 The Critique of Practical Reason by Emanuel Kant, translated by Thomas King's Mill Abbot. Preface. This work is called The Critique of Practical Reason, not of the pure practical reason, although its parallelism with the speculative critique would seem to require the latter term. The result of this appears sufficiently from the treatise itself. Its business is to show that there is pure practical reason, and for this purpose it criticizes the entire practical faculty of reason. If it succeeds in this, it has no need to criticize the pure faculty itself, in order to see whether reason, in making such a claim, does not presumptuously overstep itself, as is the case with the speculative reason. For if, as practical reason, it is actually practical, it proves its own reality and that of its concepts by fact, and all disputation against the possibility of its being real is futile. With this faculty, transcendental freedom is also established—freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it, in its use of the concept of causality, in order to escape the antonomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries to think, the unconditioned. Speculative reason could only exhibit this concept of freedom problematically, as not impossible to thought, without assuring it any objective reality, and merely lest the supposed impossibility of what it must, at least, allow to be thinkable, should endanger its very being and plunge it into an abyss of skepticism. In as much as the reality of the concept of freedom is proved by an apodietic law of practical reason, it is the keystone of the whole system of pure reason, even the speculative, and to all other concepts, those of God and immorality, which as being mere ideas, remain in it unsupported, now attach themselves to this concept, and by it obtain consistency and objective reality, that is to say, their possibility is proved by the fact that freedom actually exists, for this idea is revealed by the moral law. Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative reason of which we know the possibility a priori, without, however, understanding it, because it is the condition of the moral law which we know. The ideas of God and immortality, however, are not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will determined by this law, that is to say, conditions of the practical use of our pure reason. Hence, with respect to these ideas, we cannot affirm, that we know and understand, I will not say the actuality, but even the possibility of them. However they are the conditions of the application of the morally determined will to its object, which is given to it a priori, viz, the sumum bonum. Consequently, in this practical point of view, their possibility must be assumed, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it. To justify this assumption it is sufficient, in a practical point of view, that they contain no intrinsic impossibility, contradiction. Here we have what, as far as speculative reason is concerned, is a merely subjective principle of assent, which, however, is objectively valid for a reason equally pure but practical, and this principle, by means of the concept of freedom, assures objective reality and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nay, there is a subjective necessity, a need of pure reason, to assume them. Nevertheless, the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby enlarged, but only the possibility is given, which here to fore was merely a problem, and now becomes assertion, and thus the practical use of reason is connected with the elements of theoretical reason. And this need is not a merely hypothetical one for the arbitrary purposes of speculation, that we must assume something if we wish in speculation to carry reason to its utmost limits, but it is a need which has the force of law to assume something without which that cannot be, which we must inevitably set before us as the aim of our action. It would certainly be more satisfactory to our speculative reason if it could solve these problems for itself without this circuit and preserve the solution for practical use as a thing to be referred to, but in fact our faculty of speculation is not so well provided. Those who boast of such high knowledge ought not to keep it back, but to exhibit it publicly that it may be tested and appreciated. They want to prove, very good, let them prove, and the critical philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the victors. Quid statis, nalent, acquillicit asibatis. As they then do not in fact choose to do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up these arms again in order to seek in the mortal use of reason and to base on this the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of which speculation cannot adequately prove. Here first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, vis, how we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the categories in speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to the objects of pure practical reason. This must at first seem inconsistent as long as the practical use is only nominally known. But when, by a thorough analysis of it, one becomes aware that the reality spoken of does not imply any theoretical determination of the categories and extension of our knowledge to the supersensible, but that what is meant is that in this respect an object belongs to them, because either they are contained in the necessary determination of the will a priori or are insensibly connected with its object, then this inconsistency disappears because the use we make of these concepts is different from what speculative reason requires. On the other hand, there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory proof of the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For whereas it insisted that the object of experience as such, including our own subject, have only the value of phenomena, while at the same time in themselves must be supposed as their basis, so that not everything supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction and its concept as empty. So now practical reason itself, without any concert with the speculative, assures reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, viz, freedom, although as becomes a practical concept only for practical use, and this establishes on the evidence of a fact that which in the former