 Thank you very much, Jeff Cutmore from CNBC. And I'm delighted to see you, Dr. Kissinger, on the screen. And for me, it's a very moving moment, because actually, I met Dr. Kissinger the first time exactly 50 years ago at Harvard. Dr. Kissinger, you have been back a number of years here in Davos. I remember also our discussion, and many participants reminded me also today of the discussion we had four years ago on this stage. Thank you so much for making yourself available to discuss with the audience here in Davos, with which you are quite familiar, to discuss with you on the day on a historical day for the United States and for the world, to discuss with us the state of the world. And Dr. Kissinger, I just mentioned, it's a historical date, but many participants here in Davos felt such a speech of President Xi Jinping in his own way was also historical. I know you read the speech, and I would like to ask you, what do you draw as a conclusion from the speech of President Xi Jinping? May I make one brief comment about the previous part of your program? I knew Shimon Peres for 60 years, and he was an inspiration in many crises. And his significant contribution was that no matter how difficult problems were, he always was looking not for a definition of the problem so much as for a face in a solution. And so it is an honor for me to be able to make this comment. Now, about your question. I think that President Xi's speech was of fundamental significance. It laid out a concept for globalization and some specific challenges and roads to a solution. But to me, the most important aspect was that it was an assertion by China of participating in the construction of an international order. One of the key problems of our period is that the international order with which we were familiar is disintegrating in some respects and that new elements from Asia and the developing world are entering it. What President Xi has done is to put forward a concept of international order in the economic field that will have to be the subject of conversation and the substance of the creation of an evolving system. Dr. Kissinger, four years ago when we had our discussion here, it was just at the inauguration of the second mandate of President Obama. And I asked you at that time, what advice would you give to President Obama for his second mandate? Now, I asked you the same question again. Of course, the president is now the 58th president of the United States, is now changed. And we all look forward to, and that was very much a discussion subject here, what can we expect from the presidency of President Trump over the next four years? But what advice would you give to President Trump now? Well, I would say to President Trump that one of the major achievements or impacts of President Obama was to withdraw America from some positions in which it was overextended, but also to create the fear that America was withdrawing from the world, even from places in which overextension would not apply and in which its contribution remains essential. So President Trump will have to find a definition of the American role that answers the concern of many parts of the world that America was giving up its indispensable role of leadership in some categories and major contribution in others. And to define what, where America can lead, where it must contribute, and in that process help on the creation of an international order. Dr. Kissinger, imagine you would serve again as the National Security Advisor, and President Trump would call you into the Oval Office and would ask your advice, how now, after all the discussions who have taken place over the last weeks related to the issue, what would be your advice to structure his relationship with Russia? How do you see the Russian or how would you like to see the Russian-U.S. relationship evolving? The relationship right now is at a point in which both sides seem to be operating on the basis of the worst assumptions they can make about the other side. In America, there is a strong resentment about the hacking and there is sort of a general belief that Russia has been attempting to exploit weaknesses in the international system in order to enhance its own position. In Russia, there is the belief that the United States had systematically expanded its security belt in order to bring pressure on Russia, necessitating on Russia's part an assertion of its indispensability and of its capacity to react. President Trump has indicated that he would favor a less confrontational and more political approach. I agree with the general attitude. I think Russia is a country of a very special history of 11 time zones touching Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Its impact on all these areas is considerable. It has been the cause of many tensions, but it has also secured the equilibrium of the world in the face of challenges from Asia, from various countries in Europe. And so I hope that an effort will be made for a serious dialogue which tries to avoid the drift towards confrontation and in which Europe, America, and Russia come to some agreement about the limits within which military pressure is carried out. And so that is what I think one of the major tasks of the new administration. Dr. Kissinger, we discussed also here during this week quite substantially the Middle East's situation. And here, of course, the situation in Syria. We all know how much you were also involved and you have your own ideas about what's happening. But I would ask you, what specific conditions you feel must be met to finally secure peace and stability in the Middle East region? Is it still even a realistic objective? Or should we have all the reasons to give up hope? I should also add, what would you recommend to the new president to do to advance peace in the Middle East? But, Klaus, you're making any position in watching for me very difficult to maintain by forcing me into these recommendations. My view is that when we talk about international order, there are various components that have already a structure and they are acting on interaction with each other. The Middle East is a component in which the international order, as it was known, has disintegrated. The states that form the international system in the Middle East are themselves, several of them, dissolving, as we are seeing to some extent, in Syria and in Libya and even in Iraq. So first is the impact of the various elements in the Middle East on each other. There are a series of revolutions that are going on simultaneously and that are not always concurrent. There is the upheaval against established states. There is the religious conflict between Shia and Sunni and other religious groups. There is the impact of outside countries on the situation. So the first task that has to be undertaken is to attempt to calm the existing crises, of which Syria at the moment is the most notable. And it needs to have the following elements. It needs to have a ceasefire which, to some extent, exists among the various parties. It needs to have a withdrawal of outside forces. It needs to have a definition of political