 Thank you very much. Thanks for coming and for the interest. Just landed from Antalya, where I was today for meetings with the foreign ministers from Ukraine, Russia Federation and of course our Turkish hosts. It's been an intensive day and I think the conversations were of course having different aspects and nuances constructive and I would love to offer more details if you're interested depending on your questions. Hello, this is Jordi from Agencia Efe. There have been reports that Belarusian technicians have restored the electricity to Chernobyl. Can you confirm that? Well, we don't have confirmation of this. I must say that communications with Chernobyl have been a bit shaky. There have been interruptions and restorations depending on different times of the day. So I could not confirm this. I would have seen this information, yes, but I cannot confirm it now. Albert Ohti, DPA, Chairman Press Agency. Director General, I guess your aim was to get some sort of agreements or something of that sort to protect from both sides, to protect the security and safety of the nuclear installations. What messages, how far did you get towards that goal? What messages did you get from both sides? Exactly. Well, as you know, for a few days I have been saying that in view of the circumstances, the dangers and what we've seen on the ground what happened last week and almost daily episodes that we have in one or the other facility in Ukraine and agreed framework is required, is needed, something specific is needed if we are to reinforce the safety of the installations in the country. So of course, that initiation was received with interest, I would say, but also with many questions because of the peculiar circumstances of an armed conflict, an ongoing armed conflict, the military forces of the Russian Federation occupying and controlling parts of the territory of Ukraine and in particular nuclear facilities. So all of that made for a situation that whilst one can agree on the importance of nuclear safety and security, then you have to distill it and decline it into concrete things. So my first goal was to establish a direct dialogue at the very high level. That is very important to pass the key messages of the action and what is being proposed. And this was achieved because we had the meetings, good meetings, not easy ones but serious meetings talking into the substance of the issues that we would like to do. I think there is one important general, I would say common denominator that emerges at least as a conclusion I take from this is that both sides agree that this idea of ours, this initiative of ours is worth pursuing, that something needs to be done and that they are both ready to work and to engage with the IAEA to materialize this into some agreed format. So this is a very important building block upon which I will try in the next few days to have something more concrete. So this is my first point and my first, I think, achievement for now. You announced immediately after the fire at Sapa Ruziz that you had a plan for a trilateral meeting. Then you made a surprise announcement yesterday that you were going to Intalia without telling us really why and now it turns out that you had separate meetings with the Ukrainian and Russian foreign ministers. Does that mean this idea of a trilateral meeting is now more or less likely than before? Was this an alternative to it? How do things stand on this plan since this was a bit of a surprise and an interruption in that kind of plan? We are analyzing different formats. For me, what is important is to have an instrument, a vehicle to strengthen the safety and the security of these plans. The rest is a bit accessory, if you wish. If through a trilateral understanding agreed and undersigned by the three, this can be achieved, it's a good thing. If we have to have it on a bilateral basis with clear understandings and commitments for each side, I think it's still worth trying. It's very important to do it. So I will not get lost into seeking a fixed format which would be the only alternative and the way forward. So we are still discussing this and I'm aiming at having something relatively soon. If I may follow up on the issue of your safeguards monitoring equipment at Chernobyl and Zaporizhia. Are you any closer to understanding what actually happened and why communications were lost with the equipment at the two main facilities that are in Russian hands right now? Well, it's the same answer or similar answer that I gave to Jordi applies here. First of all, there is an issue of communications. The systems are based on a scheme which was designed, of course, for a normal moment where antennas function when power is functioning as you had any system. You would conceive any system of communications in any type of activity. And of course, this is compromised at the moment. So what we have is actually a degrading situation which is a concerning situation for us because gradually we are losing, it doesn't mean that we are losing everything but we are losing a significant amount of information. You know, in the plane I was thinking about this and I thought when I was discussing with the safeguards team that I could show you this. This, I'm not revealing any confidential information, I'm just showing you how we work. In each of these lines you have the display of the flow of information we get from different remote