 Book 6, Part 2 of Plato's Republic. Then shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other? By all means. And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, whom he followed always and in all things. Failing in this he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy. Yes, that was said. Well, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance with present notions of him? Certainly, he said. And have we not a right to say, in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being, that is his nature? He will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on, the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate, until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence, by a sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling, and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth. He will have knowledge, and will live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, till he ceased from his travail. Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him. And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie? He will. And when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads. Impossible. This and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow after. True, he replied. Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnificence, apprehension, memory were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved. We were then led to inquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the point of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher. And we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature. Why so many are spoiled, and so few escape spoiling. I am speaking of those who were said to be useless but not wicked. And when we have done with them, we will speak of the imitators of philosophy. What manner of men are they who aspire after a profession which is above them, and of which they are unworthy? And then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak. What are these corruptions? he said. I will see if I can explain them to you. Everyone will admit that a nature having imperfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher is a rare plant which is seldom seen among men. Rare indeed. And what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures. What causes? In the first place, there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praise worthy qualities, and this is a most singular circumstance. These and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them. That is very singular, he replied. Then there are all the ordinary goods of life, beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the state. You understand the sort of things. These also have a corrupting and distracting effect. I understand, but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them. Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way. You will then have no difficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you. And how am I to do so? he asked. Why? I said. We know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when they fail to meet with proper nutriment, or climate or soil, in proportion to their vigor, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment, for evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not. Very true. There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior because the contrast is greater. Certainly. And may we not say, Adamantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become preeminently bad. Do not great crimes, and the spirit of pure evil, spring out of a fullness of nature, ruined by education, rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil. There I think that you are right. And our philosopher follows the same analogy. He is like a plant, which, having proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue. But if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so often say, that our youths are corrupted by sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all sophists? And do they not educate to perfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own hearts? When is this accomplished? he said. When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled, redoubles the sound of the praise or blame. At such a time, will not a young man's heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private training enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular opinion? Or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have? He will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be. Yes, Socrates, necessity will compel him. And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned. What is that? The gentle force of attainder, or confiscation, or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless. Indeed they do, and in right good earnest. Now, what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest? None, he replied. No, indeed, I said. Even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly. There neither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of character, which has had no other training in virtue, but that which is supplied by public opinion. I speak, my friend, of human virtue only. What is more than human, as the proverb says, is not included. For I would not have you ignorant, that in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good, is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say. I quite assent, he replied. Then let me crave your assent also, to a further observation. What are you going to say? Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists, and whom they deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many. That is to say, the opinions of their assemblies. And this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him. He would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds when another utters them he is soothed or infuriated. And you may suppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become perfect in all this. He calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or art which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he means by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this honourable and that dishonourable, or good and evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces to be that in which the beast delights, and evil to be that which he dislikes. And he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, all the difference between them, which is immense. By heaven would not such a one be a rare educator. And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or finally in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem, or other work of art, or the service which he has done the state, making them his judges when he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of diamede will oblige him to produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous, which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not? No, nor am I likely to hear. You recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty, rather than of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind, rather than of the many in each kind? Certainly not. Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher. Impossible. And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world. They must, and of individuals who can sort with the mob and seek to please them. That is evident. Then do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? And remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence? These were admitted by us to be the true philosophers' gifts. Yes. Will not such and one from his early childhood be in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones? Certainly, he said. And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes. No question. Falling at his feet they will make requests to him and do him honour and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now the power which he will one day possess. That often happens, he said. And what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall, proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of helens and of barbarians, and having got such notions into his head, will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fullness of vain pomp and senseless pride? To be sure he will. Now when he is in this state of mind, if someone gently comes to him and tells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be got by slaving for it, do you think that under such adverse circumstances he will be easily induced to listen? Far otherwise. And even if there be someone who through inherent goodness or natural reasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken captive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they are likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his companionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding to his better nature, and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions? There can be no doubt of it. And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher? Impossible. Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life? We were quite right. Thus my excellent friend is brought about all that ruin and failure which I have been describing of the nature's best adapted to the best of all pursuits. They are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time, this being the class out of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to states and individuals, and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in that direction. But a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or to states. That is most true, he said. And so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage right incomplete, for her own having fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, her unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be her protectors, enter in and dishonour her, and fasten upon her the reproaches which, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some are good for nothing and that the greater number deserves the severest punishment. That is certainly what people say. Yes, and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them, a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles, like prisoners running out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy, those who do so, being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts. For although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not to be found in the arts, and many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts, is not this unavoidable. Yes. Are they not exactly like a ball's little tinker who has just got out of endurance and come into a fortune? He takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate—a most exact parallel. What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard? There can be no question of it. And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is a rank above them, what sorts of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of, or akin to true wisdom? No doubt, he said. Then, adamantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a small remnant. Pachant some noble and well-educated person, detained by exile in her service, who, in the absence of corrupting influences, remains devoted to her, or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contends and neglects, and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts which they justly despise and come to her, or, per adventure, there are some who are restrained by our friend Theagies' bridle, for everything in the life of Theagies conspired to divert him from philosophy, but ill-health kept him away from politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude, and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and be saved. Such a one may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts. He will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither is he able, singly, to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the state or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall, and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and goodwill with bright hopes. Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs. A great work, yes, but not the greatest, unless he finds a state suitable to him. For in a state which is suitable to him he will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country as well as of himself. The causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently explained, the injustice of the charges against her has been shown. Is there anything more which you wish to say? Nothing more on that subject, he replied. End of book six, part two. Book six, part three of Plato's republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Philippa. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joatt. Book six, part three. But I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her. Not any of them, I said, and that is precisely the accusation which I bring against them. Not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and estranged, as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized and is won't to be overpowered and to lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy instead of persisting degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the state that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human. And now I know that you are going to ask what that state is. No, he said, there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question, whether it is the state of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other. Yes, I replied, ours, in most respects. But you may remember my saying before, that some living authority would always be required in the state, having the same idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were laying down the laws. That was said, he replied. Yes, but not in a satisfactory manner, you frightened us by interposing objections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult, and what still remains is the reverse of easy. What is there remaining? The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered, as not to be the ruin of the state, all great attempts are attended with risk, hard is the good, as men say. Still he said, let the point be cleared up, and the inquiry will then be complete. I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power. My zeal you may see for yourselves, and pleased to remark in what I am about to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that states should pursue philosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit. At present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young, beginning when they are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from money-making and housekeeping to such pursuits, and even those of them who are reputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of the great difficulty of the subject, I mean, dialectic, take themselves off. In after life, when invited by some one else, they may perhaps go and hear a lecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by them to be their proper business. At last, when they grow old, in most cases they are extinguished more truly than Heraclitus' son, and as much as they never light up again. Heraclitus said that the son was extinguished every evening, and relighted every morning. But what ought to be their course? Just the opposite. In childhood and youth, their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender years. During this period, while they are growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to their bodies, that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy, as life advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the gymnastics of the soul. But when the strength of our citizens fails, and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious labour, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a similar happiness in another. "'How truly in earnest you are, Socrates,' he said, "'I am sure of that. And yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be convinced, through simicus least of all.' "'Do not make a quarrel,' I said, between through simicus and me, who have recently become friends, although indeed we were never enemies, for I shall go on striving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do something which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence. "'You are speaking of a time which is not very near.' "'Rather,' I replied, "'of a time which is as nothing, in comparison with eternity. "'Nevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe, for they have never seen that of which we are now speaking, realised. They have seen only a conventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being, who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue. Not a man ruling in a city which bears the same image. They have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them. Do you think that they ever did? No indeed. No, my friend. And they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments, such as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power seeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society. "'They are strangers,' he said, to the words of which you speak. And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor states nor individuals will ever attain perfection, until the small class of philosophers, whom we termed useless but not corrupt, are providentially compelled, whether they will or not, to take care of the state, and until alike necessity be laid on the state to obey them, or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings or princes, are divinely inspired with the true love of true philosophy. That either or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm. If they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right? Quite right. If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign