 Okay, so I'm being told that we can start, but we are right, not just on time almost, I mean, it's 32. I was going to give it a few more minutes, but it seems you don't need and I see that we have no some people are coming still coming in. We are over 70 participants. So that's good. And people are still coming in. So maybe we give it a couple more minutes and then we start at 35. No, I think. Yeah, I think. Yeah. Okay, let's go ahead. Okay. Hello to, to everyone. And thank you all for for attending. This, this session which I'm sure you won't regret attending actually because it's a very interesting topic, and on a very interesting book. Actually, my great pleasure to be chairing this, this book launch in some form, the launch of a book by someone with whom I work for for quite a few years, because he, the book is the result of his PhD. It's based on his PhD thesis, which he did at us. And that's Daniel Marvesky was on the screen. And so Daniel did his PhD here in the department of development studies although his PhD is more in international relations. And he then taught, he taught at us and also at Leeds, the University of Leeds. He was actually commuting for a while last year, very heroically, because that wasn't very easy teaching in both places as an illustration of what it means to be fractional and precarious and all that as we know, or as all those who are in higher education know quite well. But this year, Daniel has got a position, although it's a temporary position but it's a permanent. I mean, it's a full term full full time position sorry at the University of Hong Kong in his teaching their international relations and he is, of course, using very much. So his knowledge now of the topic of his thesis and of his book, which is Germany's political intervention in the Middle East, and essentially as for the book, the German contribution to the consolidation that's put in that way of the state of Israel and later politics in that in that regard. So that's a topic which actually has been very little covered there are very few studies of that and Daniel's book, which I very strongly recommend to every every listener or now over 80 person that's great. I very much recommend the book and it's the, as far as I know at the very least the only book of this size the only study of the scope that is focused on on the German role in the towards the state of Israel over that long period with a major focus on the building year the consolidation years of the state of Israel, when Germany played a very major role as Daniel will be telling us. So Daniel will be speaking for he planned to speak for 30 minutes but I told him that it won't nobody will be unhappy if he goes beyond that because our speakers usually speak for these those Tuesday lectures of this so as Middle East Institute. Speak around 4045 minutes but anyhow that will leave leave more time for for discussion and therefore please feel free to post your questions to the speaker and I will convey them to him when the discussion time will be open. It's, it's yours. Thank you very much for the introduction. I hope everybody can see me and hear me. Due to 2020 I'm used to teaching and talking on zoom, but it always feels like talking into a void. So if there's any trouble, please say so. I remember quite well six years ago or so when I started PhD how I was very impressed by the speakers that so as invited. And I did not imagine that one day I would be you know, be on the stage of so as and I certainly did not imagine that this stage would be a thing called zoom during a global pandemic so thank you all for for being here. In late 2020. What I will do is I will talk about this book right that just got published by hers earlier this year. Basically, most books you can already see half their content have their argument from the title and the book cover. I think with my book, the whole story is already there in the cover and in the title so if you look closely what you see here is the staff David superimposed on the German flag and that's actually taken from a mural from a picture on a remainder part of the wall, the dividing wall between the two walls. So for those who've been to Berlin and who visited the east side gallery, they will have seen this picture the gallery between the Osbahnhof and the Oberbaum Brücke. So that is the cover and the title is Germany Israel whitewashing and state building. So the argument is already there in the title it is that initially at its core we have to understand the relationship between those two as one of exchange and exchange between whitewashing for West Germany and state building for Israel to put it in more academic terms. It was a question of symbolic state building for Germany and material state building for Israel. Now the book. I mean as you've just said it's based on my PhD but I promise you it's not written like like a PhD, or at least I tried. So what I will do in this short talk is three things first I will talk about the whitewashing part of the argument, then I will talk about the state building bit, and then I will briefly go into the German role in the Israel Palestine conflict and how Germany viewed this role. So I will move through the contents of the book both topically and chronologically. And in doing so I will focus on the initial period from the post war till 1967, which is the essential period of German Israeli relations. This is where most stuff happened and I think this is where and when the relationship was shaped to the present day. And thanks. Right. So, as you can see from the cover or what the cover shows you or tells you is that for Germany the relationship with Israel is more than just a relationship with any other state it's more than just based on, you know, simple interest is much more than that the relationship with Israel for Germany, and especially for the Germany of today is one that really points to the identity of Germany it has a lot to do with German identity. In 2018, and this is how I start the book in 2018, the German parliament celebrated the anniversary of Israel, the 70th year. And in celebrating this anniversary. Politicians talked about the relationship and it was quite quite revealing. And the, the most illustrative quotes is maybe from the politician of the Green Party Katrin Göring Eckhart, who said that Israel's right to exist is our own. So she tied the German right to exist as a post Nazi post sure state to its relationship with Israel. So for Germany, having this relationship is a way of repudiating of dispelling the ghosts of of the past. Right, so for Germany is very much about basing itself as a liberal democratic state within the present. Now what is interesting if you listen to how German politicians talk about the relationship is that they always talk about themselves, but they never talk about the actual relationship so it's a very kind of narcissistic self centered type of debate it's so to say. Right, so you never learn anything about the actual historical relationship. And as you were saying there's actually quite little, you know writing literature on that. So what's the relationship