 Joshua, thank you for coming and welcome. It's nice to have you here. Karen, thank you so much for the chance to have this conversation with you and thanks to Peter and to Dan, to the whole New America team for this opportunity. I wanna, we're gonna talk about the strategy and where we've come and what challenges lie ahead and what new twists there are in our understanding. But I wanted to start today with a talk about just language, the language we use to describe what we sometimes call domestic extremism, some we call domestic violence, sometimes we call it domestic terrorism. But I've noticed of late that the term political violence or politically motivated violence seems to have come into the stratosphere of the language sphere of how we think about the phenomenon of violence being used all over the country in a variety of different forms for a variety of different reasons. And when President Biden gave his speech in Philadelphia recently, he did talk about political violence and didn't talk about domestic terrorism just in terms of how we think about these terms. And I just wondered, is there a recasting, a rethinking of how to understand in the large umbrella that covers so much of the violence we're seeing, is there a move towards thinking about political violence as opposed to what we've called in the past extremist terrorism? So let me start where your kind introduction began as well with the national strategy for countering domestic terrorism, which the administration released last June as you indicated. And it was very important to us to have early in that strategy the federal statutory definition, the federal law language of domestic terrorism, defining domestic terrorism, that the strategy was pegged to. It was important to us, first of all, because any government strategy should articulate its scope, but it was particularly important, I think, in this context, this often charged context to show that we were working from something embedded in federal law, pre-existing, and that is in a sense, narrowly scope. It's scoped to violence, threats of violence, and in essence covers acts, criminal acts designed to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or attempt to change policies of a government. And again, we thought it was important to show that we were pegging our work, heading at our strategy development and the implementation of that strategy to something we inherited from the political branches and embedded in the US code. At the same time, there is a broader phenomenon afoot. You heard this from the president, not just in those recent remarks in Philadelphia, but even going back to the remarks he delivered in Buffalo after the awful, horrific act of domestic terrorism at a supermarket there. And he talked about how there are those in different walks of life who are either adding to, or at least acquiescing it, the use of violent language, the proliferation of ideologies in which violence, even implicit, is at their core, that individuals like the one who took lives at that supermarket in Buffalo, then pointed as the justification, the motivation for their horrific actions. And that may be broader in a sense than what is domestic terrorism per se, that broader willingness to promote or acquiesce in a cultural normalization of language of political violence, but it contributes to the challenging moment we find ourselves at as a country right now. That raises something interesting, which is, you know, you focused on the law and I understand that, but one of the things you talk about in the strategy or suggest that it's actually much broader than the law. And I'm curious about your thoughts, there does seem to be a sort of whole of government approach to this. And so it isn't really just about the law, right? It's about, so just talk a little bit about how you see the sort of matrix of actors, agencies that feed into this counter-terrorism strategy. So maybe I'll separate out two things. In terms of the challenge being addressed, the problem being tackled, we think the law, the legal definition of domestic terrorism is of course the right place to begin. It scopes our work, it keeps us grounded in federal law. But the response to it incorporates a number of elements. As the strategy sets out, it includes generating better understandings of today's threat and sharing them more widely. That can be a role that can involve roles for the Department of Homeland Security, for the FBI, for example. It involves investing heavily in prevention efforts, trying to help people from ever getting to the point of breaking the law and becoming essentially a law enforcement problem. That involves a whole host of actors across the federal government. Then it involves a law enforcement response for those who make it to that stage, for whom law enforcement has identified valid reasons to investigate and in some circumstances to prosecute. Of course, that doesn't just involve federal law enforcement, but involves incredibly close collaboration with state, local, territorial, tribal law enforcement. Often they are the ones on the front lines of any given actor-actor. And the first one is to identify if there's something wrong. They also may have part of the solution set with the charges available to them. And then there are other parts of the system that the strategy goes into, such as how we ensure that parts of our government, whether it's law enforcement, whether it's the military, whether it's the intelligence community, that by their very nature need to give certain Americans special access, access to weapons, to training, to knowledge, that all of that won't be exploited by bad actors for nefarious causes. So that brings me to another question, which is one of the