 Section 6 of an essay concerning human understanding, Book 3 of Words by John Locke. This is a LibriVox recording, while LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Chapter 6 of The Names of Substances, Part 1 The common names of substances stand for sorts. The common names of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for sorts, which is nothing else but the being-made signs of such complex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and signified by one name. I say do or might agree, for though there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the idea of it being abstracted, so that more substances, if there were several, might each agree in it, it is as much a sort as if there were as many suns as there are stars. They want not the reasons who think there are, and that each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for, to one who was placed in a due distance. Which by the way, may show us how much the sorts, or if you please, genera and species of things, for which the Latin term signified to mean nothing more than the English word sort, depend on such collections of ideas as men have made, and not on the real nature of things, since it is not impossible but that, in propriety of speech, that might be a sun to one which is a star to another. 2. The essence of each sort of substance is our abstract idea, to which the name is a next. The measure and boundary of each sort, or species, whereby it is constituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is what we call its essence, which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is a next, so that everything contained in that idea is essential to that sort. This, though it be all the essence of natural substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts, yet I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal essence, to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances upon which depends this nominal essence, and all the properties of that sort, which therefore, as has been said, may be called the real essence. For example, the nominal essence of gold is a complex idea, the word gold stands for. Let it be, for instance, a body yellow of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body on which those qualities and all the other properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, though they are both called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover. Three, the nominal and real essence different. Four, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, join to a body of a certain shape, be the complex idea to which I and others annex the name man, and so be the nominal essence of this species so-called, yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence, and source of all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that sort. The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex idea is something quite different, and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of man from which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his maker has, we shall have a quite other idea of his essence than what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it what it will, and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and other contrivances within the famous clock at Strasburg, from that which a gazing country man has of it, who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward appearances. Four, nothing essential to individuals. That essence in the ordinary use of the word relates to sorts, and that it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are ranked into sorts appears from hints, that take but away at the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes. We have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly shows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am. God and nature has made me so, but there is nothing I have is essential to me. An accident or disease may very much alter my color or shape. A fever or fall may take away my reason or memory, or both, and an apoplexy leaves neither sense nor understanding, nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties than I have, and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one or the other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things. And then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort, something is found essential, that anyone examine his own thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks of essential, the consideration of some species or the complex idea signified by some general name comes into his mind. And it is in reference to that, that this or that quality is said to be essential, so that if it be asked whether it be essential to me, or any other particular corporeal being to have reason, I say no, no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on, to have words on it. But if that particular being be to be counted of the sort man and to have the name man given it, then reason is essential to it. Supposing reason to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for, as it is essential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name treatise and rank it under that species. So that essential and not essential relate only to our abstract ideas and the names of the next to them, which amounts to no more than this, that whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in the abstract idea, which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that species, nor be called by that name, since that abstract idea is the very essence of that species. 5. The only essences perceived by us in individual substances are those qualities which entitle them to receive their names. Thus, if the idea of body with some people be bare extension or space, then solidity is not essential to body. If others make the idea to which they give the name body to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential to body, that therefore and that alone is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the name of that sort stands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name. 6. Should there be found a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in iron, but wanted obedience to the lower stone, and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction from it, would anyone question whether it wanted anything essential? It would be absurd to ask whether a thing really existing wanted anything essential to it, or could be demanded, whether this made an essential or specific difference or no, since we have no other measure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas. And to talk of specific differences in nature without reference to general ideas and names is to talk unintelligibly, for I would ask anyone, what is sufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any two particular beings without any regard had to some abstract idea, which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species. All such patterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings considered barely in themselves will be found to have all their qualities equally essential, and everything in each individual will be essential to it, or which is more nothing at all. For though it may be reasonable to ask whether obeying the magnet is essential to iron, yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask whether it be essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with, without considering it under the name iron, or as being of a certain species. And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas which have names next to them are the boundaries of species, nothing can be essential but what is contained in those ideas. Six. Even the real essences of individual substances imply potential sorts. It is true I have often mentioned a real essence distinct in substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their nominal essence. By this real essence I mean that real constitution of anything which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are constantly found to coexist with the nominal essence, that particular constitution which everything has within itself, without any relation to anything without it. But essence, even in this sense, relates to sort and supposes a species. For being that real constitution on which the properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to species, and not to individuals. For example, supposing the nominal essence of gold be a body of such a particular color and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which those qualities and their union depend, and is also the foundation of its solubility in aqua regia and other properties, accompanying that complex idea. Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition of a sort of general abstract idea, which is considered as immutable, but there is no individual parcel of matter to which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it. That which is essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it is of this or that sort. But take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the real essences of substances, we only suppose their being without precisely knowing that they are, but that which annexes them still to the species is the nominal essence of which they are the supposed foundation and cause. 