 Thank you very much. Can you hear me all right? Yeah. Okay, good. Let me share my screen. I have a few slides. Okay, let's see. Can you see my slide deck? Yes. Okay, great. So, thanks very much for inviting me. Indeed, I'm going to focus as I come from UNHCR on the policy elements, and I'll speak about two pieces of work. And let me put on my time here so I can be seven minutes. I'm supposed to be so. Yes, so thanks again for this opportunity. I'll speak about the first two papers, both Christopher Blair and Austin Wright's work on Afghanistan and then Graham Blair and colleagues piece that he spoke about on the Boko Haram situation and the reintegration evaluation attitudes and social norms. So, on the, you know, durable solutions, I think, you know, thanks, you know, for raising, you know, moving beyond durable solutions. This is a critical point. I think it's just, it's very useful to see this graph in the paper on, you know, the collapse of what you call collapse of durable solution, something at UNHCR we're very, you know, aware of where you can see, I mean, and I was, I asked colleagues about this repatriation here, you know, where we see some 15% of solutions that just, you know, you have to think about are we going to be seeing that again in the future with the current crises. So, you know, and, and then I think it's also valuable for you to think about centering this a little bit more in some of the refugee policy specific pieces like, you know, the global compact does recognize, you know, that more needs to be done by all to sort of help the uneven, you know, global burden of responsibility and has these four tenants here, you know, especially around easing pressure on host countries. So I think it would strengthen your paper to, you know, center and this is ratified by the UN General Assembly back in late 2018. So, you know, it's useful to center that this is, you know, critically around, you know, for for policymakers that's been recognized and you know, there's, there's even a piece on supporting conditions and countries origin for return. So, yes. So let's talk a little bit about, you know, the results and, you know, you know, what, as you describe sort of this, you know, the situation that unfolded on the ground, right? You know, one thing I do think is also, you know, important to note from a, just also on the, you know, in the policy space is just that Pakistan, you know, is not a party to the 1951 convention, which is the, you know, the founding convention that UNHCR was starting by and, you know, underlines the principles of refugees and so therefore they don't recognize refugees officially, right? So the refugees are governed under this Foreigners Act. And I think it would be useful to, you know, highlight that a little bit in the paper. And then, you know, I just think it's useful also to like, you know, this situation that you see in with the, you know, you know, this horrific event, the Peshwar School Massacre that, you know, foments this, you know, very, you know, even though no refugee was linked to this as you really cite that this foments this, you know, very critical revision to the policy on refugees and pushes out, you know, this voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan. I think that, you know, and therefore this policy of doubling the cash instead of, I think this is something that happens in other places and it's useful to maybe cite that. You know, Kenya's one, you know, with the Westgate bomb bombing, you know, and that's, you know, there's even this new Kenya policy on camp closure, which there's been several in the last five years. So, yeah, so, right, so 500 plus thousand return, you know, you know, 60% are assisted by this cash grant. This is just what the, what you've described. I did think also it's quite interesting that the correlation work you did on how 2013 returns predict 2016 I think that that's a really strong point in the paper I'd like to learn more about like, I think you should, from policy makers perspective that's really valuable because if we can help to predict movements and just more about, you know, you know, what, what were some of the key variables you used in that prediction, you know, what, yeah, more on that would be good. Right. Yeah, so this is the main results. So I think that also you do a really novel thing with introducing this, this data set on communal violence which I think it's really exciting and something, you know, we haven't, you know, seen really before so I think this is a really not novel aspect of the paper. I know that you note the challenges with the indigeneity of that data and it's just something I want to recognize. You know, I think also another piece is that you know providing cash for repatriation is not new. Actually, it's something that HR has been doing for a long, long time. And I think it would be useful to also highlight sort of the, the really difficult situation that the Afghans return to like just having a summary statistics table on the mean number of the different types of violence that you define I think is really useful, even if it's an annex just so people understand, you know, the context I think you do a good job of describing it but it's also the