 Rhaid i ddweud y cwmhysgwm y ddylunio'r seisiwn yw'r ffordd o'r tawonau'r heistrae. Fel ydych chi'n gwybod i'n gweld y cwmhysgwm yw Professor Lynne Mawr, o'r Llyfrgell Cynigur mewn Llyfrgell Cymru. Rwy'n fyddech chi'n gwybod four o five ymgyrch yn y ddechrau. Rwy'n gwybod i'n gwybod i'r cwmhysgwm yw'r cwmhysgwm yw'r Llyfrgell Cymru, Llyfrgell Cymru, Llyfrgell Cymru, Cymru Cynigur. Professor Lin is going to talk about a couple of topics. The first one is going to look at the sovereignty claim of the WTI islands. And I think the second topic is going to look at the relationship between colonial Taiwan and the Japanese puppet regime of Manchuria. I remember when I first looked through Professor Lin's CV. That Manchuria topic really interested me. So I'm really delighted you agreed to talk about that aspect of your research. One other thing I should also say at this stage is how this afternoon's lectures came about. This afternoon's lectures are sponsored by the National Central Library. That's part of their Taiwan Chinese Studies lecture series. Professor Lin has also been lecturing in Germany as well. For conferences. We've really enjoyed working with the National Central Library. It's really helped us to promote our Taiwan Studies programme here. One particular thing I should also mention in terms of working together with the National Central Library is our new Taiwan Studies Resource Centre in the Taiwan Library, which we just opened last November. It's a wonderful collection of Taiwanese books and DVDs that are closely linked to our teaching programme. For those of you that don't know the Taiwan Library well, I really encourage you to take a look at that wonderful, I think it's on the second floor along with most of the other Taiwan material. We'll have a further talk later on this afternoon on resources in China and Taiwan Studies. Now I better give the floor to Professor Lin. Thanks again for coming back. It's great to see you again. Thank you for the introduction of Professor Dalfein. It's also for the invitation by the National Library of the Republic of China. For my two talks, the first one, as Professor Dalfein has just briefly mentioned, it will be about Taiwan Mental Health and the Simon Japanese Wall. This one will be about the Diao-Yu Thai Isolates. Actually, Diao-Yu Thai has been termed by Japan as the same culture and by my People's Republic of China as the Diao-Yu Island, and for the Republic of China, in the older romanisation, it's T-I-A-O, Diao-Yu Thai. And right now, mostly, they accept the Haim-Yu romanisation, so they turn it into T-I-A-O-Y-U-T-A-I. Since then, it has been termed by the National Library of the Republic of China as the Diao-Yu Thai Isolates for this presentation. What are these islands? This Wikipedia map, I think, is quite clear. They have actually, in total, eight islands. But there are three bigger ones, which have been shown here. Three bigger ones are here. There are three bigger ones, which have been shown here. Three bigger ones are positioned. A relative to China is like this, and a relative to Taiwan is like this. Relatively to the southern-ness, Japan's island is like this, and to Nanghap, which is the capital of the new islands, is like this. So this is about the location of these islands. Other than those three main islands, it's in Chinese called Huang Boi Yu. The biggest one is Diao-Yu Thai. That's why the whole island is called Diao-Yu Thai Island. The big one is this, and there's some distance in between. The biggest one we just saw is this three. Diao-Yu Thai, Huang Boi Yu, Chi Boi Yu. Chi Boi Yu is in normal distance. Along this main island is Diao-Yu Thai. And Chong-Bei-Yen, Chong-Nan-Yen, Bei-Xiao-Dao, Nan-Xiao-Dao, and Fei-Dang, Fu-Fei-Lai. There are also Japanese terms for this very island. You see in this several islands, it's actually just a rock. So it's called Yan. The fifth is named by Dao, islands. Three has been named as Yan, simply just rocks. There was a difference between Dao and rocks. Rocks didn't have any plants and animals. So it's impossible for the Dao. There are plants and animals on it. This is about the Diao-Yu Islands. This topic has been quite a recent controversial topic. This island turned into controversial in 1968 to 1972, because at that time, one UN organization found that the island area was the area for very huge oil and natural gas reservations, which could be bigger than that of the Middle East. So then those three, several small islands, you know the total area for those small islands was just 6 to 7 square miles, so tiny. But because of the possibility of a huge oil and natural gas reservation, it turned into some spot for a keen international competition. With those international competition in the end, May 15, 1972, the U.S. rewarded several islands to Japan. But in this process of transferring the U.S. gave ROC diplomatic documents, which is the title today. That's the May 26, 1971 note. In that diplomatic record, the U.S. said, U.S. has been forwarding to Japan is administrative right, not sovereignty. For sovereignty, U.S. will wait for the involved countries to solve by themselves. But the search for transparency of administrative rights does not undermine ROC's underlying plans for these islands. So this is about our topic, the 1971 note. And that note was given to ROC, since the transfer in 1972, since it seems to have been calmed down. Of course, it's still controversial, but not much attention has been paid to these islands. The recent crisis started from December 8, 2008. ROC first had officials trying to enter the territorial area of these islands. This is 2008, the end of 2008. And in September 2012, this is