 Good afternoon. My name is Craig Cohen. I'm vice president for research and programs at CSIS. Thank you all for being here today We're here to talk about Pakistan and the US Pakistan relationship We have two of the top analysts here in Washington with us, so it's going to be a terrific session Just to my right is Bruce Roddell. He's at the Brookings Institute. We don't hold that against him though He's the author of a recent terrific recent book on Pakistan called deadly embrace Pakistan America and the future of global jihad Bruce is a long distinguished career in government and he was famously led President Obama's AFPAC review in 2009 Bruce. Thank you for being here Tony Cordesman is the Arlie Burke chair and strategy at CSIS. He's probably CSIS's most prolific and well-known scholar Tony has also a long and distinguished career in government in May He authored a report looking a national net assessment on Pakistan and he's recently back from Afghanistan as well So Tony won the coin toss. He's going to speak first part for about 10 or 15 minutes That Bruce is going to follow then we're going to have a conversation among the three of us and then open it up to questions from the audience Tony, okay, please the floor is yours Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Let me apologize in advance. I actually am going to use PowerPoint occasionally The good news is I'll use it very quickly if you want to actually look at it We've given you a sheet which indicates where these slides are on the web and since I'm going to tie this to what I Have recently learned in Pakistan We've also given you a reference to a report that brings you up to date on the situation there Let me begin by saying that I think the operative aspect of this session is the phrase perilous course to be perfectly honest in the real world I think bilateral relations are as good as They are likely to get as bad as they happen to be There is always the possibility that Pakistan could find itself thrust by its own internal pressures Into an open confrontation with the Afghan Taliban come fully to grips with the remnants of al Qaeda But much as I would like to see that happen from an American viewpoint quite frankly. I do not believe it is likely I think it is far more likely that Pakistan will continue to pursue a strategy Which in many ways is different from ours with different priorities and to focus on its own internal security dynamics and As for the phrase regional solutions after 50 years of hearing about them My instinctive reaction is to leave the room the moment anybody mentions the phrase Frankly, I think a regional solution is about as likely as an early Arab Israeli peace settlement Or a Congress that can both cut revenues and entitlements the expended church. I Think the real issue for us the issue that dominates relations is the role of Pakistan in the Afghan conflict and At a point where we are headed towards an undefined but almost certain real transition in 2014 I Think that not only is going to shape our near-term relations But really confront both countries with the question of what is the enduring US role in Central and South Asia and How does Pakistan fit into that process? so let me begin with The issue of how Pakistan fits into the Afghan war and let me note This particular slide is drawn from the time I spent working with general McChrystal and The team that was developing the strategy that was recommended to Bruce and others in Washington Pakistan fits into a set of problems That are ones we will or will not solve in the course of the Afghan war One is whether we can defeat the insurgents tactically and there we are making I think very significant progress Another is whether we can eliminate their control and influence over the population which is more problematic At this point in time the idea of creating an effective NATO approach an integrated ISAF approach is moot It isn't going to happen countries are departing caveats are not being reduced We are seeking to build up an effective Afghan national security force Those of you who have seen the papers over the last few days probably realize that there is a major gap between 2014 as a date and the fact that that particular build-up can't occur before 2016 to 2018 We have a problem of finding a way of creating an effective legitimate Afghan government It is perhaps a warning to all of us that Karzai is supposed to leave office in 2014 the transition year We have the search for an integrated civil military effort which we had optimism about in 2009 and would not have optimism about today as those of you have seen the Washington Post may realize It is something that we cannot achieve at this point in time and then finally we come down to the reality that winning in Afghanistan Unless it means some kind of more stable Pakistan and far better relations with Pakistan Will almost certainly not achieve a stable strategic transition or outcome We may win the war, but we cannot control the future of the region and It's important to know that was recognized in the new strategy. I won't read you this slide But it's sometimes forgotten that all of these warnings were given very clearly to the White House and to the Congress and Particularly the warning about the challenge of Pakistan Now I mentioned different strategic goals, and I think this is something we cannot order through dialogue or aid or good intentions Pakistan can see that we are going to leave The question is when and in what way but over and under the most optimistic conditions 2014 is not far enough in the future for Pakistan to see the US as committed indefinitely at high levels to Afghanistan Its goals in Afghanistan are to achieve and expand its own influence Particularly in the Pashtun areas to block India from having any ability in their phrase to encircle Pakistan through influence in Afghanistan To weaken some areas and strengthen others and This geography explains in many ways why Pakistan is not going to willingly confront Al Qaeda or the Afghan Taliban either in the Fata area or Baluchistan We can succeed on occasion with limited pusher The way that we are giving aid is normally spelled B R I B E But in general what it may or may not achieve is the ability to rent some degree of limited support and compliance As long as it's sustained India will continue to play the game as a third player and in fairness to Pakistan India's role may be more moderate because its needs are more moderate, but it is a player in this equation When we look at the challenge of relations these slides are not mine they come from experts in the area We are basically dealing with the Pakistan which is pursuing its goals as well as the search For stability on a much broader level and as well as a much higher priority confrontation with India Nothing we do is going to change that equation in the near term it drives what happens within a Pakistani military within the Pakistani intelligence structure and Basically, this is the group that dominates the Pakistani government's behavior In practical terms and will continue to during the length of this war We have contributed to the problems, but let me just note for any of you who wonder about what I'm saying Many people never saw the report the president sent to Congress Several months ago. It's a very good idea to read it because in it is a very clear warning That what I've just outlined to you is not a personal view But a view in a set of concerns which represents US policy as presented to the Congress and It is not a casual set of judgments. It came hard and this document was debated with a great deal of interest and concern Now let me just know what does that lead us to it leads us where we are Last week we heard us Experts in Pakistan describe us and Pakistani relations as being at their worst since 2001 I think that's a fair judgment Pakistan cannot easily separate itself from us not given the aid Not given the value in some ways of our presence To the extent it actually serves Pakistani interests. We cannot separate ourselves from Pakistan But public opinion tensions with the Pakistani intelligence community tensions with the Pakistani military Have grown steadily for the last six months and it is very unlikely They will diminish