papers a bit long so you may wish to sharpen and limit and also you may wish on doing some more prioritization of results and or and definitely for both papers just even putting together some short, you know, two pages for policymakers or even videos or short sort of dissemination pieces so let me turn to Yeah, so I have this other piece but I feel like I'm running out of time so let me turn to the piece on Boko Haram which also was quite, you know, important for policymakers to work so you know I think, you know, your main message that this, you know, by, you know, in, you know, this experiment where you have this religious leaders who have this, you know, message around acceptance and forgiveness that this impacts, you know, perceptions of social norms and, you know, self reported change, like, acceptance of these of these X, X Boko Haram fighters obviously very important for for policymakers, and these are just some of the findings that you've already outlined so the I'm definitely under research area that we need more and also the exciting piece about it being it's really this low cost, you know, information campaign which, you know, makes it very replicable for policymakers so that's also quite exciting. I do think that there's something you may, you know, want to highlight I know you do highlight this one piece about Burkina Faso that you know that finds the opposite results of what you found. But I do think it's worth the highlight for the difference between stated and observed behavior because that's an underpinning point and I do think you should, you should nuance your, you know, your, it would be useful to nuance your main message because as I highlighted here, I'm happy to share these slides with colleagues afterwards just about just citing that it stated, you know, sorry, it's yeah versus actual. And then just other notes, you know, you make this correlation that, you know, not only Northwestern or Eastern sorry Nigeria where the Boko Haram conflict this has this high influence of religion that there's many, you know, hundreds of millions of people who billions you say, you know, could be influenced by messages from religious leaders, you know, it'd be very useful for if you have any commentary of anything from the data on, you know, further description of like the level of trust in these religious leaders or any other characteristics that define what makes you know within religion because not all populations are the same right I mean there's this. There may be some elements that are worth understanding, particularly primarily so if we were to replicate this, that this could be, you know, this could be taken into consideration. Right, so yeah, let me stop there I think. I think I'm out of time. Teresa, and we will take as was the comments as well, and have the Q&A in the road. Thank you. I'm going to comment on Michele's paper first. Very interesting study and it's very commendable that the study is on Libya. We don't have much work on Libya, so it's a very good contribution to the literature in that sense. Well, I have a couple concerns that and some suggestions about how to address those concerns. Two major concerns to begin with, selection bias and reporting bias. And error clustering, no, that's not it. No, selection bias and reporting bias. Who, I mean, this is a telephone survey. Who responds to telephone surveys is a major question here. And who doesn't respond to telephone surveys. I'm not informed, I'm quite ignorant about the coverage or the usage rates of telephones in Libya to begin with. So it's very difficult to talk about a random selection here or representativeness at all. And another thing is that it seems a large portion of the internally displaced people in Libya had already returned home. So who are these people who are still IDPs and why are they still IDPs when at least two thirds had already gone back? And also all measures are self-assessed, which brings in the probability of a response bias. These people, obviously they're not living in very good conditions, they have complaints. How is that affecting the way they perceive their situation, the way they answer the questions? And also I'm kind of curious, how do they know they had COVID? So was it just a simple question? Have you had COVID? And they knew who diagnosed them. And also it's interesting that they also report higher chronic diseases. It can be a sign of, again, a reporting bias and overreporting. Or it can be a reason to remain as internally displaced. Or it can be a reason to suffer more from COVID economically. And also one thing I strongly recommend, I mean if you can find a way to look into it, lack of social support can explain a lot of things here. How many of these people are living with relatives or with friends or with, you know, how many of them have any kind of social network? It can because impact both the level of their suffering as well as their perceptions about their suffering. So if you can, I mean all the analysis in the paper are conducted with this one survey with all with self-assessed measures. So if you can maybe complement the analysis with some outside data that gives us some information about, I don't know, any of these points like availability of a