 My name is Paul Kahneman and I'm glad to be here with RT and I'm delighted to moderate this afternoon's session. I'm just gonna make a few comments then we will open it up to our guest speakers they'll speak for 10 minutes each and then we'll open it out onto the floor. And the big discussion obviously is the future of Europe but what I'd like to try and do is hark back just one moment to the year of 1976 when Jean Monnet said today no one can say what form Europe will assume tomorrow for the changes born of change are unpredictable and just looking at the Italian elections seems to prove the case once again. So let's take it and that Europe is changing and the question for us is how we want to shape that future together. And Ireland is trying to play a significant role in that debate and the Tishocli of Radkar was addressing the European Parliament earlier on this year and he was trying to give the Irish perspective on things so might be just worth a while to review for our guests about how he sees things going forward and he told the European Parliament that Ireland is at a decisive point in its history and I think everyone would agree with that that Ireland as a country has benefited so much that it has a responsibility to lead the debate so Irish politicians are going to be traveling around Europe selling that message and that we should be positive talking about what we want to achieve rather than and what we want to block and what was noticeable for me and I was there in the hemicycle in Strasbourg on that day was there was a continuous nod to the East in the speech that he was giving. He spoke about how Ireland is supportive of EU membership for the Western Balkans. He also spoke that while we were now a net contributor to the EU budget that we were prepared to pay more for and things like structural funds for Eastern nations to ensure that they could unlock their potential. So once again there was a political message there. I mean he did cover familiar ground on protecting the cap budget. He did talk about hands-off our tax. He did talk about things like anything to do with multi-nationals and tax erosion should be dealt with by the OECD which one economist said was the slowest of slow trains. So let's not do it within the European model. Let's leave it way out there in the Atlantic. But behind it what he was really saying was we're looking for new friends I guess in a very changing world. And Frager's comments did get a reasonable amount of coverage on that day on six nine o'clock news. This was taken as something important but it's only dropping the ocean in the context of Brexit. The amount of media that Brexit generates is just huge and for me it's not just the financial aspect which continues to grab headlines for running back years. The EOSI one think tank was talking about how trade between Ireland and the UK could drop by a fifth if things go wrong. But for me it's the question of the possibility of a return to violence which is a real live issue and the conflict in Northern Ireland emerging in some way. And just last week the Justice Minister Charlie Flanagan said on RT's The Week in Politics that the greatest threat to the security of this state comes from dissident Republicans along the border and a hard Brexit or a difficult Brexit could well feed into tensions and give rise to difficulties that none of us want. I think it's a real issue and it is for maybe people of my age because I do remember the conflict in Northern Ireland and I reported from it on many dark days and I remember one in particular which was the 13th of October in 1993 and I was reporting from Belfast and it was one week after a bomb had gone off in a fish shop and a bomber and nine civilians were killed including two girls eight seven and 13. And in Belfast seven days later there was fear on the streets because everyone knew that a massacre was going to occur in retaliation for what happened and it was only a question when and I remember that sense of people literally barricading themselves into the homes of the streets being absolutely deserted and this stomach churning tension of waiting waiting for something to happen. Now in the event on that day it didn't happen in Belfast it happened in another city in Derry when the UDA struck at Greysteel and shot dead eight people in a bar including an 81 year old man. So next month marks the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement which was the culmination of a massive amount of work leading to the end of the conflict and a whole generation has now grown up knowing only peace and so it is a big concern when we hear of Brexit that some of that could be sundered that you could actually go back to some form of violence again. But in saying all that I do agree with the senior IEA fellow Tony Brown where he talked about the balance is changing and that the future of Europe is beginning to take hold and be discussed in a much bigger way and I'd like to commend the IEA for leading the debate on that. Particularly opening up to universities to talk to students about the type of EU that they're going to inherit and I did some work with the director general Barry where we went to Maneuth University talking to students about what is the Europe that they want? What do they want to see? What are the live issues for them? And I think ultimately what we're talking about is taking off our Brexit glasses and looking at Europe anew and this is where we're really striving for and to that end the former Secretary General of the European Commission Catherine Day who some of you probably know she held the position for a decade. She said in a speech in Dublin just in January that there are many forces challenging and shaping the European Union today. Brexit is only one of them and while the departure of a big member state is a significant rupture, it's likely to have a time limited impact on the European Union. And in short what we need to do is to look beyond Brexit into those new