 Mae'r gwybod i'r gilydd hwnnw wedi bod y gallu gweld ei ddweud. Mae'n gwybod i'r gilydd hwnnw'n yw'r gwybod i'w ddweud. Yn gwybod bryd yw bod eu cyhoedd yn y gwybod yma, mae yna ddweud ar rheswm 3 maen nhw. Mae'r 3 tim cans sydd yn cael eu gwirionedd. Mae'r gwybod i'r gweithiau ym Mhwyrch yw'r gweithfyrdd Briseg, gyda Seamus Martin, yn y bydd Eunion yn rheswm ysgolion, yn y 1990. ac mae'n oed o'r hyn o'r haf ymdau yn Washington. Roedden i fyfwng o'r kuwch am ysgolio ymddangos ymddangos a'r hefyd. Mae'n gŵr yn ymddeithasio gyda'r Uniau Tynedol, ac mae'n angen amddangos, wrtho ysgrifennig, mae'n gwybod gyda'r rhan o'r Paacistan a Afganistau, sy'n gyntaf hynny o'r Lundanaeth, yn y 1980. Mae'n gwybod i'r Paacistan o'r haf yma, having previously spent several weeks in Afghanistan. This has heavily coloured my thinking at the moment. I'd like to say thank you very much for inviting me back to the institute where I've spoken before and also giving me another excuse to visit Dublin where my mother grew up. Although I have to say that as a, what used to be called, from a family that used to be called i'w cwyslwch yn gyfacol, mae'n gweithio'r adnodd iddo yn ymgyrch yn Llyfrgell i Indiol, ym mwyaf yn y Llyfrgell yng Nghymru, mae'n cael ei wneud i gael ymgyrch, ond mae'n gweithio'ch gweithio'r adnodd. Yn y gweithio, mae'n gweithio'r adnodd a'r rhysgau a'r rhysgau, ond mae'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio. O'r mwyaf yn gyntaf, yw eu gweithio'n ymgyrch yn llwyddiant iawn, gyda'r periodd yn y gweithio'n gwirionedd iawn. Mae wedi mynd i dda'r echas ymgyrch ar gyfer i'w gwirionedd a phrygoedd a'r gyfer yw gwirionedd a'r cyfladdau rhysgau rhysnig rhysnig, a mor hwn yn wneud i chi'r stdyn nhw yn fwyaf i ti'r rhysnig ddau. Ond y gallwn i'n ddigonnwg ar y cyd-dweud o'r rhan o'r rhaglen yn ffamilio'r sgwrs yn Llatfyr, yn Estonia. Dwi'n gwybod a'r ydych chi'n gweithio'n gweithio. Roeddwn ni'n gweithio'n gweithio. Roeddwn ni'n gweithio y reakthiwn yn ymgyrchu eu Llywodraeth i'r prospect, eich prospect realistig, o'r llawr mewn cyfithio'r llyfrwrs yn ffamilio'r ymgyrch. Mae'n cyfnwys â'r ffeith yw'r cyd-fath yn y Cymru. Mae'r cyfnwys a'r cyfnwys eich ffyrdd yw'r cyfnwys, a'r cyfnwys i'w dyn nhw'r weist a'r dyn nhw'r democrofiol, yn cyfnwys yw'r rhys-dwyll yn ei ddwylliant i'r rhys-dwylliant. Roedd rhys-dwylliant yn y ffordd o'r gwybod yn y context feddwl, The question then arises why, given that as far as I can see this is obvious, this is fact should be obvious to any reasonably well informed person, our elites persist with such determination in claiming that Russia is a mortal threat or at least a highly important one and a vast importance to the West. Ac rwy'n credu y gallu bod yw'n gwybod yw'r rhaglion gyda'r rhaglion, ond rwy'n credu yn ymddangos, yn ymddangos, y llunio'r strategiaeth cyllidol yn cychwynol, yn ymddangos. Rwy'n credu'n credu yn ymddangos, rwy'n credu'r rhaglion, ond rwy'n credu'r rhaglion, Elef, fyddwn i mi'n plesio'r ddau bod yn gwneudio maen nhw'n gwneudio loeddol. Oneth, yw'n gallu i goodness i'w ddau enquadwyth yn gweithio'n ddim yn eithaf gwir i mi oedd hynny'n ddau'r pethau. Yn gweithio'r ddau yn y ddau sydd yn gallu i'ch brin ymgyrch i gyhoeddwyr ben sydd yn ei wneud ar gyfer ar y cwynhwych. Mae'n ei ddechrau ar gyfer y syniad o'r rhannu i'r rhannu. Ac ydych chi'n ddweud y gallu? Mae'n dweud y gallu'n gwneud yn dweud yr ather. Efallai, ar y cyfweld yn yw'r ysgolion, mae'n ddweud y ddweud o'r dweud yn ddegi'r ddweud yn ddod i'r ein ddiweddol ac mae'r ddweud yn ddegi'r ddweud yn ddegi'r ddweud y dyfodol. Mae'n ddweud y ddweud yn ddweud yn ddweud o'r llyfrwg yn y llyfrwyddiol, ac mae'n bwysig, sy'n gyffredinol, ond mae'n dweud yn ymweld i'r aledau gyda'r ysgol i'ch deudio'r lluniau hyd yn dweud i ymweld i'r lluniau. Felly, os yw'r Llyfr yn fawr, y ffant, mae'n gweithio'n ffant. The overwhelming consensus of the scientific community has set a 2% rise in global temperatures as the limit beyond which climate change becomes uncontrollable with results that it has been widely predicted could bring an end to modern civilization, 2%. Every attempt, every agreement so far aimed at limiting it, 2% has failed everyone internationally. The recent agreement between the Americans and the Chinese could radically change that, but that does depend, amongst many other things, on who wins the elections in November. If Trump loses in November, a Trump oed or Trump id is not going to lose four years from now or eight years after that, whereas the threat will continue. The overwhelming consensus in the scientific community is that even below 2%, there will be profound changes, including to human agriculture in many parts of the world, and that these changes are already apparent in many places, including most notably in northern India and Pakistan, where approximately 10% of the world's population lives, in terms of increased drought and diminished flow of water from the Himalayas. There is a consensus for obvious