climb which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is, or has been, or hereafter shall be, compelled by a superior power to have charge of the state, we are ready to assert to the death that this our constitution has been, and is, yea and will be whenever the muse of philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this, that there is a difficulty we acknowledge ourselves. My opinion agrees with yours, he said. But do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude? I should imagine not, he replied. Oh, my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude. They will change their minds, if, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them and removing their dislike of overeducation, you show them your philosophers as they really are, and describe as you were just now doing their character and profession. And then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not such as they supposed. If they view him in this new light, they will surely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them? Who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that in a few this harsh temper may be found, but not in the majority of mankind. I quite agree with you, he said. And do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in uninvited and are always abusing them and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation? And nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this. It is most unbecoming. For he, adamantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against other men, his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason, these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse? Impossible. And the philosopher holding converse with the divine order becomes orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows, but like everyone else he will suffer from detraction. Of course. And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in states or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, will he think you be an unskillful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue? Anything but unskillful. And if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us when we tell them that no state can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly pattern? They will not be angry if they understand, he said, but how will they draw out the plan of which he was speaking? They will begin by taking the state and the manners of men, from which as from a tablet they will rub out the picture and leave a clean surface. This is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator. They will have nothing to do either with individual or state, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found or themselves made a clean surface. They will be very right, he said. Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the Constitution. No doubt. And when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes upwards and downwards. I mean that they will first look at absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy. And will mingle and temper the various elements of life into the image of a man. And this they will conceive according to that other image which, when existing among men, homer calls the form and likeness of God. Very true, he said. And one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God. Indeed, he said, in no other way could they make a fairer picture. And now, I said, we are beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of Constitutions is such and one as we are praising, at whom they were so very indignant, because to his hands we committed the state. And are they growing a little calmer at what they have just heard? Much calmer, if there is any sense in them. Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being? Why would not be so unreasonable? Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good? Neither can they doubt this. But again will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable circumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have rejected? Surely not. Then will they still be angry at our saying that until philosophers bear rule, states and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our imaginary state ever be realised? I think that they will be less angry. Shall we assume that they are not only less angry, but quite gentle, and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot refuse to come to terms? By all means, he said. Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will anyone deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by nature philosophers? Surely no man, he said. And when they have come into being, will anyone say that they must of necessity be destroyed? That they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us, but that in the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape. Who will venture to affirm this? Who indeed? But, said I, one is enough. Let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous. Yes, one is enough. The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them, certainly. And that others should approve of what we approve is no miracle or impossibility? I think not. But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best. We have. And now we say, not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not impossible. Very good. And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject. But more remains to be discussed, how, and by what studies and pursuits will the saviours of the constitution be created? And at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies? Certainly. I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women and the procreation of children and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect state would be eyed with jealousy, and was difficult of attainment. But that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships nor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment, were to lose their patriotism. He was to be rejected, who failed. But he who always came forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside, and veiled her face, not liking to stir the question which has now arisen. I perfectly remember, he said. Yes, my friend, I said, and then I shrank from hazarding the bold word. But now let me dare to say, that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher. Yes, he said, let that be affirmed. And do not suppose that there will be many of them, for the gifts which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together. They are mostly found in shreds and patches. What do you mean? he said. You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, cleverness, and similar qualities do not often grow together, and that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner. They are driven anyway by their impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them. Very true, he said. On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned. They are always in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil. Quite true. And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary, in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command. Certainly, he said. And will they be a class which is rarely found? Yes, indeed. Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention. He must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or both faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises. Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge? You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts, and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom. Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten I should not deserve to hear more. And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them? To what do you refer? We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way at the end of which they would appear, but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the inquiry was continued in what to me seemed to be a very inaccurate manner, whether you were satisfied or not it is for you to say. Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth. But my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure. For nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further. Not an uncommon case when people are indolent. Yes, I said, and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the state and of the laws. True. The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest knowledge of all, which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling. End of book six, part three. Book six, part four of Plato's Republic. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Anna Simon. The Republic by Plato. Translated by Benjamin Joett. Book six, part four. What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this? Higher than justice and the other virtues? Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues, too, we must behold not the outline merely as at present, nothing short of the most finished picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think the highest truth worthy of attaining the highest accuracy. A right noble thought, but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you what is this highest knowledge? Nay, I said, ask if you will, but I am certain that you have heard the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me, or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome. For you have often been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little, and without which any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any value if we do not possess the good, or the knowledge of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness? Assuredly not. You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge. Yes. And you are aware, too, that the latter cannot explain what they mean by knowledge, but are obliged, after all, to say knowledge of the good. How ridiculous! Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it. For the good they define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they used the term good. This is, of course, ridiculous. Most true, he said. And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity, for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good. Certainly. And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same. True. There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved. There can be none. Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be what is just and honourable without the reality, but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good? The reality is what they seek. In the case of the good, appearance is despised by everyone. Very true, he said. Of this, then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his actions, having a presentment, there is such an end, and yet hesitating, because neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other things, of a principle such and so great as this ought the best man in our state, to whom everything is entrusted to be in the darkness of ignorance. Certainly not, he said. I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them, and I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them. That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours, and if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge, our state will be perfectly ordered. Of course, he replied, but I wish that it would tell me whether you conceive the supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either. I, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these matters. True Socrates, but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others and never telling his own. Well, but has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know? Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty, he has no right to do that, but he may say what he thinks as a matter of opinion. And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind man who feel their way along the road. Very true. And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base when others will tell you of brightness and beauty? Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glockon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal, if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues we shall be satisfied. Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for me. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would faint speak if I could be sure that you wish to hear, otherwise not. By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for the account of the parent. I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay and you receive the account of the parent, and not as now of the offspring only. Take however this letter by way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, though I have no intention of deceiving you. Yes, we will take all the care that we can, proceed. Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the cause of this discussion, and at many other times. What? The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define, for all of them the term many is applied. True, he said, and there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term many is applied there is an absolute, for they may be brought under a single idea which is called the essence of each. Very true. The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen. Exactly. And what is the organ with which we see the visible things? The sight, he said, and with the hearing I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense. True. But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived? No, I never have, he said. Then reflect. Has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in order that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard? Nothing of the sort. No, indeed, I replied, and the same is true of most if not all the other senses. You would not say that any of them require such an addition. Certainly not. But you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing or being seen. How do you mean? Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes and he who has eyes wanting to see, colour being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature specially adapted to the purpose the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colours will be invisible. Of what nature are you speaking? Of that which you term light, I replied. True, he said, noble then is the bond which links together sight and visibility and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature. For light is their bond and light is no ignoble thing. Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble. And which, I said, of the gods in heaven, what you say was the Lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear? You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say? May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows? How? Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun. No, yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun. By far the most like. And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispense from the sun. Exactly. Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognized by sight. True, he said. And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good beget in his own likeness to be in the visible world in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind. Will you be a little more explicit, he said? Why, you know, I said, that the eyes when a person directs them towards objects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly and are nearly blind, they seem to have no clearness of vision in them. Very true. But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them. Certainly. And the soul is like the eye. When resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence. But when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only and goes blinking about and is first of one opinion and then of another and seems to have no intelligence. Just so. Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good and this you will deem to be the cause of science and of truth insofar as the latter becomes the subject of knowledge. Beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge. You will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either. And as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun and yet not to be the sun. So in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good but not the good. The good has a place of honor yet higher. What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth and yet surpasses them in beauty for you surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the good. God forbid, I replied, but may I ask you to consider the image in another point of view? In what point of view? You would say would you not that the sun is not only author of visibility in all visible things but of generation and nourishment and growth though he himself is not generation? Certainly. In like manner, the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to all things known but of their being and essence and yet the good is not essence but far exceeds essence in dignity and power. Glogan said with a ludicrous earnestness, by the light of heaven, how amazing. Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be said down to you, for you made me utter my fancies. And pray continue to utter them at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun. Yes, I said, there is a great deal more. Then omit nothing, however slight. I will do my best, I said, but I should think that a great deal will have to be omitted. I hope not, he said. You have to imagine then that there are two ruling powers and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I'm playing upon the name. May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind? I have. Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts and divide each of them again in the same proportion and suppose the two main divisions to answer one to the visible and the other to the intelligible and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of images and by images I mean in the first place shadows and in the second place reflections in water and in solid smooth and polished bodies and the like. Do you understand? Yes, I understand. Imagine now the other section of which this is only the resemblance to include the animals which we see and everything that grows or is made. Very good. Would you not admit that both the sections of this division have different degrees of truth and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge? Most undoubtedly. Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided. In what manner? Thus, there are two subdivisions in a lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former division as images. The inquiry can only be hypothetical and instead of going upwards to a principle descend to the other end. In the higher of the two the soul passes out of hypotheses and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses making no use of images as in the former case but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves. I do not quite understand your meaning, he said. Then I will try again. You will understand me better when I've made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry arithmetic and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and alike in their several branches of science. These are their hypotheses which they and everybody are supposed to know and therefore they do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others but they begin with them and go on until they arrive at last and in a consistent manner at their conclusion. Yes, he said, I know. And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and reasons about them they are thinking not of these but of the ideals which they resemble not of the figures which they draw but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter and so on. The forms which they draw or make and which have shadows and reflection and water of their own are converted by them into images but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves which can only be seen with the eye of the mind. That is true. And of this kind I spoke at the intelligible although in the search after it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses not ascending to a first principle because she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images they having a relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater distinctness and therefore a higher value. I understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and the sister arts. And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible you will understand me to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic using the hypotheses not as first principles but only as hypotheses. That is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object from ideas through ideas and in ideas she ends. I understand you, he replied. Not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task which is really tremendous but at any rate I understand you to say that knowledge and being which the signs of dialectic contemplates are clearer than the notions of the arts as they are termed which proceed from hypotheses only. These are also contemplated by the understanding and not by the senses. Yet because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them although when a first principle is added to them they are cognisable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason as being intermediate between opinion and reason. You have quite conceived my meaning, I said and now corresponding to these four divisions let there be four faculties in the soul reason answering to the highest understanding to the second faith or conviction to the third and perception of shadows to the last and let there be a scale of them and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth. I understand, he replied and give my assent and accept your arrangement. End of book 6 and now I said let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened behold human beings living in an underground den which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den here they have been from their childhood and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move and can only see before them being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way and you will see, if you look a low wall built along the way like the screen which marionette players have in front of them over which they show the puppets. I see and do you see, I said men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials which appear over the wall some of them are talking others silent you have shown me a strange image and they are strange prisoners like ourselves I replied and they see only their own shadows or the shadows of one another which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave true, he said how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads and of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows yes, he said and if they were able to converse with one another would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them? very true and suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow? no question, he replied to them, I said the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images that is certain and now look again and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are released and disabused of their error at first when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light he will suffer sharp pains the glare will distress him and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows and then conceive someone saying to him that what he saw before was an illusion but that now when he is approaching nearer to being and his eyes turned towards more real existence he has a clearer vision what will be his reply? and you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them will he not be perplexed? will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him? far truer and if he is compelled to look straight at the light will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can't see and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him? true, he said and suppose once more that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascend and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself is he not likely to be pained and irritated? when he approaches the light his eyes will be dazzled and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities not all in a moment, he said he will require to grow accustomed to the side of the upper world and first he will see the shadows best next the reflections of men and other objects in the water and then the objects themselves then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day certainly less of all he will be able to see the sun and not mere reflections of him in the water but he will see him in his own proper place and not in another and he will contemplate him as he is certainly he will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years and is the guardian of all that is indivisible world and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold clearly, he said he would first see the sun and then reason about him and when he remembered his old habitation and the wisdom of the Dan and his fellow prisoners do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change and pity them? certainly he would and if they were in the habit of conferring honors among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before and which followed after and which were together and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future do you think that he would care for such honors and glories or envy the possessors of them? would he not say with Homer better to be the poor servant of a poor master and to endure anything rather than think as they do and live after their manner? yes, he said I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner imagine once more, I said such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness? to be sure, he said and if there were a contest and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den while his sight was still weak and before his eyes had become steady and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable would he not be ridiculous? man would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes and that it was better not even to think of ascending and if anyone tried to lose another and lead him up to the light let them only catch the offender and they would put him to death no question, he said this entire allegory, I said you may now append, dear Glaucon to the previous argument the prison house is the world of sight the light of the fire is the sun and it will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief which at your desire I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly, God