something you might all have known, because of the Tokyo head of the prefecture trying to purchase the three islands. The three islands is just what we have shown. This is three. The Derbytai and Beixiao Dao and Lansiao Dao, because those three islands had been used by Koga family, which started to use these islands since 1896. At the very beginning, they rented it from the Japanese government. Later, they purchased it. So in 2009, September, the Tokyo head of the prefecture tried to purchase those three islands. The central government of Japan was worried because this is some controversial islands. But it's beyond the control of the central government. It might instigate some international war or something like that. That's why the Japanese central government purchased it. Purchased those three islands from Koga family. Then there's a serious protest from the PRC side. They destroyed the Japanese cars. They brought down the Japanese shops. This is something that they still have some idea. And right now, the war fighters, fighter planes of both countries were fighting with each other there. There was just a small distance in between. Officials of the PRC and Japan were facing with each other around the territorial seas of these islands. So this is some issue, really, a recent imminent danger of war in East Asian seas. In last April, Obama first spoke up as the president of the US that these islands are within the sphere of US-Japan mutual security treaty. But even the US spaces like this, Japan continued to say these islands were theirs. They owned sovereignty over these islands. This is the Japanese position. What's the position of PRC? It's very important for Taiwanese historians. They say these islands are Taiwan's, and Taiwan is the PRC's. So if Taiwanese historians do not pay attention to this issue, then what Taiwan loses is going to lose. It's not only the Derwita islands, but also Taiwan. That's why I'm here. I'm only a scholar from Academic City Council, the Institute of Monarchy Street. I'm not at the position to propose the national claim over these islands. How about the leader of the Republic of China in Taiwan, President Maing Joe's sense about this issue? On August 5, 2012, when commemorating the 60th anniversary of the ROC Japan peace treaty, the president of the ROC, Maing Joe, built his East China Sea Peace Initiative. He called on joint exploration and development of resources around Japan by the ROC Japan and the PRC. So this is very much an official position from our side right now. Maing Joe's initiative was proposed with the hope to leave the controversies aside and directly go for the cooperation. That's Maing Joe's position. As a scholar from the Institute of Monarchy Street at the Demon City Council, I didn't know anything about Derwita before October 2012. The interaction between intellectuals and social realities. I didn't know about it. I tried to understand it because of that project, controversy, which was started in September 2012. Maing Joe's proposal was made before that project. I started to dig over this question in October 2012. How come I have been busy with some other projects? How come I moved to this topic? It's because in October 2012, one Harvard professor came to Taipei and kept asking me who owns these islands. Then because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives is now kept in my institute. So I just walked over to check who owns these islands. The answer is today's talk. The answer is I will see owns these islands. Then how come I am a scholar? I cannot say anything ridiculous, right? OK, so because in the process of digging the archives I found the U.S. Node issue to I will see on May 26, 1971. It's very crucial for solving those international questions. It reveals that three parties have all bases in international laws for the joint exploitation initiated by President Maung. You know the commonality and difference between me and Maung? Commonality is, well, it's fine to have joint exploration. The goal is the same. My goal is the same as Maung, but my rationale is different from Maung because Maung says just leave aside the controversies. If Taiwan goes for an international negotiation with controversies, who will pay attention to Taiwan? My difference from Maung is, well, Taiwan has its own position based on international law. Japan, PRC also have a position based upon international laws. Since everybody has the basis on international law and the UN Charter, the article one of UN Charter is for imminent challenge for international peace. We had better to go to international law. So that's why we have to pay some attention to this. The data and approach that I have been used for this discussion increase not only the archives of the Republic of China, I also use the archives of Japan and also of the US. I also refer to some international laws for this analysis. So then let's move it to the content of the note and its legacy for the US stance. This is the note, the original note. You can see it clearly that it has been issued by the Department of State from Washington, May 26, 1971. The Secretary of State presents his compliments to his excellency, the Chinese Ambassador. This is the Chinese Ambassador of the Republic of China. It has the honor to reply to the note of March 15, 1971 from former Ambassador Joe Shukai concerning the legal status of the Diorita isolates, also known as the St. Carpo Island. The United States government is aware that a dispute is between the government of the Republic of China and Japan in sovereignty over this island. It is the firm policy of the United States to take no position on the merits of this dispute. As Ambassador Joe noted, the United States presently administers this island under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan as a San Francisco peace treaty. The United States expects to return to Japan in 1972, remaining rights under Article 3 in accordance with the agreement announced by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan on November 21, 1969. The United States believes that a return of administrative rights to the party from which those rights were received can in no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of China. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan presents before it is transferred by the administration of the islands through the United States. No can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of the Republic of China. OK. The purpose of this topic is to analyze. How come U.S. issues that diplomatic note to ROC and what is the process of making of these diplomatic documents? Before that, let me say, actually the sense of U.S. and Japan now are different. Japan says Japan has sovereignty. U.S. says Japan just has administrative rights. How come this separation of administrative rights from sovereignty and the position of U.S.? How come U.S. have this position? Some Japanese worker would say it's related to some U.S. attempt for textile negotiations with ROC in Taiwan. That idea was actually by going through the U.S. archives. We could find that that attempt had actually a sort of in U.S. governmental interaction into governmental interaction. That proposal means that if U.S. did not give to Japan in the coming 1972 Okinawa revulsion treaty, that means U.S. still keeps those islands, then Taiwan might give U.S. more favorable conditions for the textile import. So this is one theory spread around. Taiwan's United Daily quoted Japan's Kyodo Tsushin, Japan's Central Agency, both covered this kind of idea and spread it to the general public. But the fact is that U.S. idea was proposed on June 7. You see, after June 7, U.S. still had an Okinawa revulsion treaty signed on June 17, and because the treaty needed the process of signature and then ratified domestically and then exchanged and turned effective. So that June 7's idea about the textile was not carried out, was not executed. So the United Daily's quotation of Kyodo Tsushin says that textile thing was related with the differentiation between administrative rights and sovereignty. Actually, it's not the textile thing because the textile idea was proposed on June 7. It's after the May 26 diplomatic documents were noted about. So actually, it's the May 26 note which led to the U.S. sense to differentiate, to prioritize administrative rights from sovereignty claims. In the treaty, and the Okinawa Reversion Treaty signed by the Secretary of State William Rogers and Japanese Prime Minister Keiji Aiju, there's no warnings on the treaty itself about Dioritae. Dioritae exists only on this map. It was awarded to Japan according to this map which had been attached to the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Dioritae is here. You see? Dioritae is here. So this is the area for the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Then after the reversion and the U.S. continues, because as I say, a treaty needs to go back to the home country to be ratified. According to U.S. constitution, every treaty has to go through the Senate approval. So while reporting in the Senate, William Rogers, the Secretary of State, already underscored the differentiation between sovereignty and administrative rights. The warnings are almost the same as that in May 26, 1971 note. And that position continues up to now for U.S.'s sense. So you can see the importance of that May 26 note. And therefore, for that administrative rights, which is also very crucial because for the U.S.-Japan mutual cooperation and security treaty, this treaty will be applied to the areas that include Japan's administrative regions but not necessarily areas under its sovereignty. So that May 26 note satisfies the U.S.-Japan treaty's coverage. So that's why Obama in last April continuously said, well, PRC, please understand that this is within the area of U.S.-Japan security treaty. So you can see the importance of May 26, 1971 note, which actually is the very origin of the U.S. sense that told Delica Oslith today. Then the background for shaping this note. We have to go back into those years. 1969 to 1971. 1969 was the year that Richard Nixon started the pro-PRC policy. But when that policy was tried to be taken, to be adopted within U.S., there were a lot of oppositions, including people more for Russia or more for India or more for PMT in Taiwan. So those policies were made very secretly, particularly under the National Security Council, headed by Kissinger. So this May 26, 1971 note was actually decided by Kissinger. At this time, U.S. attitude told Taiwan to include these others because of the improvement of U.S.