reasons that one of the principal effects in the medium term, long before we go over 2% and things become really catastrophic, if God forbid they do, one of the effects of this, one of the principal effects will be greatly to increase migration, obviously. This is a long-established pattern in various parts of the world when the climate changes and when there are severe changes to agriculture. Another fact, obviously, that very high levels of migration to Europe already exist. They were made, of course, even greater and more dramatic over the past two years by refugees fleeing the wars in Syria, Libya and Afghanistan, but this latest spike is only a relatively small part, of course, of a much longer and deeper phenomenon. Fact, over the past 60 years, according to the British census, the Muslim proportion of the British population has increased each decade on average by more than 60%. You can look that up if you wish, it takes two clicks of a mouse. Take out a pocket calculator. If that continues, if that continues, that proportionally increased continues, you have a Muslim majority of the British population by some point in the 20s, 60s, a Muslim majority. That's maths, that ain't paranoia. Now, you say, of course, it's always dangerous to extrapolate from the past into the future, etc. Is it really after 60 years of this, six decades, decade on decade? In any case, it seems to me that the burden of proof is on the people who say, oh, this won't happen, to say why it won't happen, given the patterns we see in the world, in the Middle East, the lack of development in even states that remain relatively stable, like Pakistan. And, of course, another fact is that such a demographic and cultural transformation has never occurred peacefully or in circumstances of democracy in all of recorded history. It has never occurred. There is no precedent for it occurring in this way. There are precedents, actually, for even higher levels of migration. I come from one of them, Qatar, where the indigenous population has been reduced to about 10%. Qatar, rather notoriously, is not a democracy. And, of course, as anyone who has read the papers known knows, the migrant population is kept in order by extremely rigorous police measures, intended both to exclude them completely from power, but also, of course, to move them on when their work is over. And, you may perhaps not have seen this, but a few months ago, the former head of the Equality Commission, who, interestingly enough, is himself of West Indian origin. He's black, Trevor Phillips, commissioned a poll on Muslim integration in Britain, most of the answers of which showed that around a third of the Muslim population was extremely unintegrated. Into British society in terms of attitudes and culture. I was going to discuss this in more depth, but don't have the time. So those are the facts. Question. Historians, 100 years from now, 200 years from now, how will they regard the obsession of Western elites and the Western media with the Russian threat? May it not be rather the way that we regard the European elites before 1914, leading the continent into a catastrophe for reasons which now, of course, they are reconstructed by historians, by people who, my elder brother, who understand the context of the time. But the automatic response of the average student is, these people must have been mad. Why? Why? Why were they obsessed with control over central Africa, who gets to dominate Bosnia? Well, I would say actually that in 1914, by the standards of the time, there were really serious issues involved. German domination of Europe, which of course we've ended up with by much nicer means, who gets to control central Europe, the Germans or the Russians and so forth. These were serious issues. As in the 1850s and then again in the late 1870s, between the British Empire and the Russian Empire, the question of who got to control Constantinople, the Straits and access to the Mediterranean was a really serious issue by the standards of the time. Although, of course, the other thing we need to keep in mind is that the British went to war with Russia once in the 1850s, almost went to war a second time in the 1870s. And as I presume, I hardly need to remind an Irish audience, went to war again over the Straits in 1915, only that time it was on Russia's side at Gallipoli, leading to the words of the famous song. It was better to die underneath an Irish sky than at Sövla or at Södelbar. It was indeed. In other words, you know, these apparently the geopolitical agendas which had dominated British thinking for the best part of 100 years were turned around 180 degrees in new circumstances. I would say that the current obsession based ultimately on Eastern Ukraine is more comparable to the Fashoda Institute incident of 1896, if anyone remembers that, which was basically about whether Britain or France should dominate southern Sudan. Fortunately, the British and the French in those days were not crazy enough