about, and how do you write about this. So my approach was to try to dispel to try to go beyond the German mythology about this relationship right. So I tried to look beyond to look behind the German debate because I think it obscures more, more than it shows. Basically, the German political or mainstream political political idea about relations is that they are based on German morality, but that Germany did not play a big role in the Middle East. So this is the mainstream perception a moral role, but no big implications. And I would argue that historically, the opposite of the inverse picture is much closer to the truth, which is that morality had very little to do with the Jewish roots Israel, and that Germany has indeed played a pretty big role in the Middle East. So the state building part of the argument refers to what I think is a historical fact that Germany before was the most important supporter of the state and this is the story I tell. I think what people make of this story really depends on their political position as well as I'm not saying I'm uncovering some objective truth here but I think it's a story that can be interpreted in different ways, depending on where you stand in the conflict. So let me go through the argument let's start with the whitewashing bit why whitewashing why this term. I mean if you have an idea of Germany post 1945, both Germany's in fact but I'm talking about West Germany. But it was a moral wasteland right denatification was actually aborted very early reversed, mainly because of the cold war because the US needed Germany as a frontline state in the cold war. So the US which was the most of the biggest support of denatification stopped denatification because Germany was needed. Right. This was a Germany that was still full of Nazis basically right, so you could not expect a lot of moral repentance from that country so in this context, turning towards the Jewish state in the Middle East was rather convenient for Germany, because it could present a liberal and democratic or critic Germany, where in fact it could not yet have existed. Right. Because of the, the depth, actually of of of Nazism and German society. So for anybody who has a critical view, and in fact this is the mainstream historical view is not even especially critical. The moral argument is problematic, right the moral argument for German is relations I'm not saying that morally that morality was absent. It's not and it became very important later on, but initially, it was about whitewashing. Okay, and it's not even me who's saying that is it is Conrad Adenauer, the first German Chancellor, who is saying that. In this book, I'm quoting Conrad Adenauer, who is saying on German television in 1966, the following. So this is Conrad Adenauer the first German Chancellor, right. So I quote Adenauer. He's saying, we had done to the Jews so much injustice committed such crimes against them that somehow these had to be expiated or repaired if we were at all to regain our international standing. And therefore, the power of the Jews, even today, especially in America should not be underestimated. And of quote. So this is Conrad Adenauer on German TV in 1966 and he's saying two things. First, he's saying that we need to have relations with Israel we need to pay reparations to regain our international standing. Right, so it's about rehabilitation. And secondly, he's giving this bizarre anti Semitic argument about, you know, Jewish power quote, even today, especially in the US. So what you can see there quite openly is this mixture of the drive for rehabilitation, coupled with an overblown idea of the Jewish influence in the world and over German affairs. Right, so you have this bizarre kind of anti Semitism as a sort of byproduct of this whitewashing. Right. And the book is really full of this stuff by the way, it is based on research in the German foreign office archive so it is. As you bear was saying I wrote it at the Department for Development Studies but actually it's a political history right so it's not even international relations in the sense of IR, but it is international history and say kind of historical critical analysis based on foreign office archive material and a lot of other sources. Here are a few more examples of this whitewashing. So, German Israel had military relations from from a very early stage right in the 1950s. And here is Rolf Vogel who was a journalist and art now a confidant. He was saying in 1966 about German weapon procurements in Israel. He's saying that, I quote the Uzi in the hand of the German soldier is better than any brochure against anti Semitism. So he is arguing for military relations as a means to combat anti Semitism in Germany. And to this, you got alone who was then a Knesset member of the last meeting. And later Defense Minister said that, well, the Germans have purchased our weapons not because they are good, but because they are Jewish, the Germans desperately need rehabilitation. So he is arguing in the book as well that on the Israeli side, it was very clear what Germany was largely about. Right, so this is important and also for Israel, turning to Germany was of course in many ways the most unnatural solution, right. In fact, the relationship with Germany led to the strongest domestic crisis in our under Ben Gurion's rain. So I think this is to be out on as well that, you know, for Israel, what was kind of expedient on the level of states, the relationship relations was completely actually unthinkable on on individual terms, right. So you have the states, you know, which is hardly not suffice denazified West Germany, and the states in which, you know, whose founding populations is made up to one third of Holocaust survivors. So this is really a a a a relationship between the two states that would then later impact on the societal level. Right, and this mixture of rehabilitation whitewashing and anti Semitism really marks the relationship from the German side until the the late 1960s, right, which is also of course, when the the generation of Nazism was, still dominant in the German state. Right, so I have a few other quotes here but I just leave them out I think you get the general idea. And I will move on to the second bit of the argument, which is state building. So as you bear was saying, what I'm doing in the book, as well as a bit of cold war history, a bit of cold war geopolitics, and also showing in a bit of development studies in showing that Germany was key to the consolidation of Israel. And I think it was early phase when the Jewish state was, you know, not what it would become after 67 with German help, but in fact a fragile experiment in a largely hostile Middle East. So I'm arguing that if you come together the reparations agreement which was a targeted program of industrial modernization. The secret financial help and secret military help. What you get is a picture of Germany as the most important supporter to Israel prior to 67, because for those who know the Middle East history, the US really stepped up or really became the the crucial ally of Israel after 67. Right. And before 67. I'm arguing