 I do think, however, that there are limitations to how long governments can delay the restructuring part. We are getting to the point where the cumulative decline in output in a number of countries is significantly large and the unemployment rates significantly problematic, that the delay space is shrinking very quickly. If you're looking for pretty solutions, there are none. Austerity has great difficulties. Restructuring has difficulties. Inflation has difficulties. Inflation is a tax. When I talk about financial repression, how do you get to a negative real interest rate? If you're successful in maintaining nominal interest rates more or less under control through a lot more heavy-handed regulation, drifting towards a somewhat higher inflation rate, it's what's going to kick real interest rates into negative territory, and that's what is needed. If you look at Japan, the Japanese experience has been one in which Japan has financial repression. 95 percent of the debt is held domestically. They don't worry about rollover problems because the pension funds, the banks, the insurance companies hold the debt. There is a domestic captive audience. Now, building a domestic captive audience is only part of the solution. The other part is actually being able to tax that captive audience. That's the negative real interest rate part. Where Japan has been very unsuccessful is that because of its deflationary tendencies, in effect, it's been a wasted opportunity. The bondholders have had positive real returns, and debt burdens have not been reduced over time. I think in a high debt environment, drifting to a somewhat higher inflation rate, especially coming out of the very hawkish inflation targets that we've had in the decade before the crisis, is a solution. Kicking the can down the road is a very unappealing solution, and that's why I keep going back to the term restructuring. It is very difficult for me to see. I bring in private debts into the picture because in Europe, like in the U.S., the distinction between what is public debt and what is private debt has been importantly blurred. There are still private debts today of senior bank debt in Ireland, in Spain, in Portugal. Ultimately they are going to be socialized. Ultimately they will become public debts. I think that window in which those debts can be restructured while there's still private debt without a sovereign restructuring. That window is getting narrower and narrower. There are no silver bullets when you get into this much of a debt overhand. Historically, seldom do you grow out of it. The most common historic pattern has been a combination of restructurings, inflation, financial repression, and austerity. None of those things are particularly attractive, but then again you're in an unsustainable situation.