 So let me open the floor. I see all three hands here on the first row. Can you have a mic? Thanks very much. I have a rather simple question as a Canadian living in a federation with probably as much decentralization amongst the provinces who can run their own deficits without control from federal government. We don't hear you very well. Is it on? Yeah, that's it. No, I'm saying I'm from Canada. We have a federal government of which I was a member and a minister for some years. The provinces have enormous independence. Fiscal, they have independence. They basically have huge disparities. Newfoundland for example would suffer enormously when Ontario was doing well because basically they had to sell at an elevated dollar which is fluctuated from above the American to below the American and so on. It fluctuates all the time. Now my question is why is that working so well in Canada? What are we doing? Is it transfer payments? Is it equalization payments? What's the difference? We got it. Thank you. We will answer this question in comparison with Canada. Yes, and I'll take then one question here and then the lady over there. Yeah, Uida Douche with OCP Policy Centre and Google. I must say that I... Can you hear me? Can you hear me? I must say that I sympathize a lot with Ashoka's point of view. The idea that because people don't want to leave, that's a kind of justification. It's like saying, well, you're in the top floor of a building and the house is on fire. You don't want to jump out. So that's the analogy that I would use. And the question? The question I have is, and it's in the other direction, is it possible that it's going to get easier now with the euro because the creation of the euro created a lot of imbalances because of the convergence of interest rates, which turned out to be a mistake on the part of the financial markets. Thank you. Madame? Yes, I have a direct question. If Italy goes through a financial crisis, will the answer of the European Union be a bailout? Thank you. Will it be a bailout? Will the EU bail out Italy? Yeah, will the European Union bail Italy out? Yeah. Monsieur, and then we'll come back to the panelist. Yes, thank you very much. We have seen that unilateralism, American sanctions, and commercial war problems are trying to put pressure on banks, and especially on what concerns the use of dollars in international trade. There is currently a reflection to see how we can solve this problem and turn it around. Does the euro, as my nose, can answer the question, and in what measure? Thank you for adding this dimension. Perhaps in reverse order. Olivier? No, start with Rockload. You start with Rockload? Okay. I missed the last question. I'm sorry. Can we use the euro as a potential international currency and to answer the American pressure on the use of dollars in the case of sanctions against Iran? Clear enough. I can answer the last question first, and then the others. Euro, a currency that has demonstrated its credibility, represents, at the moment I'm talking about, 22% of the international debt outstanding, the total amount of global debt, three times less than the dollar, approximately, eight times more than the yen, so it's the second currency, between the two others, but closer to the dollar than the yen. What concerns exchange reserves, it's about the same proportion. What concerns payments, to my surprise, the euro represents 31% worldwide and the dollar 42%. So we have a real existence of the euro, but I don't think it has to be interpreted as allowing to bypass the dollar of the United States personally, because all international entities need to have an activity as free as possible in the United States. It's not just the question of the regulation in dollars on New York, it's also the question of all the interests that one and the other have in the United States. And so I don't think we are in a situation, unfortunately in some cases, that really allows us to free ourselves from the dollar of the United States, from the moment when the American Congress, the American executive, and the public opinion of the Americans, consider that it is absolutely normal to use all the means of pressure they can have. I agree with that, but I have a precise question. A big difference is that the use of the dollar as an international entity is favored by the fact that, in a situation of stress, there is the possibility to have access to liquidity in dollars, there are the lines of swaps of the dollar. The lines of swaps of the dollar are an international diplomacy instrument, and there is a support of the Treasury, it's not an autonomous policy of the dollar, it's an element of the foreign policy of the United States. Europe hasn't done that. Is it conceivable that tomorrow we can have a line of swaps in euros with, of course, the assurance for the BCE that in case of loss, it would be compensated by the European budgetary authorities? The global network of swaps that we have is perfectly symmetrical. If there was a lack of euro liquidity, we could get some euro by going to the United States. But no one will think that it will be useful, no one will think that it will be useful. The question is, is there a country of Morocco tomorrow or another who would ask to have a line of swaps in euros, could they get it with the risk that it represents for the euro zone? The central banks who are in the