 a history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great, Volume 2, Chapter 1, Parts 7 and 8. Part 7. The Oligarchic Revolution. At Athens in these months there was distress, fear and discontent. How deeply the people felt the pressure of the long war is uttered in the comedy of Lysistrata, or Eurydice the Great. The heroine unites all the women of the belligerent cities of Greece into a league to force the men to make peace. Under the rivaled humour there pierces here and there a note of pathos not to be found in the poet's earlier piece. War is not a time for marrying and giving in marriage. Never mind us married women, says Lysistrata, it is the thought of the maidens growing old at home that goes to my heart. Do not men grow old too? Ah, but it is not the same thing. A man, though his hair be grey, can soon pick up a young girl, but a woman's season is short, and if she miss her chance then no one will marry her. But the fear of Persia was the shadow which brooded darkest over Athens at this time, and there was also a lurking suspicion of treachery, a dread that the Oligarchical Party were planning a revolution, or even intriguing with the enemy at Decalia. Two months after the Lysistrata at the great feast of Dionysus, Aristophanes brought out a play whose plot had nothing to do with politics, the celebrants of the Thesmophoria. But the fears that were in the hearts of many were echoed by the poet when his chorus called upon Athena, the sole keeper of our city, to come as the hater of tyrants. Lovers of the democracy might well pray to the guardian lady of the city, the opportunity for which the Oligarchs had waited so long had come at last. For outside their own ranks there was a large section of influential men who were dissatisfied with the existence of the Oligarchs. And, though opposed to Oligarchy, desired a modification of the constitution. There was a fair show of reason for arguing that the foreign policy had been mismanaged by the democracy, and that men of education and knowledge had not a sufficient influence on the conduct of affairs. The chief of those who desired to see the establishment of a moderate polity, neither an extreme democracy, nor an Oligarchy, but partaking of both, was Theramanese, whose father, Hagnon, was one of the Probuli. The watchword of Theramanese and his party was, the old constitution of the Oligarchs. By this, they meant not the constitution of Solon, but the constitution before Solon. They interpreted the whole history of Athens in accordance with their political views. They condemned Solon as the author of democracy, the first of a long line of mischievous demagogues. They made it possible for the Oligarchs to be the first of a long line of mischievous demagogues. They made out that the Areopagus, and not Themistocles, was the hero of Salamis. They branded Aristides, founder of the Delian Confederacy, for organizing a system which fed twenty thousand idlers on the allied cities. They represented Pericles as a man of no ideas of his own, but depending upon others to prompt him. After two centuries of evil government, the Athenians must go back to the times before Solon, and revive in some new form the constitution of Dracon. This constitution of Dracon, of which the chief feature was a council of four hundred, had never existed. It was fathered upon Dracon by Theramanese and his friends. The extreme Oligarchs, though the ideal of Theramanese was not theirs, were ready in the first instance to act in concert with the moderate party for the purpose of upsetting the democracy. The soul of the plot was Antiphon of Rammness, an eloquent orator and advocate who had made his mark in the days of Cleon. He was unpopular on account of his undisguised Oligarchical views. The historian Thucydides describes him as A man who in virtue fell short of none of his contemporaries, and by virtue is meant disinterested and able devotion to his party. Other active conspirators were Pyshanda, who had been in old days a partisan of Cleon, and Frenicus, who was one of the commanders of the fleet stationed at Samos. The prospects of the movement were good. It was favoured by the Probuli and by most of the officers of the fleet. Moreover, the Athenians, as they had shown already by the appointment of the Probuli, were in a temper with the fear of Persia before their eyes to sacrifice their constitution if such a sacrifice would save the city. Alcibiades had entered into negotiations with the officers at Samos, promising to secure an alliance with Tithiphanes, but representing the abolition of democracy as a necessary condition. Most of the Oligarchical conspirators were pleased with the scheme, and even the army was seduced by the idea of receiving pay from the Great King. Some indeed of the more sagacious thought they saw through the designs of Alcibiades, and Frenicus, who aspired himself to be the leader of the revolution, detected a rival and tried by various intrigues to thwart him. Alcibiades was certainly no friend of Oligarchy, but it was his policy in any case to upset the existing democracy, which would never recall him. If an Oligarchy were established, he might intervene to restore the democracy, and in return for such a service all would be forgiven, but he would have to be guided by events. Paisanda was sent to Athens to prepare the way for the return of Alcibiades and a modification of the democracy. The people were at first indignant at the proposal to change the constitution and recall the renegade. The Eumolpedae denounced the notion of having any dealings with the profane of the mysteries, but the cogent argument that the safety of Athens depended on separating Persia from the Peloponnesians was that this could be managed only by Alcibiades, and that the great king would not trust Athens so long as she was governed by a popular constitution had its effect. And there was, moreover, powerful but secret influence at work through the Hetarii or political clubs. It was voted that Paisanda and other envoys should be sent to negotiate a treaty with Tysophanes and to arrange matters with Alcibiades. It appeared at once that Alcibiades had promised more than he could perform. There had indeed been a serious rupture between Tysophanes and Sparta. Lycus, a Spartan commissioner who conferred with the Satrap, denounced the terms of the treaties. He pointed out the monstrous consequences of the clause which assigned to the king power over all the countries which his ancestors had held, and this would involve Persian dominion over Thessaly and other lands of northern Greece. On such terms he said we will not have our fleet paid, and he asked for a new treaty. Tysophanes departed in anger, but when it came to a question of union with Athens, Tysophanes showed that he did not wish to break with the Peloponnesians. He proposed impossible conditions to the Athenian envoys and made a new treaty with the Spartans, modifying the clause to which Lycus objected. The territory which the Spartans recognized as Persian was now expressly confined to Asia. But though the reasons for a revolution so far as they concerned Tysophanes and Alcibiades seemed thus to be removed, the preparations had advanced so far that the result of the mission of Pysander produced no effect on the course of events. The inverters did not scruple to use menaces and even violence. Androcles, a strong democrat who had been prominent in procuring the condemnation of Alcibiades, was murdered. Some others of less note were made away with in like manner, and there was a general feeling of fear and mistrust in the city. But there was a widespread conviction that the existence of Athens was at stake and that some change in the constitution was inevitable. The news that Abidus and Lampsakus had revolted may have hastened the final act. The revolution was peaceably affected through the cooperation of the Ten Probuli. A decree was passed that the Probuli and twenty others chosen by the people should form a commission of thirty who should jointly devise proposals for the safety of the state and lay them before the assembly on a fixed day. When the day came the assembly met at the Temple of Poseidon at Cologneus about a mile from the town. After preliminary measures to secure impunity for a proposal involving a subversion of existing laws a radical change was brought forward and carried. The sovereign assembly was to consist in future not of the whole people but of a body of about five thousand, those who were strongest physically and financially. A hundred men were to be chosen ten by each tribe for the purpose of electing and enrolling the five thousand. Pay for almost all public offices was to be abolished. To these revolutionary measures a saving clause was attached. They were to remain in force as long as the war lasts and thus the people was more easily induced to pass them. But this was only preliminary. A constitution had still to be framed. When the five thousand were elected they chose a commission of one hundred men to draw up a constitution. The scheme which they framed is highly remarkable as a criticism on certain defects in the constitution which was now to be overthrown. The body of five thousand were not to act as an