case could only be conceived. By this the strange but certain doctrine of the speculative critical philosophy that the thinking subject is to itself in internal intuition only a phenomenon obtains in the critical examination of the practical reason its full confirmation, and that so thoroughly that we should be compelled to adopt this doctrine, even if the former had never proved it at all. Which I have as yet met with against the critique turn about these two points, namely on the one side the objective reality of the categories as applied to Numina, which is in the theoretical department of knowledge denied, in the practical affirmed, and on the other side the paradoxical demand to regard oneself quass subject of freedom as a new amenen, and at the same time from the point of view of physical nature as a phenomenon in one's own empirical consciousness. For as long as one has formed no definite notions of morality and freedom one could not conjecture on the side what was intended to be the new amenen, the basis of the alleged phenomenon, and on the other side it seemed doubtful whether it was at all possible to form any notion of it, seeing we had previously assigned all the notions of the pure understanding in its theoretical use exclusively to phenomenon. Nothing but a detailed criticism of the practical reason can remove all this misapprehension and set in a clear light the consistency which constitutes its great merit. So much by way of justification of the proceeding, by which in this work the notions and principles of pure speculative reason, which have already undergone their special critical examination, are now and then again subject to examination. This would not, in other cases, be in accordance with the systematic process by which a science is established, since matters which have been decided ought only to be cited and not again discussed. In this case, however, it was not only allowable but necessary, because reason is here considered in transition to a different use of these concepts from what it had made of them before. Such a transition necessitates a comparison of the old and the new usage in order to distinguish well the new path from the old one, and at the same time to allow their connection to be observed. Accordingly, considerations of this kind, including those which are once more directed to the concept of freedom in the practical use of the pure reason, must not be regarded as an interpolation serving only to fill up the gaps in the critical system of speculative reason, for this is for its own purpose complete, or like the props and buttresses which in a hastily constructed building are often added afterwards, but as true members which make the connection of the system plain and show us concepts here presented as real which there could only be presented problematically. This remark applies especially to the concept of freedom respecting which one cannot but observe with surprise that so many boast of being able to understand it quite well and to explain its possibility while they regard it only psychologically, whereas if they had studied it in a transcendental point of view, they must have recognized that it is not only indispensable as a problematical concept in the complete use of speculative reason, but also quite incomprehensible, and that if they afterwards came to consider its practical use, they must needs have come to the very mode of determining the principle of this, to which they are now so loft to assent. The concept of freedom is the stone of assembling for all empiricists, but at the same time the key to the loftiest practical principles for critical moralists who perceive by its means that they must necessarily proceed by rational method. For this reason I beg the reader not to pass lightly over what is said of this concept at the end of the analytic. I must leave it to those who are acquainted with works of this kind to judge whether such a system as that of the practical reason which here is developed from the critical examination of it has cost much or little trouble, especially in seeking not to miss the true point of view from which the whole can be rightly sketched. It presupposes indeed the fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals, but only insofar as this gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty, and assigns and justifies a definite formula thereof, in other respects it is independent. It results from the nature of this practical faculty itself that the complete classification of all practical sciences cannot be added, as in the critique of the speculative reason. For it is not possible to define duties specially as human duties with a view to their classification until the subject of this definition, viz, man, is known according to his actual nature, at least so far as is necessary with respect to duty. This, however, does not belong to a critical examination of the practical reason, the business of which is only to assign, in a complete manner, the principles of its possibility, extent, and limits, without special reference to human nature. The classification then belongs to the system of science, not to the system of criticism. In the second part of the analytic I have given, as I trust, a sufficient answer to the objection of a truth loving and acute critic of the fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals. A critic always worthy of respect to the objection, namely that the notion of good was not established before the moral principle, as he thinks it ought to have been. I have also had regard to many of the objections which have reached me from men who show that they have at heart the discovery of the truth, and I shall continue to do so for those who have only their old system before their eyes, and who have already settled what is to be approved or disapproved, do not desire any explanation which might stand in the way of their own private opinion. I have no fear as regards this treatise of the reproach that I wish to introduce a new language, since the sort of knowledge here in question has itself somewhat of an everyday character. Nor even in the case of the former critique could this reproach occur to anyone who had thought it through and not merely turned over the leaves. To invent new words, where language has no lack of expressions for given notions, is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true thoughts, yet by new