units within the region that accept the status quo that will be defined in negotiations in Kazakhstan, which are projected or elsewhere. This is the first requirement. The second requirement is to prevent the region from being dominated by one of the parties that is capable or think that it's capable of achieving military dominance. And in that respect, some agreement between Russia, the United States, and Europe, in some form, would be extremely important. I do not think it is possible to achieve universal peace in one negotiation. The first step that has to be taken is to restore an equilibrium and to have it guaranteed by countries that are willing to act concurrently and for the same objective. Dr. Kessinger, in this respect, so you welcome the progress which hopefully will be made in Astana in the next days. I think progress there is the prerequisite for a further solution. One of the concerns it will have to include, it will have to include the United States. Yeah, and it has to include Europe. And in this respect, one of the major fears during the last days, based on some remarks and some actions of the new president, was a weakening of the transatlantic partnership, which has been so much a key element of our world order. Do you see this partnership threatened? And what would be, I come back to this, what would be your advice on the one hand to the Europeans, on the other hand to the new American president in order to safeguard this partnership? And how much is this partnership still important in a multipolar world? One of the great contributions of the Statesmanship at the end of the Second World War was the creation of the Atlantic Partnership. Because it reflected the reality that neither Europe nor the United States would by themselves be able to bring about a solution of the chaos that had been created in the Second World War. It was a major contribution by the United States to give up its historic isolation. And it was a major contribution of Europe to abandon the historic competition between its states for the concept of European unity. Those moral and psychological elements are in many respects even more important today than they were then. Because now we need a concept of world order that is for the first time in history, that all parts of the world can emit, can directly affect all other parts. And that order can arise only if concepts develop which are held simultaneously by the key actors, at least by those key actors that can disturb the equilibrium. So I believe the Atlantic Partnership is of great consequence. Because otherwise the Atlantic region would fall into the kind of competition that used to characterize Europe. The second question though is, how is that now to be implemented? So I disagree with the challenges to the importance of the partnership. I do not think it is obsolete. I think it is vital. But what needs to be reexamined is the relevance of the institutions of 50 years ago to the problems of the current period. Not the importance of these institutions, but how an Atlantic partnership would operate in the face of challenges that are entirely new and that now no longer embrace only the Atlantic region but the evolution of the whole world. That is an important task. That is a principal task. And it would require both sides. The United States entered that Atlantic partnership from a position of predominance. And therefore its habit of thinking was the technical solution of immediate problems. The Europeans at the beginning were still driven by their historic attitudes of their significant role. But as time went on, they have deferred the technical task too much to the United States. So I believe an Atlantic partnership needs to be reconstructed. But with the attitude that it is the key element of both American and European policy. In this respect, many participants were concerned about the weakening of Europe, particularly with Brexit, and not being able, even if there would be a commitment from both sides to the partnership, that Europe does not provide any more strength, which is necessary to be a key pillar. How do you feel about the present situation of Europe, particularly after the Brexit decision? Originally, when the concept of Brexit came up, I had the traditional view that it would be an unfortunate outcome. As I reflected on it further, and particularly about the role of Europe in the history of the last decades, I came to the view that the big hole in the international system has been the reluctance of Europe to go beyond soft power in its commitment and the tendency to identify Europe with the expansion or extension of bureaucratic centralized power. So I could imagine that Brexit would be used in a creative way, not to see how to minimize the damage, but how to create a new role for Europe and America in the Atlantic partnership. And that could take the following form. It could seek to address the problem that some of the key issues in Europe, for Europe, such as the economy and security, are very difficult to solve in a forum in which unanimity is the absolute requirement. And I have wondered whether it would not be possible, while maintaining the existing structure of Europe, to create within subgroups on finance and security, in which decisions could be made on the basis of maybe an influence of the countries that will have to carry the greatest burden in these issues, especially in security and in finance, to prevent the recurrence of economic crisis caused by the unwillingness to meet the stated goals. In such a system, Britain could reenter Europe as part of these groups. And it could also perform a function in linking Europe and America. I'm not saying that I have a detailed plan for this. I am suggesting that we need to find a solution in which the Atlantic region can act with the same moral conviction as it did in the early stages of the Atlantic Alliance, but which reflects the new distribution of power that has emerged and addresses the problems that one could not even imagine when the Atlantic region was formed. And if our new president gives an impetus to this kind of dialogue and withdraws the threat of an American withdrawal, which I do not believe is feasible or desirable, then we might have a new period in which the Atlantic region could contribute to the structure of the world of which President Xi has given us an ancient vision. Dr. Kissinger, our satellite time is running out. What wonderful opportunity to conclude our week here with such concrete proposals and ideas of how we can really create, I would say, a new world order. And I feel we should be very grateful to you, Henry, for taking the time at a very important day in the United States to be at least digitally with us. And on behalf of all those sitting here in the room, I would like to thank you very much. I would like to thank you personally also for the 50-year-long mentorship and all the advice you have given me. Thank you. And we appreciate it very much. Please join me. Gentlemen, please remain seated for the upcoming session. Ladies and gentlemen, please remain seated for the upcoming session.