social network, you know, something that comes from outside rather than from the assessments of the self-assessments of these people. So that'll be my suggestion here. But again, I mean very interesting and very commendable because it's on Libya and Libya is a major conflict that has so far remained almost completely silent in terms of scientific analysis. Thank you, Anas. It's great work. Coming to your paper. Again, very important discussion. I mean the main discussion about whether refugees carry conflict with them or not is extremely important, sensitive, and it's an unresolved discussion. It's an unresolved academic discussion. We have answers in both ways. So this paper argues that the effect of refugees on the likelihood of conflict in recipient countries depends on the ethnic composition on both sides and how that ethnic composition changes with the arrival of the refugees and they test their hypotheses with data from the Afrobarometer. My first question or kind of the first thing that comes to my mind is about the conceptualization of ethnic polarization and ethnic fractionalization. Yes, we can count the number of identities or we can look at the linguistic distance between them so we can devise quantitative measures. But unless those measures have incorporated the salience of those identities I think we are not doing a very good job. If these ethnic identities that we count are not salient for both sides then why are we counting them at all? Why are we concerned about whether the number of ethnic groups increase or not or the linguistic distance between them? So it all depends on how being a member of a group is defined and in societies with a dominant ethnic identity being a member is most probably defined in terms of that ethnicity, that ethnic identity but in ethnic heterogeneous societies the definition is most probably something else. Then it becomes important if refugees share those other salient characteristics or not. So we should maybe find a way to think about fractionalization and polarization in a more broader way. And also the second thing that comes to my mind again I guess this is a very common comment when you're studying conflict. Endogeneity, the endogeneity problem is always there. Migration, yesterday a presenter said this and I really like the way she phrased it. Ana Maria Ibales I think she said it. Migration is neither completely forced nor completely voluntary. And there is a lot of agency in migration and in the choice of destination. People sort themselves, they do sort themselves into different locations, into different refugee camps and one sorting criterion might be ethnicity. Several ways to deal with this problem and they do deal with this problem not saying that you're not dealing with this problem, don't get me wrong. They do deal with this problem or at least address it. There are several ways to deal with the problem of endogeneity. We have all been through those ways. One thing is to not insist on a causal argument and just acknowledge that you're talking about associations, there's nothing wrong with that. Or you can go looking for a really good instrumental variable or you can try to identify the mechanisms behind the causal association you are claiming. I personally favor this last one because I think that's the best way to go. So that is my main kind of comment for your paper. Maybe look into the mechanisms, conduct a mechanism discussion. So why? I mean, yes, your data indicates a positive association between ethnic polarization and conflict likelihood and a negative association between fractionalization and conflict likelihood, but why? So at some point you mentioned competition over resources, for example. But competition requires organizational capacity and capability. And I think that gives you a clue about a very important mechanism that might be in play here which is the unifying effect of salient ethnic identities in a way to enable groups to overcome the collective action problem. So if you can find a way to look for evidence for this, that might be great. That might just give you what you need. Okay. I guess I can give you my other comments later on. So I'll just cut it here. Sorry, I tend to talk a lot. I know. Thank you very much, Azul. Who would have questions? So I see many questions. But I would like to offer the opportunity of the speakers to respond briefly to the comments maybe in 30 seconds if you can. So Christopher, do you want to address comments of Teresa? In the interest of getting audience questions, I'll just say thank you very much, Teresa. I really appreciate the feedback. I think a lot of the points are well taken and I'd love to follow up with you offline. Exactly the same. Everybody is the same or no? Okay. I was short for the presentation so I can't speak forever. No, no, but thank you very much for the comments. So I just want to say that I agree about the salience. We need to think to improve that to some extent it's possible that for example or we measure polarization where actually it does not matter. I still don't know it will affect the result whether it just imposed some noise or whether, but I don't know. So I agree with the mechanism. So what we have in mind is the work by Esteban