network of swaps who should, by the way, be reactivated, the case of Cheyenne, and extended, of course. Normally, through this network, we have access to all the major convertible currencies worldwide by presenting collateral in its own currency. This is the advantage of this network. For the moment, it is symmetrical. Legally, of course, de facto, the dollar is much more used than the other currencies. But as I said, it is not just a currency problem. It is also a problem of measure of retortation taken in the United States against foreign interests in the United States. When I discuss with European banks, they say to me, we do not want to take the risk of having a regulation that would be in euro and totally independent of that because, in any case, our interests in the United States will be put into question. So we have to see the extent of the problem. Of course, as we go on, we will take a further dimension. We must also note that we do not have any interest in the European Union for the moment to have a euro much more used than it is currently in the exchange market and we will have a picking up of the euro which may be very dangerous for us in terms of... So I think we are in a period of transition that is necessarily ordered. It is made more difficult by a certain in what looking of the United States themselves which they do not realize, by the way. They are in their own system. They do not realize. If I can go to other countries very quickly, the different states are rewarded more or less by the image they give by the measures they can take and I saw myself of my own eyes the rise in power of some cities and the degradation in Toronto, for example, towards Montreal. I saw what it looked like if you want a rather negative image given of a particular state of a particular province compared to others. So I think that even in a as perfected as the Canadian federation we still have such phenomena and that there is a certain punishment for measures which are not optimal. In any case, from the point of view of market operators, investors and entrepreneurs, it is understandable. I am crying, but it is understandable. I would like to ask the other questions to the other speakers. I would like to go. In response to the questions I will make three very quick points. Number one, the fundamental sin of the euro continues to be a monetary union that is not backed by a political contract that has a political union. That was Calder's point. That was Marjorie Lane's point and they said that there never will be. Therefore, Canada has a political contract. The European Union will never have one. As a consequence, rules will never work. Rules will not work because the national interests will always at critical moments override the rules. Therefore, the idea that we will construct something that has the look and feel of a political union without actually creating a political union, for example, reference has been made a number of times to something called the banking union. Completion of the banking union. Ultimately, a banking union is a fiscal union. In the United States, there is a banking union because there is an entity called the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation that is backed by the full faith and credit of the US sovereign. They will never be in Europe. Anything that has remotely like the FDIC and as long as there's no FDIC calling it a banking union is always going to be a misnomer and so the if there is a crisis the ability to bail out may be quite along the lines that Olivier is saying but remember in the book called Collapse by Jared Diamond we're going to end with this. He uses the analogy of how societies collapse. They don't collapse in a day. They collapse. He gives the analogy of deforestation. The forest declines over time but saplings grow back and you look at the saplings and say well things are improving but over time the saplings cannot recover the deforestation process. The Greek story is not a good story to tell. But Sipras agreed to the terms that were dictated by the Brussels and Berlin has created in the end a deep animosity within Greece. For the next two generations the Greek parliament will not be able to take any fiscal decision that is not authorized by Brussels and not Berlin but by Frankfurt. The IMF is out of the picture. So while it may appear as though the Greek problem is solved but it remains festering at a deeper level which at some point will reveal itself. Thank you. Olivier it's been flashing red for some time but nevertheless we've got to answer the question by the lady over there. First the answer that it's working in Canada or the US is what Jean-Claude said, I think there are other reasons labour mobility across states or across provinces in Canada federal transfers which are much larger there and the absence of banking fiscal loops which is a big issue in Europe is not in those countries. On the bailout I'm quite sure that the Euro would try very hard not to bail out Italy unless they were willing to do something in exchange but it is it would be a terrible legal mess as we well know because there would be re-delination of many liabilities in DRAS and lawyers would have a field day and it don't know how it ends is basically the way to say it. Okay, thank you very much the difference between Salvini and me that has been flashing red for a while. I do apologize.