 I'm looking for someone to signal me to start. Jerry, do you want to have signal me to start? Because we're in media, there you go. Lucy, OK? And we welcome all of you to a hugely anticipated panel. I can't say enough about that. In my years of doing this, there've literally only been four or five panels. As interesting as this and the incredible success of the World Economic Forum. And thank you, Jan, for putting together this intelligent and eclectic and varied group. I'm not going to go through lengthy introductions. I lobbied for a three-hour summit. I got, it's not a TED talk, is it? We go a little bit longer than that. But this is a stellar crew. And I urge you to read what they do. Jimmy, you just came back from the North Pole. Something like that. Geet has been very visible with her responsibilities for the International Monetary Fund. Mazokata is a versatile machine. She brought along her book. And what's great about this mission economy, Matt Damon has just signed for the movie, 2024. But seriously, I'll mention some things along the way to advance your understanding of growth, which I think is it's important to leave the panel today with a desire to understand this mystery. Very quickly, a guy named Solo at MIT a few years ago invented the modern lexicon. Somebody called Stan Fisher, the North Star of Economics. Olivia Blanchard did that the other day. But there's a guy named Chad Jones. I can't remember if he's at Berkeley or Stanford. He goes back and forth every 10 years, who maybe owns my high ground on growth. And what you learn is this is a borderline religious experience. The math gets you so far. And then there's a huge mystery with it, which in the corporate world, Jim Schnabe is working on. Mariana Mazokata is hitting us over the head with our economic history and the challenges to modern capitalism. And Gita Gopinath has brought an exceptional acuity to her service at the International Monetary Fund. Dr. Gopinath, let me start with you on growth. We are in a set of crises, including a war. It has been hugely challenging, including your spring meetings. Can you give us not a single point update on growth, but is the vector right now moving into 2022 on growth? Is the vector up or is it diminishing? Tom Firstly, it's a real pleasure to join all of you here on this panel. The war in Ukraine has been a major setback to the global recovery. We had a serious downgrade to global growth in April. And the world continues to face headwinds because we have a cost of living crisis as prices of commodities, including fuel, food, are going up around the world. Central banks trying to tackle these high levels of inflation are raising interest rates very sharply. And that they need to do, but that has consequences for global finance and trade. China is also slowing because of the new waves of infections that are hitting the population and the lockdowns that go along with it, the weaknesses in the real estate sector. So we have a confluence of shocks hitting the world. And we are so not out of the woods. But the point I would also like to make is that this is all happening at a time when we have very divergent recoveries in the world. So we have the advanced economies that, based on our projections, will basically get back to where they would have been in the absence of the pandemic in 2024, so literally no output losses. But we have emerging and developing economies that will be around 5% below where they would have been in the absence of the pandemic. And it is this gap that's going along with now a food crisis, a cost of living crisis, the risk of financial turbulence of a much greater scale that's really worrisome. Is the gap use of technology, ability to affect technology within a system to recover? The haves have the technology and the have nots don't have the technology? It's a combination. So there's always been a gap in access to technology. There's a gap in access to digital infrastructure which has been crucial during the pandemic because if you didn't have the right digital infrastructure, then remote working and remote learning was not an option. But also the lack of access to finance, the ability not being able to do the kind of fiscal support that one needs to do is also a major issue. And I would also add that when it came to solving the pandemic, which required getting vaccines everywhere and tests everywhere, the world failed in getting making that happen. And we still are, that is still unfinished business that needs to be done. The New York Times this morning in New York City, roughly one third of renters are severely rent burdened, meaning they spend more than 50% of their income on rent, that according to Mayor Adams of New York City this week. I heard the same thing from the former prime minister of Ireland on his Dublin today. Marina, please fold into us our fractured growth amid these crises, buttressed up against the labor model you study. And I don't think the labor models within those algebraic equations of growth, is it? Well, the fact that you just talked about from the Financial Times I think is one of the many symptoms of the kind of growth we have, right? You can have different types of growth. Just break down GDP, which we know is not a perfect indicator, but you can use that indicator to even look at whether economies are growing through investment-led growth, you know, C plus I plus G plus X minus M, consumption-led growth. And what we have in many countries is that we have growth that is private debt fueled consumption-led growth. So the ratio