and Ray which is a contest model where the price of public nature, so you have public resources and groups may compete over these resources. So it's really theory driven. But I agree that we need to do more on the mechanism. I just want to say something about underginating. Because I agree with you that refugee camps are never randomly located and with Philip and others we have discussed that at length. But I think here we should acknowledge that the nature of the selection should be if it's related to ethnic composition. Because that's why we have this instrument that address precisely the ethnic composition. And to some extent that's true. The refugee variable is likely to be the presence of refugees. It's likely to be undergins. So we control or not for it because it might be also a bad control. But I think really the endogenous issue is about changing ethnic composition. Thank you. Michele, do you want to answer or are we picking? Very quickly. I also want to thank for the great comments. I mean, most of the things that you asked are what we'd like to do. But unfortunately, as I said, we have big difficulties in having a comparison in terms of official data. We can try to check for some of the variables probably. Maybe some marginal variables we can find some... That's on transfer for instance. So just to have an idea. Some external validity might go a long way there. Yeah. Thanks. Okay. So now we are playing to the floor. So I see four questions. So I will take four of them. Okay. And we don't have any online or... No. Okay. Yeah. Sorry. You can pass the lady first. Thank you for all the presentations. I really enjoyed listening to them. So my question is for Jean-François. I was also thinking about this mechanism issue. And maybe your data is really not enabling you to do this kind of an analysis. But I just wondered at least maybe you could show us. I know you are looking at Sub-Saharan African countries, but maybe for specific regions, for specific countries, you might have different effects. We are now doing a similar project. We'll talk after with you, with Patricia, where we are trying to find the impact of refugees in Turkey on the ethnic polarizations. And we were checking also mechanisms. Then we see that although like polarization overall, for example, do not have any negative impact, but there are different ethnic groups it might have. So maybe you will find also something interesting in that aspect. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. Eva Maria. Thank you very much. So I have one question for Chris regarding selection of the returnees, right? So your IV is built on exploiting the quantity of past returnees, but not the composition of these returning refugees. And what do you think is happening there? How can that contribute to more or less conflict? And also related to the previous question to the ethnic polarization. So are we finding that there is a conflict just transferred from one location to the next from existing ethnic tensions between specific groups, or is it a new type of conflict because there is this contestant, that they are contesting over land and resources like your theory suggested. Thank you. Krzysztof Krakowski, Collegio Carlanderto. Thanks a lot. Wonderful stuff, all of it. Let me tell you two things to offer. Jean-François, I have a very similar paper drawing on evidence from tribal Pakistan and the mechanism that we find is contact. You know, polarized means probably segregated, means that you don't engage on an everyday basis so you're a bit more afraid and that which can escalate into conflict. If you see people around you might be less likely to cooperate but at least, you know, you realize that they are not as hostile as you might think. I'll be happy to share the paper. And Graham, great stuff. I was just wondering whether there might be some problem of social desirability in a way that you essentially tell people, look, this cleric endorses reintegration, which makes it a bit harder to disagree with that because this becomes a default option. And the second thing is that how common it is that you have such a nice cleric that it should be, you know, pro reconciliation. What I found in very different contexts is that a lot of these local leaders, they tend to be pretty, you know, antagonist and confrontational. So you have an information on a larger scale how many of guys like you collaborated with other in Boko Haram affected areas. Thanks. Thank you. Yes, my first question is for the Pakistan paper. By the way, I want to congratulate the four presenters for their very interesting paper. So as you said, there are high amounts that they get, $400 per individual, $3,600 on average per household. So can you make sure that after a few days they cash the money to go over the border? Maybe they return to Pakistan very soon. Is there any evidence of that? And maybe they even just cross the border to collect the money and then go back. Is there a strong registration system? Is there controls upon arrival? Are you sure that the same household an individual does not collect the money twice? All these, I think, logistical questions are also essential for your paper. And then for the, for Michela's paper, I think it's very