assembly there was in fact to be no assembly. The five thousand were to be divided into four parts and each part was to act as council for a year in turn. The council would elect the higher magistrates from its own number. Thus the difficulties of administration which arose in the double system where the council's action was hampered by the assembly would be done away with and the inclusion of the generals and magistrates in the council was a necessary consequence. Under the democracy the holders of office could influence the assembly against the council. Under the new scheme there would be no room for such collisions. One fatal defect in this scheme was the size of the administrative body and if it had been tried we may be sure that it would not have worked but it was never tried. It passed the assembly as a scheme to come into force in the future but in the meantime a further proposal of the hundred commissioners enacted that the state should be administered by a council of four hundred in which each of the ten tribes was to be represented by forty members. It would seem but it is not quite certain that the election of the council was managed in the following way. The assembly which created it chose five men under the title of presidents who were empowered to nominate one hundred councillors and each of these councillors co-opted three others but both the presidents in their nomination and the one hundred councillors in their co-option were limited to a number of candidates who were previously chosen by the tribes. The four hundred were instituted as merely a provisional government but the entire administration was placed in their hands. The management of the finances and the appointment of the magistrates. The five thousand were to meet only when summoned by the four hundred so that the assembly ceased to have any significance and the provisional constitution was an unadulterated oligarchy. The council of four hundred was proclaimed to be a revival of the imaginary constitution of Dracon under which Athens flourished before demagogues led her into evil paths but the whole fabric of Kleisthenes, the ten tribes and the deems was retained. The existing council of five hundred went out of office before the end of the civil year and seven days later the administration of the four hundred began. Throughout these transactions intimidation was freely used by the conspirators and we are told that they went with hidden daggers into the council chamber and forced the five hundred to retire. Thucydides admires the ability of the men who carried out this revolution. An easy thing it certainly was not one hundred years after the fall of the tyrants to destroy the liberties of the Athenian people who were not only a free but during more than one half of this time had been an imperial people. It may be asked why a provisional government was introduced instead of proceeding at once to the establishment of the permanent constitution which the hundred commissioners had framed. Here we touch upon the inwardness of the political situation. The two constitutions betray the double influence at work in the revolution. The establishment of the four hundred was a concession made to antiphon and the oligarchs by their amenities and the moderates who regarded it as only preliminary while the oligarchs hoped to render it permanent. End of part seven Part eight Fall of the four hundred The polity The democracy restored and once the four hundred governed the city with a high hand and then they were overthrown. Their success had been largely due to the absence of so many of the most democratic citizens in the fleet at Samos and it was through the attitude of the fleet that their fall was brought about. The sailors rose against the oligarchic officers and the oligarchs of Samos who were conspiring against the popular party and had murdered the exile hyperbolas. The chief leaders of this reaction were Thracibulus and Thracilus who persuaded the soldiers and sailors to proclaim formally their adhesion to the democracy and their hostility to the four hundred. The assembly which had been abolished at Athens was called into being at Samos and the army representing the Athenian people deposed the generals and elected others. The Athenians at Samos felt that they were in as good a position as the Athenians at Athens and they hoped still to obtain the alliance of Persia through the good offices of Elcibiades whose recall and pardon were formally voted. Thracibulus fetched Elcibiades to Samos and he was elected a general. The hoped-for alliance with Persia was not effected but it was at least something that Tisophanes did not use the large Phoenician fleet which he had at Aspendus against the Athenians and that his relations with the Peloponnesians were becoming daily worse. He went to Aspendus but he never brought the ships and it was a matter of speculation what the object of his journey was. Thucydides records his own belief that Tisophanes wanted to wear out and to neutralize the Hellenic forces. His object was to damage them both while he was losing time in going to Aspendus and to paralyze their action and not strengthen either of them by his alliance. For if he had chosen to finish the war finished it might have been once for all as anyone may see. The Athenians at Samos now proposed to sail straight to Athens and destroy the 400. The proposal shows how much the fleet despised the Peloponnesian navy which under its incompetent admiral, Asteacus had been spending the summer in doing nothing. But to leave Samos would have been madness and Alcibiades saved them from the blunder of sacrificing Iona and the Hellespont. Negotiations were begun with the oligarchs at Athens and Alcibiades expressed himself satisfied with the assembly of 5000 but insisted that the 400 should be abolished. As a matter of fact the overtures from Samos were welcomed to the majority of the 400 who were dissatisfied with their colleagues and their own position. The nature of an oligarchy which supplants a democracy was beginning to show itself. The instant an oligarchy is established says Thucydides the promoters of it disdain mere equality and everybody thinks that he ought to be far above everybody else. Whereas in a democracy when an election is made a man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not been competing with his equals. Moreover the 400 were at first professedly established as merely a temporary government preliminary to the establishment of a polity which would be less an oligarchy than a qualified democracy. Such a polity was the ideal of Theramanes and he was impatient to constitute it. Thus there was a cleavage in the 400 the extreme oligarchs on one side led by Antiphon and Frenicus the moderate reformers on the other led by Theramanes. While the moderates had the support of the army at Samos behind them the extreme party looked to the enemy for support and sent envoys to Sparta for the purpose of concluding a peace. In the meantime they fortified Aetionia the mole which formed the northern side of the entrance to the great harbour of Piraeus. The object was to command the entrance to be able either to admit the Lacedimonians or to exclude the fleet of Samos. When the envoys returned from Sparta without having made terms and when the Peloponnesian squadron was seen in the Saronic Gulf the movement against the oligarchs took shape. Frenicus was slain by foreign assassins in the marketplace. The soldiers who were employed in building the fort at Aetionia were instigated by Theramanes to declare against the oligarchy and after a great tumult at the Piraeus the walls of the fort were pulled down to the cry of whoever wishes the five thousand and not the four hundred to rule let him come and help. Nobody in the crowd really knew whether the five thousand existed as an actually constituted body or not. When the fort was demolished an assembly was held in the theatre on the slope of Municchia the agitation subsided and the peaceable negotiations with the four hundred ensued. A day was fixed for an assembly in the theatre of Dionysus to discuss a settlement on the basis of the constitution of the five thousand but on the very day just as the assembly was about to meet the appearance of a Lacedimonian squadron which had been hovering about off the coast of Salamis produced a temporary panic and a general rush to the Piraeus. It was only a fright so far as the Piraeus was concerned but there were other serious dangers ahead as everyone saw. The safety of Euboea was threatened and the Athenians depended entirely on Euboea now that they had lost Attica. The Lacedimonian fleet, forty-two ships under Agisandridus doubled Sunium and sailed into Oropus. The Athenians sent thirty-six ships under Thimocheres to Eretria where they were forced to fight at once and were utterly defeated. All Euboea then revolted except Aureus in the north which was a settlement of Athenian clerics. At no moment perhaps since the Persian War was the situation at Athens so alarming. She had no reserve of ships. The army at Samos was hostile. Euboea from which she derived her supplies was lost and there was feud and sedition in the city. It was a moment which might have inspired the Lacedimonians