that was Germany, of course, France by the role but overall Germany was the most important supporter of our countries. So, and this was to policy makers at the time that was relatively clear so she won Paris he would write in 1970, I quote that the US helped us with money but not with weapons. The US helped us with weapons but not with money. And Germany could build a bridge over the past by delivering arms without demanding money or anything else, because this is shaman Paris 1970. After the 1967 war which of course changes the landscape of the Middle East in a fundamental way after this war the German ambassador to Israel, rights to the German Foreign Minister, I quote, an officer of the general staff, told me that the West, more heavily armored tanks delivered by us proved their worth in excellent fashion so what I'm showing here is that another military historian but if you look at how the 1967 war unfolded the battle in the air was one with the help of French war planes and the battle on the ground was actually one with the help of tanks delivered by West Germany. So this is the crucial bit of the story this exchange between whitewashing and state building under 67, which is a lot more complex than it may sound it's a complicated very often strange kind of bizarre history, but this is how I tried to conceptually understand it. Right. I mean most works on the topic are very descriptive very historical. You know very much in terms of what details chronological narratives, and I tried to understand this historical complexity. In terms of that exchange. So, what about the Palestinians or what about the Israel Palestine conflict, because of course Germany at least by implication played a pretty huge role in that conflict, right. And of course, within the German government policy makers were aware of that and they were also aware of arguments made by Palestinian and Arab actors that Germany should have a form of indirect responsibility for those who had to make room for the creation of Israel, which is the Palestinians, of course, and Germany knew that. So I'm just quoting one of many internal memoranda here which shows you or gives you that picture very clearly. This is from within the foreign office in 1968. I quote. It has long been argued by the Arab side that Germany bears a special responsibility for the fate of the Palestine refugees. This is supposedly so because of the anti Jewish politics of Hitler the subsequent Jewish mass immigration to Palestine, and because of the massive support later extended to Israel by the Federal Republic. Before the federal government is seen to be obliged to pay reparations to the Palestine refugees, similar to how it paid reparations to Israel. It is therefore important to avoid any impression of an acknowledgement of a special German responsibility responsibility towards the Palestine refugee so it was express policy. That a special responsibility, the impression of a special responsibility had to be avoided. So that was one of the policy line when it came to the Palestinians and whatever was done in favor of Palestinian refugees was done to offset or positively influence relations with the Arab states, because both German East and West Germany kind of try to play the Arab states in their German German game. So whatever Germany did regarding the Palestinians was really a function of its politics towards the Arab states. Future before 1967 what happens after 67 the first part of the book is really about the pre 67 period, and then the other half of the book is about what happens after. So it's a lot more years in a much shorter timeframe. This is justified by the fact that well relations were so important prior to 67 but not as much after right what happens after 67 is that the US of course becomes the most important back of Israel and Germany becomes the second best friend as it's often called and the key Israel ally in Europe. So relations do lose some of their urgency and they do lose some of their drama, but of course they still remain important and what we see after 67 is something that today seems quite strange if you know you know the way Israel and Palestine are being talked about in Germany, what Germany wanted to do after 67 was to normalize relations. So the thinking was well we've done our rehabilitation I want to normalize right, but when they said normalize it was also often meant or kind of underlying this was an idea to just, you know, be done be done with the past. Alright, and Israel wanted to retain this special relationship naturally because that was a beneficial relationship, and because that is what Israel saw as you know being you know historically. You know the right way. So you really have this tug of war between normalization and special relations between the two sides. And the Palestinians and the Arab states play a role in this as well, right. Because most of this happens after the oil crisis. And it moves that European countries made towards the Palestinians, where again functions of their policies towards Arab countries. So I do talk about that but I would also argue that despite all this diplomatic friction. The real underpinnings remain stable. And I also show that, you know, being the second most important friend, you know also came with a lot of benefits. So this is the second part of the book and the third part talks about German Israeli relations after unification or after you know West Germany incorporated East Germany. What happened then what happened then was that the relationship was changed to a certain direction that we still observe today. So at the end of the 1980s, the German president at the time Richard von Weizsäcker made a remarkable speech in which he said that memory on you know memorizing the past is a source of redemption. For Germany. So this is where this memory culture that Germany is often applauded for was actually formed it's it's relatively new. It's a product of the 1980s, where memorizing the past is seen as something that is quintessential to the German self to German identity more than that it has this religious overtone of redemption. And in 2008 Angela Merkel expresses the idea or you know formalizes the idea that Israel security is part of the German starts the German reason of state. So two things go together, of course, so the, the change in German memory culture is also seen and how relations with Israel are being talked about and being integrated into this memory culture, right and this is also where these, where the debate about the relationship becomes quite divorced from what is actually happening in the Middle East and from what these relations actually look like so they really become part of the debate of German about over German identity. So this debate is very ritualized. It goes in circles and anybody who knows, you know, German discussions about the conflict or about anti-Semitism, how it relates to the Israel-Palestine conflict. So one knows the arguments, knows to exchange the arguments and it's always kind of the same kind of discussion, right. But you have this pretty, I think, obvious divide between German debate and