 And welcome back to Think Tech. I'm Jay Fiedel here in Honolulu at 4 o'clock block. And we're talking today about transitional justice, one of my favorite shows, not only because it reaches the four corners of the world, but because it covers issues that are important to the world, issues that Hawaii should know about, but everyone should know about. Today we're going to talk about accountability for atrocity crimes in Sudan. With our old friend, who's been on the show a few times before, Mutasim Ali. Hi, Mutasim. Nice to see your smiling face. Hi, Jay. Nice to see you too. It's great to be here. It's great to have you. So let's talk about Sudan. And there has been some what, action taken to address atrocities and war criminals. Can you talk about what's happening and whether accountability for those crimes, those individuals has been found. So first of all, thank you for the opportunity and direct to your question about accountability. Unfortunately, I have to say that we're far from achieving the goal. But then there are indications as to some lies that some accountability are to be achieved. But we have a long way to go. And this is part of the transition, right? I wouldn't be able to conduct prosecutions or trials if there is no somehow political will. And I say this carefully because on one hand you can see that there is a bit of political will, but then there are major challenges in the country. But at least at this point there is hope for accountability. So how far has the investigation gone? How far has the prosecution gone? Where would you like to see it go from here? Particularly for the nine individuals who have been charged. Right. So there are a number of incidents that took place in the last two years. Those incidents involve crimes against humanity, mass atrocities against innocent civilians. And so what happened from the government's end was just to investigate the cases, but none of the investigation committees or recommendations were released. And so basically people do not know the results of the investigations that were led by the government. However, and speaking of nine individuals, there were members of militia group named rapid support forces. This militia group were established in 2013. The idea was to counter, you know, to counter-surgeons in the region Darfur. And so basically these militia groups committed the most heinous crimes in the region of Darfur. Over two and a half million people were displaced. You know, hundreds of thousands of people were, you know, hunted down, were culled. Hundreds of thousands of refugees in the morgans. And this is primarily because of this militia group. And so speaking of this specific case, so the factual basis of this case were in 2019, July, during the sit-ins, sort of massive protests to promote changes, political changes to Sudan. These nine members of the militia group shot at peaceful protesters. They killed six younger students. And as a result, they were, you know, they were charged for murder. And the proceeding took about three years. And then last August, August 5th, the judge gave a decision. And the decision was to convict seven defendants and two were acquitted. And this is a very significant case because it involved, again, militia groups, members of the militia group. And they are very powerful. They are, you know, the commander of this militia is the deputy chair of the sovereign council, which is the highest authority in Sudan. And so this case is really significant. And it opens doors for many cases to follow because these militia groups involve in many other, you know, crimes against Sudanese people. So a couple of things I want to ask about. Number one is, so the people who were doing the protests who were killed by the militia, they were protesting against the government. They wanted reforms in the government. And the militia is then on which side of it? The militia is pro-government? Or is it advancing some other interest? So a couple of things. People were not necessarily protesting against the government, but rather for, you know, improvements of their situation, right? Like fuel prices, food prices and all of that. And so really basic things and for freedom as well. And the militia, this is like paramilitary basically what they were founded by the former regime in Sudan. And so they are now, they're actually empowered. So they're not militias anymore. They are actually empowered. The commander of this militia is the deputy of the sovereign council, which is the highest authority in Sudan. So basically they're really leading the country. So basically they're semi-governmental, you know, institutional military forces, but not necessarily part of the Sudanese army. So why were these former militia people support a prosecution of individuals who were in the militia when they conducted, when they committed these atrocities? This is a very good question. And as you know, Jay, in Sudan today, there is a trend of, you know, revolutionary movement. Basically Sudanese people are very well aware of their rights. And so they, since 2018, they began a series of protests and those protests led to the removal of the former regime. And that gave, you know, sort of built momentum, right, for father change. And so basically, because there is that public awareness, that created a lot of pressure on the government, but also on the militia. They felt they have to, you know, to co-op with people's demand because the, you know, the public outrage was so huge. And there was a lot of international support for accountability in Sudan because that's the way for, you know, to promote change and successful transition in Sudan. And so basically the commanders of the militia and the government, you know, found that it is in their best interest to hold those individuals accountable. So basically the, which is the saddest part about this case is that the court in its decision sort of refrained from, you know, sort of accusing the militia as an organization, rather to say these individuals, this is like, they committed these crimes in their individual capacity. And so that's what is a lot of frustrating, but ignore the fact that the crime or the