alliances and I think what we heard from Tishok Radkar in the European Parliament in Strasbourg was that message of us looking out and looking beyond. And I think that to a certain extent when those are not to an East and the Eastern countries, Poland clearly is one of those countries that we are going to be looking to. It doesn't mean that we put all our eggs in one basket. Leo Radkar as well as being Strasbourg recently traveled to Vienna where he was meeting a new Chancellor younger than himself and someone I believe learned some of his English in Britain, I believe we can claim some credit for that. And obviously as the UK leaves some of the bigger member states will also be moving in to fill that vacuum and Spain in Italy will be part of that. So I think it's a wonderful thing that we're doing today and I think the IE is delighted to be able to do is to bring some of those European perspectives here because I think that what we need to know is what's going on in your countries, what's happening there, what forms the opinions that you have. What is it that the type of future that you believe is going to take hold and what is it that we can learn from you. So as we form new alliances, they're taking root on the basis of real information and what's happening. So what I'd like to do now is to start off the speeches. We're speaking for 10 minutes, our guests and then we'll open up to the floor before we go any further. If I could just ask everyone to once again, just check your mobile phone if you have it on silent or maybe turn it on to an airplane mode, please. So our first speaker is Agata Gustaja Jabowska. She's a senior research fellow with the Centre for European Reform and she's going to speak to us right now. Thank you very much for this kind introduction and for having me again in Dublin. I remember that the last time I was here was in 2014 and I was asked to speak about Poland's race to the top in the European Union. Now as you may imagine, you perhaps have noticed many things have changed since then. Poland has elected a new government, a government which sadly antagonized some of its European partners with its domestic reforms. But also one of Poland's greatest ally and I imagine also Ireland's ally is leaving the EU and that is of course UK. And in my short intervention, I would like to capture this changing dynamics that I just mentioned and offer you a central European perspective on the future of Europe post Brexit. And I would like to organize my remarks around three issues. And first, that would be the impact of Britain's departure from the EU on the overall balance of powers. And second, I would like to look into the implications of the shifts and balance of powers on the standing of the Bishograd region, that is the region that comprises Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, some say Czechia these days. I don't really like that new acronym. And Slovakia. And finally, if the time allows, I would like to look into the implications of Brexit on the public debate in Poland about Poland's place in in the EU. So without further ado, I will go into the first question. As you know, Britain used to be seen as as the member states which opposed a draft EU legislation more often than any other member state. And despite its reputation as a blocker, it was still a member state that many other EU countries were reaching out to first when they were building coalitions within the European Union. Now, that means that Brexit will no doubt shift the balance of powers in the EU and it will actually shift this balance, shift the balance of powers towards the largest member states. And as you know, these are the member states which are often more vocal and more effective in pushing forward their initiatives. And I think that poses some challenges for a number of EU countries, including I imagine Ireland, but also Visegrad countries. Well, it poses challenges for countries which used to hide behind UK's back or for those countries, we choose to recharge to Britain whenever they were trying to build a coalition around certain initiatives. That basically means that those member states will have to be now more, will have to now more forcefully push forward their opinions or they will have to look for new coalition partners. And I understand that this is actually what Ireland has already been doing, touring European capitals and sort of building new alliances. Now, that actually brings me to the second point I wanted to make. Well, where does it leave, where does it leave Visegrad region as such? Well, I must say that Britain's departure, I don't think that will surprise you, Britain's departure from the EU makes the Visegrad countries quite uneasy about their standing in the EU. And I would like to focus on two reasons or sort of two aspects of this uneasiness. Well, first one is that Brexit will, that post-Brexit basically the power will shift not only to the largest member states, but to the euro member states. Post-Brexit, the euro zone will amount for 85% of the EU economic output and also 76% of the EU's population. And basically as you probably know, out of those four Visegrad countries, only Slovakia is a euro zone member, neither Hungary nor Czech Republic nor Poland, even though they are legally committed to join the euro zone, they haven't really rushed so far to adopt the common currency. But having said this, any prospect of future sort of further deeper euro zone integration means that basically makes those member states quite concerned about these statuses in the EU. They simply worry that if there was a deeper euro zone integration, they could be pushed on the margins of the euro zone project. In a way, of course, we can debate it later on, but in a way some of those concerns are not without marriage. This is because newly elected very energetic President Macron has pushed for certain euro zone reform, and he seems to believe, he seems to be convinced that in the longer term, euro zone needs