patches on the old garment. If, therefore, the readers of that work know any more familiar expressions which are as suitable to the thought, as those seem to me to be, or if they think they can show the futility of these thoughts themselves, and hence that of the expression, they would in the first case very much oblige me, for I only desire to be understood, and in the second case they would deserve well a philosophy. But as long as these thoughts stand, I very much doubt that suitable and yet more common expressions for them can be found. In this manner then, the apriori principles of two faculties of the mind, the faculty of cognition and that of desire, would be found and determined as to the conditions, extent, and limits of their use, and thus a sure foundation be paid for a scientific system of philosophy, both theoretic and practical. Nothing worse could happen to these labors than that anyone should make the unexpected discovery that there neither is nor can be any apriori knowledge at all. But there is no danger of this. This would be the same thing as if one sought to prove by reason that there is no reason. For we only say that we know something by reason, when we are conscious that we could have known it, even if it had not been given to us in experience. Hence, rational knowledge and knowledge apriori are one and the same. It is a clear contradiction to try to extract necessity from a principle of experience, ex pumacea quam, and to try by this to give a judgment true universality, without which there is no rational inference, not even inference from analogy, which is at least a presumed universality and objective necessity. To substitute subjective necessity, that is, custom for objective, which exists only in apriori judgments, is to deny to reason the power of judging about the object, i.e. of knowing it and what belongs to it. It implies, for example, that we must not say of something which often or always follows a certain antecedent state, that we can conclude from this to that, for this would imply objective necessity and the notion of an apriori connection, but only that we may expect similar cases just as animals do, that is, that we reject the notion of cause altogether as false and a mere delusion. As to attempting to remedy this want of objective and consequently universal validity by saying that we can see no ground for attributing any other sort of knowledge to other rational beings, if this reasoning were valid, our ignorance would do more for the enlargement of our knowledge than all our meditation. For then, on this very ground that we have no knowledge of any other rational beings besides man, we should have a right to suppose them to be of the same nature as we know ourselves to be. That is, we should really know them. I omit to mention that universal assent does not prove the objective validity of a judgment, i.e. its validity as a cognition, and although this universal assent should accidentally happen, it could furnish no proof of agreement with the object. On the contrary, it is the objective validity which alone constitutes the basis of a necessary universal consent. Hume would be quite satisfied with this system of universal empiricism. For, as is well known, he desired nothing more than that, instead of inscribing any objective meaning to the necessity in the concept of a cause, a merely subjective one should be assumed, vis, custom, in order to deny that reason could judge about God, freedom, and immortality, and if once his principles were granted he was certainly well able to deduce his conclusions therefrom with all logical coherence. But even Hume did not make his empiricism so universal as to include mathematics. He holds the principles of mathematics to be analytical, and if his were correct they would certainly be apodiectic also. But we would not infer from this that the reason has the faculty of forming apodiectic judgments in philosophy also, that is to say, those which are synthetical judgments like the judgment of causality. But if we adopt a universal empiricism, then mathematics will be included. Now, if this science is in contradiction with a reason that admits only empirical principles as it inevitably is in the antimony in which mathematics prove the infinite divisibility of space which empiricism cannot admit, then the greatest possible evidence of demonstration is in manifest contradiction with the alleged conclusions from experience, and we are driven to ask, like Chelsedon's blind patient, which deceives me sight or touch, for empiricism is based on a necessity felt, rationalism on a necessity seen, and thus universal empiricism reveals itself as absolute skepticism. It is erroneous to attribute this in such an unqualified sense to Hume, since he left at least one certain touchstone, which can only be found in a priori principles, although experience consists not only of feelings but also of judgments. However, as in this philosophical and critical age such empiricism can scarcely be serious, and it is probably put forward only as an intellectual exercise, and for the purpose of putting in a clearer light, by contrast, the necessity of rational a priori principles, we can only be grateful to those who employ themselves in this otherwise uninstructive labor. End of preface. All LibreVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibreVox.org. Recording by James Christopher. The theoretical use of reason was concerned with objects of the cognitive faculty only, and a critical examination of it with reference to this applied properly only to the pure faculty of cognition. Because this raised suspicion, which was afterwards confirmed that it might easily pass beyond its limits and be lost among unattainable objects or even contradictory notions. It is quite different with the practical use of reason. In this reason is concerned with the grounds of determination of the will, which is a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas or to determine ourselves to the affecting of such objects, whether the physical power is sufficient or not, that is to determine our causality. For here reason can at least attain so far as to determine the will, and has always objective reality in so far as it is a volition only that is in question. The first question here then is whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will or whether it can be a ground of determination only