things the Biden administration did was to revive the intelligence and analysis unit that had been disbanded under the prior administration. And there has been a whole series of efforts, formal efforts to reach out to local, tribal, et cetera, groups to sort of inform them and share. My question to you is, is there something new in terms of what's being shared? Are there factors that you didn't know when you put together this strategy or that have emerged since then that are part of what needs to be shared on this wider level? I think there are really two categories of things that are new. One is what is shared, and the second is how it is shared. So just briefly, in terms of what is shared, I think there's been something of an evolution here in which the community that works on this issue has acknowledged what the data back up, which is that overwhelmingly, those who engage in lethal acts of domestic terrorism are either lone actors or very small groups. They are not massive, multi-member, long-running plots in general, with some exceptions. Now, those can still, those sorts of plots we always need to be on guard for, whether from domestic actors or international terrorists. But in addition, we need to recognize that these lone actors and these small groups can be harder in some ways to detect and disrupt, and they can move from simmering hatred to actual violence quite quickly with little warrant. The type of intelligence that is useful, especially the state and local partners on that, is different from sharing with them the details of a single long-running plot or threat stream that is being surveilled or otherwise identified over the course of many months. And I think the what that's being shared, in part, has adapted to that by sharing a sense of dates, gatherings of symbolic value, causes things that might lead that next step in which those lone actors or small groups make that unacceptable step towards violence. Then there's the how, which I also think is new. In addition to just getting more information, we think better information and a steadier flow of it to different parts of the federal family as well as state and local partners, there are new ways in which that information is being communicated. That includes a new app that the National Counterterrorism Center has disseminated. I use it regularly, that puts out at the four official use only, FOUO level information. So truly a beat cop can have the latest on a smartphone. That includes a new app that the Department of Homeland Security has rolled out for his homeland security information network. Again, getting its latest analysis into the hands of those who can use it. It includes quite regular calls by DHS and FBI leadership for state, local, territorial, tribal partners, giving essentially threat briefings, the latest updates, or a debrief on some incident of significance and what occurred and how it was understood. So I think both the what and the how of that critical information sharing piece, those have improved and we'll keep working to improve that. When you mentioned lone actors and small groups and sort of that that is a fact of the way we understand domestic extremism these days and these violent acts, it does sort of bring to mind what happened to the transnational conversation? Where, what is the international piece of this that a year ago or two years ago, we were hearing about connections between white supremacist groups abroad and the United States and adding rim as a foreign terrorist organization as yet another layer. So is that a separate part of it or does this overlap? The lone actors, small groups and international dimension? I think it overlaps and it's a critical point. I appreciate you're bringing it up Karen because there is a transnational dimension, especially to what we in the government called the REMV actor set, the racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists. And that international connection, like so much of this, won't look exactly like the transnational connections of the foreign terrorist organizations we've all spent a lot of time on since 9-11. It's not the same hierarchy, it's not the same strict affiliates and kind of core leadership that we've become accustomed to for al-Qaeda or ISIS for example, but it's very real and it involves online conversations, it involves diffuse groupings, it involves some foreign travel and it involves some flow of funding of finances across national boundaries. These are things that the director, the FBI among others, have spoken about in congressional testimony. And where appropriate, we as a government have used foreign directive, foreign facing tools to get at this dimension, very real dimension of the problem. That includes a few more REM, Russian Imperial Movement related designations earlier this year. Overall, I do think we see continuing to evolve the transnational inspiration, connectivity and to some extent travel and financial flows of this and we will continue to use those appropriate tools, those tools that are sometimes only foreign facing to disrupt those pieces of this problems. You know, that kind of brings up one of the elephants in the room, which is social media and how it's used to inspire, to recruit, to incite. And one of the things that I and others appreciated about the strategy that you put out was its embrace of protecting civil liberties and protecting as well as it could, recognizing that this is a threat that we need to deter and prevent. So the question is, how do you see now that you've been in this position for a while and really thought about it, how do you see the role of not just social media, but what can be done in terms of big tech, how to address disinformation? And I guess my real