particularly if we announce that we are making major troop cuts and We put ourselves on a vector where Pakistan can see we are leaving quickly But whether that would be any different if we were leaving slowly and had less serious troop cuts is somewhat uncertain When you look at this the supply line is critical You can talk about Pakistan as being of great strategic interest, but it isn't Pakistan is of tactical interest during this war Because we need the supply lines It is a tactical interest because we need its support in the Fada area and the Baluki area to the extent we can get it Aside from that on a global basis This is not a critical or in many ways important American strategic interest as for operations Pakistan has acted to some extent in areas under pressure that help us But these are primarily the areas which also affect its own security Not the Afghan Taliban not the Hukhanei network not the Operations of al-Qaeda or Sheikh Omar Mullah Omar but the direct areas of interest to Pakistan in The areas where al-Qaeda has been most active there have been Pakistani forces and there has been no Pakistani action This is in order of battle people like to ignore, but it is a fact That Pakistan has had troops and capabilities in the area Now very quickly going through the numbers they have built up capabilities. They have taken casualties Unfortunately in the way they fought they've also in many areas simply ended up compounding the alienation of people by displacing That's not been true everywhere. There has been some corrective action But in general one of the great problems Pakistan faces is Even when the military acts the government cannot the civil side remains Inept whether it is a flood or it is dealing with displaced people and come public opinion You obviously cannot see the details here But it's very mixed for operations in the Fata area That's different from SWAT It's different from the areas that are close to the immediate interests of Pakistanis outside the areas of interest to us and when it comes down to the attitudes in popular terms That Pakistanis have toward the United States We are by far the most unpopular single factor aside from India in Pakistani public opinion and that was true when a survey was taken some six months ago Looking at the indicators the situation has deteriorated steadily since that time a Lot of the reason for this is obvious Pakistan has not developed the Fata or Baluki areas. It's not put resources into them It is exploited Baluchistan It is relied in Baluchistan on repression Not on reform and when it is talked about reform. It is not executed The data that you find from Pakistani sources makes this all too clear and the violence level in Baluchistan is raising as Development as you can see from those pale blue bars falls far short of The average level of development in Pakistan, which is the darker blue We have the fact that this is only one of a series of areas of violence We focus on this because it affects our strategic interests in fairness to the Pakistanis The majority of threats to Pakistan's stability are not in this area They are in the other parts of Pakistan and one of the keys is the broadly permeating nature of violence and the wide variety of groups that exist throughout the country This is a country Like March of the region which also is failing to come to grips with a massive population rise The population is four times what it was in 1950 under current demographics, it will be eight times what it was in 1950 by 2050 and In general the Pakistani government has failed in every civil area To come to grips with the impact of these demographics and population growth Reading budgets is not one of the favorite activities of people in the policy community It should be because when you see where the money should have gone Which is not where it has on occasion you get an idea of how endemic the problems are And how much they're driven by failures and everything from education to infrastructure again the anger at us The lack of support for this war of ours The extent to which that people see us as a group you can have no confidence in the confidence in President Obama before the current relations began to deteriorate was 8% Although 64% Wanted relations to improve Let me just close We do have a strange quid pro quo all of you know we have drone and you have strikes in Pakistan When you look at the allocation of them by target about 40% of them have nothing to do with our goals in Terms of al Qaeda or the threat to us They are a way of directly supporting the Pakistani government because that's the target base It's outside the areas of our strategic interests and concerns Our assistance has been massive Let me go back to the word pride When you can't figure out where the money goes when there is no public accountability When you are not managing your funding streams, this is not in the conventional sense aid In the military side at least you can see a lot of the hardware and a lot of the equipment and you have some idea Where some of the training and other funds went? In the case of us civilian aid We have zero accountability You look through the publications from the State Department and AID and You have a broad area of where the money went by Category in the US budget But you have absolutely no idea of what we're buying where it's going and how it is being Accounted for and any of you have seen the Washington Post today Have probably realized this is not one of our current strengths This is a grim picture it was a grim picture when we developed the new strategy It has grown grimmer with time and unless something radical happens to change Pakistani behavior between now in 2014 Relations will probably be at best as strained as they are now Or see Pakistan move more and more Towards trying to position itself to somehow win this transition in terms of Pakistan's strategic goals. Thank you Thanks, Tony Bruce Thank you very much great for that kind introduction. Thank all of you for coming today It's always a bit of a daunting task to follow Tony on a podium like this Usually he covers the issue so well and usually we are in such a violent agreement with each other I find myself in a position. What am I going to talk about? Or should I just sit down and let questions begin? But I'm not what I would like to focus on What I would like to focus on With a little bit more detail is the US Pakistan bilateral relationship Where that is going and then offer maybe a few thoughts on how to recalibrate the US Pakistan relationship? Let me begin though by saying I'm in complete agreement Pakistan is a country That has so many problems facing it One wonders why anyone would want to be prime minister or Pakistan of president of this country It's daunting challenges From the terrorist syndicate which now has the nation literally under siege To its growing population demands into the fact that it's literally running out of water I know that doesn't sound right last year. They had the worst floods in their history That was a one-off the bottom line for Pakistan is it may follow Yemen as the second country in the world Where it's rager cities literally do not have enough water to go on? US Pakistani relations have a very cyclical quality to them for 60 years the US Pakistani relationship has been like a roller coaster We've gone up through periods of great love affair with each other followed by bitter and ugly divorces During the periods of great love affair the United States throws money at Pakistan Like it was a drunken sailor and asks for no accountability whatsoever and we turn to blind eye To everything they do that we might not like During the periods of divorce We are angry with each other Frustrated we call each other names. We sanctioned them enormously and we achieve absolutely nothing by doing so The consequence of this roller coaster is that Pakistanis have come to a conclusion It's evident in the polling data you saw the United States is not a reliable ally Nobody in their right mind living in Pakistan would come to any other conclusion Then that based on the last 60 years of American Pakistani relations The highs in American Pakistani relationship have all been based around secret projects In the 1950s and 60s it was the U2 base in