as dependent on empirical conditions. Now here there comes in a notion of causality justified by the critique of the pure reason, although not capable of being presented empirically this that of freedom, and if we can now discover means of proving that this property does in fact belong to the human will and so to the will of all rational beings, then it will not only be shown that pure reason can be practical, but that it alone and not reason empirically limited is indubitably practical. Consequently, we shall have to make a critical examination, not a pure practical reason, but only a practical reason generally. For when once pure reason is shown to exist, it needs no critical examination. For reason itself contains the standard for the critical examination of every use of it. The critique then of practical reason generally is bound to prevent the empirically conditioned reason from claiming exclusively to furnish the ground of determination of the will. If it is proved that there is a practical reason, its employment alone is imminent. The empirically conditioned use, which claims supremacy, is on the contrary transcendent and expresses itself in demands and precepts which go quite beyond its sphere. This is just the opposite of what might be said of pure reason in its speculative employment. However, as it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which here is the foundation of its practical employment, the general outline of the classification of a critique of practical reason must be arranged in accordance with that of the speculative. We must then have the elements and the methodology of it, and in the former an analytic as the rule of truth, and the dialectic as the exposition and dissolution of the illusion in the judgments of practical reason. But the order in the subdivision of the analytic will be the reverse of that in the critique of the pure speculative reason. For, in the present case, we shall commence with the principles and proceed to the concepts, and only then, if possible, to the senses. Whereas in the case of the speculative reason, we began with the senses and had to end with the principles. The reason of this lies again in this, that now we have to do with the will, and have to consider reason, not in its relation to objects, but to this will and its causality. We must then begin with the principles of causality not empirically conditioned, after which the attempt can be made to establish our notions of the determining grounds of such a will, of their application to objects, and finally to the subject and its sense faculty. We necessarily begin with the law of causality from freedom, that is, with a pure practical principle, and this determines the objects to which alone it can be applied. First part, elements of pure practical reason. Book one, the analytic of pure practical reason. Chapter one, of the principles of pure practical reason. One, definition. Practical principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under its several practical rules. They are subjective, or maxims, when the condition is regarded by the subject is valid only for his own will, but are objective or practical laws when the condition is recognized as objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being. Remark. Supposing that pure reason contains in itself a practical motive, that is one adequate to determine the will, then there are practical laws, otherwise all practical principles will be mere maxims. In case the will of a rational being is pathologically affected, there may occur a conflict of the maxims with the practical laws recognized by itself. For example, one may make it his maxim to let no injury pass unrevenged, and yet he may see that this is not a practical law, but only his own maxim, that on the contrary, regarded as being in one in the same maxim a rule for the will of every rational being, it must contradict itself. In natural philosophy, the principles of what happens, e.g., the principle of equality of action and reaction in the communication of motion, are at the same time laws of nature, for the use of reason there is theoretical and determined by the nature of the object. In practical philosophy, i.e., that which has only to do with the grounds of determination of the will, the principles which a man makes for himself are not laws by which one is inevitably bound, because reason in practical matters has to do with the subject, namely with the faculty of desire, the special character of which may occasion variety in the rule. The practical rule is always a product of reason, because it prescribes action as a means to the effect. But in the case of a being with whom reason does not of itself determine the will, this rule is an imperative, i.e., a rule characterized by shall, which expresses the objective necessitation of the action, and signifies that, if reason completely determined the will, the action would inevitably take place according to this rule. Imperatives, therefore, are objectively valid and are quite distinct from maxims, which are subjective principles. The former either determine the condition of the causality of the rational being as an efficient cause, i.e., merely in reference to the effect in the merits of attaining it, or they determine the will only, whether it is adequate to the effect or not. The former would be hypothetical imperatives and contain more precepts of skill, the latter, on the contrary, would be categorical and would alone be practical laws. Thus, maxims are principles, but not imperatives. Imperatives themselves, however, when they are conditional, i.e., do not determine the will simply as will, but only in respect to a desired effect, that is, when they are hypothetical imperatives, are practical precepts, but not laws. Laws must be sufficient to determine the will as will, even before I ask whether I have the power sufficient for a desired effect, or the means necessary to produce it. Hence, they are categorical, otherwise they are not laws at all, because the necessity is wanting, which, if it is to be practical, must be independent of conditions which are pathological and are therefore only contingently connected with the will. Tell a man, for example, that he must be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not want an old age. This is a correct and important practical precept of the will, but it is easy to see that in this case the