7. The nominal essence bounds the species to us. The next thing to be considered is by which of those essences it is that substances are determined into sorts or species, and that it is evident is by the nominal essence, for it is that alone that the name which is the mark of the sort signifies. It is impossible therefore that anything should determine the sorts of things which we rank under general names, but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for, which is that as has been shown, which we call nominal essence. Why do we say this is a horse and that a mule, this an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be this or that sort, but because it has that nominal essence, or which is all one, agrees to that abstract idea that name is a next to? And I desire anyone but to reflect on his own thoughts when he hears or speaks any of those or other names of substances to know what sort of essences they stand for. 8. The nature of species as formed by us and that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in us, and not according to precise distinct real essences in them, is plain from hints, that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one species have yet qualities, depending on their real constitutions, is far different one from another, as from others from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially are often by sad experience convinced of it, when they sometimes in vain seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulfur, antimony, or vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are bodies of the same species having the same nominal essence under the same name, yet do they often upon severe ways of examination betray qualities so different one from another as to frustrate the expectation and labor of every weary chemist. But if things were distinguished into species according to their real essences it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same species, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the essence to us, which determines every particular to this or that classes, or which is the same thing to this or that general name, and what can that be else, but that abstract idea to which that name is a next, and so has in truth a reference not so much to the being of particular things as to their general denominations. 9. Not the real essence or texture of parts which we know not. Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently which is the end of sorting, denominate them by their real essences, because we know them not. Our faculties curious no further towards the knowledge and distinction of substances than a collection of those sensible ideas which we observe in them, which, however, make with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of yet is more remote from the true internal constitution from which those qualities flow. Then, as I said, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at Strasbourg, or of he only sees the outward figure and motions. There is not so contemptible a plant or animal that does not confound the most enlarged understanding, though the familiar use of things about us take off our wonder, yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we presently find we know not their make, and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal constitution wherein these properties depend is unknown to us, for to go no further than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, what is that texture of parts, that real essence, that makes lead an antimony fusible, wood and stones not. What makes lead and iron malleable, and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances and inconceivable real essences of plants or animals. Everyone knows the workmanship of the all-wise and powerful God in the great fabric of the universe and every part thereof. Further exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man, than the best inhabitants of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and dispose them into certain classes under names by their real essences, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as soon sort things by their own, and he that has lost his smell as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odors, as by those internal constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in those species called cassiowari and querishinichio, and by their internal real essences determine the boundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea of sensible qualities that each of those names stand for, and in the countries where those animals are to be found. Ten. Not the substantial form which know not. Those therefore who have been taught that the several species of substances had their distinct internal substantial forms, and that it was those forms which made the distinction of substances into their true species, and genera, were led yet further out of the way, by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after substantial forms wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure or confused conception in general. Eleven. That the nominal essence is that only whereby we distinguish species or substances further evident from our ideas of finite spirits and of God. That our ranking and distinguishing natural substances into species consists in the nominal essences the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves is further evident from our ideas of spirits. For the mind getting only by reflection on its own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it hath or can have no other notion of spirit, but by attributing all those operations it finds in itself to a sort of beings without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of God is but attributing the same simple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves and which we conceive to have more perfection in them than would be in their absence. Attributing, I say, those simple ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got from reflection on ourselves the idea of existence, knowledge, power and pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want, and the more we have of each the better, joining all those together with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy being. And though we are told that there are different species of angels, yet we know not how to frame distinct specific ideas of them, not out of any conceit that the existence of more species than one spirit is impossible, but because having no more simple ideas nor being able to frame more applicable to such beings, but only those few taken from ourselves and from the actions of our own minds and thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our bodies, we can know more otherwise distinguished in our conceptions the several species of spirits, one from another, but by attributing those operations and powers we find in ourselves to them in a higher or lower degree, and so have no very distinct specific ideas of spirits, except only of God, to whom we attribute both duration and all those other ideas with infinity to the other spirits with limitation, nor as I humbly conceive do we between God and them in our ideas put any difference by any number of simple ideas which we have of one and not of the other, but only that of infinity, all the particular ideas of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, etc., being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of spirits with a difference only of degrees to the utmost we can imagine even infinity when we would frame as well as we can an idea of the first being, who yet it is certain is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature from the highest and perfectest of all created beings than the greatest man, nay, purist seraph is from the most contemptible part of matter and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of him twelve of finite spirits there are probably numberless species in a continuous series of gradations it is not impossible to conceive nor repugnant to reason that there may be as many species of spirits as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know and observe in them that there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us than there are of sensible and material below us is probable to me from hence that in all the visible corporeal world we see no chasms or gaps all quite down from us the descent is by easy steps and a continued series of things that in each free move differ very little one from the other there are fishes that have wings and are not strangers to the airy region and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water whose blood is cold as fishes and their flesh is so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish days there are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts that they are in the middle between both amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together seals live at land and sea and purposes have the warm blood and entrails of a hog not to mention what is confidentially reported of mermaids and semen there are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined that if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them and so on till we come to the lowest and the most inorganic parts of matter we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together and differ but in almost insensible degrees and when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the maker we have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe and the great design and infinite goodness of the architect that the species of creatures should also by gentle degrees ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection as we see they gradually descend from us downwards which if it be probable we have reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are beneath we being in degrees of perfection much more remote from the infinite being of God then we are from the lowest state of being and that which approaches nearest to nothing and yet of all those distinct