question is, are we at the sort of very, very beginning stages of this or is there some grasp of how to deal with this in a way that's both effective and legal and constitutional? Is there, how do you think about this? Let me say one point on the civil rights, civil liberties issue generally, and then one point on the tech dimension more specifically. So I think all of us here firmly believe that approaching the threat posed by domestic terrorism correctly enhances and promote civil rights and civil liberties. Domestic terrorism and civil rights and civil liberties are directly at odds. Those who want to take discussions that should be passionate, but peaceful, whether among candidates, among voters, just in our society and turn violent with them, that is in a sense, domestic terrorism in a nutshell. Countering domestic terrorism leaves space for protected speech. It leaves space for the associations people want to have peacefully, whatever their ideology, their politics, their beliefs. So I think all of us believe that approaching this issue in the careful, calibrated way laid out in the strategy and as we've tried to adhere to as we implement it, that that is not, it's not a balance with civil liberties and civil rights promotion. It is itself a promotion of civil rights and civil liberties because it takes away the violence, leaves room for speech and association in peaceful ways. And when it comes to tech, but it is simply a fact that those who want to recruit, radicalize, mobilize individuals to violence, whether in the name of international terrorist causes like al-Qaeda and ISIS, or in the name of domestic terrorist causes, they turn at times, not exclusively, but at times to social media and other internet-enabled platforms. And we have done what we as a government think is appropriate to do, which is educate and form and talk with companies about what we are seeing. Because we of course have experts who see threats as they materialize and we see an evolution and the tactics and techniques used to try to recruit individuals to violent causes. And we think it is appropriate, indeed we think it's a responsibility of ours, just the way we share that information with state and local partners, just the way in other contexts we share threat information with for example, critical infrastructure owners and operators, here we share this type of information with for example, those tech platforms who can then make a decision for themselves as to whether it violates their terms of service. And we engage actively in multi-stakeholder fora in which we try to be a helpful partner in shining a light on where we see this threat going. And that includes, and I'll call out one in particular Karen, the Christchurch call to action to eliminate terrorists and violent streamers content online. This is a multi-stakeholder forum originally generated by the governments of New Zealand and France after the horrific Christchurch mosque attacks that we as an administration were very proud to join early last year and which we remain strong supporters of and heavily engaged in the valuable conversations with. And there's gonna be more to be said about where the work under the rubric of the call is going in the next couple of weeks, including in a major summit coming up next few days. Yeah, that brings a question of something else that you and I have talked about and that is sort of citizen literacy, digital literacy about disinformation, which is a little different than how you counter disinformation online, sort of putting it on the user. And I just wondered how you see that piece of the counter extremist framework playing out. And if you think that's really just something that's an aside or something that's central to how we think about educating ourselves and our children going forward. No, we think it's central and it's central not just for tackling domestic terrorism, but for other issues. Look, we all live our lives increasingly online, not wholly online, but increasingly online. And there are many reasons for that connectivity and convenience and the recent pandemic that kept us separated in physical space for far too long. But it also means that we can be susceptible or vulnerable to those who online would try to lead us in the way of various harms from recruitment to violence, to scams, to a whole host of things. All of which means that we're better off if we are savvier, smarter, in many cases, more skeptical consumers of the content that we encounter online. I think we owe it to especially generations that will even further live their lives and have experiences online to help them be prepared through the likes of promotion of digital literacy and online fitness and similar programs. We're gonna have more to say about that. In fact, in coming days this Thursday we're honored to be hosting here at the White House a summit in which both government and those outside government will speak to what we're doing and a whole host of cross-cutting issues involving hate fuel violence, but this will be a piece of it. When you talk in the strategy about long-term issues it resonates when I read it to root causes. What we used to talk about is root causes. It's a little different, but it's sort of overlapped. So I guess that's partly the beginning of my question. And then it's guns, grievances, racism, gun culture. And I just wondered what you think the actual realistic ability to address root causes in this country are as opposed to thinking about how we might have thought about poverty, et cetera around the world. What we're really thinking about here, what the root causes and how to address this. And I understand this is somewhat in the disinformation realm, but I think it's also separate. It