-PRC relationship and also the coming end of the Vietnam War. U.S. intended to greatly remove its troops stationed in Taiwan. We have U.S. troops in the early period. But in 1969 to 1971, U.S. had an intention to withdraw those U.S. troops in Taiwan. Also, U.S. made a great mistake to have made an ROZ, to have left the UN on October 25, 1971, because this is not a term made by me. It's a term made in the U.S. Secretary of State Archives about Kissinger's mistake for resulting in this kind of outcome. At the same time, so many giving up for Taiwan, but at the same time, U.S. guaranteed Japan that Taiwan's security will be maintained. So U.S., Japan, and ROZ in Taiwan had mutual security alliance relationship. And this is the very background for the May 26, 1971 from the U.S. side. Of course, it's also affected by ROZ factors. The ROZ's rationale for its claim of sovereignty over the Delwita Islands had been persuasive. This is also a crucial reason. Another reason is the ROZ's protect Delwita movement, which had been very anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. movement. It started in early 1971, just on the eve of the May 26 note. It started in January and be amended just on the eve of this May 26 note, which was also essential for the creation of this note. So we will go to the background of the ROZ side. Actually, when the descriptors will go more for that in the process of discussion, when the U.N., United Nations Economic Commission for Asia, Fawr Ys, E-C-A-F-E, Eqa, and the abbreviation is Eqa. No, it's not Eqa. Sorry, sorry. Eqa is ROZ's recent collaboration Eqafe. Eqafe. Eqafe. And this is the abbreviation of this commission. And this Eqafe, in 1968, discovered the rich resources of petroleum oil in the dust after this. This means, you see, this is the metaphor for the continental shelf near of this area. And this is the Diorita area. The Eqafe's report reveals that this area had been very rich in oil. This is the report of Eqafe. We didn't, because for this report, there's a joint authors. Some of Taiwan's scholars had been among the authors. So actually ROZ joined that Eqafe's project for this American exploration. And after the report had been revealed, what's the response of ROZ. At the very beginning, John Taishie is very clear. Well, we don't have any power to grab it by weapon. We have to say, we are a member of UN. We have to stick to the UN charges to peaceful use of things by referring to international laws. But for international laws, at the very beginning, because it's something related with the continental shelf. At that time, UN has a law on continental shelf. Even the Republic of China was, the Republic of China's representative attended the drafting of the UN continental shelf convention in Geneva. But in 1957, ROZ didn't ratify it, as I told you. The treaties needed to process. The second process is ratification. ROZ attended the drafting, the signature of that UN continental shelf convention. So, at this point, what ROZ thought about and executed as ratification of that UN continental shelf convention. This is the first response of ROZ. And it's not until September 1970 that the report was reviewed in 1969 and the ratification of that convention was made in 1969. It's not until the September of 1970 that ROZ firstly spoke up that they about their disagreement about Japan's sovereignty over these islands. Just a disagreement, not a strong claim over. This is the second stage, just a disagreement. And then in October 1970, ROZ began to declare that they will try their best to preserve the legitimate rights on these islands. And just, there's still no clear rationale up to now. Up to February 1971, ROZ firstly officially declared sovereignty over those islands verbally. February is a verbally. It's not until March 13th that we read in the May 26th note. It's not until March 13th that ROZ delivered the note to the US. And as the Kissinger assistant commented, it's not until then that ROZ made persuasive arguments for ROZ's sovereignty claim over these islands. So you see there's some confusion of ROZ's understanding of their legal claim over these islands. ROZ came up with this finding. Because the government had a great pressure from internationally and domestically. Internationally, this is in 1971. That's the year that ROZ was the kick of the UN. So before October 25th, ROZ had a great had to be very cautious about its relation with US and Japan. It's US and Japan to be relied upon by ROZ to keep ROZ seated in the UN. This is international. So ROZ had to be careful for proposing its sense about these islands. Domestically, in the US, a lot of the students and professional protest started and protecting Jau Itai movement started. Domestically, the Taida student, Zhengda student and Sida student followed up. So it caused a very great pressure in this year. So between late 1970 to early 1971, ROZ Government exerted a lot of effort to collect related materials for positive relations between ROZ and the Jau Itai Islands. Materials found include the Min and Chin Special Envoys to convert titles to Kings of New Q, their writers, their writers about their envoys, the envoys' writers about their trip to New Q. And the trip go this way, from Beijing to Fuzhou and through several routes to New Q Kingdom. And the Jau Itai Sea, Huang Wei Yu, you see it's Wei Yu, Gwme Island. According to these writers, Gwme Island has always been described as the border of the New Q Kingdom. So Jau Itai was beyond the New Q Kingdom. And this Jau Itai Islands was described as the border of the Taiwan side. You see, in between, then we go to the geographical reasons. From this map you already see there's some deep sea between Naha and this three islands. This deep sea is called Okinawa Chwap, which could be 2,000 meters in depth. So it's a natural border between Okinawa and the Jau Itai Islands. This is Okinawa Chwap. So this is Okinawa Chwap, which is the third reason for the Jau Itai area. And then the third reason is for fishing in the Jau Itai area. It tends to be the Taiwanese fishermen. The Okinawa fishermen seldom came to these islands. Even these islands belonged to Japan until 1895. Mostly it's the Taiwanese fishermen went there. And while this island was under the US administrative control between 1952 to 1972, but up to the controversy started in 1968, it's the Taiwanese fishermen who went there for fishing. This