will is directed to something else which it is presupposed that it desires. And as to this desire, we must leave it to the actor himself whether he looks forward to other resources than those of his own acquisition, or does not expect to be old, or thinks that in case of future necessity he will be able to make shift with little. Reason, from which alone can spring a rule involving necessity, does indeed give necessity to this precept, else it would not be an imperative, but this is a necessity dependent on subjective conditions, and cannot be supposed in the same degree on all subjects. But that reason may give laws, it is necessary that it should only need to presuppose itself, because rules are objectively and universally valid only when they hold without any contingent subjective conditions, which distinguish one rational being from another. Now tell a man that he should never make a deceitful promise. This is a rule which only concerns his will. Whether the purposes he may have can be attained thereby or not. It is a volition only which is to be determined a priori by that rule. If now it is found that this rule is practically right, then it is a law, because it is a categorical imperative. Thus practical laws refer to the will only, without considering what is attained by its causality, and we may disregard this latter as belonging to the world of sense, in order to have them quite pure. 2. Theorem 1. All practical principles which presuppose an object, matter, of the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are empirical and can furnish no practical laws. By the matter of the faculty of desire, I mean an object the realization of which is desired. Now if the desire for this object precedes a practical rule, and is the condition of our making it a principle, then I say, in the first place, this principle is in that case wholly empirical. For then, what determines the choice is the idea of an object, and that relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is determined to its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called the pleasure and the realization of an object. This then must be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of determination of the will. But it is impossible to know a priori of any idea of an object, whether it will be concerned with pleasure or pain, or be indifferent. In such cases, therefore, the determining principle of the choice must be empirical, and therefore also the practical material principle which presupposes it as a condition. In the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain can be known only empirically, and cannot hold in the same degree for all rational beings, a principle which is based on this subjective condition may serve indeed as a maxim for the subject which possesses this susceptibility, but not as a law even to him, because it is wanting an objective necessity which must be recognized a priori. It follows, therefore, that such a principle can never furnish a practical law. CHAPTER I. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PURPRACTICAL REASON. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind, and come under the general principle of self-love or private happiness. Pleasure arising from the idea of the idea of the existence of a thing in so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing is founded on the susceptibility of the subject, since it depends on the presence of an object. Hence it belongs to sense, feeling, and not to understanding, which expresses a relation of the idea to an object according to concepts, not to the subject according to feelings. It is, then, practical only in so far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness, which the subject expects from the actual existence of the object. Now, a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness, and the principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will is a principle of self-love. All material principles, then, which place the determining ground of the will in the pleasure or pain to be received from the existence of any object, are all of the same kind, in as much as they all belong to the principle of self-love or private happiness. Corollary All material practical rules place the determining principle of the will in the lower desires, and if there were no purely formal laws of the will adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any higher desire at all. Remark One It is surprising that men, otherwise acute, can think it possible to distinguish between higher and lower desires according as the ideas which are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the senses or in the understanding. For when we inquire what are the determining grounds of desire and place them in some expected pleasantness, it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing object is derived, but only how much it pleases. Whether an idea has its seat and source in the understanding or not, if it can only determine the choice by presupposing a feeling of pleasure in the subject, it follows that its capability of determining the choice depends all together on the nature of the inner sense, namely that this can be agreeably affected by it. However dissimilar ideas of objects may be, though they be ideas of the understanding, or even of the reason in contrast to ideas of sense, yet the feeling of pleasure by means of which they constitute the determining principle of the will, the expected satisfaction which impels the activity to the production of the object, is of one and the same kind, not only in as much as it can only be known empirically, but also in as much as it affects one and the same vital force which manifests itself in the faculty of desire, and in this respect can only differ in degree from every other ground of determination. Otherwise how could we compare in respect of magnitude two principles of determination, the ideas of which depend upon different faculties, so as to prefer that which affects the faculty of desire in the highest degree. The same man may return unread an instructive book which he cannot again obtain in order not to miss a hunt, he may depart in the midst of a fine speech in order not to be late for dinner, he may leave a rational conversation such as he otherwise values highly to take his place at the gaming table, he may even repulse a poor man whom he at other times takes pleasure