 Section 38 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Section 38 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant Section 38 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant I immediately ordered Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines's Bluff to the Big Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Heron and A.J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haines's Bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side and on all commanding points from there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. The work of connecting by-rifle pits, where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg, we were as substantially protected as they were against us. Where we were looking east and north, we were strongly fortified and on the defensive. Johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him, but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston. From the 23rd of May, the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At three points on the Jackson Road, in front of Leggetts Brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. In fact, this parapet was also our protection. The soldiers of the two sides occasionally converged pleasantly across this barrier. Sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers for the tobacco of the Confederates. At other times the enemy threw overhand grenades, and often our men catching them in their hands returned them. Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill. Consequently, when it had extended as far as the parapet, it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy, having failed to reach our mine, had thrown up a line further back where most of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advanced line and others working in the counter mine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side still alive. I remember one colored man who had been underground at work when the explosion took place who was thrown to our side. He was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. Someone asked him how high he had gone up. Do you know, Massa? But think about Tree Mile, was his reply. General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters where he did service to the end of the siege. As soon as the explosion took place, the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were nearby, undercover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effort to expel them but failed, and soon retired behind a new line. From here, however, they threw hand grenades, which did some execution. The complement was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants and rolled them down upon us while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. During the night, we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left. But the enemy continued throwing their grenades and brought boxes of field ammunition, shells, the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine was consequently started, which was exploded on the first of July, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt to charge was made this time. The experience of the twenty-fifth admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. We lost none in the second. From this time forward, the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor and I determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. We were up now at three different points, one in front of each core, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us. At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at Fixburg. I knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close to each other, where there was space enough between the two lines to post-pickets, that the men could converse. On the twenty-first of June I was informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape by crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night, that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose, that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the Yankees to cut their way out. But they had refused and almost mutinied because their commander would not surrender and relieve their suffering, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. Afterwards this story was verified on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. Our pickets were doubled, Admiral Porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched. Material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made, and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side, had the attempt been made the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned or made prisoners on the Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the west bank to cooperate in this movement. I believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. The Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson. We had nearly exhausted the country along the line drawn from Lake Providence to opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force. By the first of July, our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the sixth of July. The debauches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through for abreast. Plank and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly were ordered prepared to enable the troops to cross the ditches. On the night of the first of July, Johnston was between Brownsville and the Big Black and wrote Pemberton from there that about the seventh of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him. On July 1st, Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders. Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are therefore requested to inform me with as little delay as possible as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the patigs necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation. Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so, but he authorized Pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement. On the third, about ten o'clock a.m., white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and Colonel Montgomery, aid the camp to Pemberton bearing the following letter to me. I have the honor to propose an armistice for hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour today as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce by Major General John S. Bowen. It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and worst of all, to the jibes of many northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the Union sure to be saved. Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith and asked to see me. I had been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri and knew him well and favorably before the war, but his request was refused. He then suggested that I should meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that if Pemberton desired it I would meet him in front of McPherson's Corps at three o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written reply to Pemberton's letter. Your note of this date is just received. Proposing an armistice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation because I have no terms other than those indicated above. At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, and A.J. Smith and several officers of my staff accompanied me. Our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines nearby stood a stunted oak tree which was made historical by the event. It was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb, had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. Since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood in the shape of trophies as the true cross. Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of the Mexican war. I knew him very well, therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if it surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. Pemberton then said rather snappishly, the conference might as well end, and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said very well. General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. I had no objection to this as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had a conference during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines, were in conversation. After a while Bowen suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms in field artillery. This was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview here ended. I agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night. Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. It was agreed, on my paging with Pemberton, that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. When I returned to my headquarters, I sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. Half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston. I informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear any suggestion, but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. This was the nearest approach to a council of war I ever held. Against the general and almost unanimous judgment of the council, I sent the following letter. In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, et cetera. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard and take possession at eight a.m. tomorrow. As soon as roles can be made out and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their sidearms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two, two horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the role of prisoners. By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aikensen's landing below Dutch Gap on the James River or to Vicksburg there to be exchanged or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was a Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over 30,000 men to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the Mississippi, dense the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to Washington or Baltimore, dense again by steamer to Aikensen's, all at very great expense. At Aikensen's they would have had to be paroled because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in exchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the southwest. I knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes. Late at night I received a following reply to my last letter. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted, but injustice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defense of Vicksburg. I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock a.m. tomorrow I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg and to surrender the city and garrison under my command by marching out with my colors and arms stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession, officers to retain their sidearms and personal property and the rights and property of citizens to be respected. This was received after midnight. My reply was as follows. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3 July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself which, with the completion of the role of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening. That is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and sidearms and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines, now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 o'clock a.m., I shall regard them as having been rejected and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men. Pemberton promptly accepted these terms. During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies on Pickett and where the lines were close together. All rebels were known as Johnny's. All Union troops as Yanks, often Johnny, would call, well, Yank, when are you coming into town? The reply was sometimes we propose to celebrate the Fourth of July there. Sometimes it would be we always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them, or we are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves. The garrison from the commanding general down undoubtedly expected an assault on the Fourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made, and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides, it would be attended with severe loss to them. The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel Pickett's said, prior to the Fourth, in speaking of the Yankee boast, that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day. That the best recipe for cooking a rabbit was, first, catch your rabbit. The paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wallpaper. The last number was issued on the Fourth and the Count's that we had caught our rabbit. I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the Third with a two-fold purpose, first, to avoid an assault which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the Great National Holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence, holding out for better terms as he did, he defeated his aim in the latter particular. At the appointed hour, the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms, and marched back in good order. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. Logan's division which had approached nearest the rebel works was the first to march in, and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the courthouse. Our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced to the clothes. The enemy had been suffering particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. It was accepted with avidity and with thanks. Pemberton says in his report, If it should be asked why the Fourth of July was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the Fourth of July into the stronghold of the Great River, and that to gratify their national vanity they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time. This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering, but it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about ten o'clock a.m. July 3. It then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the Fourth. In our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time. My recollection is two weeks. It was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. On the Fourth of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the Trans-Mississippi Department, made an attack upon Helena Arkansas. He was totally defeated by General Prentice, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers. Holmes reported his loss at one thousand six hundred thirty-six of which one hundred seventy-three were killed, but as Prentice buried four hundred, Holmes evidently understated his losses. The Union loss was fifty-seven killed, one hundred twenty-seven wounded, and between thirty and forty missing. This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy to raise the siege of Vicksburg. On the Third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the state, and destroy his army if he could. Steel and oared were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as soon as a surrender took place. Of this, Sherman was notified. I rode into Vicksburg with the troops and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the Navy upon our joint victory. At that time I found that many of the citizens had been living underground. The ridges upon which Vicksburg is built and those back to the Big Black are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity, where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made by running passageways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. A doorway in these cases would be cut in a high bank starting from the level of the road or street and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the doorway. In some instances I saw where two rooms were cut out for a single family with a doorway and the clay walls separating them. Some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy which were dropped into the city night and day without intermission. I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon and did not move into the town until the sixth. On the afternoon of the fourth I sent Captain William M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached with a dispatch to the general-in-chief it was as follows. The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture and leaves troops in transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on Johnston to drive him from the state. I will send troops to the relief of banks and return the 9th Army Corps to Burnside. This news with the victory at Kettysburg one the same day lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet, and the loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy was sealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed, but the morale was with the supporters of the Union ever after. I, at the same time, wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms, also saying I would send him all the troops he wanted to ensure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of General Gardner who was then in command of Fort Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the national forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. He added that if this was true it was useless for him to hold out longer. General Banks gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered and General Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July. Fort Hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small arms, and other stores fell into the hands of the Union forces from that day to the close of the rebellion, the Mississippi River from its source to its mouth remained in the control of the national troops. Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization, one copy for each, Federals and Confederates, and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. The duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individual, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners, to being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way hoping to escape either alternative. Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton hearing this, again, appealed to me to assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction where he expected to keep them until exchanged. This request was also declined. It was precisely what I expected and hoped that they would do. I told him, however, that I would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. By the eleventh just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederate garrison marched out, many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been, the case, had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the James River to be paroled. As soon as our troops took possession of the city, guards were established along the whole line of parapet from the river above to the river below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the entrenchments. No restraint was put upon them except by their own commanders. They were rationed about as our own men and from our supplies, the men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. Really I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breast of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists, the day before the departure the following order was issued. Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here tomorrow. They will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge and move from there to Edwards's Ferry and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass to make no offensive remarks and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed. End of Section 38, recorded by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas Jim at joclev.com Section 39 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant Chapter 39 Retrospect of the Campaign Sherman's Movements Proposed Movement Upon Mobile A Painful Accident Ordered to Report at Cairo The capture of Vicksburg with its garrison, ordinance, and ordinance stores and the successful battles fought in reaching them gave new spirit to the loyal people of the North. New hopes for the final success of the cause of the Union were inspired. The victory gained at Gettysburg upon the same day, added to their hopes now the Mississippi River was entirely in the possession of the national troops. For the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port Hudson at once. The Army of Northern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861. The Army of the Tennessee united with the Army of the Gulf dividing the Confederate states completely. The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall of Vicksburg was in these words. I fear you're paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel may be construed into an absolute release and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart you will detain them until further orders. Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of Major Watts, Confederate Commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. At Vicksburg thirty-one thousand six hundred prisoners were surrendered together with one hundred seventy-two cannon about sixty thousand muskets and a large amount of ammunition. The small arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. Up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old United States flitlock muskets changed into percussion or the Belgium musket imported early in the war almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at and a few new and improved arms. These were of many different calibers a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. The enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender I authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter. A large number of arms turned in to the ordnance department as captured were thus arms that had really been used by the Union army in the capture of Vicksburg. In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers dead and alive whose services entitle them to special mention. Neither have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. Suffice it to say the clothes of the siege of Vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed in proportion to its numbers taken as a whole of officers and men. A military education was acquired which no other school could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning would have made good regimental or brigade commanders. Most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division and one ransom would have been equal to the command of a corps at least Logan and Crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies. General F. P. Blair joined me at Millican's Bend a full fledged general without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a division in the campaign. I had known Blair in Missouri where I had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew him as a frank, positive and generous man true to his friends even to a fault but always a leader. I dreaded his coming. I knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army, officer intelligently and with subordination. It affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. There was no man braver than he nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as a politician. The Navy under porter was all it could be during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made at all in the way it was with any number of men without such assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either of the flag officer or any of his subordinates that was not promptly complied with. The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The election of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to. This was resisted and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and with that base and Grand Gulf as a starting point move our combined forces against Vicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, I received a letter from banks informing me that he could not be at Port Hudson under ten days and then with only 15,000 men, the time was worth more than the reinforcements. I therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made. The garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. It looks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaign while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree. Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg, there were three things that required immediate attention. The first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear and out of the state. The second was to send reinforcements to banks near Port Hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the Mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the stars and stripes. The third was to inform the authorities at Washington and the north of the Good News to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for the surrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended from Haines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson Road over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the state as soon as Vicksburg surrendered. Steal and command were directed to be in readiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, and Sherman was advised of this also. Sherman moved promptly, crossing the Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at Bolton, 20 miles west of Jackson. Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred and immediately fell back on Jackson. On the eighth of July Sherman was within ten miles of Jackson, and on the eleventh was close up to the defenses of the city and shelling the town. The siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. The weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much to start that pursuit was useless, but Sherman sent one division, Steals, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson. The national loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than one thousand men killed, wounded, and missing. The Confederate loss was probably less except in captured. More than this number fell into our hands as prisoners. Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind. A large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in Jackson. Medicine and food were also sent to Raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. I wrote to Sherman, impressed upon the men, the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while traveling. They should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people. Provisions and forage, when calls for were by them, were issued to all the people from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. Very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before, from the big black to Haynes' bluff. Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regular Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, I felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received and, while important points might be captured without bloodshed, I suggested to the General-in-Chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile starting from Lake Pontchartrain. Halleck preferred another course. The possession of the Trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the Mississippi. I am well aware that the President was very anxious to have a foothold in Texas to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the Confederate states. This, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas by sending a garrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande. Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile so that I was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as I had been a year before in West Tennessee. It would have been an easy thing to capture Mobile at the time I proposed to go there, having that as a base of operations troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against General Bragg's army. This would necessarily have compelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. If he had not done this, the troops from Mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and leaves were yet receiving their supplies. I was so much impressed with this idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the 1st of August and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the Navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near Mobile. I also asked for a leave of absence to visit New Orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile should be approved. Both requests were refused. So far as my experience with General Halleck went, it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one. But I did not regard this as a favor. It was simply in line of duty, though, out of my department. The General-in-Chief, having decided against me, the depletion of an army which had won a succession of great victories commenced, as had been the case the year before, after the fall of Corinth, when the army was sent to where it would do the least good. By orders, I sent to banks a force of 4,000 men, returned the Ninth Corps to Kentucky, and when transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to Schofield in Missouri where price was rating the state. I also detached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez to Garrison that place permanently. This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when Ransom arrived there. The enemy happened to have a large number about 5,000 head of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed the eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and which were on the way to these and other armies in the east. The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerrilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior and in destroying mills, churches, and rolling stock on the railroads. The guerrillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from Pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from Johnston's also. The men determined not to fight again while the war lasted. Those who lived beyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes. Those who did not wanted to get north where they could work for their support till the war was over. Besides all this, there was quite a peace feeling for the time being among the citizens of that part of Mississippi but this feeling soon subsided. It is not probable that Pemberton got off with more than four thousand of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them and these were in a demoralized condition. On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13th Corps, General Ord commanding, to Banks. Besides this I received orders to cooperate with the latter general in movements west of the Mississippi. Having received this order I went to New Orleans to confer with Banks about the proposed movement. All these movements came to naught. During this visit I reviewed Banks's army a short distance above Carrollton. The horse I rode was vicious and but little used and on my return to New Orleans ran away and shying at a locomotive in the street fell probably on me. I was rendered insensible and when I regained consciousness I found myself in a hotel nearby with several doctors attending me. My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh and the swelling almost to the point of bursting extended along the body up to the armpit. The pain was almost beyond endurance. I lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible and was carried to it on a litter. I was then taken to Vicksburg where I remained unable to move for some time afterwards. While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records. But he let all the orders be made in my name and was glad to render any assistance he could. No orders were issued by my staff certainly no important orders except upon consultation with and approval of Sherman. On the thirteenth of September while I was still in New Orleans, Halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis and thence to Tuscumbia to cooperate with Rosecrans for the relief of Chattanooga. On the fifteenth he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to Rosecrans. This was received on the twenty-seventh. I was still confined to my bed unable to rise from it without assistance but I at once ordered Sherman to send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could be provided. The division of McPherson's Corps, which had got off and was on the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and sent likewise to report to Hurlbut at Memphis. Hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own Corps at once and also to send any other troops that might be returning there. Halleck suggested that some good man like Sherman or McPherson should be sent to Memphis to take charge of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman as being, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command and besides he was entitled to it, if it had to be given to anyone, he was directed to take with him another division of his Corps. This left one back but having one of McPherson's divisions he had still the equivalent. Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga had been fought and Rose Cranes forced back into Chattanooga. The administration as well as the General-in-Chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the War Department, was sent to Rose Cranes' headquarters. I do not know what his instructions were but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived there at a later period. It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west. I received the following dispatch dated October 3rd. It is the wish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able he will come to Cairo and report by telegraph. I was still very lame but started without delay. Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported by telegraph, your dispatch from Cairo of the 3rd directing me to report from Cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th, left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo. End of Vol. 1 End of Section 39 Recording by Jim Clevenger Little Rock, Arkansas Jim at joclev.com Section 40 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant Vol. 2 Chapter 40 First meeting with Secretary Stanton General Rosecrans Commanding Military Division of Mississippi Andrew Johnson's address Arrival at Chattanooga The reply to my telegram of October 16, 1863 from Cairo announcing my arrival at that point came on the morning of the 17th directing me to proceed immediately to the galt house, Louisville, where I would meet an officer of the War Department with my instructions. I left Cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot at Indianapolis, a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me. I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, although we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before when I was in Tennessee. Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War Department and my headquarters to be connected and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary was accompanied by Governor Brow of Ohio whom I had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed a special train that had brought him to Indianapolis and accompanied me to Louisville. Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I left Vicksburg except the suggestion in one of Halicks's dispatches that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary handed me two orders saying that I might take my choice of them. The two were identical in all but one particular. Both created the military division of Mississippi, giving me the command, composed of the departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland and the Tennessee, and all the territory from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi River north of Banks's command in the Southwest. One order left the department commanders as they were while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisville after night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain the Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover. He never did. A day was spent in Louisville. The Secretary giving me the military news at the Capitol and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted and I left the hotel to spend the evening away, both Mrs. Grant, who was with me and myself, having two wives living in Louisville, in the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that, unless prevented, Rosecrans would retreat and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged him upon the government to propriety of a movement against Mobile. General Rosecrans had been at Murphysburg, Tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive, but after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen Johnston in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Halick suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay Chattanooga open to capture. General Halick strongly approved the suggestion and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered Rosecrans to advance but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim not to fight two decisive battles at the same time. If true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I, however, was fighting no battle and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn from Rosecrans's front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. Finally he did move on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards Vicksburg surrendered and the troops sent from Bragg were free to return. It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually not only by ordinary casualties but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was, as constantly, being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily or troops would have to be sent to its defense. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment was overruled and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly and troops were sent from every available point. Rosecrans had very skillfully maneuvered Bragg south of the Tennessee River and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and entrenched and made himself strong there all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushed on with his forces very much scattered until Bragg's troops from Mississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn and was able to get his army together at Chattanooga some miles southeast of Chattanooga before the main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of September and Rosecrans was badly defeated with a heavy loss in artillery and some 16,000 men killed, wounded and captured. The corps under Major General George H. Thomas stood its ground while Rosecrans with Crittenden and McCook returned to Chattanooga. Thomas returned also but later and with his troops in good order. Bragg followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge overlooking Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain west of the town which Rosecrans had abandoned and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as Bridgeport. The national troops were now strongly entrenched in Chattanooga Valley with the Tennessee River behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain and with Chattanooga Creek for a large part of the way in front of their line. On the 29th, Halleck telegraphed me the above results and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to Rosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his way and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of Vicksburg. A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself either by capture or demoralization. All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the Tennessee River, but Bragg holding lookout and Raccoon Mountains west of Chattanooga commanded the railroad, the river, and the shortest and best wagon roads both south and north of the Tennessee between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between these two places is but 26 miles by rail. But owing to the position of Bragg all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country increasing the distance to over 60 miles. This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there on the lift. Indeed the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying with a faint fastidiousness that they were living on half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof. Nothing could be transported but food and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the federal lines was exhausted even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank where it was abundant. The only way of supplying fuel for some time before my arrival had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current affecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body if followed by the enemy. On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding that I was out he became nervous and excited inquiring of every person he met including guests of the house whether they knew where I was and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleven o'clock I returned to the hotel and on my way when near the house every person met was a messenger from the secretary apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown saying that the retreat must be prevented. He showed me the dispatch. I immediately wrote an order assuming command of the military division of the Mississippi and telegraphed it to General Roscrans. I then telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the army of the Cumberland and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards informing him at the same time that I would be at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received from Thomas saying, We will hold the town till we starve. I appreciated the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open, one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. On the morning of the twentieth of October I started with my staff and proceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night. So I remained in Nashville until the next morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, military governor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of welcome. His composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and I was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenced a general handshaking which, although trying, where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified so that they could be held with the least number of men, to Admiral Porter at Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that Russians were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying his army and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them, and to Thomas suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport. On the morning of the twenty-first we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson, Alabama, after dark. Rose Cranes was there on his way north. He came into my car, and we held a brief interview in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. From here we took horses and may our way by Jasper and over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud knee-deep in places, and from washouts on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the time of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved murals and horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there was a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there. From this point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small arms. We stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles further on. The next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directly to General Thomas's headquarters and remaining there a few days until I could establish my own. During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occupying the position of Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I had known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation in 1843 up to this time. He explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country plainly that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had established a sawmill on the banks of the river by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood and by rafting logs from the north side of the river above had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge, being there already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had, far under way, a steamer for flying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scowl made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in and a sternwheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Hallick of my arrival and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee headquarters in the field. The request was at once complied with. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 41. Assuming the command at Chattanooga, opening a line of supplies, battle of Wahatchie, on the picket line. The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me besides most of the members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at Browns Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. They did not fire upon us, nor seemed to be disturbed by our presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defense. That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport, a cracker line as the soldiers appropriately termed it. They had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley, five or six miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, twenty two hundred feet above Tidewater. Just below the town, the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the south Chattanooga River, west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek, and west of that Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground between the upper and lower palisades there is a single farmhouse which is reached by a wagon road from the valley east. The entrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy who also kept troops in Lookout Valley west and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. In addition to this, there was an entrenched line in Chattanooga Valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain to make the investment complete. Besides the fortifications on Missionary Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill with occasional spurs of rifle pits halfway up to front. The enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they were separated only by the Narrow Creek which gives its name to the valley in town and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. Thus the enemy with a vastly superior force was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west and commanded the river below. Practically the army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. The Union army was short of both not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps commanded respectively by Generals Howard and Slocum, hooker in command of the whole, from the army of the Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They were consequently left on the railroad where supplies could be brought to them before my arrival Thomas ordered their concentration at Bridgeport. General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following details were made. General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by Whitesides and Wahatchee to Browns Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the 14th Corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side by a back road until opposite Whitesides then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed. Four thousand men were, at the same time, detailed to act under General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats and undercover of night, float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Browns Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also undercover of night, by the north bank of the river to Browns Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at Browns Ferry, surprised the picket guard and captured most of it. By seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily fortified while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clock the bridge was laid and our extreme right, now in Lookout Valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges over the Tennessee River, a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at Browns Ferry with the road north of the river covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout Valley at Wahatchee. Howard marched on to Browns Ferry while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th Corps, stopped three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off and soon came in and surrendered. The river was now open to us from Lookout Valley to Bridgeport. Between Browns Ferry and Kellys Ferry, the Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. To get up these rapids steamers must be cordeled, that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridgeport to Kellys Ferry. The river point is only eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side of the river to Browns Ferry, dense on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport and abundance of forage clothing and provisions. On the way to Chattanooga, I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations which the troops had been so long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. It is hard for anyone, not an eyewitness, to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and also well-fed, and abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. These dispositions, he said, faithfully sustained, ensured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time. But the dispositions were not faithfully sustained, and I doubt not, but thousands of men engaged in trying to sustain them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the south was more to be benefited by its defeat than the north. The latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance and innervated the governing class. With the outside world at war with this institution they could not have extended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled nor allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated poor white trash. The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholders must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The war was expensive to the south, as well as to the north, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to Hooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga in order to reach Lookout Valley, but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary at Wahatchee by Longstreet's Corps. When the battle commenced Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three miles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foothill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to entrench, taking many prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold his height, he pushed on to reinforce Geary. Before he got up Geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules also became frightened and breaking loose from their fastening stampeded directly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for a charge and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased and our cracker line was never afterward disturbed. In securing possession of Lookout Valley Smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. In the night engagement of the twenty-eighth and ninth Hooker lost four hundred sixteen killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army I made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek comes down the center of the valley to within a mile, or such a matter, of the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then northwesterly, and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. This creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. As I would be under short-range fire, and in an open country, I took nobody with me except, I believe, a bugler who stayed some distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left. When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the call, turn out the guard for the commanding general. I replied, never mind the guard, and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinels on their posts called out in like manner, turn out the guard for the commanding general, and I believe added, general Grant. Their line in a moment, front face to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I returned. The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. General Longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was very polite, and touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General Longstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions, but not with a view of gaining any particular information, all of which he answered, and I rode off.