to do that. They realised that there were more important issues concerned. So why, frankly? Particularly because if you look at the epicenter of the problems we're facing at the moment, I haven't even mentioned this because this is a question for the Americans, not the Europeans, the issue of rising Chinese power in the Far East. And whether these islands, or actually most of them aren't islands, they're just reefs are worth fighting over. But as far as we are concerned in Europe, of course the epicenter of our external problems is obviously the Middle East and North Africa. Well, I mean the spirit of remembering the U-turn done by British policy from the 19th to the early 20th centuries, it's worth remembering two things. The orchestration of hostility to Russia and opposition to Russia has of course been focused above all, though by no means exclusively on NATO. It's worth looking at the record of the past 20 years and asking in the Middle East on balance who's been right, who's been right in their decisions, their actions in the case of the Middle East, who was right over Iraq? America or Russia? Russia was right, no question about it. Iraq is a catastrophe. Who was right over Libya? The Russians of course abstained under, heavy in order to please us, but they abstained on a resolution which of course was only intended to provide safety for the population. The Western countries turned this into bringing down the Gaddafi regime, which of course Russia was deeply opposed to. Who was right? Look at Libya today, who was right? And look at the consequences for migration to Europe. Syria? Well, there are deep divisions on Syria, but I think the ultimate answer is that nobody actually knows what to do. If anyone in this room has an answer to the Syrian crisis which will establish stability and peace, please, I do hope you will put it forward because I don't know. One thing though that we do know, those of us who are paying attention to the issue, is that Russia's support for the Assad regime as the lesser evil and the only force the Syrian army, which in the last resort can prevent the high likelihood of a takeover by ISIS or if not just by ISIS by some mixture of Islamist forces as in Libya. This is a view shared not just by the Russian government, but of course by extensive parts of Western security establishment. So the notion that Russia and us are simply categorically on opposite sides over Syria is nonsense, frankly. Now, saying something at lunch over conspiracy theories, there have been these suggestions that Russia is somehow deliberately encouraging the refugee flow to Europe. There have even been suggestions. I heard from a senior adviser to the British Ministry of Defence over a drink just the other day that he was actually very pleased with Brexit because he thought that this would bring Britain closer to the United States and the United States would then give Britain more in terms of increased British security and so forth and so on, just as it has done over the past 15 years. At the same time, however, he suggested that Putin had been secretly funding not just the Brexit camp UKIP in Britain, but also the Scottish nationalists in order to break up Britain, something for which of course there is not a shred of truth. As for orchestrating the refugee crisis, well, you will know, I mean the Syrian war began before Russia took a hand and the flow of refugees or migrants to Europe via Russia is a tiny, tiny fraction of the ones who have been coming either through Turkey, a member of NATO and a prospective member of the European Union or through Libya, a state which we contributed heavily to destroying. I first got a sense of just how bad this was in the late 1990s, connected with the tragic loss of the ferry Estonia in the Baltic in 1994, a few years earlier. A very senior British journalist working for what is generally regarded as the most intellectual and serious of the British daily newspapers, known to both Seamus and myself, came to me in a high state of excitement when I was working for the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, saying that he had heard from what he described as well-informed sources. He assumes in some intelligence service or another, though he wouldn't say. There was a really strong evidence that Russian submarine had torpedoed the Estonia, because there was a spy on board who was carrying, I think he said, the whole bloody torpedo. This famous mythical monster, the Shkval torpedo, which is supposed to travel at hundreds of miles an hour and fly and brush its teeth and all these things. This was being transported in the Estonia to the west and so the Russians torpedoed it. I said, you know that a torpedo makes a large hole in the side of a ship and the Estonia's boughs came off and you've had investigations divers gone down from the. So you'd have to suggest, quite apart from the testimony of the survivors, you'd have to suggest a giant conspiracy involving the Swedish