in benefiting because he has only just enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theater. If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from any cause, it is all the same to him by what sort of ideas he will be affected. The only thing that concerns him in order to decide his choice is how great, how long continued, how easily obtained and how often repeated this agreeableness is just as to the man who wants money to spend it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of a mountain or washed out of the sand provided it is everywhere accepted at the same value. So the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the longest time it is only those that would gladly deny to pure reason the power of determining the will without the presupposition of any feeling who could deviate so far from their own exposition as to describe as quite heterogeneous what they have themselves previously brought under one in the same principle. Thus, for example, it is observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power in the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles which are opposed to our designs in the culture of our mental talents, etc. And we justly call these more refined pleasures and enjoyments because they are more in our power than others. They do not wear out but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment of them and while they delight they at the same time cultivate. But to say on this account that they determine the will in a different way and not through sense whereas the possibility of the pleasure presupposes a feeling for it implanted in us, which is the first condition of the satisfaction. This is just as when ignorant persons that like to dabble in metaphysics imagine matter so subtle, so super subtle, that they almost make themselves giddy with it and then think that in this way they have conceived it as a spiritual and yet extended being. If with epicurious we make virtue determine the will only by means of the pleasure it promises, we cannot afterwards blame him for holding that this pleasure is of the same kind as those of the coarsest senses for we have no reason whatever to charge him with holding that the ideas by which this feeling is excited in us belong merely to the bodily senses. As far as can be conjectured he sought the source of many of them in the use of the higher cognitive faculty but this did not prevent him and could not prevent him from holding on the same principle above stated that the pleasure itself which those intellectual ideas give us and by which alone they can determine the will is just of the same kind. Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher and yet the most rarely found. The ancient Greek schools give us more examples of it than we find in our synchronistic age in which a certain shallow and dishonest system of compromise and contradictory principles is devised because it commends itself better to a public which is content to know something of everything and nothing thoroughly so as to please every party. The principle of private happiness however much understanding and reason may be used in it cannot contain any other determining principles for the will than those which belong to the lower desires and either there are no higher desires at all or pure reason must of itself alone be practical that is it must be able to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule without supposing any feeling and consequently without any idea of pleasant or unpleasant which is a matter of desire and which is always an empirical condition of the principles then only when reason itself determines the will not as a servant of the inclination it is really a higher desire to which that which is pathologically determined is subordinate and is really and even specifically distinct from the latter so that even the slightest admixture of the motives of the latter impairs its strength and superiority just as in a mathematical demonstration the least empirical condition would degrade and destroy its force and value reason with its practical law determines the will immediately not by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain not even of pleasure in the law itself and it is only because it can as pure reason be practical that it is possible for it to be legislative remark to to be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being and this therefore is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of desire for we are not in possession originally of satisfaction with our whole existence a bliss which would imply a consciousness of our own independent self-sufficiency this is a problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature because we have wants and these wants regard the matter of our desires that is something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with our condition but just because this material principle of determination can only be empirically known by the subject it is impossible to regard this problem as a law for a law being objective must contain the very same principle of determination of the will in all cases and for all rational beings for although the notion of happiness is in every case the foundation of practical relation of the objects to the desires yet it is only a general name for the subjective determining principles and determines nothing specifically whereas this is what alone we are concerned with in this practical problem which cannot be solved at all without such specific determination for it is every man's own special feeling of pleasure and pain that decides in what he is to place his happiness and even in the same subject this will vary with the difference of his wants according as this feeling changes and thus a law which is subjectively necessary as a law of nature is objectively a very contingent practical principle which can and must be very different in different subjects and therefore can never furnish a law since in the desire for happiness it is not the form of conformity to law that is decisive but simply the matter namely whether I am to expect pleasure in following the law and how much principles of self love may indeed contain universal precepts of skill how to find means to accomplish one's purpose but in that case they are merely theoretical principles footnote here as for example how he who would like to eat bread should contrive a meal