separate institutions, including a finance minister, who would be in command over a separate euro zone budget, which would help to sort of facilitate structural reforms in euro area countries, but which also would help to soothe sort of the painful, the painful reforms and also mitigate any future, any future crisis. Now, of course, this makes those Visegrad countries worried that if the euro zone were to go for its separate euro institutions, they would be out of the table. Now, of course, I think Germany has been quite a significant, if not key, into this very delicate balancing act between euro-ins and euro-outs. It used to sort of drag euro-outs and particularly Poland. It used to advocate for a greater openness of the euro zone governance. As you remember, Chancellor Merkel played a significant role in the elevation of Donald Tusk as a European Council President, but also the Euro Summit President, which was, I think, quite significant at that moment. But the truth is, Chancellor Merkel is not going to be there forever. Some actually say that she might not even serve till the end of the next coalition government. And we don't really know whether any future German government would have such a great understanding of the concerns of euro-outs, or at least pre-ins, which haven't adopted the common currency. So that's one example. And another one is that it seems to me there is this concern in some central European countries that post-Brexit there will be not only shift to the largest member states, but there will be actually a shift of balance of powers towards the supranational EU institutions. As you remember, the UK has been a stump supporter of a strong voice of member states in the EU decision-making process. Yeah, it has opposed the Spitzenkandidaten process. It has felt uneasy, or I should actually say it used to feel uneasy about quite assertive European Parliament. Now central European countries, particularly Visegrad countries, it seems to me they might feel that post-Brexit it will be much more difficult to counterbalance the influence of supranational institutions. And I think that has influenced already their thinking about the vision of Europe. And perhaps I should just make a very brief disclaimer here. Immediately after accession, central European countries were stump supporters of the partnership with supranational institutions. And I actually think I said it even in 2014 because the supranational institutions, the European Parliament and the European Commission, while they usually actually present or sort of help those newer and perhaps smaller member states. But this has changed. Central European governments, Visegrad countries, they went now more UK type inter- governmental, I would say. Of course again we can debate whether this is a good or a bad thing. And as I said, I mean those concerns have been reflected in their vision of future of Europe in their January statement of the Visegrad region. The Visegrad countries said that they didn't like the idea of the Spitz and Candidaten process, mainly because they think that would undermine the rule of member states in elevating, in nominating or deciding actually who is the future European Council President. And they also worry that basically that would push the process, would push the independent European Commission into the arms of the European Parliament. And what is also quite interesting is that those countries, in one minute, yes, that those countries have also argued that basically the European Council, which governs individual leaders of individual member states, should be the body, which should be setting the priorities and the direction of the European Union, and particularly Poland here, has floated an idea that perhaps European Council should be an institution in charge of solving out any sort of controversial issues, perhaps like the refugee crisis, because I think it's quite important to underline the decision in 2015 to push for a vote on the relocation scheme, despite the heavy opposition of central European countries, it hasn't sort of played out well. And final point, 30 seconds, perhaps, well then perhaps in this case I will leave my final point for later, because I just wanted to very briefly say on how Brexit actually affected a domestic debate about Poland's place in the EU. Basically Brexit has made waves, as I am being told here in Ireland, but also in Poland, and post questions on whether it would consolidate the 27 or whether it would sort of trigger or trigger a result in a domino effect, and that is something that has been also used by both the current Polish government, but also by the political opposition. The political opposition, and I will stop there, the political opposition has pointed into the direction of Brexit as a sort of warning, that any anti-European narrative could perhaps not lead to polexit, but perhaps could lead to Poland's marginalisation on the EU stage. And of course the current government has used Brexit as a case for reforming the EU and the EU institutions in a way which would obviously suit the government. And this is where we all sort of come down to Brexit and David Cameron's reform agenda. We can see some of those ideas being floated by the Polish government these days, like the idea of red cards for national parliament, but just to finish on this note. Basically I think the EU has been very clear that after Britain decides to leave the EU, the deal is off the table. So I would argue that also countries like Poland should simply turn the page and focus on building fancies and looking for the EU which works for all the 27, not for the few. Excellent, I think that's the theme which will be picked up in the discussion. Our next speaker here is Paul Maria Sturck, Deputy Director of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs. Thank you, thank you very much for the invitation, Guillain, for having me here first time in the Institute and the Director-General. Thank you very much for