incidents in a robbery, we refer to it like that because it is an obeyed city of Northern Kordofan in Sudan. You know, it's a pattern of number of events. It happened in Khartoum, it happened in Darfur. And so there's no way that you can isolate the event, the incident from the militia as an organization. This is not an individual crime rather committed as an organization. Yeah, so they threw these nine people under the bus. They sacrificial, sacrificial lambs. But, you know, is it okay now? Are people generally okay with having this prosecution and letting the militia go along their way and integrate with the government? Is that okay with people? So basically, for this particular case, the victim's families were happy or excited about the verdict. Of course, there are a lot of concerns because this is only one case. There are, you know, dozens of other cases and nothing has been done about it. And also people question the domestic mechanisms, right? Like whether they're effective to prosecute or bring charges against, you know, members of armed forces that they're very powerful there in the government. And so there's that question. But I think what is good, what is important about this case, a couple of things. One is that, you know, the victim's families were able to participate on trials. This would not be, would not have been a case if the trial was at the ICC, right? This is one of the positive sides because victims can't participate during the proceedings and they can express their views. They can, you know, tell the court what they think and what they want. So that's number one. And number two, it is pretty much the first time for the Sudanese court to deem open source videos as admissible in courtrooms. As you know, Jay, there is no international standards as to how, you know, on the admissibility of open source videos in courtrooms. Even in America, there is, America has its rules in UK, different regime in Middle East, in Egypt or Morocco, different regions. So each, every country has its own mechanism. In Sudan, this is where we hold as a PEJ. We drafted a memo on the use of open source videos, how to verify open source videos. This is of course with our partners in Sudan. There are a couple of organizations, including this organization, just want to give credit to that. And Sudanese Archive, these are the organizations that we work together to draft a memo on how to use open source videos as evidence in courtrooms. And so that has been very helpful for the trial attorneys who let the prosecution of these nine individuals. And I think that will be a base for becoming, for future cases as well. Maybe you can send that memo to Congress, because the select committee in Congress is now asking for telephone and social media records on various, you know, people who were involved in the January 6th insurrection. Ha! They would like to see that memo. We'll love to share that with them. They're watching right now, Mutas. We'll love to share that with them. So anyway, Project Expedite Justice, which we've talked about, and you're a member of, you're a lawyer for, has been instrumental in these prosecutions. But not to bring them, am I right about this? Not to bring them to the International Court of Criminal Justice, but to investigate, to research the law, to advise the council involved in the prosecution about the law. So, although you're not, you know, doing perhaps as much as you would like to do, you are involved at least as advisors to the prosecution. Absolutely. Yes. Yeah, go ahead. Go ahead. Sorry. I'm wondering, and you mentioned there are other organizations and other countries that are also interested. What is the comparative level of participation? So definitely we work with partners, international partners, but also local partners. And so the way we operate, of course, as you know, international mechanism, let's say the International Criminal Court cannot prosecute every case, because this is a court of the last resort. The ICC was established to compliment the domestic or national jurisdictions, national court, national mechanisms. And so there is a need to strengthen domestic courts to prosecute all those involved in atrocity crimes. And when I say atrocity crimes, I'm speaking of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Because again, the ICC cannot prosecute all the perpetrators. This is one. Number two, in the case of Sudan, I think what we do there more is to amplify victim's voices, one and two, to build the capacity of local stakeholders, civil society organizations, lawyers, to be able to investigate, document, and use their investigations and materials for accountability, whether that be through conducting trials at the domestic level or regional or international mechanisms. So basically the idea is transform the knowledge to local stakeholders so that they can bring all the cases against the perpetrators. And by the way, the case is not only focused on atrocity crimes, but also all the other human rights violations. And so this is what we bring to our local stakeholders in the context of Sudan. Well, are you worried that having these nine prosecutions, seven convictions conducted now will satisfy the public outrage at what happened, but that the government, especially including the former militia members in the government, will let it fade going forward? And they will not follow through on the other prosecutions you mentioned. Unfortunately, this particular case is not satisfactory to the wider Sudanese people because it only represents one incident of dozens of other incidents. For example, in Darfur alone, think about the magnitude of the crimes that were committed by the former regime. Think about more than two and a half million people in the displaced persons camp. Think of people in other pro-ferrial areas in Sudan, like the Nuba Mountains and Balluna. This is like southern part of Sudan where also crimes against children, women, and elderly people, innocent civilians were killed for no reason just because of who they are. And so these are really big cases. And so as I mentioned earlier, there are some people and quite a lot of people do not trust the domestic