to operate with a little vigor both by land and sea. Athens could not have resisted a combined attack of Agis from Decalia and Agisandridus at the Piraeus. But the Lacedimonians were, as Thucydides observes, very convenient enemies and they let the opportunity slip. The battle of Eretria struck however the hour of doom for the oligarchs. An assembly in the Pnyx deposed the 400 and voted that the government should be placed in the hands of a body consisting of all those who could furnish themselves with arms. Which body should be called the 5000? Legislators or nomothetai were appointed to draw up the details of the constitution and all pay for offices was abolished. Most of the oligarchs escaped to Decalia and one of them betrayed the fort of Enoi on the frontier of Biosia to the enemy. Two, Antiphon and Archiptolemus were executed. The chief promoter of the new constitution was Theramanes. It was a constitution such as he had conceived from the beginning, though apparently not actually the same as that which had been proposed by the hundred commissioners. Thucydides praises it as a constitution in which the rule of the many and the rule of the few were fairly tempered. It was the realisation of the ultimate intentions of most of those who had promoted the original resolution. It is certain that Theramanes from the very beginning desired to organise a polity with democracy and oligarchy duly mixed. His acquiescence in a temporary oligarchy was a mere matter of necessity and the nickname of Cothornus, the loose baskin that fits either foot, given to him by the oligarchs, was not deserved. In the meantime the supine Spartan admiral Astiocus had been superseded by Mindaurus and the Peloponnesian fleet, invited by Farnabasus, sailed for the helispont. The Athenian fleet under Thracibulus and Thracilus followed and forced them to fight in the straits. The Athenians, with seventy-six ships, were extended along the shore of the Chersones and the object of the Peloponnesians who had ten more ships was to outflank and so prevent the enemy from sailing out of the straits and at the same time to press their centre in upon the land. The Athenians, to thwart this intention, extended their own right wing and in doing so weakened the whole line. The Peloponnesians were victorious on the centre but Thracibulus, who was on the right wing, took advantage of their disorder in the moment of victory and threw them into panic. The engagement on the Athenian left was round the Cape of Kinosema out of sight of the rest of the battle and resulted after hard fighting in the repulse of the Peloponnesians. This victory heartened the Athenians. It was followed immediately by the recovery of Kitsikus which had revolted. Mindaurus had to send for the squadron which lay in the waters of Euboea but only a remnant reached him. The rest of the ships were lost in a storm off Mount Athos. Another Athenian success at Abidus closed the military operations of the year but owing to lack of funds the fleet had to disperse for the winter. Tisophenes was ill-satisfied with the success of Athens and when Alcibiades paid him a visit at Sardis during the winter he arrested him but Alcibiades made his escape. The Peloponnesians were now vigorously supported by Pharnabadsus who was a far more valuable and trustworthy ally than Tisophenes. In the spring Mindaurus laid siege to Kitsikus and the satraps supported him with an army. The Athenian fleet of 86 ships succeeded in passing the helispont unseen and in three divisions under Alcibiades, Theramanes and Thrasybulus took Mindaurus by surprise. After a hard-fought battle both by land and sea the Athenians were entirely victorious. Mindaurus was slain and about 60 triremes were taken or sunk. This annihilated the Peloponnesian navy. A laconic dispatch announcing the defeat to the Spartan ethos was intercepted by the Athenians. Our success is over. Mindaurus is slain. The men are starving. Sparta immediately made proposals of peace to Athens on the basis of the status quo. It would have been wise of Athens to accept the offer and obtain relief from the pressure of the garrison at Decalea. But there is no doubt that the feeling in the navy was entirely against the peace which did not include the restoration of the power of Athens in the Aegean and Asia Minor and the victory of Kitsikus seemed to assure the promise of its speedy recovery notwithstanding the purse of Phanabadzus. The Spartan overtures were rejected. The victory of Kitsikus led to a restoration of the unity of the Athenian state which for a year had been divided into two parts centered in Athens and Samos. The Democratic Party at Athens encouraged by the success of the thoroughly Democratic navy were able to upset the polity of their amenities and to restore the democracy with the unlimited franchise and the kleisthenic council of 500. The most prominent of the leaders of this movement was Cleophon the liar-maker, a man of the same class as Hyperbulus and Cleon and endowed with the same order of talent. Like Cleon he was a strong imperialist and he was now the mouthpiece of the prevailing sentiment for war. His financial ability seems to have been no less remarkable than that of Cleon. The remuneration of offices which was an essential part of the Athenian democracy was revived as a matter of course, but Cleophon instituted a new payment for which his name was best remembered by posterity. This was the two obol payment. Though we know that it was introduced by Cleophon it is not recorded for what purpose it was paid or who received it. Some have supposed that it was simply the wage of the judges that the old fee of three obols was revived in the reduced form of two obols. But this can hardly be the case. The two obol payment is mentioned in a manner which implies that it was something completely novel. The probability is that it was a disbursement intended to relieve the terrible pressure of the protracted war upon the poor citizens whose means of livelihood was reduced or cut off by the presence of the enemy in Attica. And we may guess that the pension of two obols a day to all who were not in the receipt of other public money for their services in the field, on shipboard or in the law courts. To give employment to the indigent by public works was another part of the policy of Cleophon who herein followed the example of Pericles. In the first years of this statesman's influence the building of a new temple of Athena on the Acropolis probably begun after the peace of Nicaea but abandoned during the Sicilian expedition was continued. It was close to the north cliff on the site of the royal palace of Mycenaean days and seems to have been designed to replace the oldest temple of Athena which held the ancient wooden statue of the goddess. This new temple Athena shared with Eric Theos and though less magnificent than the Parthenon it was the true centre of the city's worship of her patron goddess. Detailed accounts of the money paid to the craftsmen citizens, metics and slaves who worked on the building and its sculptures have survived and it is interesting to find that the sculptors of the panels of the frieze were paid at standard peace rates. That this graceful ionic temple with the porch of the maidens should be completed in years of sore need is a striking tribute to Athenian resilience and in this new confidence the old system of tribute was restored. The years following the rejection of the Spartan overtures were marked by operations in the Propontis and its neighbourhood. The Athenians under the able and strenuous leadership of Elcibiades slowly gained ground. Thassos and Selimbria were won back. At Chrysopolis a toll station was established at which ships coming from the Eucsene had to pay one tenth of the value of their freight. Then Calcedon was besieged and made tributary and finally Byzantium was starved into capitulation so that Athens once more completely commanded the Bosphorus. Meanwhile Phanabazus had made an arrangement to conduct Athenian envoys to Sousa for the purpose of coming to Thames with the great king. Nearer home Athens lost Nicaea to the Megarians and Pylos was at length recovered by Sparta. As the distinctive feature of the last eight years of the Peloponnesian War was the combination between Persia and Sparta, we may divide this period into three parts according to the nature of the Persian cooperation. During the first two years it is the satrap Tisophanes who supports the Peloponnesian operations and Athens loses nearly all Ionia. Then the satrap Phanabazus takes the place of Tisophanes as the active ally of the Peloponnesians. The military operations are chiefly in the Hellespont and Athens gradually recovers many of her losses. But the affairs of the west had begun to engage the attention of the great king Darius who, aware that the jealousy of the two satraps hinders an effective policy, sends down his younger son Cyrus to take the place of Tisophanes at Sardis with jurisdiction over Cappadocia, Frigia and Lydia. The government of Tisophanes is confined to Caria. The arrival of Cyrus on the scene marks a new turning point in the progress of the war. It was a strange sight to see the common enemy of Hellas ranged along with