is a document. This is for the inner period when Jau Itai was under the administrative rule of the US. So even with this materials, as I told you, the Oversea Government had to be very cautious. Their response is only 50% sure about the Oversea sovereignty over the Jau Itai island. Still not quite sure, because these are not international laws. The Department of North American Affairs because it is this governmental officer to deal with the US, they are still quite not sure. The breakthrough was made on May 20, 1970. Representative of the Taiwan Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa, named as Xu Jin-Mai, reviewed the following information. It says, because of his own spot investigation, he was in Okinawa based on his own spotter investigation. It reveals that Ryukyu turned into Japan's Okinawa flag culture in 1879. It used to be a Ryukyu kingdom, right? And it turned into Japan's Okinawa flag culture in 1879. The Kogawa family from Kyushu, Japan went to Okinawa in 1879 and directed after the transition. And then to Jau Itai in 1880 for a business expansion. What kind of business could be done there? Together, the Turtle Bay for Chinese medicine for both feathers and other ships to collect the ships for some handicrafts purpose. After this, the Kogawa family had petitioned, had asked the Okinawa flag culture to include this island and the Okinawa flag culture. And the official request was made in 1885. But those official requests were turned down again and again by the central government of Japan because of the concern about the Qing government's opposition. When Shishiman reviewed this information, he also said that it's not until according to the Kogawa family, it's not until the victory of Japan over China that the Kogawa family started to use these islands. So this information for ours, the government, which was very crucial. And Shishiman suggested that the Kogawa family said that they had a lot of related materials. It was suggested to go to Japanese official documents for related information. Then our government did go to the Japanese official documents and render them into Chinese at that time. These are Japanese originals and these are Chinese translation at that time. At that time, protecting Diao Yutai students, the student movement might not know the fact. You have a student movement issue yesterday. The student movement for protecting Diao Yutai at that time always think that the government did not do anything. But actually, the government was doing this several things. They have rendered the Japanese archives into Chinese and saying that from 1885 to 1894, the central government of Japan turned down the Okinawa Prefecture's petition for including Diao Yutai into Okinawa again and again because they say that these islands had been named by Chinese people. In Shanghai, there's a newspaper covering our Kogawa family's visit at these islands if Japan took action. At that time, it might stimulate international confrontation. So you see that Japanese document. Up to now, what Japan said about the sovereignty over these islands is based upon their cabinet decision made on January 14, 1895. They say we decided to include I just summarized before 1994, no inclusion. It's January 14 of 1895, the cabinet, Japanese cabinet decided to include it secretly. Even their own people didn't know it, know about it. After now, they say, well, we started from that time point. That's before Shimono Seiki Treaty. Shimono Seiki Treaty turned into effective May 8, January 14 and May 8. There's some time gap. The Japanese side insisted to say no involvement with the Shimono Seiki Treaty which ended the war between Japan and China. So international communities did not render any objection to them. They did it secretly. How could international communities oppose to that? But then they claim upon this because of no international opposition and those islands were islands without human habitation. So they started to own these islands since January 14, 1895. But here, if that's something purely made domestically, you can see from this archive, the Japanese archive. This is the 9th World Show, Ministry of International Affairs. For discussion, the inclusion of Diwethae into Okinawa, it has to go to the 9th World Show. Why Wilson? Did you see why Wilson? Of course it's not different even at that time. For Japan itself, it's not purely defined as some domestic issue. It's something related with international affairs. What nation to be involved in, of course, is China. So with this material, the AOC Government started to be more vigorous and then they invited a lot of international law scholars. These are the names for those international law scholars. Among these scholars, this professor, Du Heng Chi, he had been an international law professor at Donghai University before his retirement. After retirement, he had been an international law professor at Suzong University in Taipei. In the archives, we see he is writing about to retrieve the Diwethae aethlase according to international laws. So if we compare the March 15th note with this proposal, actually the March 15th note, the rationale, had been based upon Du Heng Chi's proposal. A very crucial sense proposal at this time is to sever the link between Diwethae and Okinawa. That means because in the March 15th note, AOC proposed that the U.S. just return Okinawa proper to Japan without Diwethae. So sever the link between Okinawa and Diwethae. Because Japan's claim over Okinawa following San Francisco Peace Treaty, Article 2, Japan had to give up Taiwan and Korea and a lot of others, but not including Okinawa. Japan took Okinawa in 1879, right? And it took Taiwan in 1895 