of private debt, private debt, we always obsess about public debt, private debt to disposable income is back at a level very close to what it was just before the financial crisis. And guess what caused the financial crisis? That, you'd think we'd all be talking about it. It's hidden. It's not talked about even an election manifestos in terms of what to do to make sure that the bubble won't burst again and how to become resilient. You know, we use this word resiliency. For example, with climate, we're not using it again in terms of making sure that people's incomes are growing. Real wages have not been growing for the last 30 years. Even during the COVID-19 recovery, we had, for example, loans being given out to small companies, to people helped to buy schemes. We're talking mainly here about the West. That's not necessarily what you want to do. Just pile on even more debt. So I think really for this conversation, the question is how can we have investment-led growth and have that investment directed towards the biggest problems of our time, the digital divide, pollution, weak health systems. You just talked about the vaccine. You know, the reason we have vaccine inequity is not due to some sort of deterministic force. We have made really bad decisions in terms of how to govern our innovation systems. So the mission is not the vaccine. The mission is to vaccinate everybody in the world. Currently, we have what Dr. Tedros, the head of the World Health Organization, calls vaccine apartheid. It doesn't have to be that way. Why do we continue to allow patents, intellectual property rights, to be used as basically value extraction tools? Patents should be narrow, they should be weak, and they should be more downstream than they currently are. And we have allowed the patents system to basically allow the value that is coming out of what is really a collective investment effort to be siphoned off by few companies. Which institutions do you look to, to provide a cohesive response to assist in all these social needs? As Dr. Bremer would say, it's every nation for itself. Which institution do you look for to begin to lead us towards a more productive innovation? Well, we definitely need multilateral institutions, but as you know, because we've done a lot of interviews, never live though, this is wonderful and actually see each other live, is I think we need the state and states to really rethink their role. They shouldn't be there, it's just fixing different types of market failures, because then they will always be kind of too little too late. Actually actively co-creating and co-shaping our economy requires a very different type of tool. So in terms of innovation, for example, everything in our iPhone that makes it smart and not stupid was actually state funded, the internet, GPS, touchscreen, Siri, but then we didn't manage to govern that system to make sure it actually is really benefiting people. So today, as Shoshanda Zuboff says, you think you're searching Google for free, well, Google searching you for free, that shouldn't be seen as an ex-post thought through regulation. We can think about those things ex-ante in terms of how we govern co-investment through conditionalities and that kind of shaping towards a direction. James, the Paris Accord is maybe a primal scream of corporations to say we're gonna do it and we're gonna do it micro because macro institutions won't work. You have within the corporate architecture of SAP, on to Siemens and Merisk as well, you've tried to find solutions for this through incentives to get it jump-started. What do we need to do now to jump-start a new growth? Well, I do believe that while this Davos and the time we live in is time of uncertainty, the goal of the decade is still the same. We need to decarbonize all of the value chains in which we operate. And so in that sense, while in the short run, we have uncertainty, if we keep that goal in focus, we don't need to be that uncertain. Now, what does it take to get there? First of all, I agree that policy makers actually create frameworks for business to operate. And the most, let's say, sharp knife in the arsenal of policy makers when it comes to decarbonization is to put a global price on CO2. And with that, you incentivize the right behavior of any business. But the good news is that we are actually at a point in history where the technologies necessary to decarbonize all of these value chains. And I argue all of them. And I've tried a very difficult one of them. We can talk about that later. Those technologies are there and they are getting to a price point where it is becoming good business to decarbonize. So my answer to the growth opportunity is that we need to dramatically accelerate the investments in decarbonizing all of the critical infrastructures. This is the energy systems. These are the food systems, the transportation systems, the healthcare systems. We can make them more affordable and we can decarbonize them. And that, in my mind, is the biggest growth opportunity. And I am convinced that those companies who take the lead in driving that through innovation, reskilling their workforce, and engaging in global cooperation, those will be the winners when we come out of this phase. Then how do we adapt to crisis? I looked at Newcastle Coal the other day, Northern Australia. It's not even a standard deviation study. It's a moonshot of price of coal straight up amid the crisis we're in right now where it is every nation for itself. Within these crises, how do we come out of it where price can