Peshawar in the late 60s and 70s It was the opening to China Then it was the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and in the last decade. It was the war against al-Qaeda The Pakistanis actually do have nostalgia for one period in all of this And that was the war against the Soviet Union in the Afghanistan Because for them that was the perfect relationship what they call Reagan rules We give them money actually a check literally and make no attempt to supervise What they do with the money they could hand it out to whatever group they wanted they could buy Whatever they wanted with it and they could divert as much as they wanted to their nuclear weapons program and the United States Said nothing and in addition the United States had almost no footprint in the country But we're not going back there. In fact the latest high in US Pakistani relations Which began shortly after September 11th Was already beginning to erode by the end of the Bush administration By the end of 2007 and early 2008 the high had gone lost and we were in decline three reasons for this first The collapse of the Musharraf government our man Literally fell apart. We tried to stand by him till the bitter end that just alienated the Pakistanis more Secondly our growing doubts about whether they were really on our side in the war against Al Qaeda These doubts were personified in 2008 in one man Nadim Tash then director general of the ISI It's worth noting that his previous appointment before he was given director general of the ISI in September 2007 was commandant of the Kakao military Academy in Abu Dhabad Pakistan Curious coincidence. We can talk about more questions and answers But during his short 11 month tenure as director general of the ISI the United States found him doing two things One blowing up the Indian Embassy in Kabul and we had their hands all over it and two telling every target of our drone strikes in 2007 and 2008 That the Americans are coming you better get out of the way Talk about duplicity being caught. We caught this one He was promoted to be a core commander in the Pakistani military and of course the third event that led to the downturn in US relations in 2008 was the Mumbai terrorist operation I Think the Obama administration deserves credit for coming in with its eyes wide open I think it deserves credit for trying to reset US Pakistani relations But I think the task from the beginning was daunting indeed for the reason that Tony has laid out quite well Fundamental differences in national security outlook Fundamental differences in world outlook fundamental doubts about each other and Fundamentally different interests in many ways Those things are not easily changed even by large aid budgets like Kerry Luger and Impressive dialogues like the strategic dialogue we had with Pakistan for the last two years We are now at a new turning point a boot to bad The culmination of a number of events this year, but especially a boot to bad has put us at a new turning point Secretary Clinton said that very clearly during her six hour visit to Islamabad last month Either we see some dramatic change in Pakistani behavior and That change would be manifested in the demise of a certain known number of senior terrorist officials Harvard in Pakistan today Or we're going to see this decline continue I told Tony before the event. I am an eternal optimist about Pakistan Because pessimism does nothing for you, but even I am pretty skeptical That we're going to see them take care of the hit list that Mrs. Clinton gave to the Pakistanis last month Much more likely will be a continued deterioration and decline in the US Pakistani relationship It could be gradual It could be as we've seen this year punctuated by events like the Raymond Davis event or it could be much much quicker There are at least four scenarios Which are entirely plausible which could lead to a further and dramatic and stark Reduction in US Pakistani bilateral relations. First is another of Uttabada There's every reason to believe that in that mountain of data We took out of that villa. We will find other information other telephone numbers That will lead us to other targets Second is another Mumbai India and Pakistan are engaged in the world's most dangerous game of Russian roulette and it's mostly played by the Pakistanis We are very lucky that we've not had a mass casualty terrorist attack in India in the last two and a half years And it is almost entirely due to luck Third we could have another 9-11 and let me be clear what I mean by that a mass casualty terrorist attack in the United States Postmarked Pakistan we narrowly averted one only a year and a few weeks ago in New York City Had Faisal Shahzad been better at building a bomb had he listened to the instructions He'd been given by the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda about how to build the bomb He would have created a fireball in the middle of New York City in Manhattan that would have reached in five Blocks in each direction It might not have killed as many people as September 11th But it certainly would have led to a crisis in US Pakistani relations And the fact that his father is an air vice-martial in the Pakistani Air Force would not have been overlooked by most Americans and fourth is a coup d'etat Pakistan is rapidly reaching the point where it's overdue for its next military dictator to arrive It's a depressing cycle of Pakistani politics But certainly nothing in the history of the Zadari Ghilani government would lead anyone to believe that Civilian government in Pakistan today has turned a corner and that therefore we should expect we won't return to a military government at some point How do we reverse this what do we do now to try to prevent these things from happening? I think the first place to start is with humility There's not a whole lot we can't do but Pakistan is a very very very very difficult not to crack People say Afghanistan is hard to me Afghanistan looks surprisingly facile and easy compared to Pakistan Humility is in order Pakistanis will determine the future of Pakistan not Americans But I think that there are a couple of recalibrations or mid-course corrections That might help One is what I call accountability For the last decade Actually almost for the last two decades We have been telling Pakistan to stop playing both sides of the game in the world war against Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups We have yelled at them. We have reasoned with them. We have argued with them. We have controlled them We have tried to bribe them. We have tried to isolate them. It hasn't worked So reluctantly I come to the conclusion. We have to make it personal We have to tell Pakistan that if we identify who Major Iqbal is Major Iqbal is the high SI officer Who worked with David Hedley to set up the attack on Mumbai. We're coming after We're coming after him either by grabbing his assets Arresting him when he travels or if necessary will come after him with extreme measures This won't be easy. This won't be pretty and I'm awfully glad I don't have to be the CIA chief of station in Islamabad who delivers this message because that's one hell of a liaison relationship to manage But I don't see any other way to get their attention and in any case. We're already doing it America through the marvels of its own political system is saking out accountability against the ISI through the court structure Major General Taj who I mentioned earlier and his successor General Pasha Who are soon to come to court in the city of New York in a civil court case? Which I think it is a virtual certitude they will lose and at that point We will attach government of Pakistan assets to pay the victims of Mumbai and Mr. Taj and Mr. Pasha will be arrested the next time they turn up in this country I'd rather get that business out of the court system and use it effectively by the executive branch Secondly, I agree completely with Tony on the aid process. I think Kerry Luger was a very smart idea Whose time has already passed? I don't see how this administration or any administration can convince this Congress To continue to provide one point five billion dollars in economic assistance to Pakistan I sure wouldn't want to be the administration