but practical precepts founded on them can never be universal for the determining principle of the desire is based on the feeling of pleasure and pain which can never be supposed to be universally directed to the same objects footnote on theoretical principles propositions which in mathematics or physics are called practical ought properly to be called technical for they have nothing to do with the determination of the theoretical they only point out how the certain must is to be produced and are therefore just as theoretical as any propositions which express the connection of a cause with an effect now whoever chooses the effect must also choose the cause and footnote even supposing however that all finite rational beings are thoroughly agreed as to what were the objects of their feelings of pleasure and pain and also as to the means which they must employ to attain the one and avoid the other still they could by no means set up the principle of self love as a practical law for this unanimity itself would be only contingent the principle of determination would still be only subjectively valid and merely empirical and would not possess the necessity which is conceived in every law namely an objective necessity arising from a priori grounds unless indeed we hold this necessity to be not at all practical but merely physical these that our action is as inevitably determined by our inclination as yawning when we see others yawn it would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at all but only councils for the service of our desires then to raise merely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws which have objective necessity and not merely subjective and which must be known by reason a priori not by experience however empirically universal this may be even the rules of corresponding phenomena are only called laws of nature e.g. the mechanical laws when we either know them really a priori or as in the case of chemical laws suppose that they would be known a priori from objective grounds if our insight reached further but in the case of merely subjective practical principles it is expressly made a condition that they rest not on objective but on subjective conditions of choice and hence that they must always be represented as mere maxims never as practical laws this second remark seems at first sight to be mere verbal refinement but it defines the terms of the most important distinction which can come into consideration in practical investigations end of section two section three of the critique of practical reason by a manual count this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Andrea Fiori the critique of practical reason by a manual count translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott section three first part elements of pure practical reason book one the analytic of pure practical reason chapter one of the principles of pure practical reason theorem three a rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will not by their matter but by their form only by the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the will this object is either the determining ground of the will or it is not in the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an empirical condition is the relation of the determining idea to the feeling of pleasure and pain consequently it cannot be a practical law now when we abstract from a law all matter IE every object of the will as a determining principle nothing is left but mere form of a universal legislation therefore either a rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles that is his maxims as being at the same time universal laws or he must suppose that their mere form by which they are fitted for universal legislation is alone what makes them practical laws remark the commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what form of maximum is adapted for universal legislation and what is not suppose for example that I have made it my maximum to increase my fortune by every safe means now I have a deposit in my hands the owner of which is dead and has left no writing about it this is just the case for my maxim I desire then to know whether the maximum can also bold good as a universal practical law I apply it therefore to the present case and ask whether it could take the form of a law and consequently whether I can buy my maxim at the same time give such a law as this that everyone may deny a deposit of which no one can produce a proof I at once become aware that such a principle viewed as a law would annihilate itself because the result would be that there would be no deposits a practical law which I recognize as such must be qualified for universal legislation this is an identical proposition and therefore self evident now if I say that my will is subject to a practical law I cannot adduce my inclination e.g. in the present case my avarice as a principle of determination fitted to be a universal practical law for this is so far from being fitted from a universal legislation that if put in the form of a universal law it would destroy itself it is therefore surprising that intelligent men could have thought of calling the desire of happiness a universal practical law on the ground that the desire is universal and therefore also the maxim by which everyone makes this desire determine his will for whereas in other cases a universal law of nature makes everything harmonious here on the contrary if we attribute to the maxim the universality of a law the extreme opposite of harmony will follow the greatest opposition and the complete destruction of the maxim itself and its purpose for in that case the will of all has not one in the same object but everyone has his own his private welfare which may accidentally accord with the purposes of others which are equally selfish but it is far from sufficing for a law because the occasional exceptions which one is permitted to make are endless I cannot be definitely embraced in one universal rule in this manner then results a harmony like that which a certain satirical poem depicts as existing between a merry couple bent on going to ruin all marvelous harmony what he wishes she wishes also or like what is said of the pledge of Francis the first to the emperor Charles the fifth what my brother Charles wishes that I wish also is Milan empirical principles of determination are not fit for any universal external