German politics on the ground. You can see quite clearly when it comes to the question of the now, of course, long lost Oslo process to state solution and Palestinian state building. So Germany, when the Oslo process happened, Germany was very relieved, in fact, and it saw this as a chance to end, you know, this dilemma between supporting Israel, of course, you know, but also being in favor of some form of Palestinian self-determination, which it came around to in the 1980s. But the interesting thing is when you look at the, you know, how Germany operates in the Oslo process, this is quite different to how this is being talked about in Germany. So before I did the PhD, I was actually working for the Friedrich Eberschiftung in East Jerusalem, which is a foundation affiliated with the Social Democratic Party in Germany. And what you can see is that on the ground, German policymakers and Germans working on the ground were quite very dissatisfied with German foreign policy, right, seeing it as throwing money as a process that was leading nowhere and as a process of state building but without a clear definition or idea of where and how this Palestinian state should be created. So Germany has played a pretty important role, I would say in the Oslo process, but it has not confronted the fact that this process is, you know, long past. And the debate in Germany about the Israel-Palestine conflict is quite divorced from what is happening on the ground. So I'm ending the book with a discussion on the emerge or reemergence of the far right in German politics, how this and some or how the far right in Germany when it comes to Israel and Palestine in some ways links back relates to the early part of our years. And I'm ending the book with the statement that Germany seems to continue to contribute to an untenable situation between Israelis and Palestinians, which is a situation it has contributed to in many ways, and which I would say have been talked about enough. And I'm hoping that this book is making some kind of start in this direction. Right. Thank you very much for listening. I'm hoping this was about 30 minutes. Yeah, I mean, yes, you spoke for 30 minutes and maybe a couple more minutes. So that's great. Thank you very much, Daniel for this kind of summary of the book, which is no excuse for anyone not to read the book itself and not to acquire I mean, you just got a little flavor of what is in the book. It's a really very, very interesting, fascinating story this the story of the relation between post Nazi Germany, the Western, Western Germany, of course, this is just to mention to clarify it's not about both German is it's about Western Germany's relation to the Israeli state. And so, I mean, that's a very interesting read and also a lot of food of thought for thought about, including ethical issues a lot of reflections on the identity in politics and also the, the hypocrisy that of course that's, let's use the appropriate term in in international politics so a lot of that in this fascinating read and Jackie has posted on the chat section, some information about discount so how to to get a discount to get the book with a discount so please take advantage of it and and order the book. And now we have questions this is the opening it to questions and they are starting to to arrive. The first question is about reactions in Germany to your book. Just remind us all it came out exactly. When was it in March, this March. Yeah, so it's very recent still very recent for a book. And it came out in English, of course, Daniel is preparing a German version of his book which I hope will will come out any sometime soon but that's very important I believe that this book comes out in German, of course. Where the reaction to the, to the, the present edition, especially that in Germany English is widely read by at least among intellectuals in the academia. Okay German reactions. Yeah. You're actually quite good. So I gave a pretty long interview to the, the Deutschland funk which is a very important, you know, radio program kind of the BBC for I think of Germany that was positive. And then, what I find interesting is that the book is being discussed across the political spectrum. Right. So you have conservatives talking about it and your left, leftist talking about it, which is something that I wanted to achieve. I wanted to problem or not problematize I really wanted to, you know, trouble the whole German conversation about the topic. So, I think so far, fairly positive, but I'm still awaiting some reactions. The people who truly are a little bit, so to say pissed off, are those really believe in the moral tale, and in the moral self image that Germany tries to create right, which I do think is, you know, getting crack So if you look at Germany we have the highest rate of far right crimes in Europe. We have a Nazi party in parliament or at least, you know, in a partially openly fascist party in parliament. Antisemitism on the rise, racism on the rise. So this kind of moral self indulgement. I think is something that needs to be problematized in Germany is very important. And yeah, some people who are wedded to this idea of you know the moral reckoning of Germany. I don't want to happy, but apart from that, so far, surprisingly positive. Right. Another question relate, I mean, related to to Germany is about someone who traveled there and noticed that there are streets named after Israeli figures, like Ben Gurion or Rabin. And so the question is, is this something which is widespread and are there other figures used in the same way. Yeah, I know which streets you're referring to. There will probably be others I the, I think, again, the, the thing is, the German perspective is is very oblivious of the Palestinian perspective, right, to say the least so if in Germany is called after Ben Gurion or Rabin. It's because, you know, this show, you know, this is useful for the German self image and useful the picture Germany wants to present, which is, you know, one that has been atoned for, you know, the Jewish state in the Middle East is happy to have a job in Germany. So that means that Germany has done a great job at mastering its past. This is the kind of function. This has and I think the function such streets street names have have as well. Right and there's very little critical discussion around that I think which is what you would would like to have. This is really about the German portrayal and self self image. Part of the story. Yeah. Okay. We have to two questions. I mean, there may be others and go down and scroll down the list later, but there are two here which are more or less overlapping about asking you to talk more about the shifts in German memory. And the the cynical motives behind the the relation of federal Germany was with Israel. Maybe the answer this elaborate on the second one one first maybe. I think in Israel, the, everybody was very clear about the germ motivations right and I quoted you go along there's other quotes. I think. Fantastic. I think that Tom Segev and his works especially the seventh million really leverage very well on the Israeli