witness who goes up there and explains to this Congress With its views about cutting spending Why we're getting our money's worth out of Pakistan from that aid and that is not a Negative comment about those people involved in running this aid program. I think they're trying to do a tremendous job It's not working. It is not sustainable. So we need to switch to trade We need to decide to allow Pakistani imports into this country to face the same tariff levels as Indian imports or Chinese imports right now They're trade they're tariffed at a much much higher rate and consequently you will not find Pakistani products In the United States of America Every Pakistani leader since Zia al-Huk has asked us to do this Prime Minister Gulani asked the Congress Visiting Congressional delegation yesterday to do this. It's time to listen to trade not aid by every economics Espionage is a more effective way of building the Pakistani economy Requires no American bureaucracy and no American footprint in the country trade not aid is the second row we should take Third is focus on the itch that drives the Pakistanis India India Pakistani dynamics What I don't mean here, and I want to be very clear is an American mediator Between New Delhi and Islamabad that will not work. That is a guaranteed recipe for failure We need to be doing something more subtle and sophisticated We need to in use our Indian relationship to the extent we can to send a message to the Pakistanis That yes indeed we're going out with the other date And if you don't like that and if you don't want to catch on We're prepared to go with that other date We've got to play hardball on that with the Pakistanis But in addition to that we should also encourage the process which Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Gulani decided to start this year the one little bit of good news In this part of the world in the last year was that cricket match in which they decided to resume talks Now don't get me wrong I don't have a lot of illusions that these talks are going to go very far and either do Indians and Pakistanis But I do understand that they are important They are critical and any bright ideas we have that we can give them to help assist them in moving them along We should do so because at the end of the day some kind of change in the Indian Pakistani Relationship and the dynamics of that bilateral relationship is the only thing that is fundamentally going to change Pakistan's national security calculations and its strategic movement Which gets to my final approach, which is it is time to bury AFPAC I hated it from the day Richard Holbrook told me that phrase It's time to put Afghanistan and Pakistan and India and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and Nepal back into the South Asia Bureau It is time to break them out of pence out of Sencombe and Pacific Command and deal with this part of the world Holistically and think about it as an integrated part and only when you start thinking about it as an integrated part Are you likely to develop policies that will work in dealing with it? Thank you very much Thank you Bruce and Tony for that Rosie assessment Bruce I want to start with you. Is it is there any way that folks involve Pindi and Islamabad? Could have not known that bin Laden was in about the bud That is in my view the 64 million dollar question of This year There are only two possibilities And just to make sure we have the strategic picture here the villa that Mr. Bin Laden was living in since probably 2006 is less than a mile from the Kakul military Academy at the end of The beginning of April of this year Chief of Army Staff Kayani gave a speech at the Kakul military Academy in which he said the back of the militancy has been broken I Have this vision in my head of Usama bin Laden standing on the roof Listening to Kayani as he was saying that they're that close in that environment There's only two possibilities the Pakistanis were clueless about what was going on or complicit Clueless means they really are clueless about the jihadist Frankenstein inside their country That raises all kinds of disturbing questions about the future of the militancy The security of Pakistan's nuclear security for nuclear security It's weapons. It's arsenal It raises questions about the safety of Americans living in this country That's bad enough complicit, I Think raises even more profound questions When I say complicit Let me be careful what I mean. I don't mean That general Pasha visited the villa once a month to have tea with this our bin Laden and plot worldwide terror something more Subtle than that complicit would be knowing he was there and Deciding that that offered them some degree of control and influence Over al-Qaeda, which was in their national interest On the assumption that the Americans would never ever ever Figure out what was going on We have no proof of that today from what we hear from every person in the senior ranks of this government But on the other hand, we continue to have the question Clueless or complicit That question I suspect will haunt US Pakistani relations until we come find out what the answer was Tony, do you think that Pakistan will change its course fundamentally and its fight against militancy as a result of the bin Laden killing? The simple answer is why Because as Bruce outlined Their interest has never been in the bin Laden. It's Or in the Afghan Taliban has targets. Those are levers that to some extent they've always been able to use Are we in a position to put enough pressure on them to actually have them change the hit list? Who knows it's possible, but it seems much more likely that we will see a few scapegoats and Maybe more tolerance of unmanned combat aerial vehicle strikes at the same time Probably a reduction in special forces presence in Pakistan and There will be more maneuvering because as they can see if we have a July announcement of us troop guts That that means we are going to be largely leaving in 2014 at least as a major military presence and at that point they have every reason to try to intervene in whatever Negotiations take place between the Karzai government the Taliban and Try to manipulate the situation to their advantage So this was an important event or symbol for us It was an intense embarrassment for them just as Bruce has explained, but should have changed their behavior. I Think we already have problems in persuading the Congress to provide any more carrots much less even Sustain the carrots. We're giving them and it's just not clear what our sticks are when they know we've set this deadline of 2014 Bruce Tony argued that that our interests in Pakistan were limited to our Operations in Afghanistan. Do you agree with that? Do you think we have core interests in Pakistan? I Would I would I guess I would differentiate a little bit between interests Whether they're tactical or strategic and just the intrinsic importance of Pakistan Pakistan is on the far side of this planet We we spent the first 200 years as a republic Largely ignoring what happened over there and we seem to have gotten by okay so I don't see this as a strategic interest on the course of Western Europe or Japan or something like that at the same time we shouldn't under Should not ignore Pakistan's weight in and of itself. This is the sixth largest country in terms of population in the world It will very rapidly be the fifth largest country in the world is the second largest Muslim country in the world It will be the four largest Muslim country in the world It has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world and as we both have laid out It is probably got more terrorists per square kilometer than any other country in the world And many of them are focused on the United States So I don't know whether I would refine that as strategic interests I would just define that as this is an important country And we ignore it. I think at our peril Does that mean we have overlapping strategic interests with it? No, I don't think we have very many overlapping strategic interests with it Tony if this is as good as it gets with in the relationship between the US and Pakistan our expectations too high I think first Bruce outlined the cycles The problem I think are not that our