 Good morning, everyone. I'm Louis Putzel from C4. And as Paolo said, this presentation is a synthesis. It's not of all the cases of the day. It's the cases that are sort of the extra sectoral cases, those that are beyond forestry, beyond timber that we put together as part of a project to inform the timber sector and to go a little bit beyond and broaden the vision of a project. But just to go back a little bit to explain what we mean by formalization, more or less, everyone has all of the presenters will have a slightly different take on it. But we mean more or less codification of practices and policies and laws in a written legal code. It has to be recognized that many non-written practices in customary law are also very formal. So we're not saying that those are not formal, but that we're just using this definition of formalization. The informal sector really hit the international development world in the early 1970s. And it was mostly an issue of labor and the rights of laborers and increasing the potential for laborers to profit from activities in a sector where many were operating informally and didn't have a lot of benefits associated with formality. And of course, we recognize De Soto's work, which has to do with, which is grounded in the idea that formalization of especially rights to land is a way to both address problems of rural poverty and also of poverty, starting with urban and later rural, and also to bring credit and economic development to informal sector actors. Now just looking down later on, the discourse around informality has extended to environmental work conservation, et cetera. And I found it interesting, there were a couple of sources that sort of suggest that the reason we need formality in sustainable development and in forestry, et cetera, is because without formality, we can't tell what's going on. It's a question of being able to monitor flows of resources. And I'm going to claim that the reasons for formalization of sectoral activities are very important to the outcomes. If it's for poverty, if it's for labor rights, if it's for conservation, the outcomes are going to be different in those different sectors, and in those different areas and on the others. So a conservation oriented formalization might have different effects on livelihoods than a livelihood based formalization might have. Now going back to the seeds of this work, the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade Program of the EU and Voluntary Partnership Agreement Process, it was recognized several years ago that in order to look at informal timber trade and to formalize it, it was important to understand not only all of the legal norms in the forestry sector, but also the customary systems and those related to human rights. And there was supposed to be a review of all of those before implementation of voluntary partnership agreements. And so far there's been shortcomings in understanding customary systems in this process, in the VPA process. So we decided to pull together some lessons from other sectors to try to better inform the EU process of forming voluntary partnership agreements with timber producing countries. And these are the cases, the extra sectoral cases that have been done. And the people who did these are all here to present them. One is on non-timber forest products formalization processes in Southern Africa, processes of formalizing co-management of Brazilian Amazon inland fisheries that the authors are here. Conflict Minerals in Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, land tenure, natural resource extraction. So these are cross cutting cases. And my colleagues will all be up here to present these afterwards. The goal is to do a synthetic comparative analysis, giving context of the different sectors, and looking carefully at the drivers of the formalization process. So what is the rationale and demand behind them? And what are the driving institutions and interests behind them? And then looking at what the different instruments are. How are they executed? How are they done? How does formalization happen? And then outcomes and potential risks. OK, so I'm basically now going to focus more on the various sector specific cases. The first one being non-timber forest products in Southern Africa, and this is an interesting case because non-timber forest products in Southern Africa have been a source of a lot of work on looking at rights, at community rights, at indigenous rights. And a lot of modification of laws has happened largely in response to some global regimes, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on International Trade and Endangered Species. And these large global regimes, they interact with legislation at the national level and subnational level in the countries of Southern Africa. The fisheries cases is very interesting, largely, and you'll hear more of this from Toby McGrath, but largely it's interesting as a comparative case. And now in this set of studies, because it was very much based in social movement, so it had a little bit more of a grassroots social driving force behind it than some of the other cases. And one of the motivating factors behind fisheries was behind the formalization of fisheries in Brazil has been the interest of communities to better manage their resources and partly to exclude outsiders from over-extracting. And then the three T's are tantalum, tin, and coltan, considerate, and what's the other one? Tongsten, sorry. Yeah, so I get it. And this study is done in Great Lakes region Central Africa, Rwanda, and Democratic Republic of Hong Kong largely as the source of those minerals. And this is also a very interesting case for comparison where you have some very compelling human rights issues and conflict issues that are a rationale for formalization of the sector