perspective of Germany, which is something I can't go into I don't speak here with this. This is really about the German side of the picture. So that was, I think, very much perceived but the question was one of material need for Israel right so there's nothing about a torment or blah blah blah it's about material necessity. So that's that then why did it turn into what we have today. Where memory culture becomes a source of redemption right as in the quote by white sucker. It's a pretty big change right the continuity is still that there is a hesitancy to really openly confront a past that almost cannot be confronted right so I don't know he wrote about this 1959 and he said everything back then that needs to be said about it. I think, turning this into a religious source of redemption this memory culture is another way of preventing an actual whatever that may be confrontation with the past. And that's maybe even a continuity to the cynical post war situation because as I said you have this kind of say liberal left liberal consensus about the importance of memorizing and I don't want it's not all bad right I mean, you know probably you know does have its benefits. But I do think the or it certainly does you know it certainly does, but the secularization this religious element is has gone has gone quite far recently. And I think the question is well how does that relate to the conflict how does that I think the quote here the how does that you raise the Palestinian situation. I mean, I think the the whole Palestinian issue really problematizes the kind of story Germany likes to tell about itself. Right. So, I think the Palestinians as a very significant other to the German Israeli relationship, problematize the image the German idea of this relationship. And this is why they cannot be talked about. Right, so it's quite interesting how and strange how. Well, I mean, it even like, like the or Palestinian narratives of the conflict have quite little traction in German public discourse, right. I think you'll bear he can he can tell you more about that he tried his best. Okay, thank you Danielle. There's a, I mean, I will focus for now on the questions related to Germany which is the central topic and then at the end we'll take a couple more more general questions related of course to the books topic. There is a question about the German right I don't know what what is meant here by right is the conservative or the far right or maybe both how do they view Israel. Maybe the question would be more about the far right or I may interpret that in this way, because that is less known that I mean people. I mean what you tell the what what you said this evening is about official Germany. And you mentioned that an hour and all that. That's the, let's say the mainstream conservative party, but what about this new far right that is emerged then that you are described as fascist. Yeah, I did the alternative feel for the chance. Yeah. Yeah. What do they say about Israel. Yeah. Yes. So the the, I think they are almost comical and very, very transparent. So they have a very obvious tactical philo semitism philo Zionism. So for the far right, they are hyper supportive of the far right government in Israel so they are very supportive of the Israeli right which happens to be in power at the moment. And, and this is of course to deflect from the very real and very obvious anti semitism and racism that is constitutive of that party. So that is a very cynical game. The, but the thing about the game or the thing about this tactic is, why do they even think it can work, like why do they think this could work in German society, and that I think is the key problem. That it seems to at least partially work links back to the story I tell, and it links back to the 1950s, where, you know, I was quoting Ardenauer, who himself said that we need to pay reparations to regain international standing. So, I think the far right in some ways goes back to the German, Germany of the 1950s and of course in many ways it goes back to the Germany of the pre pre 1950s as well but it's a very tactical play. And the question is, why does this tactic work, I think that is the important question to ask. You say why you mean it works. Partially, I think, I think a lot of people call the bullshit, so to say, but that they are continuing to do this does tell you something, but I think partially yeah they're getting away with it. And I think this needs to be opposed very much, and whoever cannot see it, I'm sorry for them. Okay. Well, let's shift to the opposite side there's a question about the German left wing I mean presume the, again, not the mainstream social democratic party but the link that the more radical let's say left the term is appropriate. And also in that same context about the anti dutch. There's a specific question about about them. Right. Maybe explain what they are because most of everybody would know what. Yeah, yeah. So, so firstly in the book I don't talk about the German left because it doesn't have any influence on German policymaking. So I don't talk about the radical that the radical left talks about the radical left, but I talk about German state, right. But the German radical left is interesting because it tells you a lot about Germany. I feel about the, I feel for Cody and about the German left, you know, for co he went to the mental asylum to study what a society understands as normal. And I think if you want to learn something about Germany you have to look at the debates on the German left because they put very clearly what is at stake in the mainstream debate. In the 19th century, that's a kind of a left wing position that emerged after the nationalist euphoria of the 1990s and that, you know, turned a bit bizarre. These would be left wing, mostly university related people saying that we are against Germany, but very much in favor of Israel, which doesn't make sense logically because I mean as I show in the book Germany is a heavy support of Israel and has been so from the very beginnings. So it's an illogical position. It's very illogical. But again, it's a bit like the far right, the fact that this seems to work tells you something about Germany, I think. Okay, but you didn't elaborate. It's not very clear what you said about the link. What's their position. You mean now you mean the link as, you know, not not the radical fringes but you mean. Yes, yes, the mainstream organization. Yeah, yeah, you have the, you basically have the choice between Conrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt, right? That is the the post-war choice that you have. Who do you go for? If you go for Adenauer, you go for a position that is the one I explained which is rehabilitation, a very clear pro-Israel view, quite a kind of as his biographer says himself, imperial view on the Middle East. So you would go for that. Willy Brandt on the other hand, who is of course, you know, the godfather of social democracy and who is a person. You know, at least I should think, you know, would be good to have in Germany right now. Willy Brandt, he was very clear about the importance of relations