the victors of Platia against the victors of Salamis. It was a shock to men of Panhellenic feeling and it was fitting that at the great Panhellenic gathering at Olympia a voice of protest should be raised. Men of western Hellas beyond the sea could look with a calmer view on the politics of the east and it was a man of western Hellas, the Leontyne Gurgas himself who lifted up an eloquent voice against the wooing of Persian favour by Greek states. Rather, he said, go to war against Persia. End of Part 8 A history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great. Volume 2, Part 9 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For further information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org A History of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great. Volume 2 by John Bagnall Bury Part 9 Downfall of the Athenian Empire Prince Cyrus was zealous, but his zeal to intervene actively and furnish pay to the Peloponnesian semen might have been of little use. Were it not for the simultaneous appointment of a new Spartan admiral who possessed distinguished ability and inordinate ambition. This was Lysander who was destined to bring the long war to its close. He gained the confidence of his semen by his care for their interests and he won much influence over Cyrus by being absolutely proof against the temptation of bribes a quality at which an oriental greatly marveled. In prosecuting the aims of his ambition Lysander was perfectly unscrupulous and he was a skillful diplomatist as well as an able general. While Cyrus and Lysander were negotiating Alcibiades after an exile of eight years had returned to his native city. He had been elected strategos and had received an enthusiastic welcome. Time had in some measure dulled the sense of the terrible injuries which he had inflicted on his country and his share in the recent recovery of the Hellespontine cities had partly at least atoned. But it was rather hope for future benefits than forgiveness for past wrongs that moved the Athenians to let bygones be bygones. They trusted in his capacity as a general and they thought that by his diplomatic skill they might still be able to come to terms with Persia. So a decree was passed giving him full powers for the conduct of the war and he was solemnly freed from the curse which rested upon him as profaner of the Eleusinian rites. He had an opportunity of making his peace with the divinities of Eleusis ever since the occupation of Dekalia which he had done so much to bring about the annual procession from Athens along the sacred way to the Eleusinian shrine had been suspended and the mystic Iacus had been conveyed by sea. Under the auspices of Alcibiades who protected the procession by an escort of troops the solemnity was once more celebrated in the usual way. It is possible that if he had been bold enough to seize the opportunity of this tide of popularity he might have established a tyranny at Athens but he probably thought that such a venture would hardly be safe until he achieved further military or diplomatic successes. The opportunity was lost and did not recur. A slight incident completely changed the current of feeling in Athens an Athenian fleet was at Notion keeping guard on Ephesus and Lysander succeeded in defeating it and capturing fifteen ships. Though Alcibiades was not present at the battle he was responsible and lost his prestige at Athens where the tidings of a decisive victory was confidently expected. New generals were appointed immediately and Alcibiades withdrew to a castle on the Hellespont which he had provided for himself as a refuge in case of need. Conan succeeded him in chief command of the navy. The Peloponnesians during the following winter organised a fleet of greater strength than they had had for many years 140 ships. But Lysander had to make place for a new admiral, Callicratidas. The Peloponnesians at first carried all before them. The fort of Delphinian in Chios and the town of Methymna in Lesbos were taken. Conan, who had only 70 ships was forced into a battle outside Metellini and lost 30 triremes in the action. The remainder were blockaded in the harbour of Metellini. The situation was critical and Athens did not underrate the danger. The gold and silver dedications in the temples of the Acropolis were melted to defray the costs of a new armament. Freedom was promised to slaves, citizenship to resident aliens for their services in the emergency and at the end of a month Athens and her allies sent a fleet of 150 triremes to leave Metellini. Callicratidas, who had now 170 ships, left 50 to maintain the blockade and sailed with the rest to meet the foe. A great battle was fought near the islets of the Arginusai, south of Lesbos and the Athenians were victorious. 70 Spartan ships were sunk or taken and Callicratidas was slain. An untimely north wind hindered the victors from rescuing the crews from the wrecked ships as well as from sailing to Metellini to destroy the rest of the hostile fleet. The success had not been won without a certain sacrifice 25 ships had been lost with their crews. It was believed that many of the men floating about on the wreckage might have been saved if the officers had taken proper measures. The commanders were blamed. The matter was taken up by politicians at Athens. The generals were suspended and summoned to render an account of their conduct. They shifted the blame on the triarchs and the triarchs, one of whom was Theramanes, in order to shield themselves accused the generals of not having issued the orders for rescue until the high wind made the execution impossible. We are not in a position to judge the question for the decision must entirely depend on the details of the situation and as to the details we have no certainty. It is not clear, for instance, whether the storm was sufficiently violent to prevent any attempt at a rescue. The presumption is, however, that the Athenian people were right in the conviction that there had been criminal negligence somewhere and the natural emotion of indignation which they felt betrayed them into committing a crime themselves. The question was judged by the assembly and not by the ordinary courts. Two sittings were held and the eight generals who had been present at Arginusai were condemned to death and confiscation of property. Six including Thracilus and Pericles, son of the great statesman, were executed. The other two had prudently kept out of the way. Whatever were the rights of the case, the penalty was unduly severe, but the worst feature of the proceedings was that the assembly violated a recognized usage of the city by pronouncing sentence on all the accused together instead of judging the case of each separately. Formally illegal, indeed it was not, for the supporters of the generals had not the courage to apply the Grafe Paranomen. Protests had no effect on the excited multitude thirsty for vengeance. It was an interesting incident that the philosopher Socrates, who happened on the fatal day to be one of the Pritonais, objected to putting the motion. All constitutions, democracy, like oligarchy and monarchy, have their own dangers and injustices. This episode illustrates the gravest kind of injustice, which a primary assembly swayed by a sudden current of violent feeling and unchecked by any responsibility sometimes commits and repents. The victory of Arginus I restored to the Athenians the command of the Eastern Aegean, and induced Acidimonians to repeat the same propositions of peace which they had made four years ago after the battle of Chisicus. Namely, that Decalia should be evacuated, and that otherwise each party should remain just as it was. Through the influence of the demagogue Cleophon, who is said to have come into the assembly drunk, the offer was rejected. Nothing was left for the Spartans but to reorganize their fleet. Etonicus had gathered together the remnants of the ships and gone to Chios, but he was unable to pay the seamen who were forced to work as laborers on the fields of Chian farmers. In the winter this means of support failed, and threatened by starvation they formed a conspiracy to pillage the town of Chios. The conspirators agreed to carry a reed-stick in order to recognize one another. Etonicus discovered the plot but there were so many reed-bearers that he shrank from an open conflict and devised a stratagem. Walking through the streets of Chios attended by fifteen armed men he met a man who suffered from ophthalmia coming out of a surgeon's house, and seeing that he had a reed-stick ordered him to be put to death. A crowd gathered and demanded why the man was put to death. The reply was because he had a reed-stick. When the news spread every reed-bearer was so frightened that he threw his reed away. The Chians then consented to supply a month's pay for the men who were immediately embarked. This incident shows that money had ceased to flow in from Persia. It was generally felt that if further Persian cooperation was to be secured and the Peloponnesian cause to be restored, the command of the fleet must again be entrusted to Lysander. But there was a law at Sparta that no man could be Navarque at the time. On this occasion the law was evaded by sending