courts to prosecute perpetrators for those crimes. But at the same time, the ICC can not really prosecute everybody. In Sudan today, we have four suspects who were wanted by the ICC. One of them sort of surrendered the ICC. He's now in the custody of the ICC. And three other defendants are in the custody of the Sudanese government, but they're yet to extradite them to the ICC. And so people want those guys to be, these are senior leaders, the former president, former minister of defense, the former minister of interior affairs. And so these guys, they need to be extradited, but the government sort of, they're sort of debating whether to extradite them or not. And that's sort of a big issue for the Sudanese people. Again, domestic mechanisms in Sudan may not be capable or willing to prosecute senior leaders at this stage. And the reason why, because these militia groups are all over the place and the government really cannot control them, they are the government. And so that's the main worry. But hopefully for a long run, and after a successful transition, people can speak about domestic mechanism. But again, I think there are serious challenges. These trials are not satisfactory, but it opens the window for more cases to follow. But I think that's core in our whole discussion here on the show. We call transitional justice. And the transition is the transition from a country was in disarray, with fragmented violence, with militia people all around, no working government, a failed country essentially. And we want to transition that country to a more moral, a more equitable, a more just, a more democratic government. So that's what you guys in Project Expedite Justice are seeking to do. And I know from previous discussions that you feel, and I think you're right about it, is that the prosecution of war crimes is really critical to have people believe in the government. And if people don't believe in the government, you will never have a righteous government. That's the problem. So you have to make them believe, and this is the way that Project Expedite Justice makes the contribution. But I want to oblique for a moment, Mutasim, to Afghanistan. Because Afghanistan we saw, I mean, I was just watching Rachel Maddow, and she pointed out that in the 19th century, well, twice in the 19th century, Britain tried to build up Afghanistan. And they attacked Afghanistan and tried to take control. As late as 1919, they were trying to do that three times altogether. Then the Russians came in 1979, and they spent 10 years doing nothing, I mean, achieving nothing there. And then obviously we came after 9-11, and we were not able to achieve a whole lot. And so what you have now is in Afghanistan that is essentially governed by the Taliban. You can say the Taliban is terrorist, but one thing is clear is that they have the guns. And I think that's so in the militia arrangement that did happen anyway in Sudan and other countries in Asia and Africa, there's a he who has the guns rules the place. You know, that's maybe why so many people in the United States would like to have guns under the Second Amendment, because they know this basic truth that if you have a gun, the other guy is going to do what you say. So what we have in Afghanistan is the Taliban has the guns, the Taliban has been guilty of war crimes in the past and atrocities. And they have said they not into that anymore, but nobody believes them. And I think that's probably right not to believe them. And the question is, you know, what kind of comparison can you make to a country like Sudan that was previously overridden by militia, other countries too, and Afghanistan, is there a difference? What comparison would you make? Sure. So first of all, thank you for bringing this Afghani issue. I think this is really important. And my empathy with Afghans, children and women in particular. And I was, you know, watching a press conference for, you know, conducted by the spokesperson of Taliban. And he said that they will respect the freedom of women and children and everybody based on Sharia law. And we know what does that mean, which means that women will have no rights and they will continue to be prosecuted. And it is really unfortunate that this is the situation. And of course, it will be very, and you draw the example of, you know, when you have a power, then you can really rule. You can do whatever you want without being held accountable. And so this is exactly the situation in Darfur, or an incident in general. Taliban, you know, is went now for committing the most heinous crimes against Afghans. They continue to commit crimes. And God knows what will come, you know, after the departure of, you know, the American troops and the UK and France and the European troops. I think, you know, we are yet to see some terrible disasters to come. And so it is really unfortunate that, you know, whoever has the power, and that means you have a gun, you have money, you can do whatever you want. Nobody can hold you accountable despite the crimes that are committed. Again, the Taliban now became a de facto government. And for the world to, you know, to cooperate and sort of try to mitigate the the dummy that they may cause, the violation that they may, you know, commit. And so the comparison that I will draw between the situation in Afghanistan and Sudan, it is really appalling to see perpetrators that are in power and nothing can be done about them. This is, in Sudan we have this militia, rapid support forces. They were brutal militia and they're still brutal. They committed many atrocities and nobody can hold them accountable. That's exactly what is happening in Afghanistan today. Unfortunately, the only people that have the power to change the situation will be Afghans and will be Sudanese. Of course, it is challenging. They need the support of the world, but definitely, you know, it's hard to see an external force to come and make a change in countries like Afghanistan and Sudan. Oh, there's all the marks of tragedy, so let me just paint a picture as it is likely to be the case. We know from the 90s that Taliban were brutal. And we suspect they may be brutal again, even though it's