is. The fourth pillar of the strategy that we've been discussing tries to be both candid and realistic. It tries to articulate a number of factors, including ones you've just mentioned, Karen, that contribute to the domestic terrorism threat and threat landscape as we confronted today and are in some ways bigger than it. And moreover, that require addressing if we're gonna sustainably roll back the domestic terrorist threat we face but that certainly can't be resolved overnight. Those include easy access to firearms that can make it easier to engage in an act of domestic terrorism or more lethal for someone who is. It involves disinformation and in particular disinformation that aggravates polarization that involves racism because some of the most dominant strains of ideology motivating domestic terrorists today are fundamentally racist in nature. Now, no one thinks we're gonna solve those problems overnight, but we'd be doing a disservice if we didn't tackle them both as challenges in and of themselves and as contributors to the domestic terrorism landscape today. And frankly, since the strategy was released last June to give just one example, major firearms legislation has actually been passed by the US Congress and signed quite proudly by President Biden. Now, as the president has said, he doesn't think that's enough. You'll hear him continue to say that, but it's a place that we would not have thought of ourselves in perhaps a year plus ago. It also took horrible tragedy to get there and I'm quite conscious of that. But these are long-term problems, long-term contributors to this challenge and challenges in their own right. And I think we as a government will continue to grapple with them while recognizing that in a sense, ratcheting up the sense of urgency and tackling them is the way in which they feed into the domestic terrorism problems we currently confronted. Before we get to the questions from the audience, I have a couple more. One of them is what isn't in the strategy? What's evolved over the past year that you wish, if you were rewriting the strategy today or just adding a little a coda to the end, you would say, let's include this. Is there anything or are we pretty much on the same trajectory in terms of understanding the threat, the basket of potential responses and the timetable? You know, there's a piece that's acknowledged in the strategy, but where I think there's still work to be done. And that is the piece that acknowledges that this is bigger than government, that like so many hard problems of public safety, of national security, but maybe especially so given the societal nature to this, that this is something that yes, we as a government need to step up and tackle in all the ways the strategy indicates we're doing, but that there needs to be a commitment by those across society to try to get back to a point where language of violence certainly threats of violence and of course violence itself is universally a port sideline taken out of the equation for our political and ideological disagreements, however fierce, however lively, however real those might be. None of us can look back to a point in the past in which that was totally gone from the landscape, but it has crept back too much, too much to a point where we needed a national strategy to tackle this issue. And I hope going forward, even as we as a government figure out how to generate even better intelligence on this, how we as a government figure out even better ways to screen and vet those who assume positions of trust in the government, even as we as a government invest in even more effective prevention efforts that we also are joined by and are a good partner to those outside government in the academic communities, the business communities, the celebrity communities and that they lend their own voices and other ways of contributing to getting at this notion that we as a democracy, we disagree with each other peacefully, we argue peacefully, but we resolve these things at the ballot box and not through violence. Which brings up the political context that this is all happening in. And one of the things about the Philadelphia speech and other speeches recently has been the recognition countrywide by the media, by politicians, by the president that there is some link between what we're seeing politically in terms of divisiveness and what's happening on the streets with violence and in our churches and in our schools. And so I guess what you're suggesting is that the larger voice of the country is bipartisan and needs to sort of declare itself that way when it comes to these issues. And is that sort of, am I getting that right? Is that basically? I think it's well said and in some ways it is the theory of the case behind the summit we're proud to be hosting here Thursday, which is the very title United We Stand means that there is unity in standing against turning to violence with one's grievances, whether real or perceived. We think that we are capturing not just the law by the way, which of course proscribes, prohibits violence, but also a real sentiment of the American people that whatever our differing views of a whole host of policy matters, domestic policy matters, foreign policy matter, that there is a wide swath that wants to resolve those differences peacefully and not in the just appalling and horrific ways that we've seen in Buffalo and in El Paso and in Pittsburgh and in Atlanta. And I could go on with the incidents that we can all come to mind over recent years but incidents that leave behind grieving family and friends. And so that is what we hope to lift up with Thursday's summit. It's what we hope others will join us in lifting up and it's work we wanna carry forward as we bring