assist us to a better growth? Well, a higher price on coal and oil is a good incentive to rethink the supply chain. Not if you provide the coal or you provide the oil, but if you consume it. And so it suddenly becomes a very good business case to actually think about re-adjustment. Do you think we'll have a seismic change here when finally corporations will be incentivized? I think that we're already at a stage where a major corporation invest in this because they can see that it will make them more competitive. We have this wrong assumption and mindset that decarbonization is something philanthropic. Some you like green or you don't like green. This is the best business opportunity we ever had. My example is from Mask. Mask is the largest container shipping company in the world. In 2018, we decided to decarbonize shipping, zero carbon shipping. We had no idea how to do it at the time. Only three years later, we now know exactly how to do it. We ordered the first 12 vessels and we are going to use power to X, which is the conversion of green electricity to green fuels. And my prediction is that the demand for green fuel is going to be dramatically higher than the supply over the next 10 to 15 years as companies go down this path. And that sounds in my business years like a great business opportunity. If demand is higher than supply, normally there's a great opportunity for anyone. Well, this is really important, Gita, and that these are rich people's problems. And the answer is you have a charge with the managing director to look at everyone else. How do we transport these incentives, a greater invest, a marginal investment, to the nations that don't have the advantages of Mercer or any other company? No, firstly, I would say that we're at a point where all countries in the world, regardless of their level of income at this point, recognize the importance of addressing climate change. Now, in some parts of the world, like in Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, it's about climate adaptation rather than climate mitigation. But, you know, in all of the parts of the world, including India, where they still have, you know, a big growth story ahead of them, they very much recognize the importance of tackling climate change. But what I would also say that in addition to climate, they have many other investments that they need to make. They need to make investments in health, in education. I mean, I just want to point out that the pandemic has been terrible for learning. We've had two years, 2020 and 2021, but 1.6 billion children have lost school time. And this is the cohort that will make up about 40% of the labor force, you know, past the middle of the century. So there's no, you know, we can do all the investments we want in our physical infrastructure, but we don't have the human capital to, and the skills to work with it. We won't get the growth that we need. So I think that's another area where big investments are needed. De-globalization is the theme here. It does seem like everyone's apart or falling apart as well. How does an institution like the IMF incentivize people to begin to solve these problems, but do it within a framework that isn't de-globalization? Firstly, I think it's important to recognize that every country in the world has benefited from the integration that we have seen. Now, yes, there are segments and communities within countries that have been negatively impacted by the kind of integration that we have seen, but when you look at the country as a whole in terms of the cost of living, in terms of those who work in export sectors making much higher wages than those that work in mostly domestically oriented sector, it has been a plus for the world as a whole. We were able to bring more than a billion people out of extreme poverty over the last three decades. So there have been many positives that have come with global integration. Now, yes, it's not perfect. We need to have a lot more that fixes, not to fix the system, we need to clearly build resilience in our supply chains, security that we need in terms of our sources of supply, but, and also the domestic policies at home in terms of how we help the people who are left behind. So there's a lot that needs to be done, but let's just make a couple of points, which is what people don't realize is that while, yes, there's been a lot of integration, around 85% of inputs that companies buy are brought from other domestic companies. So if you do want to build resilience to the kinds of shocks we're seeing around the world, you need greater diversification. And so that greater diversification actually comes with more global trade, not less. And this is very important. Maryann, you've been taking notes down there. I know you're ready to go here. I'm not gonna miss words, I've thrown one book over the years My Children Older Now, and said, shut up and read this. And this was the wonderful work by Fareed Zakaria. If they were young cherubs today, I would throw at them a book called The Value of Everything. In the first six or seven chapters, Professor Masakata walks through how we got here. It's the clearest description of the path long before Adam Smith, physiocrats, under Ricardo, and forward as well. You finished that book, Maryanna, with the economics of hope. What is the hope that we have in growth? What, you've been hearing these two very different people speak of the issues at hand. What is the hope that we need right now to jumpstart growth? Well, the reason I wrote the other book, the blue one you have