having me. I will build a bit on what Agatha was mentioning and have first a few comments on the shape of European integration which I think are worth mentioning now and then focusing on Spain and the role that Spain can have in this refurbished EU after Brexit. First of all, the big question that keeps worrying me for the last few months, not years since Brexit is whether that is an opportunity or not. It's an opportunity for the EU or is something that will lead to bad status of kind of thinking about the future of the EU and that's pessimism about this great political experiment that the EU is. And first of all, my first concern is that most of the debate now is focusing on the idea of multispeed Europe. And most of the debates about multispeed Europe, we have to take into account that it is a method, not an end game of the integration process. A method, I mean, which means that it is a way to refine how the EU functions. But in any case, it's putting forward new ideas about what the EU is, why it should survive, what is the end goal and why do we want to remain together despite one of us, the UK, is living. So all these big questions remain unanswered. And if you look at the different kind of crisis portfolio that the EU is micromanaging for the last few years, we have no end result in either of those crises. We have no idea about what the future shape of the euro zone will be, whether we want more integration, more supernational powers for the commission in that reformed euro zone, whether that will mean euro bonds or that will mean fiscal transfers, whether we will stick to austerity, all these debates are not happening. So the same kind of discussions that we used to have before the euro zone, before the Brexit crisis on the euro zone are still there. So this is not being solved. Of course, the same applies for Schengen and for the reform of Schengen. We're not discussing about the joint asylum policy. It is there in the picture. Someone might want to pick it up, but it is not something that is out of the, in the, discussed by the leaders. What this means to me is that perhaps we are putting too much emphasis on the method, not enough on the end of the process. Precisely at a time when citizens are asking for more of those answers. We are building on these dynamics of being studied largely in the literature on the politicization of the European Union. The politicization of the European Union basically means that citizens care about Europe, not only seen from their national perspectives. They care about the future of European integration because they know perfectly that what happens in Germany has an impact on Spain. What happens in the refugee crisis in the countries of the east and central Europe has an impact on the rest of the EU members. And what happens in Italy, what happened in Italy yesterday will certainly have an effect on the future reform of the European Union. So in any case, all these questions remain, remain unanswered. The big thing here is whether multispeed, if not providing an answer to the future of European integration, can kind of put forward a necessary rethink on the rebalancing of the EU. And this is what I built from Agata's very good comments on the power dynamics in the EU. I am somehow skeptical to the view that groupings of countries are kind of behind any EU integration processes and the EU is becoming more sub-regional. The V4 has a position on the refugee crisis, true, but it remains divided within. It's not the same Poland and Hungary than the Czech Republic. So they are not exactly on the same lines on the future of the EU. They might agree on the relocation scheme and on the quotas scheme and reject that scheme. But it's not that clear that they form a solid subgrouping of countries in the future shape of the EU. The core Europe, France and Germany, are deeply divided at the end of the story about Eurozone reform. They have very different perceptions about risk sharing and risk reduction. And of course this implies that the core EU is not so united on the future of the European Union either. And thus it leaves the question of what EU do we want and answer. And the same applies for something that I don't like to use, but which is pejoratively used, which is the Met Club and the Mediterranean countries. I prefer to call up the southern countries. And we've seen with the southern front of the European Union and Spain belongs to that southern front that they have not agreed either on any of the big crises. Spain did the best it could to differentiate itself from Greece during the Euro crisis. Spain is not Greece. Spain can follow the dynamics of the core Europe. And Spain will reform itself and will be the good pupil of Eurozone reforms and austerity policies. So in that regard, Spain and Greece have nothing to do together. Italy said Italy is not Spain because Italy knew perfectly that if it followed the Spain's logic, of course, this would backfire internally. We've seen that yesterday with the Cinque Stelle being the biggest force. If you don't count Salvini and Berlusconi together, but in any case. So this grouping of countries are actually happening and you have different sub-regional configurations, but in any case are united among themselves. This means that there is no clear picture about what the role these groupings will have in the future EU. What all of these groupings have in common is that they have rather made centrifugal dynamics permeate into the European Union integration process. What we are not seeing is anyone actually carrying the big flag of the EU integration of the future because of these divisions among themselves. This leads me to Spain and a few words. And I don't know how much time I have left, but four minutes, OK, more than enough. More than enough. What's the position of Spain in this rebalancing of the European Union? And here I would say that Spain is deeply divided on Brexit. This leads me, of course, to Brexit as well. Why? Because on the one