a spotlight to those who share that commitment to resolving differences peacefully. And just to note the sort of subtitle of the summit is countering hate-fueled violence, is that right? So it's very much focused on the prevalence of hate as a motivator and part of what's going on. So I just wanted to bring that up. I'm gonna get to some audience questions and then come back to some of my own but because they fit right here which is here's one from Anonymous. How concerned are you about violence around the midterm elections and from whom? And I think this follows kind of where we're talking now in the conversation. We do know that there are threats of violence. We do know that the elections are a target. We do know that there's hate-fueled speech and threats around this. What are your thoughts? So I learned from the experts in law enforcement and the intelligence community who provide us with threat briefings which we try to share and they try to share with the public including through a threat assessment that was embedded quite literally in the middle of last year's domestic terrorism strategy. And what they say is that we are in a persistent state of heightened threat and that we are likely to be there for a while and that in particular, hot button issues whether they relate to a particular election cycle or whether they are in some ways the perennially hot button issues can take that persistent heightened threat landscape and heighten it a little bit further. So we have gone about our work in the first year and a half or so of this administration within in essence, two recognitions. One, that that is the state of play. It is one that requires the sort of dedication to addressing this issue, to the intersecting issue of hate crimes and a broader set of violence prevention that the current moment demands. And the two, we need to approach it in a way that's sustainable because we don't have reason to believe that we're suddenly gonna come down from that, turn some corner, pass some magic date on the calendar and come down from that threatened vibe. That means investing funds in a way that's sustainable. It means building the sort of structures even the sort of information sharing mechanisms that we talked about earlier Karen where technology can help us get information and intelligence out to stakeholders who need it faster. But we are doing this both with a recognition that we're at a moment of heightened threat and that we need to build our work in a way that anticipates that threat environment to remain elevated for the foreseeable future, frankly. So you've talked a little bit about some of the accomplishments and the wake of the strategy and the focus on this since Biden came into office and you've talked about gun legislation and we've talked about reviving the intelligence unit. But aren't there broader accomplishments? I mean, how do you see the strategy? As you say, this is a long haul but there have been a number of things that have happened and I just wanted to know if you wanted to talk about them and then we could talk about what's yet to happen but let's talk about what has happened and what you see as progress in this area. Well, I'm always grateful for the chance to tout the good work those generally good work by all sorts of colleagues around the government who are on the front lines of dealing with this. And let me at least offer a few categories of this with apologies to those whom I don't get to. One is law enforcement, both federal and non-federal. It is of course the disrupted plot, the plot that is stopped before it can be actual violence and then is successfully charged and prosecuted that does not get the headlines of the tragic ones that do take lives but that is a far better day for law enforcement for society for all of us and it is really extraordinary work by law enforcement again, federal and non-federal alike that has saved lives and will continue to save lives and it's tireless work and it's hard work. Then I would point to where we're investing in the future. This includes huge allocations of sums of money by the Department of Homeland Security which elevated domestic violent extremism to a fifth national priority for a big pot of money for state, local, territorial and tribal partners, $77 million going to that effort. It also includes a separate pot of Department of Homeland Security funding to address terrorism and targeted violence prevention, terrorism generally, but for the first time ever the most recent grand cycle had an explicit focus on domestic violent extremism. So there's a lot being invested in preventing those acts from ever getting to the stage of law enforcement's problem in the future. And then I'd point to one more thing which is the work being done by different parts of our government to improve how within their departments they tackle this issue and DHS has done work in this area, the Justice Department has done work in this area but I might point in particular to the Department of Defense which as part of its implementation of the national strategy last December released a pre extensive report it's available on their website about how they are updating their policies and adapting their posture to address the threat of domestic terrorism or domestic violent extremism of the ranks. In particular, they updated their definition of extremist activities after close consultation with the Justice Department and others to capture a broader array of worrisome potentially violent activities. So all of these strike me as a success is frankly even as we are quite conscious of there always being the attack that happens the awful day like a buffalo in which we need to learn the lessons so we can prevent the next one. That's