast reactors will be high performance breathers I think that or it should be a sad or other will be indicating to you if you do not have already the notion of doubling time in a fast reactor you think of breathing breathing ratio one point something but one has to translate the breathing in something which is more practical to say what the long will take for this reactor fast reactor to make enough plutonium that I will be able to start a new fast reactor without using any further resources this is the doubling time in very simple words and these countries will be looking for very short doubling time the fast reactors that have been deployed up to now have doubling time of the order of 23 years innovative will be fast reactors that have doubling time of the order of 10, 10 years that will allow to respond to the requirements now if this is the overall nuclear energy production if only this is the total and let's see starting from here the PWR will be replaced as soon as it will be possible with the availability of new fuel will be replaced by fast reactors and here is the curve of fast reactors in such a way that PWRs will be eliminated from the scenario of the order of 150 years from now starting as I say the deployment of fast reactor by 2060 and this will be a deployment which is fairly rapid deployment of fast reactor that will be taking place of the PWRs in order to arrive to a full energy production by nuclear only by fast reactors or the order of 150 years from now what about the other region you will see where there is Latin America and Africa is a very similar scenario as I indicated before fast reactors with this very performing very well in terms of doubling time will be deployed by 2080 and replacing the PWRs in order to have their PWR phased out practically in 100 years from now and having a full production of nuclear energy fast reactors by the order of 150 years from now these are the type of scenario that one will arrive and you will see it's something that I'm not the dates here are important it's fairly voluntaristic all of that and you see that to cope with the problem of resources which means eliminating PWR with one through cycle with the introduction of fast reactor whatever we will do this will be however something that we will take will take long time and we will need as we will see a lot of infrastructure for doing that now first of all oh well here are for completing the scenario and I will be quicker in all of that this is the case of the OECD and the region dominated where the leadership is in Russia and you will see that the same type of scenario will bring to the replacement of PWRs by these fast reactors break even fast reactors by the order of 150 years from now and more or less the same type of scenario for the region where there is a Russia leadership now what about the resources was the starting point if we need an expanding nuclear energy and we want to respond with the modern reactors we can do with modern PWRs all the time or PWRs plus an innovative type of reactor like the fast reactor a fast reactor with different type of breathing ratio now what about the resources now remember this is the curve that was indicated with only PWRs with the consumption of resources you remember was such that one will end up in consuming all the identified resources the probable resources and the unconventional ones by 2150 and now if using the scenario that I have been indicating before using iso generator in the OECD countries and a breather but strongly breathing reactors in Asia and the other regions of the world well here we will be able to curve to reduce the consumption of uranium and keeping very close to the limit of unconventional resources all the time but if one of the regions of the world like ALLM will not be or able or willing or have enough resources to develop the full fuel cycle and will stay with PWRs so if only Asia will be using fast reactors with a very high breathing you will see that in that case one will be entering in the region of unconventional resources very soon and will stay and increasing the request of resources so it's a very delicate overall geopolitical problem that is related to the resources remember that the availability of the resources is something that is very much of a strategic problem if I say resources they are not distributed uniformly all over the world you know very well that I think that in India they are very happy of having thorium for example because they can think of a different way of going to the use of resources there are other countries that do not have this type of resources and there is a very strategic issue the one that is indicated over there now resources but what about what is related to the optimization of use of resources with fast reactors of course the increase of the fuel fabrication and reprocessing capacities will be very significant increasing capacity in this type of facility will be required in all the fast-growing regions in particular of course in Asia and Africa and Latin America and these are some numbers that I think are interesting Asia and Africa and Latin America will require the New York's fabrication capacity of 10,000 tons very soon by four decades, five decades from now it depends from Asia sooner of course and ten years later from in Africa and Latin America this is tomorrow it looks our life's part your life's part not mine but it's tomorrow for thinking of taking the necessary decisions in terms of acquiring technology allowing this technology to become a standard routine in a country this is very soon moreover if the fast reactor are implemented because we see this innovative type of reactor are able to cope in a decent way to the problem of availability of resources the fast reactor implementations the York's fabrication capacity requirement will decrease after of course after few decades less PWRs and a sharp increase of the fuel fabrication is then expected you see that this is the order of magnitude of the fabrication of fuel which is a very, very