monitoring or cameras and systems for different facilities in Ukraine. As you can, of course, deduct green is green and red is no information. And you can see that this is in safeguards terms, it's not a good situation because we are losing information. Safeguards is predicated on the basis of a constant monitoring capacity that we can have. The reasons may be diverse. When you have a power cut, of course, the systems may be working but you have local feed, we have batteries, we have many alternative systems but the communication, direct communication that we get from the sites is interrupted. We know that the continuity of knowledge can be reconstructed, that we still have the information, that it's coming back soon or relatively soon. So far maybe we will continue to have interruptions. So this shows that apart from the safety and security aspects that we are trying to look into, there is a growing issue related to safeguards and the assurances that we must give on where this material is and what's happening with it. If I may, sorry, is it a coincidence that communications have been lost with your safeguards equipment at the two main nuclear facilities that are occupied by Russia or they're held by Russia? Or do you hold Russia responsible for the fact that communications have been lost? Well, I don't have any investigative capacity to understand what is the real reason behind a particular interruption at a particular place on a particular time of the day. It's impossible for me. The only thing we are doing is of course we are dealing with this. Whenever this happens, we try to establish or re-establish contact as soon as possible. In some cases we were able to redress situations. In some other cases this has proven to be so far not possible. Yes, a follow-up on the safeguards issue. To what extent or at what point does the loss of safeguards information become a potential safety and security risk? Because doesn't the safeguards information also, like not having safeguards information means that one also cannot be sure what has happened to the nuclear material, right? Yes, well, there is not one single point in the curve for every single facility. It depends on the operational status of the facility. It depends on the kind of facility, how much material is in it, and so on. What we are doing is we are carrying out, I would say, a very focused follow of every facility to understand whether we are or we could be reaching this point. It's not something for today, but it's a growing trend. So it's something that it's preoccupying me and I am raising this thing also, this issue with our interlocutors. Sorry, but I'm asking this because the general public often doesn't understand the concept of safeguards versus safety or security. So could you explain in simple terms to what extent this is or is not a safety issue, the fact that you don't have the safeguards? Yeah, I would say in very simple terms because safety, security, safeguards, they have interrelationships. I would say safety and security is basically what has to do with preventing a nuclear accident. This is what we are, this is the main objective to prevent the loss of control, containment, cooling, and thereby not having an accident which would have consequences on people or the environment. In terms of safeguards, the issue here is an issue of non-proliferation, is an issue of security, security in the sense of peace and security. Being sure that we can say that this material, and there is a lot of nuclear material in Ukraine with 15 reactors, et cetera, we lost track of. And this is why the two things go hand in hand. This is why I went there with my two deputies, Madame Evrar in the area of safety and security and Mr. Apparo in the area of safeguards. Because these are the two areas we are trying to look at. I don't know if it's a clarification that may be useful for the general audience. Thank you. Yes, I have a little question. So you came to Antalya with experts, was on the Russian, Ukrainian delegation, were there also experts on nuclear issues or we were just talking to politicians? We were talking about the basic principles of what I want to do. And in doing that, I was referring a lot to the technical parts. Because for them to understand what are the limits and what are the parameters of what I need to do. I needed to describe. Were there nuclear experts in that meeting by the Russians and the Ukrainians or you were just talking to political? The dialogue was, frankly, there were big delegations and I couldn't tell you exactly whether they had or not. They knew that they were meeting with the director general of the IAEA. Our normal interlocutors were not there. But, and the conversation, the aim of the conversation was to discuss the general approach and whether I can have something that they could be able to work with. We are going to be presenting quite detailed ideas in the next few hours to both sides after this more general conversation has taken place. And after we could, I could confirm that both sides are ready and disposed to work with us on this specific issue. And then we'll take it from there. I hope that I'll be able to work on a series of different aspects, ranging from the technical advice on a number of things. Moving on to the facilitation, which is very important, the facilitation of the supply chain that all these facilities require, which is