interesting. We have a question that I think fits very well here which is can you speak to how the strategy and government efforts think about the classification of the various movements of ideological streams viewed as tied to threats? I think it's a good question. I mean, it's how big is this basket? How much do you try to identify the different strands? What are you thinking? It is a good question. And here I would again encourage taking a look not just at the national strategy but at the summary of the law enforcement and intelligence communities threat assessment that we embedded in it because they include a few of the categories at least the categories of greatest concern and their articulation is quite useful and it's the one that we as policy makers take our cues from. So they talk about racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists and the particular transnational connections among that group as well as the lethality of some of their attacks. They also talk about the anti-government movement militias and others who in particular are found to target either government facilities or government personnel which of course fits the very ideology that's motivated them to violence in the first place but there are others motivated to violence by a wide range of ideologies. And I sometimes describe those ideologies as left, right, center and off the charts. Take something like the in cell movement, the involuntary celibate movement. I wouldn't know whether to describe that as left or right. It's off a recognizable or cognizable political spectrum but it moves people to violence at times at least. And so strategy is built acknowledging that there are a wide array of motivations, ideologies, viewpoints, whatever the best way to capture these motivations to violence might be and that our goal as a government of course is to prevent violence from any effect. Whatever the ideological or political lean our responsibility as well as our ambition is to prevent them from becoming violence. I guess one question I have in terms of your sharing information with state, local, tribal, tutorial. I mean, I think one of the questions is how are they listening? What about those states that are not necessarily wanting to participate in this? Are you finding that or aren't you finding it? And what is that particular challenge and how do you get around it? Is it sitting down with people? Is it, what's the conversation that goes on on that level? I think in some ways the best we can do there is to keep things in the law enforcement channels that exist because across this country, really every day US attorney's offices, FBI field offices are working with state, local law enforcement in very granular ways. And those we hope are professional relationships that endure trusting relationships, relationships in which information is shared appropriately of course in both directions and in which there's a collaborative spirit of disrupting criminality and violence. But in particular, we try to keep our law enforcement work as a federal government, but more broadly the country's law enforcement work is insulated from politics in particular as it can be. And so for us as a federal government, our goal is to offer resources, to offer training, to offer information such that it is wanted by, it is welcomed by, it is embraced by, it is used by our partners, our colleagues in state, local, territorial and tribal law enforcement. And that includes updating resources that we have heard in the past, they find useful. I'll give you again a concrete example of this and I think it's mentioned very briefly in the national strategy itself. We have had previous iterations of something called the, informally called the red book. It's the mobilization indicators booklet that draws on in past editions, previous individuals associated with international terrorism to derive quite accessible, quite ready to use indicators of potential mobilization to violence. This red book has been quite popular. The most recent edition, which I think went live on the office of director of national intelligence website this past January. Again, you can find it there. It includes for the first time, not just indicators derived from past experience with international terrorism, but also indicators derived from past experience with domestic terrorism. In part because we have enough of a body that we think the data can support it, in part because that's the demand. That's what our state and local partners need and want to see given the current threat environment. So ultimately, we hope that we, and this we goes far, far beyond the White House. It's the justice department, it's the FBI. It's the department of Homeland Security. It's others in law enforcement in the intelligence community supporting them. That they are generating the resources, the training, the products, the information, the intelligence that is responsive to the needs and demands of state and local partners and is useful to them. You know, you mentioned guns before and the headway that the administration has made. And yet, we don't have an assault, a ban on assault weapons or weapons that we can turn into more powerful weapons. And I'm really one of the things I'm interested in is, you know, it's like guns are a problem in this country. And the question is, is this really something that can be accomplished in terms of assault, you know, assault weapon bans or is it really something that you think is gonna stay on a different parts of the country will have different, you know, ways of dealing with this? What's your long-term, not just hope, but what is the reality of this suggest to you? And I say that because it seems just so much that if we got rid of guns and particularly