species for the reasons above said we have no clear distinct ideas 13 the nominal essence that of species as conceived by us proved from water and ice but to return to the species of corporeal substances if I should ask anyone whether ice and water were two distinct species of things I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative and it cannot be denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right but if an Englishman bred in Jamaica who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice coming into England in the winter find the water he put in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning and not knowing any particular name it had should call it hardened water I ask whether this would be a new species to him different from water and I think it would be answered here it would not be to him a new species no more than congealed jelly when it is called is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and warm or then liquid gold in the furnace is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman and if this be so it is plain that our distinct species are nothing but distinct complex ideas with distinct names next to them it is true every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution we're on depend those sensible qualities and the powers we observe in it but the ranking of things into species which is nothing but sorting them under several titles is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them which though sufficient to distinguish them by names so that we may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species by real essences according as we distinguish them into species by names we shall be liable to great mistakes 14 difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of real essences to distinguish substantial beings into species according to the usual supposition that there are certain precise essences or forms of things whereby all the individuals existing are by nature distinguished into species these things are necessary 15 a crude supposition first to be assured that nature in the production of things always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences which are to be the models of all things to be produced this in the crude sense it is usually proposed would need some better explication before it fully be assented to 16 monstrous births secondly it would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things the irregular and monstrous births that in diverse sorts of animals have been observed will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these 17 our monsters really a distinct species thirdly it ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be really a distinct species according to this elastic notion of the word species since it is certain that everything that exists has its particular constitution and yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities which are supposed to result from and accompany the essence of that species from whence they derive their originals and to which by their descent they seem to belong 18 men can have no ideas of real essences fourthly the real essences of those things which we distinguish into species and as so distinguished we name ought to be known that is we ought to have ideas of them but since we are ignorant of these four points the supposed real essences of things stand us not instead for the distinguishing substances into species 19 our nominal essences of substances not perfect collections of properties that flow from the real essence fifthly the only imaginable help in this case would be that having framed perfect complex ideas of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences we should thereby distinguish them into species but neither can this be done for being ignorant of the real essence itself it is impossible to know all those properties that flow from it and are so annexed to it that any one of them being away we may certainly conclude that that essence is not there and so the thing is not of that species we can never know what is the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of gold any one of which failing the real essence of gold and consequently gold would not be there unless we knew the real essence of gold itself and by that determined that species by the word gold here I must be understood to design a particular piece of matter for example the last guinea that was coined for if it should stand here in its ordinary signification for that complex idea which I or anyone else calls gold that is for the nominal essence of gold it would be jargon so hard is it to show the various meanings and imperfections of words when we have nothing else but words to do it by 20 hence names independent of real essence they are which it is clear that our distinguishing substances into species by names is not at all founded on their real essences nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species according to internal essential differences 21 but stand for such collections of simple ideas as we have made the name stand for but since as has been remarked we have need of general words though we know not the real essences of things all we can do is to collect such a number of simple ideas as by examination we find to be united together in things existing and thereof to make one complex idea which though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs and is convertible with it by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences for example there be that say that the essence of body is extension if it be so we can never mistake in putting the essence of anything in the thing itself let us then in discourse put extension for body and when we would say that body moves let us say that extension moves and see how ill it will look he that should say that one extension by impulse moves another extension would by the bear expression sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion the essence of anything in respect of us is the whole complex idea comprehended and marked by that name and in substances besides the several distinct simple ideas that make them up the confused one of substance or of an unknown support and cause of their union is always a part and therefore the essence of body is not bear extension but an extended solid thing and so to say an extended solid thing moves or impels another is all one and as intelligible as to say body moves or impels likewise to say that a rational animal is capable of conversation is all one has to say of man but no one will say that rationality is capable of conversation because it makes not the whole essence to which we give the name man end of section six section seven of an essay concerning human understanding book three of words by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording or LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org chapter six of the names of substances part two twenty two our abstract ideas are to us the measures of the species we make in instance in that of man there are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours but are hairy and want language and reason there are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape but want reason and some of them language to there are creatures as it is said parenthesis sit feedies pennies and thorn but there appears no contradiction that there should be such and parenthesis that with language and reason and a shape in other things agreeing with ours have hairy tails others where the males have no beards and others where the females have if it be asked whether these be all men or no all of human species it is plain the question refers only to the nominal essence for those of them to whom the definition of the word man or the complex idea signified by that name agrees our man and the other not but if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different it is wholly impossible for us to answer no part of that going into our specific idea only we have reason to think that where the faculties of outward frame so much differs the internal constitution is not exactly the same but what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is in vain to inquire whilst our measures of species be as they are only our abstract ideas which we know and not that internal constitution which makes no part of them shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill when they agree in shape and want of reason and speech and shall not the want of reason and speech be assigned to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man and so of the rest if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things 23 species in animals not distinguished by generation nor let anyone say that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female and implants by seeds keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire for granting this to be true it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further than the tribes of animals and vegetables what must we do for the rest but in those two it is not sufficient for if history lie not women have conceived by drills and what real species by that measure such a production will be in nature will be a new question and we have reason to think this is not impossible since mules and Jumarts the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare are so frequent in the world I once saw a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat and had the plain marks of both about it where in nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone but to have jumbled them both together to which he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature will find it hard even in the