near you, which was really to continue that economics of hope, which is to say that actually having a discussion, which is often a local discussion at the city level, can be at the regional level, at the national level, and definitely at the global level, what are we even trying to do? What are our missions? What's the purpose? What kind of growth do we want? If we want inclusive and sustainable growth, what does it mean for the investment pathway? All of this just remains kind of, as Greta Thornberg says, blah, blah, blah, unless we get serious. And getting serious about hope means actually transforming these global challenges like the Sustainable Development Goals, 17 of them, with 169 targets beneath them, into concrete missions and moonshots. Getting the plastic out of the ocean is one of the concrete moonshots that could help us tackle SDG-14, Life Below Water. Having carbon neutral cities across the nation, but across the world is a very concrete way to go after SDG-13. The digital divide, which as Geeta was saying, during the lockdown, people, many students globally, stopped accessing their human right to education. There are concrete things we can do to go after those, but it doesn't happen just by coming to Davos as much as we all love to come here and talk about purpose and stakeholder value. The question is, what does it actually mean for how the public sector, the private sector, increasingly the third sector, actually work together concretely towards a goal? And it's interesting, if you go back to the moon landing, it was really well designed, like the first thing that Ernest Brackett did, the head of procurement in NASA was to change cost plus contracting to fixed price, like with a challenge and then you'd get extra, there were incentives for innovation and quality improvement. So it was like a challenge-based kind of procurement. We often don't do that with normal procurement policy. Sweden does today, because they have, for example, a very high level challenge of a fossil free welfare state, which then lands on the very particular like school lunches, which have to be healthy, tasty and sustainable with that kind of target. And the procurement of those school lunches helps to foster sustainability through something as normal as again, lunch. It's not just big climate strategy and kind of carbon prices, but just the other thing is they really cared also about the contracts. They had a no excess profits clause in NASA. In other words, we're gonna do this together, so we're not gonna turn it into a gambling casino. And just so everyone understands, I live this, my father was directly involved with the Hubble Space Telescope and this was a raging debate, which I lived at the dining room table over the quality of the contracts. How do the progressives, use the language of America, substitute it for yours. How do the liberals, the progressives, drag distrustful conservatives over to some of these thoughts? I do not see it occurring. My experience at least in going to the US also to talk about the, well, the other book, The Entrepreneurial State, was that it was actually a thesis that was equally appealing, if you want, to Republicans and Democrats, because the idea of also stop wasting money on policies that don't work, because you both talked about incentives, but sometimes policies that are geared around incentives really just increase profits and not investment. I've seen this in my own area of economics innovation policy. Many R&D tax credits, if they're badly devised, they're meant to sort of incentivize innovation and they're simply increasing the profits of companies but not actually helping to reinvest the profits that are being made back into the economy. In fact, many companies say the pharmaceutical industry are ultra-financialized. Something like $4 trillion have been used just for share buybacks in the last 10 years by the Fortune 500 companies. That's an investment problem. That's a reinvestment problem. And it's really interesting to go back to the kind of military industrial complex kind of institutions, which today really need to be much more geared towards our social problems. Bell Labs, which I'm sure you know, was a really important private sector R&D laboratory inside AT&T. It came about in a phase of American kind of history where the government was much more confident in order for AT&T to retain its monopoly status, it had to reinvest its profits back into the economy, back into innovation and big innovation beyond telecoms. And that kind of conditionality is something I've become really interested in because the word conditionality, especially if we think of the kind of IMF conditions, doesn't always inspire great thoughts, but conditions in terms of truly building back better so that every grant loan bailout scheme is conditional on actually working together towards something, not micromanaging. Jim, this is critical in that there was a Bell Labs, Arthur D. Little, Rand was maybe the key item. These were think tanks and there was a linkage of business and business technology with government technology. How shattered is it? Well, first of all, I think technology is the secret source that we need to get accelerated on. So Robert Solo agrees with you, I believe. I mean, that's where, can we all agree that growth comes from technological progress? Yeah, but Solo's model was about technology as exogenous. What we're talking about is technology as an endogenous function of investment. How do we get exogenous again where we get a better good, Jim? Well, see, I'm