a full generation or more later. You know, people have the hope that the new Taliban is nicer than the old one, but there's no assurance of that at all. And so let's assume for this discussion that they engage in the same kind of atrocities they were engaging in in the 90s. And let's assume that the world hears about it, because no country these days is sealed off. At the very least, you find out the atrocities that are going on in the country. So, query, what can the world do about that? I mean, I'm not optimistic. I know you're not optimistic about it, but what can the world do? What can the International Court of Criminal Justice do? What can project expedite justice and the group you work with that looks into these things and tries to get the train back on the track? What can we do when we find out that now in the absence of the United States and other allied countries, we find out that they're back to their old tricks of atrocities and war crimes. What can we do? Well, I mean, Jay, unfortunately, there is no good answer to this. It is very difficult question, difficult... I don't want to say it's a hypothesis, really. This is more likely to happen, because there are old science and these guys are sort of their vengeance, and they sort of they're fundamentalists, and they really sort of, they rule on Sharia law, and we know what that means. And so, you know, the only way that we actually, we shouldn't, as international community, as human rights organization, we shouldn't wait for atrocities to happen rather to monitor the situation and take all the early measures. And here, the huge responsibility is upon the United Nations Security Council. You know, there are a lot of politics there, but definitely it will create a lot of pressure, and the international community, they should do all the take all the necessary measures to make sure that Taliban would at least uphold or act as a government. I'm not sure they will uphold it. They are, you know, human obligations to free people as human beings, but at least to act as government, not as a militia. So that's one. But from our end, as you know, Project Expedite just is a small organization, and we try to, you know, to make, to maximize our impact as much as possible. But again, there are major crimes every day. We hear a lot of, you know, crimes and atrocities, and it's hard to focus way to work exactly. But I think what we can do is basically to monitor the situation and work with our supporters and partners and think of what would be the best way to do it. But at this point, I do not think the International Court of Justice or International Criminal Court, the ICC would be able to do much in Afghanistan, because in the end, for the ICC to be effective, it has to, you know, to have, you know, countries need to collaborate with the ICC. As you know, I'll give you an example of the case of Sudan. The former president of Sudan, Omar Abashir, was wanted by the ICC since 2009. So this day, he's not being extradited. He used to travel across the continent, Africa. He used to travel, you know, in Asia and even to Europe. And he's not going to dare to, you know, to hand him to arrest and hand him to the ICC. And so it is hard to imagine that the ICC would be able to do something there. But I think it is more about creating a lot of pressure, public outrage and financial economic sanctions to make sure that Taliban will not harm innocent civilians. Well, I take your point. And I think inherent in what you're saying is that the first duty of anybody interested in dealing with the atrocities we believe may likely happen in Afghanistan now is to find out about them. To have, I don't want to say boots on the ground, but sources of information on the ground that would report it back to you and that you in turn would have investigated at least externally and that you would report it to the media. And the world would thereby know what is happening there. That is step one, isn't it? And if you can do that, then you can keep the light focused on them and hopefully limit their war crimes. What do you think? Absolutely. So what we can definitely in our job is to, of course, monitor the atrocities and the crimes and amplify, you know, the voices of victims to make sure that they're heard, and then also to increase the capacity of civil society organizations who do extraordinary work. They're very courageous and they just need a little bit of support to investigate and bring charges against perpetrators. Of course, they face a lot of restrictions and they're being targeted by the authorities and all of that, but they're courageous enough to continue their blessed work. And that's why we support them. And so we will continue to do this despite the challenges and hope and surely we're committed to end the impunity. Of course, this is not alone, but definitely working with our partners. That's wonderful what you are doing. But I fear that, you know, it's not only Sudan, it's not only Afghanistan, it's not only Syria. There are so many countries we can tick them off. It would take a while where we know that there are war crimes going on, that their governments are failed governments and people are under tremendous humanitarian pressure. And so therefore I think that the work of Project Expedite Justice is not over by any means. It's only beginning. And as we speak, you know, there'll be more countries. I'm sorry to say, but I believe there'll be more countries in this kind of predicament, more people under the oppression of failed states. And so get ready for a long and challenging career, Lutas, and there's plenty of work for you to do. Absolutely. And we are ready for that. And we are driven by the pain of people, you know, who are being victimized, who are being targeted systematically. And that's why we're inspired to continue to do this work. And we will make sure that all the perpetrators will face justice in the end. From your lips to God's ears. Thank you. Thank you, Matassa Mali. It's wonderful to talk to you. I'm encouraged and I really appreciate what you're doing. Thank you very much. We'll have to talk again soon. Absolutely. Appreciate it. Thank you, Jay. Hello, hi.