race of animals to determine by the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is and be at a loss about the real essence which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation and has alone a right to the specific name but further if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation must I go to the indies to see the sire and dam of the one and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other to know whether this be a tiger or that t 24 not by substantial forms upon the whole matter it is evident that it is their own collections of sensible qualities that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men in the sorting them much less were any substantial forms ever thought on by any but those who have in this one part of the world learn the language of the schools and yet these ignorant men who pretend not any insight into the real essences nor trouble themselves about the substantial forms but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities are often better acquainted with their differences can more nicely distinguish them from their uses and better know what they expect from each then those learned quick-sighted men who look so deep into them and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential 25 the specific essences that are common made by men but supposing that the real essences of substances were discoverable by those that would severally apply themselves to that inquiry yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions or anything else but their obvious appearances since languages in all countries have been established long before sciences so that they have not been philosophers or logicians or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men but those more or less comprehensive terms have for the most part in all languages received their birth and signification from ignorant and illiterate people who sorted and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them thereby to signify them when absent to others whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing 26 therefore very various and uncertain in the ideas of different men since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their nominal and not by their real essences the next thing to be considered is how and by whom these essences come to be made as to the letter it is evident they are made by the mind and not by nature for were they nature's workmanship they could not be so various and different in several men as experience tells us they are for if we will examine it we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances in all men the same no not of that which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with it could not possibly be that the abstract idea to which the name man is given should be different in several men if it were of nature's making and that to one it should be animal rational into another animal impoom bipeds lattice in we bus he that annexes the name man to a complex idea made up of sense and spontaneous motion joined to a body of such a shape has thereby one essence of the species man and he that upon further examination adds rationality has another essence of the species he calls man by which means the same individual will be a true man to the one which is not so to the other I think there is scarce anyone who will allow this upright figure so well known to be the essential difference of the species man and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than descent is very visible since it has been more than once debated whether several human fetuses should be preserved or received to baptism or know only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children without knowing whether they were or not as capable of reason as infants cast in another mold somewhere of though of an approved shape are never capable of as much appearance of reason all their lives as to be found in an ape or an elephant and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul whereby it is evident that the outward figure which only was found wanting and not the faculty of reason which nobody could know would be wanting in its due season was made essential to the human species. The learned divine and the lawyer must on such occasions renounce their sacred definition of animal rationale and substitute some other essence of the human species. Manziur Manaj furnishes us with an example worth it taking notice of on this occasion. Quote When the abbot of Saint Martin says he was born he had so little of the figure of a man that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under deliberation whether he should be baptized or know. However he was baptized and declared a man provisionally till time should show what he would prove. Nature had molded him so untowardly that he was called all his life the abbot Malatru i.e. ill-shaped. He was of Caen. This child we see was very near being excluded out of the species of man barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was and it is certain a figure a little more oddly turned had cast him and he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to pass for man. And yet there can be no reason given why if the liniment of his face had been a little altered a rational soul could not have been lodged in him. Why a visage somewhat longer or a nose flatter or a wider mouth could not have consisted as well as the rest of his ill figure with such a soul. Such parts has made him disfigured as he was capable to be a dignity in the church. End quote. Twenty-seven. Nominal essences of particular substances are undetermined by nature and therefore various as men vary. Wherein then would I gladly know consist the precise and unmovable boundaries of that species. It is plain if we examine there is no such thing made by nature and established by her amongst men. The real essence of that or any other sort of substance it is evident we know not. And therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences which we make ourselves that if several men were to be asked concerning some oddly shaped fetus as soon as born whether it were a man or no it is passed out one should meet with different answers which could not happen. If the nominal essences whereby we limit and distinguish the species of substances were not made by man with some liberty but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature whereby it distinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake to resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned by Lasitas with a man's head and hog's body or those other which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts as dogs horses etc. If any of these creatures had lived and could have spoke it would have increased the difficulty. Had the upper part to the middle been of human shape and all below swine had it been murdered to destroy it or must the bishop have been consulted whether were man enough to be admitted to the font or no as I have been told it happened in France some years since in somewhat alike case so uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us who have no other measures than the complex ideas of our own collecting and so far are we from certainty knowing what a man is though perhaps it will be judged greater ignorance to make any doubt about it and yet I think I may say that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined and the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal essence so far from being settled and perfectly known that very material doubts may still arise about it and I imagine none of the definitions of the word man which we yet have nor descriptions of that sort of animal are so perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person much less to obtain a general consent and to be that which men would everywhere stick by in the decision of cases and determining of life and death baptism or no baptism in productions that might happen 28 but not so arbitrary as mixed modes but though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes to the making of any nominal essence it is necessary first that the ideas were of it consists have such a union as to make but one idea how compounded so ever secondly that the particular ideas so united be exactly the same neither more nor less for if to abstract complex ideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts they make two different and not one in the same essence in the first of these the mind in making it's complex ideas of substances only follows nature and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union nature nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse nor the color of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold to be the complex idea of any real substances unless he has a mind to fill his head with cameras and his discourse with unintelligible words men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together there in copied nature and of ideas so united made their complex ones of substances for though men may make what complex ideas they please and give what names to them they will yet if they will be understood when they speak of things really existing they must in some degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of or else men's language will be like that of babble and every man's words being intelligible only to himself would no longer serve to conversation and the ordinary affairs of life if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist 29 our nominal essences of substances usually consist of a few obvious qualities observed in things secondly though the mind of man in making its complex ideas of substances never puts any together that