based upon Shimono Circuit Treaty between China and Japan for Okinawa. And Japan did not give it a renounce because the verb used in the San Francisco Peace Treaty is a renounce. In Article 2, no renunciation of Okinawa for Japan. That's why the U.S. kept saying that Japan keeps the residual sovereignty over Okinawa right after turning into the effect of the Okinawa Peace Treaty on April 28, 1952. Directly after that, Japan kept the residual sovereignty. That's the background for the 1972 Treaty of Okinawa Reversion. So that's the Okinawa situation. But for Diwethae Isles, according to Duhunz, for any territory transferred because of the war, it has to await for the peace treaty to finalize the war, to end the war, to have a legal settlement of those territory transferred. This is the most important legal concept for Diwethae, optional, as I think. So Duhunz proposes this international law principle. You see, the Koga family asked us to include Diwethae into Okinawa all the way from 1880, and the Okinawa government proposes it since 1885. It's not until 1891 that Japan made that decision for that inclusion. According to the document that I cited, the Japanese government directly said, well, the situation today is different from the 1885 situation. What's the difference? The Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1894. After December, China already accepted the peace negotiations. At the end of 1894, China already accepted the peace negotiations. Japan already had a victory in the war. That's why Japan says the situation has been changed, so they turn to decide to include Diwethae into Okinawa. So this decision, according to the international law that I just summarized to you, has to be finalized in the Treaty of Shimonoseki because that's the peace treaty which finalized the war between Qing China and Japan between 1894 to 1895. Diwethaf. Then Japan said, well, what say? Well, you look up a Treaty of Shimonoseki. No wording about the Diwethae islands at all. Then, well, are they? According to Duhon, the original audience goes like this. China says to Japan in perpetuity and post sovereignty the foreign territories together with the fortifications, the arsenals, and the public property, their own. And the foreign territories include the island of Monsang, together with all islands of attending all belonging to the said island of Monsang. For Duhon, Diwethaf is here. All islands of attending all belonging to the said island of Monsang. And he has his international law inside here by reading into Hong Kong to have an opportunity in front of belonging to. There's a difference in international law about these two words. Belonging to just emphasize those people who was, there was a people living on those places and they pay taxes and the government range the protection over them. That's belong to. Diwethaf was not within this category but obtaining to underscore the geographical connection as I shown you before, Diwethaf was geographically, geologically connected with Taiwan Island. So that obtaining to was intentionally added by the Japanese government. The original threat was shoshu. Later it changed to shoyou ffushu. How come the magic government was so attentive to this was shoshu, shoyou ffushu that fool is obtaining to. Because the Koga family was always nagging at the Japanese government to include those islands and it's not until you see the Koga family when they go to this islands that Shimono Seki turned effective May 8 and the Koga family went there directly on June 1. You can see this historical context. So today many Japanese say Diwethaf islas were not including the Shimono Seki treaty actually do not clearly understand the major government's meticulous attention to their national interest in 1895. The exerted a great effort to include Diwethaf with Taiwan to go with Taiwan to have been seated to Japan. Understand? So since Taiwan was seated in Shimono Seki Treaty to Japan then was the post Second World War situation for Taiwan. This is the international law international treaty in continuous with the Shimono Seki Treaty for Taiwan's sovereignty. As I just write for you the Shimono Seki Treaty had full sovereignty of Taiwan seated to Japan in perpetuity. So many people complained that this treaty didn't don't have the word Gwenghwan return. You have to go back to that seated in perpetuity. So legally Japan could not use the word restore. They could only use renounce give up. You see? So it's very correct in terms of treaty wardens in San Francisco Treaty or this type of treaty for using renounce. Because in Shimono Seki, Japan acquired the right over Taiwan in perpetuity. So this is a treaty signed by the Japanese Emperor. This is in-syn. No matter in terms of trust in the Oriental concept or in terms of international law in Western concept Japan has to obey this to this treaty. Okay? So that's why March 15th was made with all these legal arguments. That's why the assistant to occasion herself last time in October they didn't say clearly about their right over this islands but this time they already could out of clear reasons. So this is the background for the May 26 note of U.S. Firstly, implications for present situation several just maybe two weeks ago PRC Minister of Defense of the Ministry of Defense talked with the U.S. Minister of Defense saying that PRC had got no chance to sign the peace treaty with Japan after the end of Second World War and the PRC PRC sacrificed so many people so it's the war declaration for PRC to follow rather than the peace treaty for PRC to follow. Of course U.S. side didn't say anything but if you were the Minister of U.S. Minister of Defense what would you