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Published on Nov 4, 2013
If we value our time spent waiting in a queue, how many people should there already be in the queue for it be worth while to join the queue?
In this short video I demonstrate how selfish people make queueing systems worse on average to everyone else.
Naor wrote a great paper in 1969 called: 'The regulation of queue size by levying tolls' (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909200). In that paper Naor found thresholds (ie number of people in the system) at which selfish players should choose to join a queue or not. Naor also looked at what Optimal players should do to reduce the mean average cost.
At the end of the video I show what happens if we have a mixture of selfish and optimal player.