our expectations are too high if you mean the United States government Were the people who are in Pakistan or the people who developed a strategy in Afghanistan? Bruce made a good point about interests. We would like to have better relations friendly and solid relations with every country and particularly those that still have some elements of democracy But I think the fact is that we are headed down a path where Unless we can somehow actually implement all of the suggestions Bruce made and do so successfully and It would be unfair to ask him to assign a quantitative probability to that We're going to certainly not see a major shift between now and transition in Afghanistan and if the faster that transition takes place the steeper it is and the more yet basically Arbitrarily or rapidly cuts both support to Afghanistan and Pakistan Probably the more the problem will increase But even if we carry out the other scenarios the situation has no reason to get immediately better What would change it if you actually had a Pakistani government that really addressed the underlying causes of why This rise and extremism and terrorism is taking place if you had a military with more vision that saw Dealing with the causes rather than repression or military action as a solution If you had political parties, which were less family oriented less corrupt Which actually acted on reform rather than simply talked about it Then we might at some point have a partner, but do I expect any of that to happen? I Couldn't name the person who would make the change in Pakistan. Maybe Bruce has some suggestions There's what scenario worries you the most do you have confidence in the Orientation of the core commanders in the Pakistan military you talked about a possible coup How do you assess that situation? I will answer that but I will also answer his question I know we're in we're again in violent agreement here The only thing I would I would say is that there are Pakistanis who recognize every problem we have laid out And you can get on their email distribution lists and be bombarded with with quite moving Statements about what needs to be done In Pakistan and thanks to all president Obama. I'm on all those email lists I'm also on a lot of other email lists from other people in Pakistan Which are not quite so pleasant to read what they have to say about me The problem is that those people are literally being murdered in front of our eyes They're being murdered in front of our eyes and the Pakistani government seems to be doing nothing about it If you want a Pakistani politician who would go in the right direction Probably sherry rockman who is now living Basically in her house Under threat of murder every time she goes out her front door Your question. What do I worry about worst is a coup from within the military in which the First century reincarnation of Zia Hulhuk arrives that is to say a Pakistani general who was a committed jihadist In 1980 Such a man came to power And we were fortunately able to point him in the direction of atheistic communism next door and together we had the highlight of us Pakistani relations as the Pakistanis see it The problem is there's no Soviet Union around anymore There's no place to deflect jihadist views and it'll be reflected at us. Is it possible? Well, I think I've given you the name of a court commander who I think it is very realistic and possible Nadim Taj He sure smells like a committed jihadist to me And fortunately He's just been promoted again To adjunct general of the Pakistani military. So he's no longer a court commander. Are there others like him? If I could give one piece of advice To Leon Panetta and David Petraeus About what one piece of information I would most like to know in the whole world right now It is the true core beliefs of Pakistan's core commanders Because one of them is going to be the next leader of this country and we need to know who they are Tony what advice would you give general Petraeus? I think at this point we are struggling to find Exactly the issues that Bruce raised it is to understand not Simply the problems in Fata or Baluchistan it is to understand the problems in the country and It is not simply the wide range of violent extremist movements But the internal threats within this power structure and that is particularly true because you have a country which soon will have a major Increase in its ability to produce nuclear weapons Which does manufacture missiles and Which is doing it in a climate where you are building up on both sides significant nuclear strike capabilities in An environment which is a little unique Because both India and Pakistan have essentially had to lie about their nuclear testing program They are arming nuclear weapons that they have not adequately tested or characterized and They are arming them on missiles, which they have not tested To the point where they know exactly what will happen if they're fired Now they are a long way away, but as Bruce points out You have interests that go beyond strategic interests and the whole picture of any kind of nuclear confrontation as Both sides rush to deploy capabilities. They don't understand That's a very dangerous issue How about China should we worry about China and Pakistan growing closer together? You mentioned that we might sort of threaten Pakistan that we might start siding more with India Couldn't they come back to us and say well fine You can go with India and we're going to go with China. Is that a is that a credible threat from their standpoint? Well, it's a threat they make We had a remarkable scene recently where Pakistan's Minister of Defense Most of you don't know who that is because in Pakistan being the civilian Minister of Defense and the government is The least possible important job in the entire cabinet But he did get a trip to Beijing and He came back and said we're going to give China a naval base On the Arabian Sea and there was this kind of embarrassed Silence for a few hours from Beijing and then a statement that came out and said well You know, we really don't want a naval base on the Arabian Sea, which may be a lie I'm not a China expert. So I don't know what I cannot tell you the Chinese part of this But from the Pakistani standpoint They do see China as their all-weather friend, which will bail them out The truth is in every war with India, they haven't bailed them out. They've stood on the sidelines They are an important partner for Pakistan in terms of military equipment in terms of the nuclear Technology and capability that Tony just talked about But I think they're a more complicated ally than the Pakistanis want us to believe they are and Here I would also throughout there's another ally they have Which is the Saudis in the Gulf States and there the Arab Spring is moving the Gulf States closer to this to the Pakistanis has a source of reliable military manpower in the event of more Bahrains and more internal Problems in the Gulf Pakistan has alternatives to us It likes to exaggerate the size of those alternatives, but they do have alternatives to us. I may just make a point I think There's another side of this than the purely military one and that is simply trade logistics and the rest And there's been a lot of talk about new Silk Roads and the rest well first Pakistan is not a particularly attractive economic structure for China It is not a particularly good route For pipelines and roads unless you believe a it is completely secure and be you have a real reason to move from the Indian Ocean North and In fact when you look at what China is doing it isn't financing a major road through Pakistan It's financing a major road through Iran up to Herat to connect with Central Asia And that is a massive investment for China. The other problem is it For obvious economic reasons you have Central Asia funding east-west Communication lines and lines north to Russia So what you have is a rather peculiar Subculture of people who study South Asia who are fascinated by Afghanistan and Pakistan On the other hand you have realities on the map and they're moving east west and north and In other directions and for really clear reasons in terms of trade Economics and energy flows Bruce you mentioned the Arab Spring. I wonder what you both