Lysander out as secretary but on the understanding that the actual command lay with him and not with the nominal admiral. Lysander visited Cyrus at Sardis, asserted his old influence over him and obtained the money he required. With the help of organised parties in the various cities he soon fitted out a fleet. An unlooked-for event gave him still greater power and prestige. King Darius was very ill, his death was expected and Cyrus was called to his bedside. During his absence Cyrus entrusted to his friend Lysander the administration of his satrapy and the tribute. He knew that money was no temptation to this exceptional Spartan and he feared to trust such power to a Persian noble. With these resources behind him Lysander speedily proved his ability. After Tethysus by the Athenian fleet under Conon he declined battle. Then when the enemy had dispersed he sailed forth first to Rhodes and then across the Aegean to the coast of Attica where he had a consultation with Agis. Recrossing the Aegean he made for the Helispont and laid siege to Lampsacus. The Athenian fleet of 180 ships reunited and followed him thither. Lampsacus had been taken and besieged Sestos but they determined now to force him to accept the battle which he had refused at Ephesus and with this view proceeded along the coast till they reached Aegospotomy, Goats rivers an open beach without Harbridge over against Lampsacus. It was a bad position as all the provisions had to be fetched from Sestos at a distance of about two miles while the Peloponnesian fleet was in an excellent harbour and supplied town behind. Sailing across the strait the Athenians found the enemy drawn up for battle but under orders not to move until they were attacked and in such a strong position that an attack would have been unwise. They were obliged to return to Aegospotomy. For four days the same thing befell. Each day the Athenian fleet sailed across the strait and endeavoured to lure Lysander into an engagement. Each day its efforts were fruitless. From his castle in the neighbourhood Alcibiades described the dangerous position of the Athenians and riding over to Aegospotomy earnestly counselled the generals to move to Sestos. His sound advice was received with coldness, perhaps with insult. When the fleet returned from its daily cruise to Lampsacus the seamen used to disembark and scatter on the shore. This day Lysander sent scout ships which, as soon as the Athenian crews had gone ashore for their meal were to flash a bright shield as a signal. When the signal was given the whole Peloponnesian squadron consisting of about 200 galleys rode rapidly across the strait and found the Athenian fleet defenseless. There was no battle no resistance. Twenty ships which were in a condition to fight escaped. One hundred and sixty were captured at once. It was generally believed that there was treachery among the generals and it is possible that Adamantis who was taken prisoner and spared had been bribed by Lysander. All the Athenians who were taken to the number of three or four thousand were put to death. The chief commander, Conan who was not among the unready succeeded in getting away. Greek ships usually unship their sails when they prepared for a naval battle and the sails of the Peloponnesian triremes had been deposited at Cape Abarnis near Lampsakas. In form of this Conan boldly shot across to Abarnis seized the sails and so deprived Lysander of the power of an effective pursuit. It would have been madness for the responsible commander to return to Athens with the tidings of such a terrible disaster and Conan sending home twelve of the twenty triremes which had escaped sailed himself with the rest to the protection of Evagoras, the king of Salamis in Cyprus. Never was a decisive victory gained with such small sacrifice as that which Lysander gained at Aegospotomy. The tidings of ruin reached the Pyreos at night and on that night not a man slept. The city remembered the cruel measure which it had once and again as Tamilos and Schione and shattered at the thought that even such measure might now be meted out to itself. It was hard for the Athenians to realize that at one blow their sea power was annihilated and they had now to make preparations for sustaining a siege. But the blockade was deferred by the policy of Lysander. He did not intend to attack Athens but to starve it into surrender and with this view he drove all the Athenian clerics found in the islands to Athens in order to swell the starving population. Having completed the subjugation of the Athenian Empire in the Helispont and Thrace and ordered affairs in those regions Lysander sailed at length into the Saronic Gulf with a hundred and fifty ships, occupied Aegina and blockaded the Pyreos. At the same time the Spartan king Pausanias entered Attica and joining forces with Agis in the Akkadim, west of the city. But the walls were too strong to attack and at the beginning of winter the army withdrew while the fleet remained near the Pyreos. As provisions began to fail the Athenians made a proposal of peace offering to resign their empire and become allies of Lassidemen. The envoys were turned back at Silesia. They would not be received by the Ephers unless they brought more acceptable terms and it was intimated that the demolition of the long walls for a length of ten states was an indispensable condition of peace. It was folly to resist yet the Athenians resisted. The demagogue Cleophon who had twice hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honour. First after Kizicus then after Arginusai now hindered it again when it could be made only with humiliation. An absurd decree was passed that no one should ever propose to accept such terms but the danger was that such obstinacy would drive the enemy into insisting on an unconditional surrender for the situation was hopeless. Theramanese undertook to visit Lysander and endeavour to obtain more favourable conditions or at all events to discover how matters lay. His real object was to gain time and let the people come to their senses. He remained three months with Lysander and when he returned to Athens he found the citizens prepared to submit on any terms whatever. People were dying of famine and the reaction of feeling had been marked by the execution of Cleophon who was condemned on the charge of evading military service. Theramanese was sent to Sparta with full powers. It is interesting to find that during these anxious months a decree was calling to Athens an illustrious citizen who had been found wanting as a general but whose genius was to make immortal the war now drawing to its close the historian Thucydides. An assembly of the Peloponnesian allies was called together at Sparta to determine how they should deal with the fallen foe. The general sentiment was that no mercy should be shown that Athens should be utterly destroyed and the whole people sold into slavery. But Sparta never felt the same bitterness towards Athens as that which animated Corinth and Thebes. She was neither a neighbour nor a commercial rival. The destruction of Athens might have been politically profitable but Sparta with all her faults could on occasion rise to noble views. She resolutely rejected the barbarous proposal of the Confederacy. She would not blot out a Greek city to search noble services to Greece against the Persian invader. That was more than two generations ago. But it was not to be forgotten Athens was saved by her past. The terms of the peace were the long walls and fortifications of the Piraeus were to be destroyed. The Athenians lost all their foreign possessions but remained independent, confined to Attica and Salamis. Their whole fleet, with the exception of the Tyremes, was forfeited. All exiles were allowed to return. Athens became the ally of Sparta, pledged to follow her leadership. When the terms were ratified Lysander sailed into the Piraeus. The demolition of the long walls immediately began. The Athenians and their conquerors together pulled them down to the music of flute players and the jubilant allies thought that freedom had at length dawned for the Greeks. Lysander permitted Athens to retain twelve Tyremes and having inaugurated the destruction of the fortifications sailed off to reduce Salamis. It is not to be supposed that all Athenians were dejected and wretched at the terrible humiliation which had befallen their native city. There were numerous exiles who owed their return to her calamity and the extreme oligarchic party rejoiced in the foreign occupation regarding it as an opportunity for the subversion of the democracy and the re-establishment of a constitution like that which had been tried after the Sicilian expedition. Tyremenes looked forward to making a new attempt to introduce his favorite polity. Of the exiles the most prominent and determined was Cretias son of Calaisgrus and a member of the same family as the law-giver Solon. He was a man of many parts, a pupil of Cretias and a companion of Socrates, an orator, a poet and a philosopher. Combination was formed between the exiles and the home oligarchs. A common plan of action was organized and the chief democratic leaders were presently seized and imprisoned. The intervention of Lysander was