do not really or are not supposed to coexist and so it truly borrows that union from nature yet the number it combines depends upon the various care industry or fancy of him that makes it men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious qualities and often if not always leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take of sensible substances there are two sorts one of organized bodies which are propagated by seed and in these the shape is that which to us is the leading quality and most characteristic cold part that determines the species and therefore in vegetables and animals and extended solid substance of such a figure usually serves the turn for however some men seem to prize their definition of animal rationale yet should there a creature be found that had language and reason but partake not of the usual shape of a man I believe it would hardly pass for a man how much so ever it were animal rationale and if Balaam's ass had all his life discourse does rationally as he did once with his master I doubt yet whether anyone would have thought him worthy the name man or allowed him to be of the same species with himself as in vegetables and animals it is the shape so when most other bodies not propagated by seed it is the color we most fix on and are most led by thus where we find the color gold we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also and we commonly take these two obvious qualities his shape and color for so presumptive ideas of several species that in a good picture we readily say this is a lion and that arose this is a gold and that a silver goblet only by the different figures and colors represented to the eye by the pencil 30 yet imperfect as they thus are they serve for common converse but though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking yet men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple ideas or qualities belonging to any sort of things signified by its names nor is it a wonder since it requires much time pains and skill strict inquiry and long examination to find out what and how many those simple ideas are which are constantly and inseparably united in nature and are always to be found together in the same subject most men wanting either time inclination or industry enough for this even to some tolerable degree content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life and so without further examination give them names or take up the names already in use which though in common conversation they pass well enough for the differences of some few obvious qualities coexisting are yet far enough from comprehending in a settled signification a precise number of simple ideas much less all those which are united in nature. He that shall consider after so much stir about genus and species and such a deal of talk of specific differences how few words we have yet to understand the implications of may with reason imagine that those forms which there have been so much noise made about are only chimeras which give us no light into the specific natures of things. And he that shall consider how far the names of substances are from having significations wherein all who use them do agree will have reason to conclude that though substances are all supposed to be copied from nature yet they are all or most of them very imperfect. Since composition of those complex ideas are in several men very different and therefore that these boundaries of species are as men and not as nature makes them if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true that many particular substances are so made by nature that they have agreement and likeness one with another and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us or the making of determinant species being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms I cannot see how it can be properly said that nature sets the boundaries of the species of things or if it be so our boundaries of species are not exactly conformable to those in nature. For we having need of general names for present use stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would best show us their most material differences and agreements but we ourselves divide them by certain obvious appearances into species that we made the easier under general names communicate our thoughts about them for having no other knowledge of any substance but of the simple ideas that are united in it and observing several particular things to agree with others in several of those simple ideas we make that collection our specific idea and give it a general name and observing several particular things to agree with others in name that in recording our thoughts and in our discourse with others we may in one short word designate all the individuals that agree in that complex idea without enumerating the simple ideas that make it up and so not waste our time and breath in previous descriptions which we see they are feigned to do with discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for. 31. Essences of species under the same name very different in different minds but however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary conversation it is plain that this complex idea wherein they agree is by different men made very differently by some more and others less accurately in some this complex idea contains a greater and in others a smaller number of qualities and so is apparently such as the mind makes it the yellow shining color makes gold to children others add weight malleableness and fusibility and others yet other qualities which they find together with that yellow color as constantly as its weight and fusibility. 31. For in all these and the like qualities one has as good a right to be put into the complex idea of that substance wherein they are all joined as another and therefore different men leaving out or putting in several simple ideas which others do not according to their various examination scale or observation of that subject have different essences of gold which must therefore be of their own and not of nature's making. 32. The more general our ideas of substances are the more incomplete and partial they are. If the number of simple ideas that make the nominal essence of the lowest species or first sorting of individuals depends on the mind of man variously selecting them it is much more evident that they do so in the more comprehensive classes which by the masters of logic are called genera. These are complex ideas designedly imperfect and it is visible at first sight that several of those qualities that are to be found in the things themselves are purposely left out of generical ideas. For as the mind to make general ideas comprehending several particulars leaves out those of time and place and such other that make them incommunicable to more than one individual so to make other yet more general ideas they may comprehend different sorts it leaves out those qualities that distinguished them and puts into its new collection only such ideas as are common to several sorts. The same convenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter coming from Guinea and Peru under one name sets them also upon making of one name that may comprehend both gold and silver and some other bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities which are peculiar to each sort and retaining a complex idea made up of those that are common to them all to which the name metal being annexed there is the genus constituted the essence whereof being that abstract idea containing only malleableness and fusibility with certain degrees of weight and fixedness wherein some bodies of several kinds agree leaves out the color and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver and the other sorts comprehended under the name metal whereby it is plain that men follow not exactly the pattern set them by nature when they make their general ideas of substances since there is no body to be found which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it without other qualities as inseparable as those but men in making their general ideas seeking more the convenience of language and quick dispatch by short and comprehensive signs then the true and precise nature of things as they exist have in the framing their abstract ideas chiefly pursued that and which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names so that in this whole business of genera and species the genus or more comprehensive is but a partial conception of what is in the species and the species but a partial idea of what is to be found in each individual if therefore anyone will think that a man and a horse and an animal and a plant etc. are distinguished by real essences made by nature he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences making one for body another for an animal and another for a horse and all these essences liberally bestowed upon bucophallus but if we would rightly consider what is done in all these genera and species or sorts we should find that there is no new thing made but only more or less comprehensive signs whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things as they agree and more or less general conceptions which we have framed to that purpose in all which we may observe that the more general term is always the name of a less complex idea and that each genus is but a partial conception of the species comprehended under it so that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them and certain names which are made use of to signify them and not in respect to anything existing as made by nature 33 this all accommodated to the end of speech this is adjusted to the true end of speech