in that sense very optimistic and I believe that the technological development that we've seen over the last 20 years has put us in a place where we can basically track every single physical item on this planet. We can create energy cheaper with solar and wind that we can with fossil fuels. We can reinvent entire value chains. Well, the problem is that we have an incremental approach. And when you have that, you put technology in play incrementally. And what we need is almost like, we need the big dream of a rewired value chain and then work backwards. Who needs to be around that table to figure out how to do that? And how do you accelerate? For me, it's about the acceleration that needs to happen. And we cannot let the uncertainty that we see right now that comes out of the war on Ukraine and the pandemic distract us from the fact that we need acceleration. So I'm optimistic because we have the technologies, we know the problems, we have the solutions. And what we need is leadership and collaboration, which is why I totally agree, we cannot let globalization reverse. I will not leave to have a host with that thought. I will leave with a thought that we will need more collaboration. We have a billion people that needs to come into the innovation cycle because we need to connect to them. And they have often the big ideas because they have economic boundaries that are very, very limited. And those are the people with the big ideas. So I'm optimistic, but it can only happen through leadership where you have the courage to think big, imagine a better future, and then work backwards, the dream, and then collaboration. Nobody can do this alone. I look at inflation, Gita, where it is. And the area below an x-axis is called the integrand. And the integrand in America of negative real wages is absolutely appalling. I mean, it's the duration here of the negative real wage is tangible. I want to borrow from Masocato and bring it over to the prism you have at the IMF with this dangerous word, exploitation. Within this uncertainty, are the poor being exploited? Is the rich just trying to survive through these selective crises? So firstly, the poor have a very different experience depending upon which part of the world they live in. That's what we've seen over the last couple of years. In the advanced economies, they've received a lot of support from the governments in terms of cash transfers being able to keep up their spending. So in fact, if you look at where real wages are actually going up in the US, it is in the bottom most income decile where you've seen the most increase in real wage growth. And it's in the other upper decile where you've actually seen the decline. But in emerging and developing economies, on the other hand, where governments weren't able to provide the kind of response at the scale that the advanced economies did, it's been particularly tough. We know that there are 75 million more people in extreme poverty in 2021 because of the pandemic. So it varies depending upon the part of the world that you live in. I've heard people worry about the fact that, well, wages going up is a problem because that can feed into inflation. This is to be very clear. Price is going up is what's inflation. You could absolutely have a scenario where wages could go up, but all that means is that corporations have less of profits and prices stay exactly the same. So let's just be very clear about that. We certainly could see an environment where wages go up, but that doesn't have to necessarily generate a way to price spiral. Mariana, I want to speak of institutions like the IMF that have huge responsibilities to their clients, to basically the developed world. And I would suggest their clients are inherently conservative, which makes institutions like the IMF conservative. How do we get those institutions and their clients to risk, to take the gambles that Jim is talking about, how do we get the client states of these institutions, including the World Economic Forum, to jump off the cliff into the Mazzucato world? How do we get them to do that? You're laughing about it, but it's not happening. No, the Mazzucato world may be laughing. But first, Gita just says something really important. Can I just repeat it so everyone remembers it? The labor share of global income is low. The profit share is high. There's nothing natural to that. That is an outcome of decisions we are making. And I just gave a talk at the L7. There's the G7, the T7, L7 with all the global trade unions. And this is a huge issue. Why is it? And part of this is, in fact, I think, personally due to this ultra-financialized form of corporate governance that we have. If profits are not getting reinvested back into production but being used by share buybacks, towards share buybacks, workers don't benefit from that. David Ricardo, just coming back to some of the economic history you were prodding with me before, David Ricardo wrote Principles of Political Economy in 1821. He had a chapter 31 called On Machinery, where he was already looking at what people look at today in terms of what happens with AI and digital tech in terms of workers' wages and employment. He was just looking at in terms of the effect of mechanization and industrialization. And he already kind of foresaw the problem, which is a lot of technological changes, labor displacing. But then what happened for 200 years was that those profits that were being made from technology that was labor displacing were being reinvested back into production. So you actually had