 Section 50 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Grant the movement of the Army of the Potomac, crossing the Rapidan, entering the Wilderness, battle of the Wilderness. Soon after midnight, May 3, 4, the Army of the Potomac moved out from its position, North Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the Army defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed, not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. The losses inflicted and endured were destined to be severe, but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with the immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded, and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. It is true, the Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York, and the national capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice, had come fearfully near making their boast good, too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion, so here was a standoff. The campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses to both armies in a given time than any previously suffered, but the carnage was to be limited to a single year and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this. The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. Ten days rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition, were taken in wagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains and butchered as wanted. Three days rations, in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. The country over which the army had to operate from the rapid down to the crossing of the James River is rather flat and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tidewater and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The country roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense forest in places like the wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. All bridges were naturally destroyed before the national troops came to them. The army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, John Sedgwick, and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. The fifth corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right and marched directly for Germania Ford. Proceeded by one division of cavalry under General J. H. Wilson, General Sedgwick followed Warren with the sixth corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right of Lee's line. Hancock, with the second corps, moved by another road for the east, directly upon Eli's Ford, six miles below Germania. Proceeded by Greg's division of cavalry and followed by the artillery. Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the time, to pick at the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. The fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. Burnside, with the ninth corps, was left back at Warrington, guarding the railroad from bull run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing to Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m., giving the information that our crossing had been successful. The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. The battlefield, from the crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the wilderness toward Spotsylvania, was of the same character. There were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battlefield, but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roads were narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from Orange Courthouse to the battlefield. The most southerly of these roads is known as the Orange Courthouse Plank Road, the northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There are also roads from east of the battlefield running to Spotsylvania courthouse, one from Chancellorsville branching at Aldrich's, the western branch going by Piney Branch Church, Allsops Dense by the Brock Road to Spotsylvania. The east branch goes by Gates's Dense to Spotsylvania. The Brock Road runs from Germania Ford through the battlefield and on to the courthouse. As Spotsylvania is approached, the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Courthouse. From there to Fredericksburg, he had the use of the two roads above described, running nearly parallel to the wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities for that country for concentrating his forces to his right. These roads strike the road from Germania Ford in the wilderness. As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward. Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's Store on the Orange Plank Road greg to the left towards Chancellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there, and entrenched. Sedgewick followed Warren. He was across the river and in camp on the south bank on the right of Warren by sundown. Hancock, with the second corps, moved parallel with Warren and camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and by the evening of the fifth, the trains of more than four thousand wagons were safely on the south side of the river. There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon train that would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all difficulties the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Engels, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. At a glance the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note the contents, if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry, if forage, whether grain or hay, if rations, whether bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee, or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowed to follow the Army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the Army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues, except the ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed theirs at the depots. I left Culpeper Courthouse, after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedgwick's Corps and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river. Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to Germania forward wagonloads of new blankets and overcoats thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks, and in Providence I had never witnessed before. Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May that the Army of the Potomac was moving evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judged from the fact that at one fifteen p.m. an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old Wilderness Tavern our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their entrenchments at mine run. Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butler, and Crook had moved according to program. On discovery of the covering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell, and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us. Hill, on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the same road, Longstreet was at this time middle of the afternoon at Gordonsville twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike. He was nearby and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before bivvacking for the night. My orders were given through General Mead for an early advance on the morning of the fifth. Warren was to move to Parker's Store and Wilson's Calvary, then at Parker's Store, to move on to Craig's Meeting House. Sedgwick followed Warren closing in on his right. The Army of the Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move southwestward to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church. At six o'clock before reaching Parker's Store, Warren discovered the enemy. He sent word back to this effect and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This was the speediest way to reinforce Warren, who was confronting the enemy on both the Orange Plank and Turnpike roads. Burnside had moved promptly on the fourth, on receiving word that the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the rapidan. By making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the fifth. Mead moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern four miles south of the river as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in position. Burnside at this time was not under Mead's command and was his senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy, I informed Mead and without waiting to see Burnside at once moved forward my headquarters to where Mead was. It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his entrenchments if we were not entrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt when he discovered the enemy nearby. Neither party had any advantage of position. Warren was therefore ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. About this hour Warren was ready and attacked with favorable, though not decisive, results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive and immediately he was ordered to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again received his orders to attack and General Getty received orders from Mead a few minutes later to attack, whether Hancock was ready or not. He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards. Hancock immediately sent two divisions commanded by Bernie and Mott and later two brigades, Carols and Owens, to the support of Getty. This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carol were wounded but remained on the field. One of Bernie's most gallant brigade commanders, Alexander Hayes, was killed. I had been at West Point with Hayes for three years and had served with him through the Mexican War a portion of the time in the same regiment. He was a most gallant officer ready to lead his command wherever ordered. With him it was, come boys, not go. Wadsworth Division and Baxter's Brigade of the Second Division were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty, but the density of the intervening forest was such that there being no road to march upon they did not get up with the Head of Column until night and bivvacked where they were without getting into position. During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregs's Division of Cavalry to Todd's Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge. Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put it close to it. Neither side made any special progress. After the close of the Battle of the Fifth of May, my orders were given for the following morning. We knew Longstreet with twelve thousand men was on his way to join Hill's's right near the Brock Road and might arrive during the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at four thirty o'clock. Mead asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. Hancock had now fully one half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth, with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by Hill and to the right of Hancock. He was directed to move at the same time and to attack Hill's left. Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between Warren and Wadsworth and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their front to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's center to swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's Army. Hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. Burnside had three divisions, but one of them, a colored division, was sent to guard the wagon train and he did not see it again until July. Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His purpose was evident, but he failed. Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Cutharpen Road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry commanded by General Barlow with all his artillery to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to attack as ordered and Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about an hour when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another stand outside of his Richmond defenses. Given, commanded Hancock's left and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. On the morning of the sixth, Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock Road and at Todd's Tavern and defeated them at both places. Later, he was attacked and again the enemy was repulsed. Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart and thinking the enemy, coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happened during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of Todd's Tavern and Brock's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy. But the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from Chancellorsville by the road Hancock had advanced upon to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock a.m. Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at 6 o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces in the morning a mile or more. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged became encouraged and returned with them. They were enabled from the density of the forest to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advance position, but, after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning which was strongly entrenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wadsworth, while trying to rally his men, was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up but made no immediate attack. The Confederate general, Jenkins, was killed and Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field not to resume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee and compensated in a great measure for the mishap or misapprehensions which had fallen to our lot during the day. After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock's position and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigade, having been formed at right angles to the entrenchments, held by Hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move, but it broke and disappeared without a contest. Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now only about nine in the morning and he was getting into position on Hancock's right. At four-fifteen in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was maintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Burnie's division gave way and retired in disorder. The enemy, under R.H. Anderson, took advantage of this and pushed through our line planting their flags on a part of the entrenchments, not on fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but temporary. Carroll, of Gibbons's division, moved at a double-quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy inflicting great loss. Fighting continued from five in the morning, sometimes along the whole line, and other times only in places. The ground fought over, had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed and many of the severely wounded of both armies lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the bursting shells and the conflagration raged. The wounded, who had not strength to move themselves, were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally the fire communicated with our breastworks in places. Being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle still raged. Our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion and his personal efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but I revoked the order which I had given previously to this assault for Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train which was at some distance. Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all this time, but their efforts had no more effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken up except one at Germania Ford. The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. This left our right in danger of being turned and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and entrenched it for protection against attack, but late in the afternoon of the 6th, early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding their precautions taken and created considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers The defense, however, was vigorous and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged were. Early says in his memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not been attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their entrenchments. On the morning of the 7th, General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from Ctharp and Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him, but Lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. There was no battle during the day and but little firing except in Warren's front, he being directed about noon to make a reconnaissance in force. This drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This ended the Battle of the Wilderness. End of Section 50. Recorded by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim. At J-O-C-C-L-E-V-D.com. Section 51 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 51, After the Battle, Telegraph and Signal Service, Movement by the Left Flank. More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an advantage, but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them, but the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. Our losses in the wilderness were very severe. Those of the Confederates must have been even more so, but I have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germany of Ford Bridge was transferred to Eli's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to Washington. It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac. First, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men entrenched themselves. For this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in and increased the elevation in front of them. It was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defenses of considerable strength when a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy or in his presence. These would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The second was the use made of the telegraph and signal core. Nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. Insulated wires, insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm on the ground or underwater, were wound upon reels making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a saw-buck placed crosswise of the saddle and raised above it so that the reel with its wire would revolve freely. There was a wagon supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each core, each army and one for my headquarters. There were wagons also loaded with light poles about the size and length of a wall tent pole supplied with an iron spike in one end used to hold the wires up when laid so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades and always kept with the command they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned to particular headquarters and never changed except by special orders. The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp, all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to and would be led in a line parallel there to, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of the wire, the hold of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. The men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once, raising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached to trees or some other permanent object so that one pole was sufficient at a place. In the absence of such a support, two poles would have to be used at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. While this was being done, the telegraph wagons would take their positions nearer where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be affected between all the headquarters of the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corps were assigned to specific commands. When movements were made, they would go in advance or on the flanks and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote by signals the positions of different parts of our own army and often the movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them, but sometimes they gave useful information. On the afternoon of the 7th, I received news from Washington announcing that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. I had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there. My order for this movement was as follows. Headquarters, Army of the United States, May 7, 1864, 6.30 am. Major General Mead, Commanding, Army of the Potomac. Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spotsylvania Courthouse with one Army Corps at Todd's Tavern with one and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spotsylvania Road with the road from Alsopps to Old Courthouse. If this move is made, the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Nye River. I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the Pike to Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the Plank Road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg Plank Road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination. All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move and then move off quietly. It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do, we must be prepared to resist them and follow up any success we may gain with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. All the hospitals should be moved today to Chancellorsville. U.S.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. During the seventh, Sheridan had a fight with the revel cavalry at Todd's Tavern but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. Soon after dark, Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on the Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops, mead with his staff accompanied me. The greatest enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to them that they had passed through the beginning of the end and the battle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furious fuschelade of artillery and musketry plainly heard but not felt by us. Mead and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. We looked to see if we could which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be the right hand one and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock of my staff with the instinct of the engineer suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported that Lee was moving and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's Column when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern where we arrived after midnight. My object in moving to Spotsylvania was two-fold. First, I did not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there. Second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond, if possible, and if not to draw him into the open field. But Lee, by accident, beat us to Spotsylvania. Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government. Accordingly he ordered Long Street's corps, now commanded by Anderson, to move in the morning, the Eighth, to Spotsylvania. But the woods, being still on fire, Anderson could not go into Bivouac and march directly on to his destination that night. By this accident, Lee got possession of Spotsylvania. It is impossible to say, now, what would have been the result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given, but it is certain that we would have been in Spotsylvania and between him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the army of the Potomac would have had the shorter line. Thus twice, since crossing the Rapidan, we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was caused by our not following up to success gained over Hill's corps on the morning of the Sixth, as before described. The second, when fires caused, by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of the Seventh Eighth, which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the Eighth. But accident often decides the fate of battle. Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the Seventh, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spotsylvania and holding the bridge over the Pol River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get to Spotsylvania. But Mead changed Sheridan's orders to Merritt, who was holding the bridge, on his arrival at Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry, but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps, which had not been detained at the crossing of the Pol, as it would have been, but for the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding, with two brigades of cavalry, the bridge over the Pol River, which Anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to reinforce Wilson and hold the town. Anderson soon entrenched himself, if indeed the entrenchments were not already made, immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he entrenched, his right and left divisions, the former Crawford's, the latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler, drove the enemy back some distance. At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his support. To this end Sedgwick, who was at Piney Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was notified of Warren's engagement and was directed to be in readiness to come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's, on our extreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason, probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done, so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then, all of Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. Warren's difficulty was twofold. When he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged, so as properly to cooperate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. Lee had ordered Hill's corps, now commanded by early, to move by the very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the morning of the Eighth, Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg. Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond, he had possession of Spotsylvania, and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession of Spotsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only found that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battlefield of Spotsylvania for that day, but he, in like manner, kept early back and forced him to move by another route. Had I ordered the movement for the night of the Seventh by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an hour or earlier start. It took all that time for a warrant to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made was tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. Our left occupied its entrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy, he would have found the second corps in position fortified, and practically the fifth and sixth corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed mead. Should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field? As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man, and he was, beside, thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. End of section 51, recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock Arkansas, Jim at JOCCLEV.com. Section 52 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant. Chapter 52. Battle of Spotsylvania. Hancock's position. Assault of Warren's and Wright's corps. Upton promoted on the field. Good news from Butler and Sheridan. The Matapani River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Taw, the Poe, and the Nye Rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. It takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness Tavern. The Poe rises southwest of the place, but farther away. Spotsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams and where they are but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches Spotsylvania without crossing either of these streams. Lee's army, coming up by the Cartharpen Road, had to cross the Poe at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came by the Brock Road. Sedgwick crossed the Nye at Cartharpen Furnace. Burnside, coming by Aldrich's, to Gates's house, had to cross the Nye near the enemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of Wilcox's division and the stream was crossed. The brigade was furiously attacked, but the remainder of the division, coming up, they were unable to hold their position and soon fortified it. About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from Hancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to the Cartharpen Road, crossing the Poe at Corbins and again at Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the Eighth while one division should occupy Spotsylvania. These movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the attempt to get to or towards Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmond if he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Nye. The Poe and the Nye are narrow