think Is it possible to see the sort of popular uprising that we've seen in Tunisia and Egypt Bahrain other places Syria Is it is it possible to see them Pakistan? You had the lawyers movement a few years ago, but it sort of fizzled out Could could there be a sort of demonstration effect in Pakistan? Well, I mean if there's one lesson of the Arab Spring it is don't rule out possibilities in the future at the risk of looking foolish Very quickly after you've ruled them out, so I wouldn't rule anything out I'd invert it a little bit in many ways Pakistan had its Arab Spring in 2007 and 2008 you had a Arouse citizenry that asked for the rule of law that asked for accountability that wanted its System to be reformed and the demand at the end of a dictator and they succeeded Now maybe it would have all turned out a whole lot better if Mrs. Boutou hadn't been murdered But I think that's a bit of a slim hope the problems in the Pakistani system are much more endemic than that and You know to give Pakistanis credit This is their Fourth time at trying to build a democratic system. I give them a lot of credit for persistence for aspiring to be a democratic modern state but you have to believe in the triumph of hope over experience to believe that it's going to succeed and it's not going to succeed as long as the dominant Political player in the country a state within a state the army is so relentlessly focused on competition with India that it demands a Exorbitant part of the national budget for its demands and demands total control over national security Be held solely in the hands of the army and the civilian political leaders not even have any involvement in it it's it is a Army in church of the state in many ways today and that is a political Problem, which I don't think is resolved easily through The kind of political Demonstrations and up people that we had is more likely to go back to military dictatorship than it is to a Effective functioning democracy Greg if I may just I'm always a little worried about this phrase Arab spring first No two Arab Springs are alike so we end up describing the French Revolution and the American Revolution is being identical by using that same logic and Very recently I heard a senior Arab described the Arab Spring as What you in the West don't understand is for us the spring is intensely hot and filled with sandstorms I suspect it's a little more realistic than some of the descriptions. We've heard elsewhere, but what I think Bruce has pointed out first you have Which were an option in some ways as you did in Egypt between a civil elite and the military structure And second what you also have is not so much a national consciousness center to run one place But a whole group of separatists Somewhat different movements which do not have reason to cohere and produce some kind of unified process of change So you may see a power struggle between the civil and military elite But that's not the same thing. I think even as the Egyptian case was We really I think in general need to remember That the only thing revolutions do have in common is that none of them are alike If the military is part of the problem Should we think about putting greater conditions on the military aid that we give to box on Bruce mentioned that He thought Kerry Lugar was a great idea. That was past its day The civilian aid clearly is under greater pressure in Congress. How about the military assistance? You bribe people to freedom. I mean let's be real What we want is to maintain the lines of communication through 2014 without more trouble Not have more problems with you cab strikes and occasionally have them do something useful When we're pushing them hard enough Probably not a good idea to suddenly discover we need a really good military accounting process. I can't I can't top Bruce you probably know that the dynamics within the administration as well as anyone on the outside And I was wondering if you could characterize the state of debate on Pakistan now in Washington Will Secretary Gates's departure will that shift the center of gravity? How do you how do you read things? Traditionally Pakistan's strongest promoter inside the United States government Has been the CIA Because the CIA argued that the relationship with the ISI although very very difficult produced results Certainly, you know that was the argument back in the 1980s When the ISI ran the Mojaheddin war for us and that was the argument through most of the first half Three-quarters of this decade The the formula the CIA Would repeat endlessly is that the ISI is our most important ally in the war against al-Qaeda And our most difficult ally in the war against al-Qaeda and they would point to people like college Sheikh Mohammed Abu Subedah and others whom we had gotten through assistance of the ISI That's changed that has changed in the in the last Year and certainly has changed in light of the Raymond Davis affair And Abu Tabad certainly Changes it even more my former colleagues are Spending even more time than I am trying to answer my question clueless complicit Because for them it's an even more up close and personal question If that advocate Changes as it has That leaves in a essence the uniformed military which is arguing the case that we need them for the supply line And you know, I had a drink with Kayani last night. He's really an okay guy He's not as bad as he thinks The departure of Gates and the arrival of Panetta who's going to bring with him the new CIA view I think is also bad news for Pakistan that will leave is as the principal defender of Engagement with Pakistan the State Department which of course because it is the State Department argues in favor of engagement with with everybody That's what diplomats are supposed to do It's track record of winning those debates Not just in this administration, but in every administration is pretty slim it may have engagement, but it's engagement often with Nothing inside of it so my reading of the tea leaves is that not only does events on the ground argue that this relationship is going to get worse bureaucratic changes and Personnel changes in Washington probably will add to that tendency towards getting it's worse all that said At the highest levels of this administration as I said earlier, they've never had illusions about Pakistan But they also do understand that Pakistan is an important place and they're getting angry with it getting frustrated with it Feels good, but that's not a policy Anger is not a solution to this problem That solutions are not very good, but anger is the least effective of Tony you showed our popularity plummeting in Pakistan despite all the aid we give despite the strategic communication plan That's been cleared all the way up to the president Is there any strategic communications plan that could work in Pakistan given the drone strikes? They've been long killing the raid Davis affair, or is it a helpless cause? I don't think it's hopeless, but I think frankly that One of our great problems is the idea that somehow you find a message you control it, and you keep repeating it And somehow impacts on public opinion if there's any place that's worked since No, from the start of the second Bush administration. I would love to hear it I think the difficulty is if you really want to communicate to people you have to communicate with them as Realistically and in as much depth as possible And as Bruce points out you have people not simply on the civil side, but in the military the intelligence security people who are very realistic about this range of problems What you don't have is a matching Set of media what you don't have is a political structure that does a good job of communicating it and I think the other problem is until Pakistan's domestic politics can address Pakistan's problems They can't be realistic about us And that's the tragedy it wouldn't matter that much if Pakistanis were angry at the United States What does matter is the inability to focus on education population Water Infrastructure the failure of the central government to respond and emergencies like the flood all of the things that the people actually need and with that the threat that is posed by religious and Separatist extremist groups a Threat which in many ways