what Schumpeter called creative destruction, new jobs, new sectors, new skills needed. That basically stops in the 1980s with this idea that the best way to run companies is just to maximize shareholder value. That is a huge issue. And if we can't talk about it here when we're talking about climate and all these important problems, we don't look at the structures we have on the ground, which are also the structures of government, which I think are really poor. It's not just about business. But this really needs to be, I think, a conversation about what are the new types of governance structures in public and private, and also how can the relationship between them be really symbiotic and mutualistic and not parasitic. In Italy, where I'm from, we have a parasitic public-private relationship. Subsidies, guarantees going to the private sector with no kind of condition about transformation, about structural change, about investment. Has Mario Draghi been good for Italy? No comment. No comment. There we go. Definitely better than previous leaders. The problem is he has a very difficult situation, like many countries when you have coalitions where you're basically blocked from doing anything. But he's definitely brought stability and that in Italy is a great thing. I want to spend six minutes here on a theme that started on the 24th of February with the war in Ukraine and then we'll open it up for some observations in tight questioning from the floor. I want to question short to these wonderful panelists so we can use the last 15 minutes here productively. February 24, I'm guessing, screaming phone calls. Where's Fokker's Landau? And we got David Fokker's Landau on the phone quickly here in the shock of a war in Ukraine. And someone who's done so much on capital flows and thinking about how countries respond, Fokker's Landau was adamant. There would be a massive fiscal spending off of the war in Ukraine and the shifts that we're seeing right now. I want to talk about a concept away from capital deepening, which is almost fiscal deepening. And Gita, your wonderful three books at your spring meetings, the outlook and such in the fiscal book, talk of this. What kind of fiscal spending do we need or are we going to see to give us the growth, the sustainable growth we need? Is there going to be a new fiscal spending after this war? I mean, the recipe for growth hasn't changed. You mentioned technology and yes, technology is a big part of it, but the other very important ingredients include human capital, just having a productive workforce, which requires having a healthy workforce too. So all of those pieces haven't changed. There's no mystery to it. I think the challenge that countries face around the world now is after having dealt with two years of the pandemic, countries have record high levels of debt. They don't really have the fiscal space to the kinds of investments that are still needed and they're getting hammered by more shocks. So how do you deal with this as, for instance, let me think about the parts of the world where it's a bigger constraint which is developing countries. Firstly, these countries do need to increase their own fiscal capacity. There's no doubt that they just aren't able to collect enough revenue in a progressive manner. That's not something that they can function with. They will need to increase their tax base. They will need better collection of tax revenues and also they will need to improve how they spend so that they prioritize spending in the kinds of sectors we just talked about. The second thing that is very important is that we have countries who have debt at high levels of debt distress. In fact, several of them need their debt to be restructured and we have a hole in the international financial architecture which is we don't have a good debt resolution mechanism. The common framework which the G20 came up with is one such proposal that is supposed to close that gap in the international financial architecture. It is promising but it has yet to deliver. So I think it is very important to be able to address that piece. And lastly, the wonderful international corporate tax agreement that was signed together by more than 130 countries needs to be implemented because that's the kind of revenue that you can get that will also help with the investment. How do you respond to the President's recent trip and I don't need you to comment specifically in United States politics, that's inappropriate. But TPP went down in flames. There's been a couple other acronyms that have been discovered and now it's Indo-Pacific. When you see this phrase in the media, Indo-Pacific. How do you respond to that in the real world? So the Indo-Pacific economic framework has the positive that there is engagement between the US and the Asia-Pacific region including India and while there is still not much there in terms of the trade piece and that point is to build on it. But I think given the times we live in where there is so much talk of fragmentation and so on I think when I hear of countries coming together and working even if it's, you know, it's there's a lot more that needs to be done. I think it offers hope. Jim, I want to talk to you about Europe. You've lived this big, how many employees in total have been under you in Europe between Siemens and Maersk? So Siemens has 300,000 people worldwide. Maersk has 100,000 people worldwide. And we both companies reacted, I think very responsive to and responsible to the situation. Within your optimism, can you be optimistic about Europe with