little streams but deep with abrupt banks and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms at the time we were there and difficult to cross except were bridged. The country about was generally heavily timbered but with occasional clearings. It was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. By noon of the night the position of the two armies was as follows. Lee occupied a semicircle facing north, northwest, and northeast in closing the town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Poe. Ewell came next, then early. Warren occupied our right covering the Brock and other roads converging at Spotsylvania. Sedgwick was to his left and Burnside on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern but as soon as it was known that early had left Hancock's front the latter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the Poe early in the afternoon and was ordered to cross the Poe and get on the enemy's flank. The fourth division of Hancock's corps, Mott Commanding, was left at Todd's when the corps first came up but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of Sedgwick's now right's sixth corps. In the morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his entrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one to the army of the Potomac and to the nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. Hancock was now, nine p.m. of the ninth of May, across the left flank of Lee's army but separated from it and also from the remainder of Meade's army by the Poe River. But for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. The Poe at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. Just below his lower crossing, the troops crossed at three points, it turns due south and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. During the night this corps built three bridges over the Poe but these were in rear. The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left during the night. Accordingly, on the morning of the tenth, when Hancock renewed his effort to get over the Poe to his front, he found himself confronted by some of Earley's command which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in affecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy entrenched in his front, no more were crossed. Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the tenth with the view of forcing a crossing if it was found that an advantage could be gained. The enemy was found strongly entrenched on the high ground overlooking the river and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson's left rested on the Poe where it turned south, therefore for Hancock to cross over, although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army, would still further isolate him from it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of Hancock's and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly, in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the center by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Poe, given was placed to the right of Warren and Bernie in his rear as a reserve. Barlow's division was left south of the stream and Mott of the same corps, was still to the left of Wright's corps, Burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force and if an opportunity presented to attack with vigor. The enemy, seeing Barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter and with considerable loss to himself, but the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. Bernie was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossing built by our troops and covered the crossings. The second assault was repulsed again with severe loss to the enemy and Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this move. Between the lines where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. He was repulsed on both occasions but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. He then organized a storming party consisting of twelve regiments and assigned Colonel Emery Upton of the 121st New York Volunteers to the command of it. About four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered Warren's and Wright's corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. The movement was prompt and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. The battlefield was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen by any one person as to the progress made. Mead and I occupied the best position we could get in rear of Warren. Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the killed. He was not followed, however, by the enemy and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. To the left our success was decided but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton, with his assaulting party, pushed forward and crossed the enemy's entrenchments. Turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. So much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce that I ordered Upton to withdraw. But the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that I withdrew the order. To relieve them I ordered a renewal of the assault. By this time Hancock, who had gone with Bernie's division to relieve Barlow, had returned bringing the division with him. His corps was now joined with Warren's and Rice in this last assault. It was gallantly made many men getting up to and over the works of the enemy but they were not able to hold them. At night they were withdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important advantage but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By this authority I conferred the rank of Brigadier General upon Upton on the spot and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badly wounded in this fight. Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of Spotsylvania courthouse completely turning Lee's right. He was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained in I being with the troops where the heavy fighting was did not know of it at the time. He had gained his position with but little fighting and almost without loss. Burnside's position now separated him widely from Rice's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to join on to this. This brought him back about a mile and lost to us an important advantage. I attached no blame to Burnside for this but I do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position. The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage except in the single instance of this attack on Barlow. Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. On the eleventh there was no battle and but little firing, none except by Mott, who made a reconnaissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. I wrote the following letter to General Halleck, near Spotsylvania Courthouse, May 11, 1864, 8.30 a.m. Major General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D.C. We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result, up to this time, is much in our favor, but our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded, and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater. We, having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few, except a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Bell Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible and end as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Bell Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to Bell Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so. I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers and by keeping them entrenched in every position they take. Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defense of Richmond. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General. And also I received information through the War Department from General Butler that his cavalry under Cots had cut the railroad south of Petersburg separating Beauregard from Richmond and had whipped Hill, killing, wounding, and capturing many. Also that he was entrenched and could maintain himself. On this same day came news from Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations and most of the medical stores for his army. On the eighth I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications which was successfully executed in the manner I have already described. End of Section 52, Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at joccldv.com. Section 53 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant. Chapter 53, Hancock's Assault, Losses of the Confederates, Promotions Recommended, Discomforture of the Enemy, Ural's Attack, Reducing the Artillery. In the reconnaissance made by Mott on the eleventh, a salient was discovered at the right center. I determined that an assault should be made at that point. Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren and Wright under cover of Knight to Wright's left and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. It took most of the Knight to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside was ordered to attack on the left of the salient at the same hour. I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. Hancock put Barlow on his left in double column, and Birney to his right. Mott followed Birney and Gibbon was held in reserve. The morning of the twelfth opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's entrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to cross, but notwithstanding all these difficulties the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. The hand-conflict was soon over. Hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners, among them a division and a brigade commander, twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition. Several thousand stand of arms and many colors. Hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside on the left had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy but not without loss in return. This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back, but he did so slowly with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss until behind the breastwork he had captured. These he turned, facing them the other way and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to reinforce Hancock and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soon after coming up, but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated and with emphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Mead written orders to relieve Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy firing over the heads of his own troops. Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his center from that quarter. If the fifth corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the sixth corps, better results might have been obtained. Lee masked heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. Five times during the day he assaulted furiously but without dislodging our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket poles. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade, and one regiment with heavy losses elsewhere. Our losses were heavy but as stated no whole company was captured at night, Lee took a position in rear of his former one and by the following morning he was strongly entrenched in it. Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up. Cutler's division sent to Wright and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, General Humphries, to remain with Warren and their remaining division and authorized him to give it orders in his name. During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. About the center stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly union that I stopped. She said she had not seen a union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. She said her husband and son, being union men, had had to leave early in the war and were now somewhere in the union army if alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered Russians issued to her and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son were. There was no fighting on the thirteenth, further than a little skirmishing between Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to a brigade and assigned to Barney's division. During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade for promotion to the grade of Major General in the regular army, Hancock for Brigadier General, Wright, Gibbon, and Humphries to be major generals of volunteers, and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers. Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President. The night of the thirteenth warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily. The roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way to get through. It was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in Wright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove the enemy and was then repulsed in turn. Heirs coming to his support with his brigade of Griffin's division, Warren's Corps, the position was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the fourteenth. This brought our line east of the courthouse and running north and south and facing west. During the night of the fourteenth, fifteenth, Lee moved to cover this new front. This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to the rear of our new center, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. On the fifteenth news came from Butler and Abarill. The former reported the capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff on the James River and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville Road, and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. The next day news came from Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defenses of Richmond. The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by Courier. This condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. I wrote Halleck near Spotsylvania Courthouse May 16, 1864, 8 a.m. Major General Halleck Washington, D.C. We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fedricksburg. All offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have 24 hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements alone have suspended hostilities and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. U.S. Grant, Lieutenant General, the condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the seventeenth. But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to their old positions and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line so the assault was unsuccessful. On this day, eighteenth, the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. News came that Siegel had been defeated at Newmarket badly and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before I had sent the inquiry to Halleck whether Siegel could not get to Staunton to stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I ask at once that Siegel might be relieved and someone else put in his place. Hunter's name was suggested and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported him driven from Drury's bluff but still in possession of the Petersburg Road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved and can be put in his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. In fact, the good news for the enemy must have been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomforture. But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank on toward Richmond to commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the cooperation of the Navy in changing our base of supplies from Fredericksburg to Port Royal on the Rappahannock. Up to this time I had received no reinforcements except six thousand raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler just arrived. They had not yet joined their command Hancock's corps, but were on our right. This corps had been brought to the rear of the center ready to move in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon with Earleys as a reserve to attack us in that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg and had been halted on the road to the right of our line near Kitchings Brigade of Warren's Corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops and they maintained their position until reinforced in a manner worthy of veterans. Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. Bernie was thrown to Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, was given as a reserve and Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear to cut him off from his entrenchments, but his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners besides his killed and wounded. The army being engaged until after dark I rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from Spotsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded by a division of color troops commanded by General Ferraro belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferraro was therefore promptly notified and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come. If he had to retreat to do so towards Fredericksburg, the enemy did detach as expected and captured 25 or 30 wagons which, however, were soon retaken. In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, Lee could be reinforced largely and I had no doubt he would be. Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler, being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in North Carolina and Seagull's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek whipped. Many troops could be spared from the valley. The wilderness and Spotsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It occupied much of the road in marching and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before leaving Spotsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defenses of Washington over 100 pieces of artillery with the horses and caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than 206 horse teams and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James River, I again reduced the artillery with the army largely. I believe that if one core of the army was exposed on the road to Richmond and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack the exposed core before reinforcements could come up, in which case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time to entrench. So I issued the following orders. Near Spotsylvania Courthouse, Virginia, May 18, 1864, Major General Mead, Commanding Army of the Potomac. Before daylight tomorrow morning, I proposed to draw Hancock and Burnside from the position they now hold and put Burnside to the left of right. Right and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight and entrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left cores. Tomorrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved southeast with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three cores of the army and attacked if possible before time is given to entrenched. Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. U.S. Grant. On the 20th of February, Lee, showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left flank movement to commence after night. End of Section 53, Recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at joclev.com