hand, Spain sees Brexit as an opportunity. It's been mentioned before in the introduction. Spain sees Brexit as an opportunity in the sense that, of course, there is a void there that someone has to fill in. Spain has been out of the picture of European integration for so many years. First, because of the economic crisis, of course, is focusing internally and the effects of the economic crisis on the internal political configuration of Spain. And second, because of Catalonia. It has gone out of the picture of thinking big about the EU and thus now is thinking whether it can play hard and can play a big role in this refurbished EU. At the same time, it has always been a very pro-EU country, very pro-integration country. So it will not see multispeed Europe in very positive terms if this means that multispeed Europe is kind of the backdoor for disintegration or for different speeds and thus someone being left behind. Because Spain, at the end of the day, is very much afraid that it will be left behind, that Spain will be left behind. So it has kind of mixed feelings about the opportunity that Brexit and multispeed represent for Spain and feeling that void that the UK has left and Poland is leaving. And also it is divided in the sense that it will still be very pro-European, pro-integrationist. So in this configuration of kind of dialectics between both positions, it is where Spain is trying to kind of have a role in the refurbished core of the European Union. Spain has been arguing for the last years or months that the core Europe cannot be France and Germany only. Core Europe needs to be France, Germany, Italy and Spain. And this is what Versailles meant basically. The Versailles meeting was exactly about being, having a more kind of a wider core Europe. So most likely it will follow on that direction of being put in the middle of the picture. That being said, of course, the stakes for Spain of Brexit are very high. This here, Spain and Ireland, we were discussing that during the lunch, are very similar. They're both very exposed to Brexit. The largest number of expats, of UK expats, is residing in Spain. So of course, there is a human dimension to Brexit, which is very important. It fears Spain that it will have to become a net contributor to the EU budget in the next negotiations. And of course, in terms of FDI and tourism, Spain has big stakes on Brexit, not to mention the Gibraltar issue, which is also kind of a very bilateral important problem for the UK and Spain. So all being put together, what I think is that if we are aware that these groupings of countries have not have a united position towards the reform of the EU and that Spain is kind of divided on its position, I am afraid that the most centrifugal dynamics that have been happening in the EU for the last few years since the crisis are likely to stay among us for the next few years. And these, of course, will be the big discussions that will take place from Brexit, the European parliament elections and for the years to come. But I will leave it here and then perhaps we can elaborate a bit more later. Thank you very much, Paul. I hope you don't mind the short bios, it's just more interesting what you said than what you did. So our next speaker is Paul Schmidt, Director-General of the Austrian Society for European Politics. Hello. Thank you for the invitation. I will, in my presentation, I will try to use some of the points that were already made and give you a perspective through Austrian lenses, so to speak. Brexit, of course, how could it not be mentioned? But it's time limiting, the impact is time limiting. There was an impact also on public opinion in Austria. And I will tell you the story. We, at our institute, we do a lot of opinion polls. And right after the 23rd of June, 2016, after the vote, we did an opinion poll. We've been doing this since the existing of the office. So we have a timeline of around more than 50 opinion polls always asking, do you want to stay or do you want to go? And Austria was somehow always in the circle of those countries named that could actually follow UK on its path to leave the European Union. And since Austria joined the European Union, in fact, we joined with the 23rd majority with a referendum in 1994. We joined in 1995. And then we had a majority of 66 up to 75, depending on what was happening on a daily basis of people in favor of EU membership. So we did a opinion poll right after the Brexit vote. And it was interesting to see that those wanting to stay, the number of those that want to remain, went up 14 percentage points. So that was huge, in fact. If you look at the last 22 years, that was a huge amount. And those wanting to leave actually went down around 8 percentage points. And we were not the only one who did that opinion poll. There were others in Austria as well. And that was at a time when the far-right FPÖ political party in Austria actually played with the idea of a referendum on this issue. And they quickly changed their mind, in fact, because they saw that to be successful in national elections, you have to be much more moderate. There's no place for romanticism, it seems, at least concerning that question in Austria. And also concerning the Euro, for example, this is not an issue at all. At the beginning it was, again, the right-wingers who tried to return to the Austrian currency, which was the Schilling. But they changed their mind because they saw that in the opinion polls that this is not a choice that Austrians would actually go for because they are pragmatic. They accept that their currency is the Euro. They see advantages and disadvantages, but going back to another currency in a world which we have today is something that they're not really want to go in. This being said doesn't mean that there's not criticism, there's not skepticism concerning European integration. Of course there is, but there's also pragmatism that no one wants to leave, that we want to change the design of the