certain guns or, you know, had background checks or just so much that we could do that would in and of itself for all of the wonderful programs and ideas and pushback that the national strategy identifies, including guns, that this one would really be a game changer or am I just wrong on that? Well, I mean, let me step back. First of all, we as an administration as an executive branch have tried to do that which I succeeded in doing, that which can be done within our powers alone. So we have, for example, taken action to address untraceable ghost guns. We have offered through law enforcement channels model red flag laws to state and local authorities. Other things that the Justice Department has the lead on, but that's one category, that which the executive branch can do on its own. And there's a second category, the category that requires congressional support. And again, we've taken that farther than occurred in many, many years with the recent legislation. And at the same time, you've heard the president say that he is committed to continuing to work to go further still. So how far can we go? I don't think we know that sitting here today, but I will say we've gone further legislatively than we might have thought had we been having this conversation one year ago. And so my hope is that if we're lucky enough, I'm lucky enough to get to have this conversation with you in a year's time, Karen, that we will have still pushed further because I can say this administration is committed to continuing to try and to working with Congress to see how far we can go. I have two questions. I'm gonna read and we have a ton of questions. I'm gonna give you two and then we'll wrap it up, okay? This is from Hazel Weiser with the ADL's analysis of the Oak Keepers. We have information that many law enforcement officers are aligned with this radical group. How serious is this infiltration of the right into law enforcement and even the military? And then for Mia Bloom, have you guys figured out yet how someone moves from violent ideas to violent actions? Since the majority of in-cells and QAnon are not violent and dangerous to anyone other than themselves, is it a question of degree? And I think both of those, I think you could address and then we'll wrap it up. Yeah, maybe I'll go backwards. So look, as Mia and other scholars who work on this would be the first to point out, radicalization to violence tends to be a very personal journey and personal can often mean individualized. That said, we need, as a government, as a society, frankly, our law enforcement to know what to look for to try to prevent that radicalization to violence occurring before it's too late. And so it's the sort of research which is drawn from past actors, whether they got to the point of violence, whether they were disrupted before, it's that sort of research that informs the red book I was talking about earlier, but putting aside the red book, it then informs the sort of threat briefings that occur truly on an ongoing basis across our federal government and with the sort of training that we do for state and local partners. We always want to update that. We always want to learn from the last one. Law enforcement always wants to know is there something that was missed when someone did get to the terrible point of violence? But we do think there are the sort of indicators and warnings that, as I say, are laid out by law enforcement and parts of the intelligence community in that red book that I mentioned earlier. And then as I think I've pointed to as well, we think it's critical that those who are given positions of trust, whether that's in law enforcement, whether that's in the military, whether that's in the intelligence community, all of these are positions of trust that they have access to weapons, to training, to knowledge, to things that the United States needs, the right people to have access to, but also can't be allowed to be exploited for nefarious acts. That also includes state and local and territorial and tribal law enforcement. Now we have different ways of relating, of course, to those who become part of federal law enforcement or the US military versus those who become part of state and local law enforcement. But where it's the federal government itself, different components have explained over the past year and a half how they've improved their own vetting screening, including recurring vetting and screening procedures, Department of Justice, as well as Department of Homeland Security, which has law enforcement components to it. And as the strategy points to, we have found ways where we think we can be a better partner to state and local law enforcement by informing them, assisting them as they improve the coordination of their own vetting and screening of their employees. None of this ever reaches an endpoint. It's not done. It's an ongoing process of trying to ensure that we're not giving access to the sort of sensitive materials and the sort of sensitive training that I mentioned before. But it's one that's critical, not just to protect those who serve alongside anyone who might exploit or pervert the sort of training or access they get, but to protect all of us. Joshua, every time I hear you talk, I learn something or I learn a lot of things. But it's not just that I learned something and I'm sure the audience shares that with me. It's that I feel better. I feel that we have some kind of handle and some kind of ability as a country to counter this violence that can potentially be so destructive. So good luck at the Unite. We stand summit in two days and thank you ever so much for sharing your time and your thoughts with us. Thank you, Karen. Grateful to get to have this conversation with you.