with Israel, but he also was one of the key figures in bringing to light the Palestinian situation and who really made moves of understanding towards the Palestinians, right? So I think these are the two big figures that you have to look at and the social democrats and parts of the link, you know, I think most of them would work in the Willy Brandt kind of tradition. You have a Willy Brandt center in Jerusalem actually. Okay, and well, related to that also, there's a question about, I mean, did the atmosphere, the conditions for the debate about Israel, about the relation of Germany with Israel has, I mean, has this changed over years to now? Is there more room for critical views of the state, I would say, especially under Netanyahu's government? I think there's no debate about German relations with Israel. There's a lot of debate about Israel and, you know, by implication about the Palestinians, but there's no debate about the actual relationship. It's really, really funny. So Germany has this massive role in the conflict, but it doesn't talk about that role. It doesn't know much about it, which is why I agree with Jebair would be nice to soon find a German publisher for the book. So no, there is no debate about the German role. It's all projection. It's all about national identity, and it has very little to do with the Middle East. So as regards the atmosphere, I think right now it is very, very charged, right? So Germany has officially condemned BDS as anti-Semitic. It has adopted the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism. So there is, you know, as critical observers would say, a shrinking of space for debates. And this also comes with, yeah, and this relates to this ignorance, actually, of German-Israeli relations, you know. So in a way, I totally ignore German debates about the Middle East because I think they are so surreal, right? So let's see what my book does, you know, with those debates. I'm not sure yet. Okay. Yeah, and you mentioned there was a question about the BDS issue, which you just mentioned. One of the questions presupposes that Germany benefited economically from its relations with Israel. So how would you react to this? That Germany, okay, I can't see the question. No, don't worry. Okay, answer my question. Don't look at the question. Okay, so Germany benefited. I'll let you do that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So if you look at the reparations agreement, it was good for Germany economically because reparations were paid in terms of capital goods, machinery, ships, stuff like that. So for Germany, it was part of the small part of the Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle of the post-war years. So, you know, the common idea if you have, you know, somebody who sinned and somebody, you know, who was the victim of that sin is that the sinner repents and pays, does something, right? But in the German case, what Germany did never amounted to, never cost much to Germany. Why? Because after World War Two, Germany was very quickly on its feet again. And Israel was the destitute refugee state in the Middle East. So whatever Germany did, automatically had a huge impact on Israel. And, you know, it didn't take much out of the German pockets, right? So for Germany, yes, there was certainly some material benefit. Also, if you look at military cooperation and technology out of that today. But all in all, for Germany, this was more about the whitewashing, more about German identity than about what could, what Israel could give Germany materially, right? So it's not a one-way street either way. But for Germany, the material benefits that did accrue were kind of a nice side effect, I would say. I hope understood the question correctly. Yeah, and someone wants you to clarify, probably someone seems to be surprised by the fact that there were tank deliveries. So just a question asking you to confirm that this issue. Maybe you could say more about the kind of weapons or the kind of military relations there was between Western Germany, West Germany and this. So I do find military history a bit boring, but it's quite important, actually, you know, this is, you know, it's important. So Germany, yeah, not just tanks, delivered all kinds of stuff. So boats, helicopters, weapons, ammunition, and tanks. Those tanks, those, you know, the most important tank delivery was a kind of triangle trade with the US. So prior to 67, the US did not want to openly arm Israel because, you know, of relations with Arab states, but it did want to do something. So Germany was partially also pressured to deliver tanks that were actually American. So I'm also talking a lot about the American role, of course, because you cannot talk about relations without talking about the US. Yeah, just to clarify that question, tanks in the 50s and 60s, absolutely, and much more than that. Okay, I have now a question, which I read because it's actually a long statement by Professor Smudder-Lavi, who's Professor Emerita at the University of California at Davis. And she's writing, she says, thank you for your historical, political analysis of the Israeli-German relationship. My question or comment has to do with the interplay between German-Israeli international relationships and intra-Jewish relationship inside Israel. I think that these two factors create a pincer that enables Israel's ultra-nationalism and the continued occupation of Palestine. West Germany and the State of Israel signed an agreement on 10 September 1952 for West Germany to pay compensation refunds for slave labor and persecution to Jews who survived the Nazi Holocaust. The only Israeli political opposition to this agreement came from the Herut Party, which is the precursor of the Likud, and was headed by Minahem Begin. So Herut believed that it was and Father Mevel, I don't know how to say that, to quantify the suffering of Holocaust survivors in German Marx no less. So your comment on this comment. Yeah, yeah, I actually just read the question and then it goes on to talk about the Mizrahi Jews of Arab origin. And the question then I think turns, it's not the one I have. Okay, it's two different questions. Okay, actually, yes, I must say. There is a part two later on. That's true. Let's start with part one. Okay, okay. I think Minahem Begin was right. He was correct. The question is, what would he have done had he been in power, right? Because Ben Gurion, I don't think he had a rosy image of Germany. He just thought that whatever Germany could give was more important than the moral question, right? For him, the interest of the state overrode the moral question. So the latest book by Tom Sager for a quote here again is I think called a state at any costs is a biography of Ben Gurion. And this already tells you everything, right? Ben Gurion wanted to state at any cost and if that included help from, you know, Germany. Okay. So that was Ben Gurion. And begging had a very clear analysis of Germany, and it had a very clear moral position that the Jewish suffering that the murder of the Holocaust should not be quantified in terms of German money weapons or capital