as opposed to conservation, for example. And if we look at these cases comparatively, to some degree there's some kind of a gradient. They all cross more than one. They all cross these lines. But from human rights interests, to livelihoods interests, to the interests of having a sustainable resource base and environmental interests, so they form an interesting group for comparison to each other. And if we break down the drivers of formalizations in terms of their rationale and demand for the formalization, we see that largely NTFPs in Southern Africa, for this sector, the driving forces have been to prevent over exploitation, to promote equitable benefits sharing, and to bring more revenue to the state. Whereas in the fisheries in Brazil, we have to prevent fisheries conflicts and access by outsiders. And there were technological changes introduced largely from outside and from the state level, which increased extraction. So mitigating those effects is part of the reason for formalization, the rationale behind it. And in the Great Lakes region, Congo, DRC, Congo, and RONDA, we have financing of armed groups, human rights abuses, health risks, lost tax revenues. And then we have very different levels in terms of driving institutions in interests. And I'll show you this slide to illustrate that. So in South Africa, we have a very broad range from indigenous movements to these large global regimes. In Brazil, we have from grassroots movements to local NGOs, so a little bit less international pressure coming to bear, but some international scientists and NGOs, and largely scientists and some assistants coming to interface with these processes. And in DRC, RONDA, we have a relatively heavy involvement of international trade, usually not just trade, but also human rights and UN peacekeeping, et cetera, coming to bear on national processes. And less grassroots local interest in the process, or at least involvement in the process. And from our cases, we are able to describe a number of instruments of formalization, how formalization is executed and technically executed through changing how land titles are granted, permitting systems, concession models, et cetera, to some occasionally banning informal activity when the formalization effort isn't working, or for other reasons, and trade-based instruments to certify products as extracted, traded, creating these different mechanisms to monitor, to control, to verify, and to prevent illegal flows of material within countries and more between countries. In terms of outcomes, it's very hard to simply present these outcomes at this time. The outcomes are very complex, both in terms of how effective they've been and what still remains to be done, but in NTFEs in Southern Africa, one thing that you can see is that there's been a lot of activity, lots of changes in many, many different laws across the legal system of each country, and not just in terms of national law, but also subnational laws, local bylaws, et cetera, and those interfacing different ways with customary laws. And it's a very diverse and kind of labyrinthine outcome of efforts to interface with these higher-level regimes, such as the CBD. In the mineral sector, you have lots of mechanisms. It's very technical, many technical mechanisms to monitor and control. Many of them have been designed, and there are great hopes for them, but they haven't yet really been implemented. And it's going to be, there are many challenges to how they will be implemented. And then in fisheries in Brazil, you have these adaptive systems of state national laws to integrate home management. To look at some of the main points from the cross-cutting cases, we see differences between where colonization has happened versus where it hasn't. Where socialism has happened versus countries where there had been no socialist experience. And there are many different, some of the effects of one phase carry over into the other. And the authors talk about the memory of people and the memory of the system, and how the memories of past can come back and affect future outcomes. And in the formalization of resource extraction, we have some of the outcomes are criminalization, et cetera. So the authors forgive me for mentioning all these things, but these are the points that we can sort of pull together in a synthetic fashion. And from all of this, we come with a very substantial list of risks of formalization that need to be taken into account when an international development agency or regime attempts to create a formalization program in order to achieve specific outcomes, for example, in sustainable resource management and conservation. So a lot of these effects, a lot of these risks that people face, some of them are also environmental, but people risk expropriation. Collective practices that are not necessarily negative can be negatively effective. Conflicts can increase, especially if memories of what people had in the past come back to bear on their perception of their rights and what they think they should still be able to do that they're no longer able to do. There are numerous types of potentially adverse effects on women in the international resource sectors, including, for example, having to interface more with male bureaucrats and law enforcement people as one example. Economic losses from the sector, the whole sector can experience a major loss, especially if there's a ban or a moratorium. And then one very prevalent effect that's obvious in many of these cases is that small scale operators often lose out in favor of larger scale. OK, so there are a range of other things, potential new forms of corruption, enforcement failures, et cetera, formalization. And that's where I'm going to leave it. And let my colleagues go into much more depth on all these cases. And thank you very much.