which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions for thus he would discourse of things as they agreed in the complex idea of extension and solidity needed but use the word body to denote all such he that to these would join others signified by the words life sense and spontaneous motion needed but use of the word animal to signify all which partake of those ideas and he that made a complex idea of a body with life sense and motion with the faculty of reasoning and a certain shape joined to it needed but use the short monosyllable man to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea this is the proper business of genus and species and this men do without any consideration of real essences or substantial forms which come not within the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things nor within the signification of our words when we discourse with others end of section seven section eight of an essay concerning human understanding look three of words by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org chapter six of names of substances part three thirty four instance of castle wearies right to talk with any one of a sort of birds I lately saw in St. James Park about three or four feet high with a covering of something between feathers and hair of a dark brown color without wings but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like sprigs of Spanish broom long great legs with feet only of three claws and without a tail I must make this description of it and so make others understand me but when I am told that the name of it is Kasaurus I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my complex idea mentioned in that description though by that word which is now become a specific name I know no more of the real essence or Constitution of that sort of animals than I did before and knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds before I learned the name as many English men do of swans or herons which are specific names very well known of sorts of birds common in England thirty five men determine the sorts of substances which may be sorted variously from what has been said it is evident that men make sorts of things for it being different essences alone that make different species it is plain that they who make these abstract ideas which are the nominal essences do thereby make the species or sort should there be a body found having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or not IE whether it were of that species this could be determined only by that abstract idea to which everyone annexed the name gold so that it would be true gold to him and belong to that species who included not malleableness in his nominal essence signified by the sound gold and on the other side it would not be true gold or of that species to him who included malleableness in his specific idea and who I pray is it that makes these diverse species even under one and the same name but men that make two different abstract ideas consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities nor is it a mere supposition to imagine that a body may exist where in the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness since it is certain that gold itself will be sometimes so eager as artists call it that it will as little endure the hammer as glass itself what we have said of the putting in or leaving out of malleableness in the complex idea the name gold is by anyone next to maybe said of its peculiar weight fixedness and several other the like qualities for whatever is left out or put in is still the complex idea to which that name is a next that makes the species and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea so the name of the sort belongs truly to it and it is of that species and thus anything is true gold perfect metal all which determination of the species it is plain depends on the understanding of man making this or that complex idea thirty six nature makes the similitudes of substances this then in short is the case nature makes many particular things which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities and probably to in their internal frame and constitution but it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into species it is men who taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them and where in the observe often several individuals to agree range them into sorts in order to their naming for the convenience of comprehensive signs under which individuals according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea come to be ranked as under in signs so that this is of the blue that the red regiment this is a man that a drill and in this I think consists the whole business of genus and species thirty seven the manner of sorting particular beings the work of fallible men though nature makes things alike I do not deny but nature in the constant production of particular beings makes them not always new and various but very much alike and of kin one to another but I think it nevertheless true that the boundaries of the species whereby men sort them are made by men since the essences of the species distinguished by different names are as has been proved of man's making and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from so that we may truly say such a manner of sorting things is the work men ship of men thirty eight each abstract idea with a name to it makes a nominal essence one thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine which is that from what has been said it will follow that each abstract idea with the name to it makes a distinct species but who can help it if truth will have it so for so it must remain till somebody can show us the species of things limited and distinguished by something else and let us see that general terms signify not our abstract ideas but something different from them I would say no why a shock and a hound are not as distinct species as a spaniel and an elephant we have no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel than we have of the different essence of a shock and a hound all the essential difference whereby we know and distinguish them one from another consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas to which we have given those different names thirty nine how generic and species are related to naming how much the making of species and generic is in order to general names and how much general names are necessary if not to the being yet at least to the completing of a species and making it pass for such will appear besides what has been said above concerning ice and water in a very familiar example a silent and a striking watch are but one species to those who have but one name for them but he that has the name watch for one and clock for the other and distinct complex ideas to which those names belong to him they are different species it will be said perhaps that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between the two which the watch maker has a clear idea of and yet it is plain they are but one species to him when he has but one name for them for what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species there are some watches which are made with four wheels others with five is this a specific difference to the workman some have strings and physics and others none some have the balance loose and others regulated by a spiral spring and others by hogs bristle are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman that knows each of these and several other different contrivances in the internal constitutions of watches it is clear each of these have a real difference from the rest but whether it be an essential a specific difference or no relates only to the complex idea to which the name watches given as long as they all agree in the idea which the name stands for and that name does not as a general name comprehend different species under it they are not essentially not specifically different but if anyone will make minute divisions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches and to such precise complex ideas if names that shall prevail they will then be new species to them who have those ideas with names to them and can by those differences distinguish watches into these several sorts and then watch will be a general name but yet they would be no distinct species to men ignorant of clockwork and the inward contrivances of watches who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk with the marking of the hours by the hand for to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea and signify no more nor no other thing but a watch just thus I think it is in natural things nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs if I may so say within are different in a rational man and a changeling no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling but whether one or both these differences be essential or specific is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for for by that alone can it be determined whether one or both or neither of those be a man 40 species of artificial things less confused than natural from what has been said before we may see the reason why in the species of artificial things there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in natural because an artificial thing being a production of man which the other designed and therefore well knows the idea of the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea nor to import any other essence than what is certainly to be known and easy enough to be apprehended for the idea or essence of the several sorts of artificial things consisting for the most part in nothing but the determinant figure of sensible parts and sometimes being there on which the artificer fashions in matter such as he finds for his turn it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof and so settle the signification of the names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished with less doubt, obscurity and equivocation than we can in things natural whose differences and definitions depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries. 41. Artificial Things of Distinct Species I must be excused here if I think artificial things are of distinct species as well as natural since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts by different abstract ideas with general names next to them as one from another as those of natural substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol as distinct species one from another as a horse and a dog they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas and to others by distinct appellations. 