and the Finnish government, which allowed them to rig the entire investigation, but also somehow thereafter to prevent any other divers going down and exploring the hole where it was. Pointing that the divers had established the yes indeed, the doors came off in a storm and there was no evidence of a torpedo or an explosion. And then a light came into his eyes that I've seen in so many places, Russia above all. I remember a senior Russian journalist, his equivalent in many ways, explaining to me how America had actually been buying the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 in order to draw India into an American alliance and you get that light. And he said, ah, he said, but might the Russian submarine not have rammed the ship and knocked its bows off? I don't know if there are any submariners or sailors or anything, but I presume I don't need to explain why this would not really work, or at least not without the loss of the submarine as well. But this guy thought this was a serious proposition. And at that moment a phrase came back to me from the days of the Vietnam War, an adaptation you remember of a famous saying of an American admiral in a battle with the British, we have met the enemy and he is us. In other words, we are producing, some of us are producing conspiracy theories as a mirror of what used to be Soviet propaganda. We are still trapped, not in an attempt to understand issues with Russia from the point of any kind of objectivity, but essentially in propaganda and counter propaganda to many of us. And the wild of fringes, of course, insane conspiracy theories. Now, coming to what I suppose should have been the main issue, and the general point of this being that we're going to hear again from the Warsaw Summit statements that the Pentagon considering Russia, the greatest threat now to America and American interest, really in a world that includes the Islamic State, this British general, Seamus and I were talking about it. On the record, of course, of a series of brilliant British military successes over the past 15 years, writing this book saying that there's going to be a third world war because Russia invades the Baltic states. Why? Why? Well, I think you see the answer is summed up in a phrase from Charles Tilly, the sociological historian, residual elites. We have inherited from the Cold War, I say we, I'm talking about British here, Ireland was not in NATO, but we have inherited elites who were created to a great extent, calibrated over many decades to resist a power based in Moscow, one. I'm still at it. It is much too difficult for them to confront these infinitely more difficult challenges, to which indeed there are no easy solutions, there may be no solutions at all. But certainly whatever they are, they are problems which NATO is totally, totally unadapted to confront. And of course the other great thing, the wonderful thing about confronting Russia, unlike confronting ISIS, is that as throughout the whole of NATO's history during the Cold War, you don't have to fight. You're a military alliance, but you don't have to fight. The one thing that was made categorically clear, first during the Georgia war in 2008, and again since the Ukrainian crisis first erupted, was that whatever happened, whatever promises had been made, whatever grand statements had been issued, there was no question whatsoever of NATO actually going to war with Russia in Georgia or Ukraine. And that is in part for just obvious reasons of the real risks and real interests involved, but there's also a damn good democratic reason for it. Western electorates would never stand for it. The Dutch have just shown that in their own referendum on Ukraine. So you see the wonderful thing is it's perfect for NATO. It is perfect for NATO. On the one hand it's what they were created to do, and on the other hand you don't actually have to fight, something which NATO has proved extremely bad at over the past 15 years is fighting. It couldn't be better from that point of view. Now, in terms of the specific Ukrainian crisis, point one, this is happening on the river Daniet, which is a tributary of the Don. It isn't happening on the Elb, isn't happening on the Rhine. This is where 26 years ago or more until the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. This is where the crisis was supposed to happen, remember. 