 And yes, if we let Russia's Americans come through this, they'll fundamentally be unable to get any useful information, no matter what they do. And same thing with the Americans. The Americans also have to say. So again, the third party is physics. And I'm serious. Physics cannot be hacked, physics cannot be hacked. Physics can be only understood, maybe. Sometimes we don't. Let me, I'll come to you. Any questions for anyone who has not asked questions? I didn't ask any questions. That was then. That was a different time. All right, tell me your question. Can we use this as well to maybe track where the, so let's generalize it. Don't just keep it to weapons. Generalize it to the nuclear facilities. So let's find out where the yellow cake is going. Let's find out whether it's, whether or not Ukraine really cleaned it up or whatever, right? Why not just take it to the next level? We can even publish another paper out of it. In fact, that has already been done. So in the 90s, there was lots of worries about spent fuel, as well as fresh fuel materials in Kazakhstan, being smuggled to different places. And Americans agreed with Kazakh leadership. I think there was something similar with Russia's too, where they would do similar checks on the fuel material. I think it was fresh fuel, but not spent fuel. But the Kazakhs and the Russians did not want all the information about the fuel to come out. They wanted to verify that it's this type of fuel, that type of fuel, things like that. That time they actually used the information barrack. Despite everything I said, that the information barrack is not entirely secure because they can be hacked. At that time, they felt that, yeah, but you know, this is fuel, this is not bombs. So the Kazakhs and the Russians felt that even if something can be hacked, or even say in the Americas, it's not so critical. So information barracks turn out to be good enough. They did use the information barrack. This is a non-technical aspect of the agreement, where politics becomes quite important. Essentially, in fact, the whole concept of using information barracks for weapons came from fuel analysis. Yeah, so this is very relevant. My question is about the issue of the question. How much of the modified, I think it's going to be like, how many times, like, a process? It depends on, and relies, it depends on the cross-section. So if you look here, what do you expect? No, no, no, the numbers. I don't know what the numbers are. A hundred times, ten times, three times. So what they really do is that they attribute them quite a bit. Yeah. They attribute them, and you don't want them to attribute too much, unless you don't have any statistics left. Typically, there's something like fact of 10 or something like that. So the coefficients are different. Yes, yes. I'm kind of not sure what is the result of it. Actually, if you have that spectra, that lines, so that material is inside. Well, if it is attenuated this much or that much, what is the difference that much? It's a norm. What is it telling the value of it? Well, what is important is the attenuation factors. Two things, one of them is they are fixed, which is what allows you to do the comparison. For a particular form. For a particular form. You keep them for all fixed. So every single energy line that I showed in this spectrum, they have essentially an attenuation factor associated with them, which is fixed. Second thing is that fixed them. The fact that it's fixed allows you to do the comparison. If they were not fixed, this would be possible. Second thing is that they are unknown to the inspectors, which means that for them, if they knew what the attenuation factor is at, they would work everything back. They would figure out what was otherwise. But if they don't know it, then they cannot do this right. My point is it's something different. If the lines are a little bit large or small or whatever, still you have the spectrum. That's right. The spectrum tells about the material. Yes, yes, yes. You're absolutely right. So that's right. So from the spectrum, you can find out that with the foil, there is uranium. But those are, that's okay. What you do is that you agree that everyone knows the bump has uranium. Bump has plutonium. Bump has explosive. So the two sides agree that we're going to put a foil that will verify plutonium, uranium, explosive. So they can see a spectrum where there's lines corresponding to uranium, plutonium, explosive, et cetera. And that's okay because they know that up to you. So yes, you are right. In just the energy positions of the case, it tells you what the material is made out of. But that's acceptable. That is acceptable. So the coefficients may alter that much and you cannot guess how much quantum that was uranium inside. That's right. So that is the trick. That's right. Okay. The other question was probably my final question. It's related to the self-radiation. So if there's a container, there's a plutonium of uranium inside, whatever container it is, can it really attenuate that much that you cannot or what is the issue? Or you can put it into your backpack. It's kind of funny. So would you risk to do that? So this thing over here, right? So you're asking, is there enough attenuation here? That's what you're asking for? Yes. So how big this material, this cone is that I showed this range of angles. First of all, it's not clear how this would happen. My guess is that it would be probably not this warhead. This is actually what it's called, this is what it's called, these cones are the things that re-enter the atmosphere through the final stage of the attack. But the actual bomb is a little thing inside this cone. So one way of doing this is that it comes down to what will people consider to be agreeable. Ideally, you want to have just the core of the nuclear explosive itself. Pull it out and compare it to each other. You might be able to do it with a range of angles depends how thick they are, which I don't know because it's highly classified. It is too thick? It is. Oh, but those are tactical weapons. Those are tactical weapons. It's very tiny, a little amount. So for the backpack, it's something that a human would care. This is something you launch from 8,000 kilometers away. It needs this massive construction in order for you to be able not to burn in re-enactments. That might be a big advantage. Of course it will. I mean you can make up for it by using a more intense source. You can have a higher current in your accelerators. But it's not like that. So they are admitting some kind of radiation? Of course. Certainly, it detects? No. You can't do that anything because there's all this shielding. There's like tons of lead here. So if there's a gamma from here, or tricycle from here, it's going to get stopped. It will never get bigger. So detector cannot be shattered. Really? Really? No. Two meters of concrete will stop everything coming out of the water. Two meters of concrete is huge. No, no, that is your ground of the shield. We are not looking at how much you can put. You can put like meters and meters of shielding over here. The warhead, when the warhead comes, it comes without the concrete, right? You can leave it there. Ah, no, no, no. You make sure there's no detectors. The detector has no power. You put the bomb over here. You can make sure there's a ton of water shielding over here. That, that, that's... What? But you turn it on only when the bomb is over here. So you make sure that you don't measure. That's not a difficult thing. When the bomb is not here, the detector is off. You bring the bomb over here. The detector has no ability to measure anything from the bomb. That's it. So you are just not allowed to do detectors close to the lever? Ah, okay. Any more questions? So maybe, let me once again say thank you for a very high opening and interesting talk that turns us on a lot. As we found out, if we didn't already know, this is important for all of us wherever we live. So thanks for taking the time and all the questions.