42. Substances alone of all our several sorts of ideas have proper names. This is further to be observed concerning substances that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names whereby one only particular thing is signified. Because in simple ideas, modes and relations it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often this or that particular when it is absent. Besides the greatest part mixed modes being actions which perish in their birth are not capable of a lasting duration as substances which are the actors and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting union. 43. Difficult to lead another by words into the thoughts of things stripped of those abstract ideas we give to them. I must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this subject and perhaps with some obscurity but I desire it may be considered how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things stripped of those specific differences we give them which things if I name not I say nothing and if I do name them I thereby rank them into some sort or other and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species and so cross my purpose. 44. For to talk of a man and to lay by at the same time the ordinary signification of the name man which is our complex idea usually annexed to it and bid the reader consider man as he is in himself and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution or real essence that is by something he knows not what looks like trifling and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things as thought to be made by nature if it be but only to make it understood that there is no such thing signified by the general names which substances are called by but because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of specific names and ideas a little more clear and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings or which is the same to the signification annexed by others to their received names and sometimes to know archetypes at all give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its ideas to substances either to the substances themselves or to the signification of their names as to the archetypes and also to make plain the nature of species or sorting of things as apprehended and made use of by us and of the essences belonging to those species which is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge than we at first imagine forty-four instances of mixed modes names Kenea and Niof let us suppose Adam in the state of a grown man with a good understanding but in a strange country he knew and unknown about him and no other faculties to attain the knowledge of them but what one of this age has now he observes Lamech more melancholy than usual and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife Ada whom he most ardently loved that she had too much kindness for another man Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve and desires her to take care that Ada commit not folly and in these discourses with Eve he makes use of these two new words Kenea and Niof in time Adam's mistake appears for he finds Lamech's trouble preceded from having killed the man but yet the two names Kenea and Niof the one standing for suspicion in a husband of his wife's disloyalty to him and the other for the act of committing disloyalty lost not their distinct significations it is plain then that here were two distinct complex ideas of mixed modes with names to them two distinct species of actions essentially different I ask where in consisted the essence of these two species of actions and it is plain it consisted in a precise combination of simple ideas different in one from the other I ask whether the complex idea in Adam's mind which he called Kenea were adequate or not and it is plain it was for it being a combination of simple ideas which he without any regard to any archetype without respect to anything as a pattern voluntarily put together abstracted and gave the name Kenea to to express in short to others by that one sound all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex one it must necessarily follow that it was an adequate idea his own choice have he made that combination it had all in it intended it should and so could not but be perfect could not but be adequate it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent 45 these words Kenea and Neof by degree grew into common use and then the case was somewhat altered Adam's children had the same faculties and thereby the same power that he had to make complex ideas of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds to abstract them and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them but the use of names being to make those ideas within us known to others that cannot be done but when the same sign stands for the same idea in to who would communicate their thoughts and discourse together those therefore of Adam's children that found these two words Kenea and Neof in familiar use could not take them for insignificant sounds but must needs conclude they stood for something for certain ideas abstract ideas they being general names which abstract ideas were the essences of the species distinguished by those names if therefore they would use these words as names of species already established and agreed on they were obliged to conform the ideas in their minds signified by these names to ideas that they stood for in other men's minds as to their patterns and archetypes and then indeed their ideas of these complex modes reliable to be inadequate as being very apt especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds using the same names though for this there be usually a remedy at hand which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery which I think answer untranslated Hebrew word and untranslated Hebrew word stand for in another man's mind with whom I would discourse about them as it was impossible in the beginning of language to know what Kania and Nilf stood for in another man's mind without explication they being voluntary signs in every one 46 instances of a species of substance named Zahab let us now also consider after the same manner the names of substances in their first application one of Adam's children roving on the mountains lights on a glistening substance which pleases his eye home he carries it to Adam who upon consideration of it finds it to be hard to have a bright yellow color and an exceedingly great weight perhaps at first are all the qualities he takes notice of in it and abstracting this complex idea consisting of a substance having that particular bright yellowness and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk he gives the name Zahab to denominate and mark all substances that have these sensible qualities in them it is evident now that in this case Adam acts quite differently from what he did before informing those ideas of mixed modes to which he gave the names Kaniyya and Neof for there he put ideas together only by his own imagination not taken from the existence of anything and to them he gave names to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract ideas without considering whether such thing did exist or not the standard there was of his own making but in the forming his idea of this new substance he takes the quite contrary verse here he has a standard made by nature and therefore being to represent that to himself by the idea he has of it even when it is absent he puts in no simple idea into his complex one but what he has the perception of from the thing itself he takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable 47 this piece of matter thus denominated Zahrab by Adam being quite different from any he had seen before nobody I think will deny to be a distinct species and to have a peculiar essence and that the name Zahrab is the mark of the species and a name belonging to all things partaking in that essence but here it is plain the essence Adam made the name Zahrab stand for was nothing but a body hard shining yellow and very heavy but the inquisitive mind of man not content with the knowledge of these as I may say superficial qualities puts Adam upon further examination of this matter he therefore knocks and beats it with flints to see what was discoverable in the inside he finds it used to blows but not easily separated into pieces he finds it will bend without breaking he is not now to be added to his former idea and made part of the essence of the species that name Zahrab stands for further trials discover feasibility and fixedness are not they also by the same reason that any of the others were to be put into the complex idea signified by the name Zahrab if not what reason will there be known more for the one than the other if these must