the new fiscal spending that will be required including on defense? Well, we did already have recovery funds coming out of the COVID situation which were earmarks digital and green, which is a good thing. This is building the future and not trying to build the past. What I see from a corporate side and the Russian situation is that many companies reacted by pulling out of Russia, even some beyond the sanctions. And that is possible because most companies have roughly 1% of their revenue in Russia. So it's not a disaster. You can react to that, you can deal with that and they are. Now, if you take that further and say, well, what if this was China? A completely different situation, completely different dependency. Now, that indicates to me that business global companies have an important role to play in enforcing peace because if the economic consequence of sanctions because you begin to have wars or trade wars are too big, it may actually hold back the idea of even starting such a war. So I think in many ways, the situation in Russia and Ukraine for me is a wake up call to everyone and hopefully it's a wake up call to collaborate more. That's why I enjoyed the fact that US went to Asia and discussed. And in India, I mean, we can never solve decarbonisation without getting India on board on that, which is the largest population in the world. And we need to reinvent the food system. I have two concerns with this thing. It's energy, which will give Europe a dramatic disadvantage over the next years because of the dependency on the Russian gas and its food systems, where we haven't seen the impact yet, but it is about to come and it's going to be pretty bad. So on the inflation, for instance, for me, it's not the salary issue. It's three things. It's our supply chains. We can fix that, fix the ports in the US, fix the COVID lockdowns in China, and we can get supply chains to work again. Multisource instead of single source. It is the energy system, where a dramatic investment in renewable energy will bring down the cost of energy, not up. And then, of course, we have the food system, which is not so easy to solve. And there, I see the biggest concern action because this will hurt the poorest countries the most. It'll have us go another hour here, which they're not going to let us do. Mariana, I look at this discussion and the backdrop to me is, to borrow a phrase, the rise of autocracy. And I'm going to leave the country's names out of it. But there's any given number of countries where we're seeing a democratic outcome that is less than friendly. Can we get to a better growth, a new growth that you describe with the rise of autocracy that we see now? But autocracy has both kind of a business model side of it, as well as a political. And currently, if there was an election in Italy today, it's very likely that the equivalent of Le Pen's party in France would win. So a very right-wing, conservative, xenophobic racist party basically would win tonight in Italy. And why is that? The level of dissatisfaction for many of the different reasons that we've been talking about, many people have been left behind. Coming back to that just statistic, the labor share of global income is at one of the lowest levels it's ever been, pisses people off. And unfortunately, what we know is that in those periods and then also the cost of living crisis when you then don't have leadership coming from a progressive side. Forget the left-right distinction, progressive, meaning we actually want progress. We want more sustainable and inclusive societies. When we don't have leadership that has clear agendas on that and you have other leaders who are just kind of stoking fear, blaming immigrants, blaming a certain country setting up walls, that makes it look much easier in terms of how you actually battle your own problems. And I think this is a huge issue. But it's very, sometimes people treat, I think, the Trump's America in a condescending way. But if you look at the dissatisfaction and the disillusionment among so many people in America who simply have not necessarily had those cash transfers, who don't have the kind of jobs that are decent jobs that allow you to have a certain life where you don't worry about tomorrow, the uncertainty amongst the American workforce in one of the most rich countries in the world is huge. And so I do think that bringing labor to the table in a new way, but also reinventing the welfare state, which we haven't really talked about, but we have weak welfare states. The reason this crisis, the pandemic, was so much worse than it had to be is because our global health systems, but in both the developed world and the developing world, were weak. And if we can't have a COVID recovery, a global COVID recovery, which strengthens global health systems, that'll be a massive failure. And we know that we're only as healthy as our neighbor is, literally on our street and our cities and our nations and globally, and yet have we actually seen a lot of attention on strengthening every health system globally? Had this crisis begun in Africa and not in China, we would globally be worse off. But that's not where the conversation's at, right? So I do think there's a huge opportunity for change, but we need to be kind of pointing our fingers and the microscopes in the right places. Lucy, you're on five minutes, right? Right, let me have a question from the floor. Let's try to get two questions in here. Anyone? Questions are right there. Thank you, Chris Giles, from the Financial Times. I'd just like to ask