then invoked for the establishing of a new constitution and awed by his presence the assembly past a measure proposed by Dracontides that a body of 30 should be nominated for the purpose of drawing up laws and managing public affairs until the code should be completed. The oligarchs did not take the trouble to repeal the law which would expose the proposer of the measure to prosecution by the Grafi Paranomon. They felt sure of their power. Cretias, Tyremenes and Dracontides were among the 30 who were appointed. The ruin of the power of Athens had fallen out to the advantage of the oligarchical party and it has even been suspected that the oligarchs had for many years passed deliberately planned to place the city at the mercy of the enemy for the ulterior purpose of destroying the democracy. The part played by Tyremenes in the condemnation of the generals who had the indiscretion to win Arginusai the parts he subsequently played in negotiating the peace and in establishing the oligarchy the serious suspicions of treachery in connection with the disaster of Aegospotomy have especially suggested this conjecture. The attempt of the 400 on a previous occasion to come to terms with Sparta may be taken into account and the comparatively lenient terms imposed on Athens might seem to point in the same direction. One thing seems certain the oligarchic party had been distinctly aiming at peace and the repeated opposition of Cleophon in politic as we have seen indicates that he suspected oligarchical designs. It must also be admitted that the conduct of the Athenians in fixing their station at Aegospotomy and delivering themselves to the foe like sheep led to the altar argues a measure of folly which seems almost incredible if there were not treachery behind and the suspicion is confirmed by the clemency shown to Adimantus. It must however be acknowledged that it is hard to understand how the treason could have been effectually carried out without the connivance of Conon the commander-in-chief yet no suspicion seems to have been attached to him. The whole problem of the oligarchic intrigues of the last eight years of the war remains wrapped in far greater mystery than the mutilation of the Hermae. End of Part 9 Chapter 11 Part 10 of A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 2 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Graham Redman A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 2 by John Bagnell Bury Chapter 11 Part 10 Rule of the Thirty and Restoration of the Democracy The purpose for which the Thirty had been appointed was to frame a new constitution. Their powers as a governing body were only to last until they had completed their legislative work. The more part of them, however, with Cretias, who was the master-spirit had no serious thoughts of constructing a constitution. They regarded this as merely a pretext for getting into power and their only object was to retain the power in their own hands, establishing a simple oligarchy. In this, however, they were not absolutely unanimous. One of them, at least, the Ramanese, had no taste for pure oligarchy but was still genuinely intent on framing a polity tempered of both oligarchic and democratic elements. This dissension in the views of the two ablest men, Cretias and the Ramanese, soon led to fatal disunion. The first measures of the Thirty were, however, carried out with cordial unanimity. A council of five hundred, consisting of strong supporters of oligarchy, was appointed and invested with the judicial functions which had before belonged to the people. A body of eleven under the command of Ceteris, a violent, unscrupulous man, was appointed for police duties and the guard of the Piraeus was committed to a body of ten. The chief Democrats who, on the fall of Athens, had opposed the establishment of an oligarchy were then seized, tried by the council and condemned to death for conspiracy. So far there was unanimity. But at this point the Ramanese would have stopped. At such times, moderate councils have small chance of winning ranged beside the extreme policies of resolute men like Cretias who had come back in a bitter and revengeful spirit against democracy, relentlessly resolved to exercise an absolute despotism and expunge all elements of popular opposition. A polity on the broad basis which the Ramanese desired was as obnoxious to Cretias as the old democracy into which he was convinced it would soon deviate. He and his colleagues were therefore afraid of all prominent citizens of moderate views, whether Democratic or oligarchic, who were awaiting with impatience the constitution which the 30 had been appointed to prepare, the men on whom the polity of the Ramanese, if it came into existence, would mainly rest. The 30 had announced as part of their program that they would purge the city of wrongdoers. They put to death a number of men of bad character, including some notorious informers. But they presently proceeded to execute with or without trial not only prominent Democrats, but also men of oligarchical views, who though unfriendly to democracy were also unfriendly to injustice and illegality. Among the latter victims was Niceratus, the son of Nicias. To the motives of fear and revenge was soon added the appetite for plunder, and some men were executed because they were rich, while many fled happy to escape with their lives. Even medics, who had little to do with politics, were spoiled. Thus the speechwriter Licias and his brother Polymarcus, who kept a lucrative manufactory of shields, were arrested, and while Licias succeeded in making his escape, Polymarcus was put to death. And while many Athenians were removed by hemlock, or driven into banishment, others were required to assist in the revolting service of arresting fellow-citizens in order that they thereby become accomplices in the guilt of the government. Thus the philosopher Socrates and four others were commanded with severe threats to arrest an honest citizen, Leon of Salamis. Socrates refused without hesitation to do the bidding of the tyrants. The others were not so brave. Yet Socrates was not punished for his defiance, and this immunity was perhaps due to some feeling of piety in the heart of Cretias, who had been one of his pupil-companions, a feeling which might be safely indulged, as the philosopher was neither wealthy nor popular. To these judicial murders and this organized system of plundering the remedies was unreservedly opposed. The majority of the council shared his disapprobation, and he would have been able to establish a constitution but for the ability and strength of Cretias. His representations indeed induced the thirty to broaden the basis on which their power rested by creating a body of three thousand citizens who had the privilege of bearing arms at the right of being tried by the council. All outside that body were liable to be condemned to death by sentence of the thirty without a trial. The body of three thousand had practically no political rights and were chosen so far as possible from known partisans of the government the staunchest of whom were the thousand knights. This measure naturally did not satisfy the remedies. His suggestions had, in fact, been used with a purpose very different from his to secure not to alter the government. In the meantime the exiles whom the oligarchy had driven from Athens were not idle. They had found refuge in those neighbouring states, Corinth, Megara and Thebes, which had been bitter foes of Athens but were now undergoing a considerable change of feeling. Disatisfaction with the high-handed proceedings of Sparta who would not give them a share in the spoils of war, had disposed them to look with more favour on their fallen enemy and to feel discussed at the proceedings of the thirty who were under the aegis of Lysander. They were therefore not only ready to grant hospitality to Athenian exiles but to lend some help towards delivering their city from the oppression of the tyrants. The first step was made from Thebes. Thrasybulus and Ornitis with a band of seventy exiles seized the attic fortress of Lysander and the Parnese range close to the B-ocean frontier and put into a state of defence the strong stone walls whose ruins are still there. The thirty led out their forces, their faithful knights and three thousand hoplites and sat down to blockade the stronghold. But a timely snowstorm broke up the blockade. The army retired to Athens and for the next three months further was done against Thrasybulus and the men of Phile. The oligarchs were now in a dangerous position menaced without by an enemy against whom their attack had failed menaced within by a strong opposition. They saw that the influence of the Ramanese who was thoroughly dissatisfied with their policy would be thrown into the scale against them and they resolved to get rid of him. Having posted a number of devoted creatures armed with hidden daggers near the railing of the council house Cretias arose in the assembled council and denounced the Ramanese as a traitor and conspirator against the state a man who could not be trusted an inch in view of those repeated tergeversations which had won him the nickname of the Buskin. The reply of the Ramanese denouncing