say what I suggest is here? Then first about if Japan did not accept that Derwita Islands went to Japan according to the Shimono Safety Treaty that means they don't accept the international law principle that I just summarized everything to move because of the war have to be decided by the peace treaty which is finalizable What does this international law imply? It's like if A is gambling with B and they say at the very beginning that if I lose then my house my one house will be given to you and the gamble was on and on sometimes A wins sometimes B wins but finally A thinks well I cannot lose more I just lose this house ok this is surrender surrender could not make a legal transaction of that house for the legal transaction of that house they have to go to the court or the official government to make that legal transaction this is the idea for that international law principle so if Japan don't accept that Derwita was with Taiwan to go to Japan based on the Shimono Safety Treaty then Japan needed to observe what the PRC minister of defense said several days ago Japan had to observe the Cairo Declaration and the Postum Declaration the Postum Declaration act was based upon Cairo Declaration it says Japan had to stay at the four islands and the minor islands that we allies agreed with each other and so that means Japan could not have Okinawa you see PRC's attempt now PRC has been so much trying to expand out outward if the other side could not defend itself he has enough reason to expand out ok this is really crucial as I say Japan actually could return Okinawa because of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and 1972's Okinawa Reversion Treaty but if you don't follow this international law principle to say well it's not the Shimono Safety the difference between Shimono Safety and Japan's permanent decision is that international law it has to await for the peace treaty to finalize the territory transaction do you understand this point 1895 January 14th the permanent decision Japan up to now they have the basic viewpoints about about Senkaku issued in 1972 it's right on the website of Japan's ministry of foreign affairs yw gwaen dwi'n gwein cyngor dweud o'r gyfrindleid into Chinese always stick with that cabinet decision but I would say international law Japan had to accept those islands went to Japan because of Shimono Safety Treaty if Japan doesn't follow this then Japan had to follow the war declaration because that cabinet decision was made while the war was still on because this treaty had not been turned effective so it's still in the process of war and Kylo or Poesan was both war declarations according to those war declarations Japan could not have Okinawa understand this point maybe it's crucial because it went through two wars first is the Sino-Japanese War second is the Second World War and the international law principle was the same if Japan doesn't obey the international law principle for the first war then he has to observe that because he stick with the cabinet decision made in the war then the allies made the decision in Kylo and Poesan saying that Japan had to had to be back to the four islands Japan could not have Okinawa so then without Okinawa Japan could not have Diao Rui Tai either because of Okinawa so Japan had some plan of Diao Rui Tai you get a point? ok that's for Japan as well as then how about the PRC they say well we didn't have a chance to sign a peace treaty we have no obligation we have no work the war has been ended in the Second World War ended in 1945 PRC it doesn't appear in 1945 you know China had war against Japan for so many years right? after the failure up to what time for this up to three ok we could finish it by three not bad ok so Japan had actually tried to take a neutral position Zhongli neutral position after so many years defeat by Japan particularly you know in Second World War in the first stage is the German and Japan side to have a war in the first stage it's not until the second stage that the allies turn to be on the winning side transition event historical event is Cairo before Cairo actually Zhang Kaixue was quite was thinking of taking a neutral position without Madame Zhang Kaixue you remember for the Cairo declaration we always have the photo with Madame there right? Madame had been very influential for Zhang Kaixue's decision to join the allied camp without Zhang Kaixue's decision China would not be in any position to be on the winning side to sign the peace treaty so we have to give credit to ROC government rather than PRC government okay so of course the war calls the Chinese people a lot of casualties the war is a nation to nation a commutation rather than a government to government confrontation Chinese people sacrifice needs to be taken care of after now the PRC side always complained that well their sacrifice had not been taken care of yet and this is very much a route for the East Asian conflict right? but for me on October 25th PRC could sit at the permanent member of the Security Council of UN because the PRC was not involved with the war at all the war ended in 1945 PRC showed up in 1949 you know my other subject is about images on occurrences up to October 1 the communism money still carried on their notes okay PRC showed up only after October 1st 1949 so for people who sit on the permanent seat of the Security Council was the winning countries in the Second War War War, right? so having the PRC sitting there is a great compensation for people, Chinese people's sacrifice in the war you know in related with Diao Ytai issue how people how how important how huge is the benefit for PRC sitting in the Security Council permanent seat of