now interrupted, up to the possible presence of our experts there. But as I said, I think in one of our past press conferences, before I do that, I need an agreed framework and an understanding of what it is that we are talking about. Sorry, just to clarify, you said that you were able to restore communications or re-establish a link with some of the safeguards equipment with which communications had been lost. So is it still the case that you have no contact with them? No, but there are places where we've lost and we have not been able to restore. Right, so I'm talking about Chernobyl and Zaporizia. Is it still the case that you have no contact with the safeguards equipment? That's correct. OK. And if I may just more generally, you sound less optimistic about this whole idea, this whole framework and the tri-natural meeting and everything before. Am I right in thinking that? No, no, I would say we have a very conscious of the difficulties ahead. I'm quite encouraged, on the contrary, on one important thing, is that Ukraine and the Russian Federation want to work with us. They agree to work with us and they are prepared to work with us. Perhaps the gravity of my tongue has to do with the gravity of the situation, because it's a very dire situation and we need to move fast. And I am aware of the responsibility we have and the expectations that there are. So, but if we talk about, as I was saying in my reply to the first question, I think it was extremely important, first of all, that we were heard. We are the only international organization acting, engaging the two actors, looking into concrete things that we intend to do. And they agree to work with us. So this is tremendously encouraging. But at the same time, I'm aware that before getting to a result, there's going to be a lot to be discussed. This is what we are going to be concentrating our efforts over the next few hours and days, maybe. Thank you, DG. Stefan Löwenstein, Frankfurt, I give my name, Zeitung from Germany. On Twitter, Minister Kuleba acknowledged your meeting and he added that, first of all, he insists that Russians have to withdraw from Czernobyl and Saporizhia. Isn't that the all or nothing position you have criticized before? No, the all or nothing at all that I am referring to is not wanting or not being willing to engage on this issue unless you can solve wider issues. And I think it is very... The attitude of Foreign Minister Kuleba is very positive in this regard because he is ready to engage. But of course, it is also true that he is reiterating a very basic position of Ukraine. And I think it is important to say that from the very beginning, we have said that our remit is nuclear safety and security. So we are not dealing with the political aspects about which we are, of course, acutely aware. This is obvious. But we are not dealing with the territorial integrity or sovereignty which are at stake in a case like this. I don't know if the distinction is clear. So he repeats his basic position. And I think it is, of course, his right to do that. But I see a very positive evolution in the position of Ukraine that they are willing to work with us. I understand what was or what was not achieved today. So if I understand you correctly, you receive no assurances whatsoever from each side, for example, not to use armed force at or on or near nuclear installations. That's my first question. And the second question is, did both sides agree with you on a future, concrete future meeting? Well, on the first one, the answer would be no because we were not discussing in detail what is going to be included in this agreed framework. We are presenting some ideas. We are going to be discussing. And there is a high probability of a meeting very soon. When this is confirmed, I will let you know. But it will be incorrect of my part to confirm anything before I have an agreement. It will be undiplomatic. So one second. OK, yes. Sorry. Oh, I've got a typo there. I'm just going to fix that. OK, right there. You need some help? No, no, it's here. No, we just normally ask for help. Yes, so just very broadly, we know that you've suggested a try-out for a meeting. You've said the format might be different. Fine. But you said you wanted one in Chernobyl. Russia said not Chernobyl, somewhere else. And Ukraine said no Chernobyl. Oh, as well, OK. As well, because of this, may I interrupt you? No, no, please, please, sorry. For different reasons, these are the things that start to happen when you start to engage. You put something on the table, and both sides, for different reasons, said, not that, but let's work. And one side, which is Russia, has even said a third country. So many things are being discussed. I'm just wondering if there are any new clear conditions like that, since that have become clear since this meeting about how and where to start? There are no conditions, there are preferences. And I would say on red lines as well. Because, well, it is obvious that for Ukraine, it is very important that their basic positions, with regards to the whole situation, are preserved. And we don't have any problem with that, because we know that for the success of this exercise, there must be a clear delimitation of the scope of the exercise. Well, thank you very much. And we'll be talking about this soon, I hope, since I hope we'll have news about it very soon. Thank you very much. Thank you.