is not directed towards us or Afghanistan or anyone on the outside It's caused by the problems on the inside You all have been very patient. We have about 20 25 minutes for questions. Please state your name Affiliation, please ask a question rather than offer a speech Go ahead. Please wear microphone. Wait wait for the microphone to Yeah, Marisa Lino from Northrop Grumman a simple question not unreasonable hypothetical that there will be a Deal cut between the government and Kabul and the Taliban. How does that change the equation? Well, the practical problem is it can be any deal under the sun When you cut this kind of deal, are you cutting around us or with us? Are you cutting it with a group of Taliban which might actually accept a political role? Or is this simply a cosmetic device by the Taliban to try to manipulate the situation? Is it shake Omar which seems a somewhat uncertain deal? This particular group of bedfellows is always possible in politics, but the idea of Omar and Karzai is Not something that strikes me as immediately possible You have the problem of Haqqani and how does Haqqani fit into this structure? The other thing to remember is we are still fighting in many ways a tactical war to try to transform Afghanistan Into a state with a more effective government with popular support The Taliban is fighting a war of political attrition Or in many ways they want to expand their influence Expand their control and simply outweigh does which is what they need to do to win if The Afghan government remains weak and something they can exploit so the problem with most of these deals particularly and Tell the Taliban can be firmly convinced that they're going to lose unless they reach some kind of a competition Is that this kind of negotiation can simply be an extension of insurgency by other means? And we've seen that in Cambodia and we've seen it in Nepal and a great many other areas It's compounded by the fact that there are a number of countries in ISAF Germany in particular That simply want out under any form of political accommodation possible So the pressure isn't simply pressure That affects the key negotiating partners. It's pressure within NATO and ISAF and there are elements certainly here in the United States of people who believe that frankly If we can't create a stable in-state anyway Accommodation and departure is the better part of valor. I just want to add one thing I agree with all of that In favor of a political process, but I'm deeply skeptical that a political process is going to emerge I'm deeply skeptical that if it does emerge will produce the outcomes we want I have a fear that a political process between Karzai and the Taliban will lead to the collapse of the Northern Alliance as Abdullah and others say we're not interested in In a political process with people who we regard as our mortal enemy, but I just also want to Put an inconvenient fact out there There is a great hope in Certain circles here and in many many circles in Europe that the Taliban can be split from al-Qaeda That these are not necessarily bound together Organizations Well, there was an inconvenient fact Less than 96 hours after Osama bin Laden was killed the Taliban Shura Council put out a eulogy and bemoaned this disastrous moment that has come to the Islamic world and Lauded mr. Bin Laden as a hero of Islam as a hero of their movement as a defender of Afghanistan As a hero of the Palestinian cause Everything that you would not want the Afghan Taliban to say about Osama bin Laden. They said it Now we can dismiss it as propaganda if you want to people will say, oh, you know, they got carried away by the moment Well You do that at your own peril. I think the Afghan Taliban revealed the relationship between al-Qaeda I suspect That in that mountain of data that they're going through they're going to find a lot more communications between Mr. Bin Laden and Taliban commanders then people Would want to find You're on the quiddish or as distribution list as well. Yes, I get a lot of weird emails Please on the back My name is Vincent Wong from University of Richmond. I share your frustration You have used the word cyclical relationship to describe us Pakistani relationship I wonder if we can really afford to this divorce Pakistan Bruce mentioned some of the intrinsic Importance of Pakistan and I'll add just add a few more proper some of this has to have to do with negative importance If we could drive Pakistan into China's orbit, they can Continue You know Proliferating the aq con network come to mind they can provide a sanctuary to al-Qaeda and so on So I wonder if marriage of convenience is a possibility I don't think either Tony or I are advocating divorce We're not we're not here in the business of saying let's break with Pakistan and enter a hostile relationship What we're trying to be is realistic that Engagement Prospects of success We're always small and look smaller today than they did two years ago Three years ago when President Obama was elected and I think we have to deal with that reality There are all kinds of negatives of a Pakistan that is Even more hostile Than the one we have today Greg asked me what my nightmare scenario is my nightmare scenario is a jihadist state in Pakistan Where through the instrument of a military coup a true believer in global Islamic jihad takes control of the fastest growing nuclear Arsenal in the world the fifth largest country in terms of population. What would we do about that? Try to wrap your head around what American strategy would you deal with to deal with a country like that? We're going to Engage them. They're not likely to be interested in engaging us We're going to contain them Well, we might have some success in that because virtually everyone else would also find it as dangerous But containment is always a long-term approach. Are we going to use kinetic force? Are we going to use force against Pakistan? Should we invade Pakistan? I know your reaction is this guy's nuts But we have invaded three Islamic countries in the last decade one we kind of only invade their airspace But we're still invaded their airspace But in the case of Pakistan this really would be insanity taking on a nuclear armed enemy with a hundred and eighty million people who As Tony's poll charts show us are not exactly ready to be won over to the American way of life By some GIs that we have bubblegum It can get much worse We're not advocating that We're not in favor of divorce But I think realism is important in thinking about the future of US-Pakistani relations We are in a dark place and it's getting worse I think that first I'm going to have to try to get away from the middle image of Rambo part 9 as We go in to get the nuclear weapons in Pakistan whereas the Vesters alone when we really need him and I don't say that totally facetiously because people say well, it's a nuclear power and therefore we have to what and Sometimes you get these fantasies we're going to bomb them out of nuclear weapons Or we're going to send in special forces Frankly that is an extraordinarily dangerous image What we also have to recognize is when we talk about transitioning out of Afghanistan There is a question will we leave enough people to keep the structure together for a while? Can it hold together on its own if we do instead of fully transitioning in 2014 Actually sustain the Afghan National Forest Development through 2020 and beyond which is the real-world plan If you want it to hold together If we do that do we maintain a capability and some kind of presence to deal with extremism in Pakistan that attacks terrorist targets the so-called counter-terrorism strategy if so what do we have to pay the Pakistanis and What do we have to give them to implement it? These are all strategies which we may find ourselves thrust into They don't give you however anything like the presence or the leverage that we have now We have a hundred and seven billion dollars worth of military operations funded this year four billion dollars worth of aid Seven billion dollars worth of additional money to deal with VA and the medical costs of the war Which accumulate with time with the wounded and other people who are eligible Are we ever going to sustain even a fraction of that beyond? 