the impolicy of Cretias and his colleagues is said to have been received with applause by most of the council who really sympathized with him. Cretias seeing that he would be acquitted by the council resorted to an extreme measure. He struck the name of the Ramanese out of the list of the three thousand. Footnote an appearance of legality seems to have been given to this act a law was passed, presumably on the spot, that persons who had opposed the four hundred in four hundred and eleven B.C. or taken part in destroying the fort at Ietiania should be excluded from the constitution. End of footnote and then along with his colleagues condemned him to death since those who were not included in the list could not claim the right of trial. The Ramanese leapt on the sacred hearth and appealed for protection to the council but the council was stupefied with terror and at the command of Cretias the eleven entered and dragged the suppliant from the altar. He was born away to prison the hemlock was immediately administered and when he had drunk he tossed out a drop that remained at the bottom of the cup as banqueters used to do in the game of Kotobos exclaiming this drop for the gentle Cretias. There had perhaps been a dose of truth in the approaches which the gentle Cretias had hurled at him across the floor of the council chamber. The Ramanese may have been shifty and unscrupulous where means and methods were concerned but in his main object he was perfectly sincere. He was sincere in desiring to establish a moderate polity which should unite the merits of monarchy and democracy and avoid their defects. There can be no question that he was honestly interested in trying this political experiment and the very nature of this policy involved an appearance of insincerity and gave rise to suspicion. It led him to oscillate between the democratic and oligarchical parties seeking to gain influence and support in both the ultimate realization of his middle plan and thus the democrats suspected him as an oligarch, the oligarchs distrusted him as a democrat. In judging the Ramanese it seems fair to remember that a politician who in unsettled times desires to direct the state into a middle course between two opposite extremes can hardly avoid oscillation more or less to escape the imputation of the buskin. After the death of the Ramanese the 30 succeeded in disarming by means of a stratagem all the citizens who were not enrolled in the list of the 3000 and expelled them from the city. But with a foe on attic ground growing in numbers every day Cretias and his fellows felt themselves so insecure that they took the step of sending an embassy to Sparta to ask for a Lacedemonian garrison. The request was granted and 700 men under Calibius were introduced into the Acropolis. The 30 would never have resorted to this measure except under the dire pressure of necessity for not only was it unpopular but they had to pay the strangers out of their own chest. It was perhaps in the first days of the month of May that it was resolved to make a second attempt to dislodge the Democrats from Phile. A band of the Knights and the Spartan garrison sallied forth but near Acani they were surprised at night and routed with great loss by Thrasybulus. This incident produced considerable alarm at Athens and the 30 had reason to fear that many of their partisans were wavering. Deciding to secure an eventual place of refuge in case Athens should become untenable they seized Elyusis and put about 300 Elyusinians to death. This measure had hardly been carried out when Thrasybulus descended from Phile and seized the Piraeus. He had now about a thousand men but the Piraeus without fortifications was not an easy place to defend. He drew up his forces on the hill of Munichia occupying the temples of Artemis and the Thracian goddess Bendis which stood at the summit of a steep street. Highest of all stood the darters and slingers ready to shoot over the heads of the hoplites. Thus posted with his prophet by his side Thrasybulus awaited the attack of the 30 who had led down all their forces to the Piraeus. A shower of darts descended on their heads as they mounted the hill and while they wavered for a moment under the missiles the hoplites rushed down on them led by the prophet who had foretold his own death in the battle and was the first to perish. Seventy of the enemy was slain among them Cretias himself. During the truce which was then granted for taking up the dead the citizens on either side held some converse with one another Thrasybulus, the herald of the Eleusinian misty impressive both by his loud voice and by his sacred calling addressed the adherents of the 30. Fellow citizens why seek ye to slay us? Why do ye force us into exile? Us who never did you wrong. We have shared in the same religious rites and festivals We have been your school fellows We have fought with you by land and sea for freedom We adjure you by our common gods abandon the cause of the 30 monsters of impiety who for their own gains have slain in eight months more Athenians than the Peloponnesians slew in a war of ten years believe that we have shed as many tears as you for those who have now fallen this general appeal and individual appeals in the same tone at such an affecting moment must have produced an effect upon the half-hearted soldiers of the 30 who had now lost their able and violent leader there was dissension and discord not only among the 3000 and the council but among the 30 themselves it was felt that the government of the 30 could no longer be maintained and that if the oligarchy was to be rescued a new government must be installed a general meeting of the 3000 deposed the 30 and instituted in their stead a body of 10 one from each tribe one member of the 30 was re-elected as a member of the new government but the rest withdrew to the refuge which they had provided for themselves at Ilyusis the body of 10 represented the views of those who were genuinely devoted to oligarchy but disapproved of the extreme policy of Cretias and his fellows they failed to come to terms with Thracibulus who was every day receiving reinforcements both in men and arms the civil war continued and it soon appeared that it would be impossible for Athens to hold out against the democrats in the Pyreus without foreign aid an embassy was accordingly dispatched by the 10 to Sparta and about the same time the remnant of the 30 at Ilyusis sent a message on their own account for the same purpose both embassies represented the democrats at Pyreus as rebels against the power of Sparta the Lacedemonian government through the influence of Lysander was induced to intervene in the support of the 10 Lysander assembled an army at Ilyusis and 40 ships were sent under Libis to cut off the supplies which the democrats received by sea the outlook was now gloomy for Thracibulus and his company but they were rescued by a disunion within the Lacedemonian state the influence of Lysander which had been for the last years supreme was perceptibly declining the king Porcenius was his declared opponent and many others of the governing class were jealous of his power vexed at his arrogance perhaps suspicious of his designs the oligarchies which he had created at Athens and in the other cities of the Athenian empire had disgraced themselves by misgovernment and bloodshed and the disgrace was reflected upon the fame of their creator Lysander had hardly begun his work when Porcenius persuaded the effers to entrust to himself the commission of restoring tranquility at Athens and Lysander had the humiliation of handing over to his rival the army which he had mustered a defeat convinced Thracibulus that it would be wise to negotiate and on the other hand Porcenius deposed the irreconcilable 10 and caused it to be replaced by another 10 of more moderate views both parties then the city and the Piraeus alike submitted themselves to Spartan intervention and Sparta under the auspices of king Porcenius acquitted herself uncommonly well a commission of 15 was sent from Lassodiman to assist the king and a reconciliation was brought about the terms were a general and mutual pardon all past acts from which were accepted only the 30 the 10 who had held the Piraeus under the 30 the 11 who had carried out the judicial murders perpetrated by the 30 and the 10 who had succeeded the 30 all these accepted persons were required to give an account of their acts if they wished to remain at Athens Ilyusus was to form an independent state the Athenian who chose might migrate to Ilyusus within a specified time the evil dream of Athens was at last over a year and a half of oligarchical tyranny and foreign soldiery on the Acropolis she owed her deliverance to the energy of Thracibulus and the discretion of Porcenius Porcenius displayed his discretion further by not meddling with the reconciled authorities in their settlement of the constitution it was decreed on the motion of Tessaminus that law givers should be appointed to revise the constitution and that in the meantime the state should be administered according to the laws of Solon and the institutions of Draken the union of the two names is significant of the conciliation provisionally then the franchise