goods. Yeah, so it's true. And this actually goes up until the 1980s, when Begin actually becomes Prime Minister, that, you know, Germany's relations really suffer. So it's more like the, you know, Ben Gurion and Jiman Paris, those figures who were key to this reconciliation process if you want to use that word. Yeah. Yeah. And so, carry on. Now we move to the part two. So Herut was also concerned by the large income and power gap such as an imbalance in flux of funds would create between Ashkenazim and Mizraheem in the Israeli state. On 5th October 52, Dov Shilansky, a member of Herut and Holocaust survivor from Lithuania, was arrested for attempting to bomb the Israeli Foreign Ministry in Tel Aviv. He had walked into the basement of the Ministry building carrying a suitcase containing 25 sticks of TNT. His aim was to hold the reparation agreement process. And after a two year prison sentence Shilansky went on to a career in law and politics rising to the position of this chairman between 88 and 92. He was a fierce advocate for Mizrahi equality, and his admirer is Mizrahi communities throughout Israel, Mizraheem or Jews originating in the Arabian Muslim words, and the non Yiddish margins of Europe are 50% of Israel's citizens. They vote almost in unison for right wing parties, making the center of Israeli politics move toward ultra nationalism. And the question, can you please further discuss the electoral power of the Mizrahi majority vote in light of the Israeli-German relationship and the impossibility of any present day just solution for the Israel-Palestine Very broad question. I must say it's also a bit out of my expertise, right, because Israeli domestic politics are not something that I can expertly comment upon. I do think that you are talking about a very interesting shift here because it's true. The Israeli rights as derived from Jabotinsky really was an opposition to any kind of reconciliation process with Germany. And now this changes also as the demographics, the electoral demographics change because of course Holocaust survivors and those related to, I mean, the majority of the persecution took part in in Europe. So the historical memory was, you know, obviously strongest among that electoral group, which was quite divided on Germany, right. So, actually it's a very good question. I think I should think about it a bit more. I just take it up. I think I would just need to think about it a bit more. Yeah, and I will ask the question, I think is more knowledgeable about this than me. So, yeah, you turn this discussion around even. It shouldn't be difficult to find that Professor Levi's. Yeah, carry on continue the discussion by email. And there is a question about how the, the fact that I mean how the, the, the, this part of the Israeli population which whose background is German out this, this fact affect the relationship. Or maybe also how, how was it, how is it seen from Germany, which is an interesting question. For example, if you look at the negotiations that led up to the relations agreement. The negotiators on the Israeli side were Germans, German Jews, right. And the Germans were of course Germans, but the Germans who negotiated were not Nazi loyalists, right. The people are now a sense to negotiate with Israel were actually the good kind of Germans, right. So here you had this weird situation where you had people from the, you know, good part of Germany, discussing on behalf of well the old country. So that was always a thing and I do think that this cultural affinity language shared history did help, obviously, with negotiations with coming to agreements where they would have seemed impossible, right. So I do agree that this would be a weakness of my book which is a more, you know, structurally oriented. So I'm making this, you know, kind of broader historical argument. So if we look at the more specific detailed narrative histories of German Israeli relations, especially on certain aspects of it. I think you would find a lot of that there where this cultural shared heritage did lead to an easing, you know, of negotiations. Maybe you can also a little bit elaborate on that because, I mean, in a certain sense, those who are of German background could be the most sensitive to any relation with Germany. And so how did this part of the population, if you have any knowledge about that, that was not the focus of your research, but you spoke of individuals involved in negotiations but how about the larger population of Germany. Yeah, I think what we have to see here is that German weapons, German capital, German money all serve to build the Israeli state, right. But for most Israelis, especially German, you know, German born Israelis. They did not want to have anything to do with Germany. As far as I know, Wagner is still prohibited to be played in Israeli concert halls, right. So you have German submarines, but you don't have Wagner music. So this idea of not wanting to have anything to do with the Germans was very, very strong, right. So this very obvious cynical state interest came first. What happened on the social on the society level came later. And I do think that is a story that is partially divorced from the state to state story, right. Which I think is an important story, right. And I think the individual, you know, relationship with, you know, the state to state story is important but I think the state to state came first. And for most, basically all Israelis. Germany was related with Germany were no go, you know, so as I'm saying this is really material needs on the state level. There's a question which goes back to Germany which is more your turf that about the how does anti Muslim racism connect with with this whole issue. And for instance in the case of the if they the far right support of Israel is that does this connect to their Islamophobic or anti Muslim kind of attitude. Yes, of course so for the FDA for example they want to get rid of owner, you know, the United Nations Agency responsible for Palestinian refugees. And the far right they would explain the Israel Palestine conflict by Palestinian antisemitism so for them the cause of the conflict is Palestinian and Jewish sentiment and so on so I mean you know the talking points. So, yeah, I mean for the far right anti Muslim racism, other kinds of racism as well I mean also anti Jewish racism, you know, is constitutional constitutive. So yes definitely. And on the broader societal level. Well I think the fact that it's fairly easy in German society to not talk about Palestinian viewpoints Palestinian narratives does tell you something it tells you that their perspective, their lives are perhaps less important. You know, in comparison. So, yeah, it's, you know, it's there. Yeah, sorry. Yeah, it's there for sure. Yeah. There's a request that you say more about what happened to the bds question in Germany. Yeah. I mean, as you will have seen it was when 2000 and 1819 that bds was basically outlawed by the German parliament right as an anti Semitic movement. So, yeah, again, I would say that this is, there hasn't really been a big debate on, you know, you know