European Union, but being a member of the family and not leaving. We've had also asked the question whether Austrians would like to see the UK leave the European Union, we've always had a majority of people saying of course not. Okay, but Brexit as well as the economic and financial crisis and the migration issue triggered a reform process in Europe, triggered a debate on the future of Europe which started in fact on a European level with the different white paper speeches, reform scenarios and which needs to go down to the national, regional and local level in order to make it happen. We've seen many, many speeches, but we're not so quick on substance I would say. We've seen also council conclusions in Bratislava at the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the European Union in Rome, with member states showing their commitment, but it's just words and we're waiting for the deeds and we don't know whether member states would actually deliver on it. And this is where I think the Macron speech was really important because one thing is that you react to something on the table, put forward by a commission president for example, or you don't really engage in the debate because it's just a paper and it's on a European super national level that it's institutional topics, it's an elite debate, but the other thing is having an important member state and the president of France putting forward his vision and asking for national democratic assemblies to discuss these kind of things. The European Commission has been doing that in many, many, many member states with their citizens' dialogues, but it's a difference if it does the European Commission or if it's actually done and organized by the member states. I can tell you from our experience, we closely cooperate with the delegation of the European Commission in Vienna in Austria, but if we organize something with a commissioner, it's much harder for us to draw a big crowd of people than if we organize something with a member of the national government just because their faces are known, they are in the newspapers. So in order to get this debate going, you actually need those kind of people, you need national ownership and to get a discussion going and to get the implementation of one of the other vision, actually, to make it happen. It's interesting to see that Macron put his ideas forward at a time where we didn't yet have a stable government in Germany. So Germany was on hold and everyone was waiting for Germany to react to these proposals. And if you read the coalition agreement, I agree with Paul that there are divisions between Germany and France concerning the future of the Eurozone, but if you read the coalition agreement in Germany, you have not only because it's the first chapter which is on the European Union, which is, if you compare to other coalition agreements in other countries, also in my country, which is quite surprising, positively surprising, if I may say. But they go quite far in what they consider important to happen. Paul, you've said that Ireland also is ready to do so. They committed themselves to raise their contributions to the EU budget, which is quite interesting. You have other countries who don't do that, who have a different position. They talked about the importance of migration, but not only in the sense of managing the external borders, but also about helping the transition countries, also about tackling migration, tackling the root causes for migration. So they have a much broader perspective on this. But also, of course, trying to improve the security situation within the European Union. The social dimension was really important in this coalition agreement, and also in the Macron speech, fair mobility, inter-European mobility, that's something very crucial for Austria. The question of fair taxation, tax competition, how to tackle tax evasion, avoidance, tax fraud, something very important also for Austria. Because if you look at the geography and the different states of development, of the economies of the neighboring countries of Austria, you can see that there's a lot of competition going on, having all the neighboring countries in the single market without borders to trade, which is a good thing, everyone benefits. But there's a race to the bottom where we all lose because it takes away room for mis-fiscal maneuvers. Interesting, the enforcement of European values, something important, something that the German chancellor, also future chancellor, talked also about in relation to the EU budget. The question of EU enlargement, further in EU enlargement, you have a new Western Balkan strategy of the European Commission, is something which is very important for Austria, having been traditionally close to the countries of the Western Balkans. And now we have a date, I mean it's a moving target, okay, but at least we have a date defined, which is 2025. And this is not only a date, at least this is the way we understand, this is not only a date about the countries of the Western Balkans getting ready in their reforms, two minutes? One. One minute, I have to be much quicker. Getting ready in the reforms on the path to accession, but the European Union has to be ready. We have to have our reforms well in place and working if we want to further enlarge because I can tell you from our data, no one in the country which I know best wants to enlarge the European Union if we have not really managed to consolidate the European Union. Now, I can talk about Austria's European perspective and priorities, maybe in the second round. Just one more thing, that would go too far to talk about what we should do now, that's the third round, but the summing up concluding, Austria would like to see itself or perceives itself as a bridge builder. We want to mediate between these new divides between East and West. That would be our standpoint. I don't know if we actually can play that role, but that's something to be discussed. Okay, thank you very much.