2014 if we do it even that long and if so, what is our leverage in this region? What kind of aid would actually work with Pakistan and What is our policy towards South Asia and towards Central Asia at a time when yes We have interests in Pakistan. We have interests in Latin America we have interests in Japan and We are headed toward a period in time when we have to be much more careful about how we allocate these resources Then we have been in the past These are all very hard choices But what they all warn you against is focusing only on the present in Pakistan as one country of particular interest We've spent the last decade without a regional strategy towards anybody We can't afford to have a Pakistan centric strategy or an Afghan centric strategy in the future Yeah Muhammad Altafad BLA first of Bruce. What makes you think that Pakistan can become a jihadist country? Yes, they do not trust United States, but they are being killed by these jihadists who believe in global jihad Secondly when we talk about political negotiations with Taliban in Afghanistan, where do we leave Pakistan in regards to its long-time belief that One day US is going to leave Pakistan with Afghanistan to deal with the situation Secondly How do we look at the relationship with their relationship with Haqqani group and their long-time wish to have a major role in Afghanistan after 2014, thank you I Think the answer the first question is as I said before a coup which has a reincarnation of Zia Hohok The Pakistani army is at war with part of the Frankenstein it created and it is in bed with part of the Frankenstein it's created the complexity the contradictions That go on in the Pakistani army's behavior towards jihadism are Difficult for the American mind to comprehend But it is these contradictions and these complexities which make this such an important and difficult problem to deal with Is such a coup imminent is it inevitable? No Is it possible certainly? Is it the most likely outcome? Fortunately, I don't think so Craig was asking me for my nightmares Usually your nightmares are not the most likely thing that's going to happen to you next day But you ought to pay attention to worst-case scenarios not be obsessed by them either The question of Pakistan's role in a future political Process in Afghanistan seems to me to be first of all a question that should be addressed to Afghans Countries do not have a right to be involved in the internal political process of their neighbors without invitation And the problem for Pakistan and Afghanistan is it is perceived to have invited itself in over the course of the last 30 years without invitation if you think my Doubts about the honesty of the Pakistani army In its dealings with Afghanistan are extreme You should talk to Amar al-Assala the former head of Afghan intelligence Amar al-Assala is a very interesting case He's been saying for the last five years one thing over and over again Osama bin Laden is not hiding in a cave is hiding in the heartland of Pakistan in a Pakistani Military garrison probably protected by the ISI Everything but that last statement is now a fact. He was right about Pakistan Thank you. I may turn to Afghanistan. The issue isn't just the Akhani network It's 2015 Karzai has either changed the Constitution or he's gone No one has emerged under Karzai as a strong competent leader Any of us who have met some of the other would be Afghan leaders Have a good reason to be extremely cautious about what comes next if it isn't Karzai Who in the southern Pashtuns now has what political status? How separate are the southern Pashtuns from the northern Pashtuns? How is the Akhani network then fitted in to the Taliban generally is the Quetta? Sure, even at that point still real is Omar still around How much of the central government Has actually evolved in a positive direction versus a Lot of polls which indicate that basically it has not improved in popularity As a result of the new strategy nationally Just in the areas where we've now provided added security in the south and Kandahar What is the status of the northern groups in Afghanistan and Having had two failed elections One for president and one for parliament and having created a legislative body, which has no clear function Even if it is properly elected Because we never really gave them the control over money that any legislature should have What actually evolves Since we can't at this point in time answer a single one of those questions predictably and We have no transition plan that anybody has articulated Either in Afghanistan or the administration to move toward a goal that would deal with them. I Would just suggest to you that we need to look far beyond 2014 as quickly as possible Particularly because something people forget again and again in this city is for us to act we need money We're already drafting the FY 2013 budget submission That will fund the transition year If we do that as we now are without any guidance as to the plan for transition We present a lot of problems for us that potentially we could avoid And this is the kind of reality we face When we start talking substance as distinguished from political concepts and good intentions I think we have time for one or two more if there are other questions. Yeah, please please wait for the microphones My name is Saraya Siddique. I'm with healthy afghan children. I'm an afghan American have been working in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the past 18 years My question is that how often? Afghans especially civil society of Afghanistan are actually Engaged or involved in the decisions that are made for Afghans In Afghanistan or about Afghanistan or the future of Afghanistan are they being consulted or at least their opinions are Considered. Thank you. I think that The answer is which Afghans first you've had two elections Afghans ran we certainly no one on the outside suggested who should run in these elections You do have an Afghan government which is being steadily strengthened The fact is at this point in time the aid money vastly exceeds the capacity of the government to spend it much less spend it wisely So the ministries themselves can't execute the budgets they draft When you talk about civil society, we have as a result moved money To give independent funds for provincial governors because the Constitution does not provide a way of funding the governors You've created a structure to help train and create Deputy district governors You've created a structure to try to empower local jurors through the aid process I'm not sure who it is in the Afghan process That is excluded from this The fact is that if you look at what has actually happened You keep hearing people in the Afghan government say we should control the money and then you look at what happens when you give it to them and Frankly, you've already exceeded by far their ability To deal with it at this point in time Let me say that you're not going to put this kind of money into NGOs. You are reforming the contracting process That won't give Afghans as a whole more decisions with the whole idea is to get away from a contracting process that had major Subcontractors and go directly to Afghan contractors that hopefully would also solve some of the security and other issues, but This isn't something where you suddenly call a large popular assembly in Kabul And ask people what they're doing. It's also a fact that while they're not normally published you're running quarterly polling of Afghans to figure out their perceptions and wants and Certainly you've responded because what Afghans have wanted by way of aid has been not development in the classic sense but relatively simple schools local electric power better roads and water and Of course security They've also wanted to have government services and less corruption But this is very much a matter for Afghans to solve not for us We can run anti-corruption drives and run the training programs and build up governance But while those can sometimes help they do not reform societies Or if they do we don't have a single example of success since World War two And it is not imminent anywhere. I know of you can help people help themselves Final question. Okay. Please join me in thanking Bruce Roddell and Tony