knows but whether true or false my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears less of all and is seen only with an effort and when seen is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right parent of light and of the Lord of light in this visible world and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed I agree, he said as far as I am able to understand you moreover, I said you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell which desire of theirs is very natural if our allegory may be trusted yes, very natural and is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of men misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness he is compelled to fight in courts of law or in other places about the images or the shadows of images of justice and is endeavoring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice anything but surprising he replied anyone who has common sense will remember that the bewildered men of the eyes are of two kinds and arise from two causes either from coming out of the light or from going into the light which is true of the mind's eye quite as much as of the bodily eye and he who remembers this when he sees anyone whose vision is perplexed and weak will not be too ready to laugh he will first ask whether that soul of men has come out of the brighter life and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excessive light and he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being and he will pity the other or if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which grits him who returns from above out of the light into the den that, he said, is a very just distinction but then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before like sight into blind eyes they undoubtedly say this, he replied whereas our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being and of the brightest and best of being or, in other words, of the good very true and must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner not implanting the faculty of sight for that exists already but has been turned into the wrong direction and is looking away from the truth yes, he said, such an art may be presumed and whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise the virtue of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue how eager he is how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end he's the reverse of blind but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil and his mischievous in proportion to his cleverness very true, he said but what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights were attached to them at their birth and which dragged them down and turned the vision of their souls upon the things that are below if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now very likely yes, I said and there is another thing which is likely or rather unnecessary inference from what has preceded that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth nor yet those who never make an end of their education will be able ministers of state not the former because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public nor the latter because they will not act at all except upon compulsion fencing that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blessed very true, he replied then, I said the business of us who are the founders of the state will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now what do you mean? I mean that they remain in the upper world but this must not be allowed they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den and partake of their labors and honors whether they are worth having or not but it's not this unjust, he said ought we to give them a worse life when they might have a better? you have again forgotten my friend I said the intention of the legislator who did not aim at making anyone class in the state happy above the rest the happiness was to be in the whole state and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity making them benefactors of the state and therefore benefactors of one another to this end he created them not to please themselves but to be his instruments in binding up the state true, he said I had forgotten observe Glaucon that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a cure and providence of others we shall explain to them that in other states men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics and this is reasonable for they grow up at their own sweet will and the government would rather not have them being self-taught they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received but we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive kings of yourselves and of the other citizens and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated and you are better able to sharing the double duty where for each of you when his turn comes must go down to the general underground abode and get the habit of seeing in the dark when you have acquired the habit you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den and you will know what the several images are and what they represent because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth and thus our state which is also yours will be a reality and not a dream only and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other states in which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in the struggle for power which in their eyes is a great good whereas the truth is that the state in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always the best and most quietly governed and the state in which they are most eager the worst quite true he replied and will our pupils when they hear this refuse to take their turn at the toils of state when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heavenly light impossible he answered for they are just men and the commands which we impose upon them are just there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity and not after the fashion of our present rulers of state yes my friend i said and there lies the point you must contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler and then you may have a well-ordered state for only in the state which offers this will they rule or truly rich not in silver and gold but in virtue and wisdom which are the true blessings of life whereas if they go to the administration of public affairs poor and hungering after their own private advantage thinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good order there can never be for they will be fighting about office and the civil and domestic royals which does arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole state most true he replied and the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy do you know of any other indeed i do not he said and those who govern are not to be lovers of the task if they are there will be rival lovers and they will fight no question and of book seven part one book seven part two of plateaus republic this is a liberal box recording all liberal box recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liberal box dot org recording by ligny the republic by plateau translated by benjamin joe at book seven part two who then are those whom we shall compelled to be guardians surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of state and by whom the state is best administered and who at the same time have other honors and another in a better life than that of politics they are the men and i will choose them he replied and now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced and how they are to be brought from darkness to light as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods by all means he replied the process i said is not the turning over of a noister shell but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being that is the ascent from below which we affirm to be true philosophy quite so and should we not inquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting such a change certainly what sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to being and another consideration has just occurred to me you will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes yes that was said this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality what quality usefulness in war yes if possible there were two parts in our former scheme of education were there not just so there was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption true that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover no but what do you say of music which also entered to a certain extent into our former scheme music he said as you will remember was the counterpart of gymnastic and trained the guardians by the influences of habit by harmony making them harmonious by rhythm rhythmical but not giving them science and the words whether fabulous or possibly true had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them