the different aspects of bds there hasn't been a big debate about where it originally came from. And the whole decision was I think understood and framed and projected as something that again relates to the German self image as you know country that learned his lesson from from from the past. So, again, I think the, the, you know, the, well the outlawing of the bds movement is part of that story. That being said, it's also very obvious that, you know, it's I think it's almost unavoidable that the idea of boycotting Israel in the context of Germany brings back memories of boycotting. Jews in Germany, even though of course that is not what I reckon most bds supporters would want right but these are connections almost inevitable. Okay. There was a question asking you to, to maybe tell you the story of what's going on, or what's behind this, the scandal in which Netanyahu is involved concerning the German submarines. Yeah. Delivery to Israel. Yeah. There is. I think there's very little talk of this I'm surprised I thought it would be a big, maybe you explain the story for. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So basically, I mean, as you know, submarines are a big part of the most obvious part of more recent military relations between the two countries. Israel has enough submarines by military standards doesn't need, you know, a sixth or seventh or eighth German submarine, but still, you know, it is kind of keeping ordering ordering a submarine so there is an issue of corruption involved between our Tyson club and and the Netanyahu office and this is part of the criticism leveled against Netanyahu in Israel. Right, but the this controversy itself is not debated much in Germany but I think what it does tell you is that well behind the scenes, things are extremely cynical. What it also tells you is that there is this aspect of you know, corruption and personal politics, which really doesn't fit in with the overall grand moral narrative. Right. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Yes. Two more questions I would say and then we will come to the end of the session. One which I read, because it's a factually tells also a story that the audience would be interested in that recently the will the Villivan Center and the young social democrats the USOS were severely attacked by the CDU and FDP politician as anti semi since they cooperate with the Palestinian. So the, the, the center cooperates with both sides that they have connections with Meretz and young labor and the Israeli young labor and they try to find possibilities of dialogue. So maybe you could elaborate on how you see a human policy about the Palestine question possible in Germany was such distorted discussion about anti semitism. Yeah, how would you, what would you tell the users. Yeah, I mean that's my point exactly. Such a policy doesn't seem to be possible when discussions are that distorted. Right. And they're immediately drawn to this territory of German identity. So this decision to, well, I think, reinvigorate really relations with young fatah was immediately criticized by the springer press. So it's really the right wing springer press which is, you know, very, very instrumental in this regard, and you should look at the actual history of springer which is quite interesting reintegrated a lot of Nazis into its ranks. And I think Willy Brandt, he would be very brand himself, I think he would be quite embarrassed. I mean, he was the first European politician who along with Bruno Kreis, he actually met and sat down with you see a lot to talk about, you know, possible two state solution. So for the SPD Willy Brandt to have who have been very much, you know, pro Israel from the beginning. In fact, the SPD was the only party that was unequivocally pro Israel I would say for the right reasons. I think Willy Brandt would be really embarrassed if you saw this kind of, you know, debate happening, happening today. So yeah, I think it's a very good question. And I do think the picture at the moment is, is, is very negative. It's bizarre. It's strange. And it's, it's a very kind of cynical, very politicized discussion and my advice to the users would just be to explain the history. Explain Willy Brandt's actual position. Explain, you know, the role of the SPD in the process of relations with Israel, which is in many ways a much more positive role than that played by the right wing in Germany. So yeah, my advice to the users is read my book. Well, for an author that's a permanent advice. Yeah, I mean, I was part of the, you know, Peter Heber shifting. So, you know, not. Okay, but yeah. So to end with a general question which connects with a couple of questions that were raised, which both turned out about the issue of reparations. And so how, how, I mean, with people regard this issue of reparations in this case, compared to reparations for slavery, you know, the issue of reparations for slavery and for colonial rule. What kind of reflection if there is also. Yeah. Yeah, or in general. It's a big question so I can't really give you a, you know, satisfactory answer but you have to remember that the first genocide of the 20th century was the genocide of Germany against the hero and number population of today's Namibia. Right. And Germany has not paid reparations for that genocide it has not even completely apologize for it officially. Right. This tells you that Germany has a, I think fairly obvious amnesia when it comes to its own colonial history and its own imperial history. Right. And also if you look at the reparation history for a Nazi Germany. A lot of victims of Nazi Germany have gone uncompensated till today, you know, so, you know, Eastern European slaves or you know it's funds are better work compensated only 2000 when few of them were still alive. The politically persecuted homosexuals the Cynthia and Roma and so on. They haven't seen anything. So, actually, the history of general reparations is really, it's a fairly limited one. The book. And I think one reason why this history today is seen as exceptional in the European context is because Europe does not acknowledge its imperial and colonial crimes at least not to the extent that you would pay reparations so it's in comparison to this amnesia that Germany is able to look good. Okay, I think we're, we're done with the key, I mean with the questions and the time is over anyway. So, thank you very much, Daniel and I should say you have really you have the added merit of speaking with a huge jet lag. And so you must be extremely tired so we won't keep you longer than that. I'm sure you're, you're, you won't be late before sleeping now and so many, many thanks for this very stimulating very interesting talk. And I'm sure those who listen to it to the end enjoyed it and well we very much wish you to manage to have a German edition as soon as possible so maybe next year or yes, whatever so many thanks again and thanks to all to the audience and of course thanks to a key and Dina and the organizers of this event for the Middle East Institute. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you Daniel brilliant.