30 years ago, people like General Sheriff of course were writing about the Third World War, beginning with Soviet tank armies coming across the Fulda Gap into West Germany on their way to France and Belgium and Britain and Ireland and wherever. Now, this is happening on the borders of Russia, more than a thousand miles to the east in an area where the great majority speaks Russian. I'll come back to the specific legitimacy of the Donbas in the end and whose territory it was. In other words, if there is one thing which is glaringly obvious is that without justifying some of the Russian actions or reactions which have indeed been on occasions not just illegal and immoral but politically wrong and actually contrary to Russia's own interests in particular cases, nonetheless, it is perfectly obvious that viewed over the past generation, Russia has been on the defensive strategically, not on the offensive, and it is the west which has been on the offensive geopolitically and not the reverse. Second point. We have expected Russia to play by the rules of the European Union. Problem, Russia is not a member of the European Union and never will be. Russia therefore feels entirely justified in playing by the general rules of international great power politics and therefore draws attention, not without reason, to the record in this regard of the United States of China of Turkey and so on in their regions. Final point in Ukraine. Russia initiated the present crisis, not of course deliberately, but by trying to essentially bribe Ukraine or Ukrainian government into membership of the Eurasian Union. Now, the Eurasian Union is the absolute centerpiece of Russia's international strategy. This was the attempt of the Russian government to create an economic and political block around itself. Not a recreation of the Soviet Union, this was never going to lead to another Soviet army, it was never going to lead to a tight administrative state. But it was their hope to create a block which would guarantee Russian exports, thereby helping to preserve the Russian industry, and would give some chance, however pathetic, of maintaining Moscow as a world pole, as a great power, if not equal to Washington and Beijing, at least up there with the Indians as one of the poles. Now, and it was the Ukrainian government's agreement to that, the European Union's challenge to it via the offer of an association agreement, the reaction of many Ukrainians against membership of this Russian dominated block which set off the whole crisis. Now without going into the details of what happened on the ground which of course are greatly contested, I would just like to point out that on the most important point Russia has lost and lost permanently. Whatever happens, whatever happens, Ukraine as a whole is not going to come into any version of the Eurasian Union, that's over. On the other hand, it should be absolutely apparent by now that there is no chance whatsoever of Ukraine in any foreseeable age of the world joining the European Union. That's out because the European Union is in far, far too much trouble to be able to do that. So, we are left with a Ukraine, as it was before, lying between the Western Russia, for which we need to find some kind of local solution, because this has been a Ukrainian crisis. It is not about a threat to invade Poland or the Baltic States. Look at the importance of Ukraine to Russia. You do not need to posit wider Russian agendas. The agenda is Ukraine and it's an agenda which on balance they've lost. Final thing, I always like to, having been fairly gloomy, to throw in a more positive note. Part of the problem at the moment is that the Ukrainian government seems just too weak, the Ukrainian polity is too divided apart from the else, as well as strong nationalist sentiments, to put into effect the terms of the Minsk agreement which of course called for constitutional change in Ukraine and a federal system, including some special autonomous status for the Donbas. Well now, the thing about the Donbas is that it is not whatever the Ukrainians may say, sacred soil of Ukraine, at least Danieck isn't, and it isn't the sacred soil of Russia. It is in fact the sacred soil of Wales. I don't know if any of you know the original name of Danieck before the Soviets renamed it, Yusofka, which comes from Mr Thomas Hughes. So my solution is that obviously it should be renamed Yusofka, like so many of these Ukrainian places which had names given to them over the years, and it should be given back to the Hughes family for them to decide. Now if, as I confidently expect, the Hughes family turns it down, it should be given to the family that sold the area of what is now Danieck to the Hughes family and the name of that family was Levan. That would be me. That was my great grandfather who sold it in order to concentrate his property back in the Baltic provinces which didn't work either but that's another story. And so you give it back to, I'll be the agent of the Levan family, and you hold a referendum. We're all Democrats, right, more or less? You hold a referendum in the Donbas. Sheamus, who's been an election observer for the OSCE, goes out as chief election observer, and you hold a referendum on where the population of the Donbas should go. This is the only Democratic solution, and you have obviously the obvious choice of places. Do you want to remain in Ukraine? Do you want to join Russia? Do you want to be an independent state of the Donbas? Or do you want to join Wales? I have no doubt whatsoever what the Democratic answer of the population would be. Thank you.