was limited to those who belonged to the first three Solonian classes those who could at least serve as hoplites it is noteworthy that there was an idea afloat of making the possession of landed property a qualification for political rights but it was a totally unpractical idea such a test would have excluded rich men it would have included many of the fourth class in the end no new experiment was tried the law givers restored the old democracy with its unlimited franchise and Athens entered upon a new stage of her career the amnesty was faithfully kept the democrats did not revenge themselves on the supporters of the oligarchical tyranny but it was easier to forgive than forget and for many years after the reconciliation a distinction was drawn though not officially in the ordinary intercourse of life between the men of the city and the men of the Piraeus the men who had fought for freedom and those who had fought against it that was almost inevitable and so long as the oligarchs held elusis there might even be some ground for suspecting the loyalty of their old supporters after about two years of independent existence elusis was attacked by Athens the elusinian generals were captured and put to death and the town resumed its old place as part of Attica hence forward for well nigh three generations the Athenian democracy was perfectly secure from the danger or fear of an oligarchical revolution that hideous nightmare of the 30 had established it on a firmer base than ever end of chapter 11 part 10 recording by Graeme Redman chapter 12 part 1 of a history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great volume 2 this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Dick Durrett a history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great volume 2 by John Bagnell Bury chapter 12 part 1 the Spartan supremacy and the Persian war Sparta had achieved the task which he had been pressed to undertake and had undertaken somewhat reluctantly the destruction of the Athenian Empire it was a task which though not imposed by the unanimous voice of Greece appealed to a most deeply seated sentiment of the Greeks their love of political independence the Athenian Empire had been an outrage on that sentiment and apart from all calculations of particular interest the humiliation of the great offender must have been regarded even by those who were not her enemies with an involuntary satisfaction the avowed aim of Sparta throughout has been to restore their liberty to those states which had been enslaved by Athens the liberty of those whom her ambition threatened now that this object was accomplished as fully as could be desired it would have been correct for Sparta to retire into her old position leaving the cities which had belonged to the Athenian Empire to arrange their own affairs if her deeds were to be in accordance with her profession the alternative course for a state in the position of Sparta was to enter frankly upon the Athenian inheritance and pursue the aims and policy of Athens as an imperial power other states might have adopted this course with advantage both to themselves and Greece for Sparta it was impossible and so when Sparta unable from the nature of her institutions and the character of her genius to tread in the footsteps of her fallen rival nevertheless resolved to take under her own dominion the cities which had gone forth to deliver from all dominion she not only cynically set aside her high moral professions but entered on a path of ambition which led to calamity and distress for Greece the main feature of Greek history for the thirty years after Agios Postomy is Sparta's pursuit of a policy of a grand diesman beyond the Peloponnesias the opposition which this policy calls forth leads both to the revival of Athens as a great power and to the rise of Thebes in the end Sparta is forced to retire into the purely Peloponnesian position for which her institutions fitted her in the making of those institutions and activity beyond the Peloponnesias had not been contemplated and they were too rigid to be adapted to the enlarged sphere of an Aegean dominion nothing short of a complete revolution in the Spartan state could have rendered her essay in Empire a success but the narrow Spartan system was too firmly based in the narrow Spartan character to suffer such a revolution we may wonder how far the general who had placed his country in the position of arbitress of Greece appreciated the difficulty of reconciling the political character of Elacidamion with the role of an imperial city unspartan as he was in many respects Lysander had possibly more enlightened views as to the administration of an empire than his countrymen a story is told that when Calibius the Spartan was knocked down by a young athlete whom he had insulted and appealed to Lysander he was told that he did not know how to govern free men to deal with free men abroad was what the average Spartan could not do and it was such men as Calibius that Lysander had to use for the establishment of the empire which he had resolved to found in each of the cities which had passed from Athenian into Spartan control a government of members was set up and its authority was maintained by Elacidamion Hamost with Elacidamion Garrison the cities were thus given over to a twofold oppression the foreign governors were rapacious and were practically free from home control the native oligarchies were generally tyrannical opponents by judicial murders and both dickarts and Hamost played into each other's hands Lysander exercised with a high hand and without farsightedness the dictatorship which was his for the time and might at any hour be taken from him he was solely concerned to impose a firm military despotism on the states which had been rescued from the Athenian Confederacy it is obvious that the Athenian and Spartan empires had little in common they were first of all sharply contrasted through the fact that the Spartan policy was justified by no public object like that to which the Confederacy owed its origin and this contrast was all the more flagrant considering that after the battle Agis Potami there was the same demand for a Pan-Hellenic Confederacy with the object of protecting the Asiatic Greeks from Persia as they had been after the battle of Mycaly but so far from contracting her supremacy with such an object Sparta had abandoned the Asiatic Greeks to the great king of the Athenian help Athens had won her power as a champion of the Eastern Greeks Sparta had secured her supremacy by betraying them in the second place the method of the two states in exercising their power were totally different the grievances against Athens though real were mainly of a sentimental nature the worst Athens had done from Confederate cities of autonomy there were no complaints of tyranny rapine or oppression but under the Lassid demonian supremacy men suffered from positive acts of injustice and violence and might seek in vain at Sparta for redress the spirit of the system which Lysander instituted may be judged from the statement that any Spartan citizen was regarded as law in the subject states the statement comes from a friend of Lassid demonian the position of power which Lysander had attained in the eyes of the world and enjoyed without moderation could not fail to excite jealousy and apprehension at Sparta itself he held a sword of royal court almost and the Samians accorded him divine orders by calling after his name a feast which had hitherto been a feast of Hera he was recalled to Sparta and he obeyed the summons bearing a letter from the setrap from Abbasus to justify him but when it was open instead of being an encomium of the deed of accusation and Lysander was covered with ridicule as the victim of a Persian trick he was permitted to escape from the situation on the plea of visiting the temple of Zeus Ammon in the Libyan Oasis in accordance with a vow but his work remained Lassid demon upheld her uncongenial military capitalism modifying Lysander's system only so far as not to insist on the maintenance of the Dekarches but to permit the cities to substitute other forms of government under the ages of the Hamo financially the empire was so constituted as to secure an income of a thousand talents to meet the expenses of Sparta of her system the receipt of such an income was a political innovation and its administration involved money transactions of a nature and on a scale which would have been severely condemned by Lysergers the admission into the treasury of a large sum of gold and silver which had been brought to Sparta by Lysander was a distinct breach of the Lysergeon discipline thus inflexible as the Spartan system was the necessities of empire compelled it to yield at one point and a point where attack is want to be especially insidious the supremacy of Sparta lasted for a generation though with intervals in which it was not effective and its history for more than half of the world is mainly determined by her relations with Persia as it had been through Persia that she won her supremacy so it was through Persia that she lost it and through Persia that she once more regained it end of chapter 12 part one recording by Dick Tourette and Chester New Hampshire