but in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are now seeking you are most accurate i said in your recollection in music there certainly was nothing of the kind but what branch of knowledge is there my dear glochan which is of the desired nature since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us undoubtedly and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded and the arts are also excluded what remains well i said there may be nothing left of our special subjects we shall have to take something which is not special but of universal application what may that be a something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common and which everyone first has to learn among the elements of education what is that the little matter of distinguishing one two and three in a word number and calculation do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them yes then the art of war partakes of them to be sure then palimides whenever he appears in tragedy proves agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number and had numbered the ships and sat in array the ranks of the army atroi which implies that they had never been numbered before and agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet how could he if he was ignorant of number and if that is true what sort of general must he have been i should say a very strange one if this was as you say can we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic certainly he should if he's to have the smallest understanding of military tactics or indeed i should rather say if he's to be a man at all i should like to know whether you have the same notion which i have of this study what is your notion it appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking and which leads naturally to reflection but never to have been rightly used for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being will you explain your meaning he said i will try i said and i wish you would share the inquiry with me and say yes or no when i attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is as i suspect one of them explain i mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them while in the case of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further inquiry is imperatively demanded you are clearly referring to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance and by painting in light and shade no i said that is not at all my meaning then what is your meaning when speaking of an inviting objects i mean those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite inviting objects are those which do in this latter case the sense coming upon the object whether at a distance or near gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular then of its opposite an illustration will make my meaning clearer here are three fingers a little finger a second finger and a middle finger very good you may suppose that they are seen quite close and here comes the point what is it each of them equally appears a finger whether seen in the middle or at the extremity whether wide or black or thick or thin it makes no difference a finger is a finger all the same in these cases a man is not compelled to ask a thought the question what is a finger for the sight never intimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger true and therefore I said as we might expect there's nothing here which invites or excites intelligence there is not he said but is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers can sight adequately perceive them and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity and in like manner does the touch adequately perceives the qualities of thickness or thinness of softness or hardness and so of the other senses do they give perfect intimations of such matters is not their mode of operation on this wise the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft you are quite right he said and must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of a hard which is also soft what again is the meaning of light and heavy if that which is light is also heavy and that which is heavy light yes he said this intimations which the soul receives are very curious and required to be explained yes I said and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence that she may see whether the several objects announced to her are one or two true and if they turn out to be two is not each of them one and different certainly and if each is one and both are two she will conceive the two as in a state of division for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one true the eyes certainly did see both small and great but only in a confused manner they were not distinguished whereas the thinking mind intending to light up the chaos was compelled to reverse the process and look at small and great as separate and not confused very true was not this the beginning of the inquiry what is great and what is small exactly so and thus arose a distinction of the visible and the intelligible most true this was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect or the reverse those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions invite thought those which are not simultaneous do not I understand he said and agree with you and to which class do unity and number belong I do not know he replied think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer for if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the side or by any other sense then as we were saying in the case of the finger there would be nothing to attract towards being but when there is some contradiction always present and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality thought begins to be aroused within us and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at the decision asks what is absolute unity this is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the mind to the contemplation of true being and surely he said this occurs notably in the case of one for we see the same thing to be both one and infinite in multitude yes I said and this being true of one must be equally true of all number certainly and all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number and they appear to lead the mind towards truth yes in a very remarkable manner this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking having a double use military and philosophical for the men of war must learn the art of number or he will not know how to array his troops and the philosopher also because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being and therefore he must be an arithmetician that is true and our guardian is both warrior and philosopher certainly then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe and we must endeavor to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our state to go and learn arithmetic not as amateurs but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers with the mind only nor again like merchants or retail traders with a view to buying or selling but for the sake of their military use and of the soul herself and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being that is excellent he said yes I said and now having spoken of it I must add how charming the science is and in how many ways it can do this to our desired end if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher and not of a shopkeeper how do you mean I mean as I was saying that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect compelling the soul to reason about abstract number and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument you know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule anyone who attempts to divide absolute unity when he's calculating and if you divide they multiply taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions that is very true suppose a person were to say to them all my friends what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning in which as you say there is a unity such as you demand and each unit is equal invariable and the visible what would they answer they would answer as I should conceive that they were speaking of those numbers which can only be realized in thought then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary necessitating as it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth yes that is a marked characteristic of it and have you further observed that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge and even the dull if they have had an arithmetical training although they may derive no other advantage from it always become much quicker than they would otherwise have been very true, he said and indeed you will not easily find a more difficult study and not many as difficult you will not and for all these reasons arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained and which must not be given up I agree let this then be made one of our subjects of education end of book seven part two