Security Council of UN we have to go to another another international law UN convention of the law of the seas UN convention of the continental shelf after PRC sat on the permanent seat of the Security Council of UN PRC started to mobilize all the third world countries to change the UN convention on the continental shelf into the UN convention of the law of the seas in the continental shelf of the law there is no clear boundary for the development of maritime resources they just say each country could develop maritime resources near to that country is very ambiguous PRC said it to have 200 nautical miles beyond the coastline of each country you say PRC had that long coastal lines this is very much the root of the current east Asian controversies east seas controversies and south seas controversies because PRC also all this they could develop all this maritime areas ok so this is just one example for their sitting there how many fish it has been and in addition to this this 200 nautical miles is beyond the boundary of the territorial seas in the original convention is three nautical miles beyond the coastal line the PRC had ascended to 12 nautical miles PRC if he it still would like to sit in this beneficial position it has to observe UN Charter article 1 every controversy had to be solved according to international law so well then we could say PRC right because the distance between Dioritae Island and PRC the nearest coast is within 200 nautical miles so PRC could reach the sail ok then Japan of course from that small island to Dioritae Island is also within the 200 nautical miles and Japan had effective control over this island that's the administrative rights ok and ROC had 70 rights so this is the international law basis that I have so far there are three parties one question you might have in mind is what's the difference between administrative rights and the sovereignty rights if you go back to the audience they have legislative power they have administrative power they have theoretical power then why come, how come this is not sovereignty back to Macau's situation Portugal Portuguese entered Macau in 1553 without any treaty because before 16 Westphalia started from 1648 1553 is much earlier than 1648 the international treaties started from the Westphalia system ok and it's not until 1887 that the Portuguese government had a treaty with the Qing government saying that Portuguese people could have an administrative rights over Macau so in 1774 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal said Macau was a Chinese territory under their administration the difference between administrative rights and sovereignty is ownership and a use right ok so the hours they still have the ownership of these islands then the Japanese side would say well Japan always the diplomatic ties was severed in 1972 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs uttered in that year about the termination of the ROC Japan peace treaty for to deal with this when you people go to Japan maybe not all of you some of you who have come from Taiwan and still carrying ROC passport I would like to ask you when you go to Japan are you carrying a PRC passport or ROC passport in international treaties because treaties often have many many articles some articles carry the nature that is dealing with something going on ok it's called executory articles for some articles it deal with something to be finalized it's it's labeled as executory articles for the transfer of Taiwan's sovereignty which have been ceded to Japan based on Shimono Seiki Treaty for the sovereignty change it has been executed for the diplomatic ties it has been terminated you can see the 1972 significance for the Taipei Treaty for something going on for example trade cooperation or navigation cooperation fishing cooperation all of them start in 1972 but for the transfer of Taiwan's sovereignty or the end of war it was not resuming the war after the termination of the this treaty in 1972 as claimed by Japan side right the end of the war what the peace treaty means the end of war or the transfer of Taiwan's sovereignty says its efficacy is still returned by ROC okay and you could take last we take my call as example this time let's take Hong Kong as example in 1943 there's a treaty between between England, US and China ROC China for the abolition of all the treaties in it the extra territory rights was given up by US and England okay within the extra territory rights before 1943 is the British Council to judge the criminals in China for the after 1943 it's the Chinese judge to make that judgment so directly changed because as a part is the secretary articles but for the 99 years lease of the new territories in Hong Kong it had to stay there that's why Hong Kong was not returned to China in 1943 it was returned to China in 1997 so you can see within the same treaty some articles carried the nature of the executory articles and some executive articles so the sovereignty rights is still in the hands of ROC in Taiwan because that treaty was signed in 1952 ROC had already been in Taiwan so sovereignty over Taiwan had been returned by ROC in Taiwan okay so since Taiwan is ROC and the Delta Islands was pretending to belong to Taiwan so Delta is always in Taiwan so we we get our rationales for President Ma's initiative that's the end thank you thank you without stopping, fantastic I don't think oh yes, light I know it's already late for the coffee break actually we do have a dedicated time for Q&A so would you like to just have a quick break so Professor Lee have a break first then we can have a more dedicated time later and we can all come back aiming at two different topics