the panel how the unexpected rise in inflation over the past year has changed their view, both on the scope for global growth and government's role in it. Geeta, let's get you in trouble with that question, please. So yeah, so there has been a run-up in inflation that the characteristics of it vary depending on what the country you're looking at, the parts of the world where it's being driven mostly by higher energy prices, higher food prices, and so the more the headline piece. And there are other parts where we've seen a much stronger increase in all the other parts of inflation, so kind of much more broad-based. But I will say that over the last three months, the more broad-based feature of inflation has spilled through the global economy, and we're seeing it much more widely. I think the surprise element has been that we've been used over the last decade to living in a world where we worried about demand being too low, and most of macro stabilization was about controlling the level of demand in the economy. And then you get hit by the pandemic, and even before the war, you have major supply shocks, global supply shocks. And so I think as policymakers to then figure out how much imbalance there is in the system between supply and demand became a major challenge, not just in terms of good supply, but including labor market supply, because people were saying out of the labor market. So I do think that the lesson that we have learned from these last couple of years, and which is important going forward, especially if what we worry about, which is that we could have many more supply shocks, especially coming from climate change, but also from further viruses and so on, is that policymakers have to now realize that it's not just the demand piece, but the supply part that's moving also dynamically. And now they are in a situation where they find themselves having to move very rapidly to deal with a persistent set of shocks. Chris, thank you for that question. Marianne, I'm going to go to you because Geet is not going to answer it. And it's real simple. Are we going to a new inflation regime, Adam Pozen at Peterson, a little bit of Olivier Blanchard, where the new 2% guide is 3% or even higher? Do we need inflation to solve some of these growth problems? Well, one thing that Geet has said before, which is really important is the source of this inflation is not higher wages, right? So just increasing interest rates, hoping that people then spend less is kind of mad in terms of actually what's happening to their own cost of living. And in that case then, they've just had an increase in their mortgage, right? So the question is who pays for these higher prices? Who pays for the inflationary effect? And you see very different strategies being implemented right now in terms of taxes on windfall profits of energy companies. So this is a distributional question. Anytime you have inflation, it affects distribution. And that, again, is not a deterministic, like there's no economic law that decides what happens. It does come back down to decisions that need to be made based on, again, taxes, interest rates, specific industries that are benefiting massively from this particular price hike, what to do about it. You see very different reactions globally. I hate these short seminars. I could go for another two hours, Jim. You get the last observation here. To get to the better outcome, do we need a bigger inflation? Is 3% run rate inflation better for us than 2% run rate inflation? So I think zero inflation, 0% is bad, because when money is cheap, you invest it in stupid things. So I'm not so concerned about a very high inflation scenario because some of the reasons for the inflation, like the supply chain issues we have, this is about container vessels waiting in front of ports to take out capacity from transportation. And if we just fix those bottlenecks, we get the flows again, and the prices go down dramatically. So I'm actually optimistic. And I think we need a solid, a healthy inflation rate around the 2%. And then we need to dramatically shift our investments. It's not like we need more investments, but we need to shift our investments from the fossil world to the decarbonized world, the opportunity is big. I'm a concerned optimist, concerned because right now we talk more about the issues than the solutions, but optimistic because we have the technologies and we could now inspire for the collaboration necessary. It's a leadership moment. Thank you. Dr. Gopinath insists we're going longer. It's her fault. We'll find the answer be. I am sorry, but while I like to agree with the lot of what Marianne said, on the point of what policy needs to be done, just to be clear, I do believe there is an important demand component to inflation and monetary policy does need to react to it. Yeah, but not in a knee-jerk kind of way, right? I mean, mild inflation has always been a result of growth. We had disinflation for 200 years before World War II, kind of Keynesian economics came in. So it's the question of what's the kind of right level. Are we going back to classical economics? Is that what this is really about is we're leaping? No, but the source of the inflation, I mean, the source of the inflation matters to the kind of policy design that you have and just this fear of inflation and just immediately in a knee-jerk kind of way, increasing interest rates, that sort of thing. So within this conversation, do you want to give us a new outlook to three decimal points? No. Thank you so much for attending today.