commendable that you do the Libya research because we, very few papers on Libya, but I share Asrush's comments and suggested very much. And maybe if you ask COVID questions, one question could be to be more precise about it is have you been tested to get COVID? And yes or no? Have you been diagnosed of having COVID? Not just do you have COVID? Because many people even in well-informed Western populations don't know if they have COVID. They have coughing, they maybe have fever, they maybe have other things. But how can you really be sure that you have COVID is only when you are tested? Otherwise it's self-assessed, self-reported with all the biases that you have. Thank you very much. We are three minutes left. So Christopher, I will give you the floor briefly. And for the people here, I will ask to answer very briefly we will be able to continue at the coffee break. So Christopher. Yes, thank you. So first to Anna Maria's question. Yes, I should clarify the instrument is combining the kind of time series national level inflow with the historical resettlement pattern. So I think we pick up some of the kind of geography of resettlement there, of repatriation there. But in the appendix we also show a result that leverages distance to the encashment centers in Afghanistan. And that also is like a kind of a different geographical measure for exposure to return. So do more in the paper than I could present today. But you might find that of interest if you take a look at the draft. And thank you for that question. And to Philip's question quickly. Yes, there was a biometric process involved here. So everyone was fingerprinted as a way of preventing duplicate access to the encashment. And so follow-up surveys suggest that the vast majority of people stayed in Afghanistan at least for 2016. Thank you very much. Thanks so much, Chris, for the question first about social desirability. I guess I think there are two things we might be worried about. One is that you're asking kind of about a sensitive behavior. And so people might not want to answer honestly after hearing that the religious leader shares a different view. I guess I've become increasingly skeptical of the existence of that. We have a meta-analysis that we did last year that shows that in most areas except for attitudes towards authoritarian regimes, towards the leaders of authoritarian regimes, there's very little detectable social desirability bias. But I think you could also be worried about kind of demand effects that you've learned what the purpose of the experiment is from the perspective of this leader and then you might want to follow him. We don't find effects on all outcomes, so it doesn't move your anger towards these groups, which is something that was directly targeted in the message. He shared ideas about forgiveness from these religious texts. And so I guess I take that as some small evidence about the fact that it's not just that we're moving in all of the directions that are suggested and it's really just in these norms and behavioral intentions. And I guess lastly, the way that you put it, I liked which was the leader told you to do something and so you're saying that you would do it. But I think I almost think that that's kind of the part of the mechanism that is going on here. So certainly we would want to collect behavioral evidence that demonstrates that this shows up in actual behaviors, but I think that if you saw that there that the desirability is almost what this leader cue mechanism is partly about. So thanks for that. Do you want to address some answers or comments? No, I just want to thank you for giving me some task. We will try to fill the gap as much as possible. Thanks. Jean-François. Yes, so I think many of the comments are actually related to your comments. You can try to make a problem. About ethnic heterogeneity ethnic group heterogeneity, I think it's a good idea. Maybe it can stress the issue of science. Sorry for my English. Yes, so I think that's a good idea. I need to check for the data. I didn't know about your work for Pakistan, so it's very interesting. I think the way to go that may join your comments about mechanism is actually to exploit much more heterogeneity. So we don't have much information about the refugees but at least for the local population. That's a bit what we got with the unemployed when you use individual data, but maybe we can do much more to try indirectly to highlight some mechanism. And the transfer of conflict is a very good point. So we control for conflicts but this is another issue. For the fact that you have conflict next door. But I think for transfer of conflict by refugees it's almost like if we were doing the reduced form for estimation. The IV is actually capturing those ethnic groups that are coming from areas with a high level of conflict. So there might be something to do but I need to think about this. But thank you very much. This is a great suggestion. Thank you. We are running out of time. If you have an extra question I propose we continue the discussion at the coffee break. I would like to thank all the speakers for their original work and all the commentator for their constructive comments and thank you for this interesting discussion.