significant amount and when one is comparing with the existing world annual reprocessing capacity which is the order of 4,000 tons per year a value of six times higher is expected in Asia and the values of four times higher in ALM by 100 years from now and this would mean that these regions of the world will have reprocessing capacities that should increase their capacity of reprocessing of more than 1,000 tons per year every 10 years which means the equivalent of the development of the large reprocessing plant of the order of every 15 years these are I think very simple not too questionable numbers you can revise that by 20% even 30% but it doesn't change the story the story is that if one wants to be serious about an expanding nuclear energy and look seriously to the availability of resources in implementing innovative reactors one has to allow enough time and enough resources and also the institutional developments to allow to have this type of infrastructure deployed in the different countries will be these centres in the world that will be doing the work for others I suspect not even if I've been working a lot on this regional centre of the fuel cycle I think that for the independence on the separated countries area of the world there will be a proliferation of regions where the fuel cycle facilities will be available so what we learned from these studies well my first bullet is it can be shown that the potential future scarcity of uranium resources can be very serious in particular for the regions of the world where the energy demand growth is and will continue to be high where nuclear energy is expected to partially meet the demand I don't remember if there are any Chinese among you but even with this projection of very large amount of nuclear reactors deployed in China for example in the overall energy mix even in 100 years from now the part of nuclear from the overall electricity production will be the other of 20-30% so this is the meaning of this partially so these are not extreme scenarios what I'm presenting to you in the case of an open cycle and this is the second bullet over there an increased pressure on the uranium market is to be expected towards the end of the current century which is not the very good news and moreover the increasing of mining needs of unequally distributed resources is a further factor of uncertainty you remember that the slope of the curve of the number of big mines that have to be opened from here to the end of the century again let me remind you that the resources are not as you perfectly know evenly distributed all over the earth so there will be regions of the world where this increase in mining will be spectacular and one of the preferred way of coping with this difficulty was deploying the fast reactor as rapidly as possible to minimize the thermal reactor fleet to minimize the uranium resource consumption and to cope partly with the steeply increasing global energy demand but even a significant deployment of fast reactor the uranium resources can remain a crucial issue unless there is a very high breathing so I don't know what will be presented to you this week but this is something that you have in the back of your mind I think if you go to your Indian colleagues in the room they will be looking to specific type of fuels probably metal fuel because they will provide a much better doubling time they are looking even less than 10 years and this is very innovative as a reactor type it's not only the type of fuel the arrangement of the fuel in the core this makes it innovative innovation goes with development with progress with need however this is one I think of my final points is that it's true that there is a few power fast reactors that are expected to be deployed but there are a few and there are also very limited experimental capabilities available like the MBR reactor which is a fantastic exception to that to cope with innovative concept challenges and this is also I think something that has not to be forgotten from one part that the need of planning for the expansion of the fuel cycle facilities in a spectacular way but just much before that to deploy the reactors and to validate the concept one will need experimental facility which are not there except for the MBR reactor and this is also disturbing in terms of the overall strategy worldwide this is at least good news and with respect to the current deployment there are in fact innovative ideas that I hope will be discussed by some of my colleagues later on that look very promising like the Brest 300 prototype for a commercial reactor so in the frame of fast reactors an innovative reactor which will be competing with the innovative reactor that is BN 800 that has been made critical recently and once more remember the fact that one can have big plans on the paper on the blackboard for deployment of reactor but no safety authority will be allowing to license a reactor concept if not enough experimental validation will be available to confirm the innovative characteristic that you are looking for and it will be in any case a very significant challenge to develop the suitable fuel cycle infrastructure in particular in the regions where at present there is limited or no power plants at all and the needed fuel fabrication and spent fuel reprocessing capacity will be required to increase at least by one order of magnitude every next decade it's something that one needs to think about of course this is the caveat of all my presentation this is what I've been saying you have understood there is very much dependent on the hypothesis that have been made in particularly on the energy demand growth however some of the general trends have a general value there will be a very strong energy demand growth this is sure and this general trends indication can motivate further studies and one should not hide the fact that there is urgency and in particular in some regions of the world not necessarily in the area of the world where you are at present so thank you very much