then all the other properties which any further trials shall discover in this matter ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea which the name Zahrab stands for and so be the essence of the species marked by that name which properties because they are endless they explain that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype will be always inadequate 48 the abstract ideas of substances always imperfect and therefore various but this is not all it would also follow that the names of substances would not only have as in truth they have but would also be supposed to have significations as used by different men which would very much umber the use of language for if every distinct quality that were discovered in any matter by anyone or supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea of signified by the common name given to it it must follow that men must suppose the same word to signify different things since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities in substances of the same denomination which others know nothing of 49 therefore to fix the nominal species real essence supposed to avoid this therefore they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species from which these properties and would have their name of the species stand for that but they not having any idea of that real essence in substances and there were signifying nothing but the ideas they have that which is done by this attempt is only to put the name or sound in the place instead of the thing having that real essence without knowing what the real essence is and this is that which when they speak of species of things as supposing them made by nature and distinguished by real essences 50 which supposition is of no use for let us consider when we affirm that all gold is fixed either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition i.e. part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for and so this affirmation all gold is fixed contains nothing but the signification of the term gold or else it means that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the gold is a property of that substance itself in which case it is plain that the word gold stands in the place of the substance having the real essence of a species of things made by nature in which way of substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification that though this proposition gold is fixed be in that sense an affirmation of something real yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application and so is of no real use or certainty for let it be ever so true that all gold i.e. all that has the real essence of gold is fixed what serves this for whilst we know not in what sense what is or is not gold for if we know not the real essence of gold it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence and so whether it be true gold or no 51 conclusion to conclude what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex idea of mixed modes by no other pattern but by his own thoughts the same have all men ever since had and the same necessity of conforming his ideas of substances to things without him as to archetypes made by nature that Adam was under if he would not willfully impose upon himself the same are all men ever since under too the same liberty also that Adam had of affix in any new name to any idea the same has anyone still especially the beginners of languages if we can imagine any such but only with this difference that in places where men society have already established a language amongst them the significations of words are very and sparingly to be altered because men being furnished already with names for their ideas and common use having appropriated no names to certain ideas and affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous he that have new notions will perhaps venture sometimes on the coining of new terms to express them but men think it a boldness and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current but in communication with others it is necessary that we conform the ideas we make the vulgar words of any language stand for to their known proper significations which I have explained at large already or else to make known that new signification we apply to them end of section 8 section 9 of an essay concerning human understanding book 3 of words by john lock this is a LibriVox recording our LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Christopher Boswell chapter 7 of Particles 1. Particles connect parts or whole sentences together besides words which are names of ideas in the mind there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the connection that the mind gives to ideas or to propositions one with another the mind in communicating its thoughts to others does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before it but others also to show or intimate some particular action of its own at that time relating to those ideas this it does several ways as is and is not are the general marks of the mind affirming or denying but besides affirmation or negation without which there is in words no truth or falsehood the mind does in declaring its sentiments to others connects not only the parts of propositions but whole sentences one to another with their several relations and dependencies to make a coherent discourse 2. In right use of particles consist the art of well speaking the words whereby it signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration are generally called particles and it is in the right use of these that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style to think well it is not enough that a man has ideas clear and distinct in his thoughts nor that he observes the agreement or disagreement of some of them but he must think in train to observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings upon one another and to express well such methodical and rational thoughts he must have words to show what connection restriction distinction opposition emphasis etc he gives to each respective part of his discourse to mistake in any of these in his hearer and therefore it is that those words which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such consistent and indispensable use in language and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves three they say what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts this part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others over diligently cultivated it is easy for men to write one after another of cases and genders moods and tenses gerunds and supines in these and the like there has been great diligence used and particles themselves in some languages have been with great show of exactness ranked into their several orders but though prepositions and conjunctions etc are names well known in grammar and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions yet he who would show the right use of particles and what significance and force they have must take a little more pains enter into his own thoughts and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing four they are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind neither is it enough for the explaining of these words to render them as is usual in dictionaries by words of another tongue which come nearest to their signification for what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood in one as another language they are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind and therefore to understand them rightly the several views postures, stands, turns limitations and exceptions and several other thoughts of the mind for which we have either none or very deficient names are diligently to be studied of these is a great variety much exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers and sometimes almost opposite significations in the Hebrew tongue there is a particle consisting of but one single letter of which there are reckoned up as I remember seventy I am sure above fifty several significations five sense in but but is a particle none more familiar in our language and he that says it's a discreet of conjunction and that it answers to said Latin or me in French thinks he has sufficiently explained it but yet it seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable first but to say no more here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going before it came quite to the end of it secondly I saw but two plants here it shows the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other thirdly you pray but it is not that God would bring you to the religion fourthly but that he would confirm you in your own the first of these buts intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it fifthly all animals have sense but a dog is an animal here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former as the minor of a syllogism sixth this matter of the use of particles but lightly touched here to these I doubt not might be added a great many other significations of this particle if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude and consider it in all the places it is to be found which if one should do I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of it would deserve the title of discreetive which grammarians give to it but I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs the instances I have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in recoursing which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles somewhere of consistently and others in certain constructions have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them end of section nine recording by Christopher Boswell