legislation but just as little for internal for each man makes his own subject the foundation of his inclination and in the same subject sometimes one inclination sometimes another has the preponderance to discover a law which would govern them all under this condition namely bringing them all into harmony is quite impossible five problem one supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the sufficient determining principle of a will to find the nature of the will which can be determined by it alone since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by reason and is therefore not an object of the senses and consequently does not belong to the class of phenomena it follows that the idea of it which determines the will is distinct from all the principles that determine events in nature according to the law of causality because in their case the determining principles must themselves be phenomena now if no other determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that universal legislative form such a will must be conceived as quite independent of the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation namely the law of causality such independence is called freedom in the strictest that is in the transcendental sense consequently a will which can have its law and nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will six problem to supposing that a will is free to find the law which alone is competent to determine it necessarily since the matter of the practical law i.e. an object of the maxim can never be given otherwise than empirically and the free will is independent on empirical conditions that is conditions belonging to the world of sense and yet is determinable consequently a free will must find its principle of determination in the law and yet independently of the matter of the law but besides the matter of the law nothing is contained in it except the legislative form it is the legislative form then contained in the maxim which can alone constitute a principle of determination of the free will remark thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other now I do not ask here whether they are in fact distinct or whether an unconditioned law is not merely the consciousness of a pure practical reason and the latter identical with the positive concept of freedom I only ask once begins our knowledge of the unconditionally practical whether it is from freedom or from the practical law now it cannot begin from freedom for of this we cannot be immediately conscious since the first concept of it is negative nor can we infer it from experience for experience gives us the knowledge only of the law phenomena and hence of the mechanism of nature the direct opposite of freedom it is therefore the moral law of which we become directly conscious as soon as we trace for ourselves maxims of the will that first presents itself to us and leads directly to the concept of freedom in as much as reason presents it as a principle of determination not to be outweighed by any sensible conditions nay holy independent of them but how is the consciousness of that moral law possible we can become conscious of pure practical laws just as we are conscious of pure theoretical principles by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them and to the elimination of all empirical conditions which it directs the concept of a pure will arises out of the former as that of a pure understanding arises out of the latter that this is the true subordination of our concepts and that it is morality that first discovers to us the notion of freedom hence that it is a practical reason which with this concept first proposes to speculative reason the most insoluble problem thereby placing it in the greatest perplexity is evident from the following consideration since nothing in phenomena can be explained by the concept of freedom but the mechanism of nature must constitute the only clue more over when pure reason tries to ascend in the series of causes to the unconditioned it falls into a tini me which is entangled in incomprehensibilities on the one side as much as the other whilst the latter namely mechanism is at least useful in the explanation of phenomena therefore no one would ever have been so rash as to introduce freedom into science had not the moral law and with it practical reason come in and force this notion upon us experience however confirms this order of notions suppose someone asserts of his lustful appetite that when the desired object in the opportunity are present it is quite irresistible ask him if a gallows were erected before the house where he finds this opportunity and order that he should be hang there on immediately after the gratification of his lust whether he could not then control his passion we need not belong in doubt but he would reply ask him however if his sovereign ordered him on paying of the same immediate execution to bear false witness against an honorable man whom the prince might wish to destroy under plausible pretext would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his love of life however great it may be he would perhaps not venture to affirm whether he would do so or not but he must unhesitatingly admit that it is possible to do so he judges therefore that he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought and he recognizes that he is free a fact which but for the moral law he would have never known seven fundamental law of the pure practical reason act so that the maximum of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation remark pure geometry has postulates which are practical propositions but contain nothing further than the assumptions that we can do something if it is required that we should do it and these are the only geometrical propositions that concern actual existence they are then practical rules under a problematical condition of the will but here the rule says we absolutely must proceed in a certain manner the practical rule is therefore unconditional and hence it is conceived a priori as a categorically practical proposition by which the will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately by the practical rule itself which thus in this case a law for pure reason practical of itself is here directly legislative the will is thought as independent on empirical conditions and therefore as pure will determined by the mere form of the law and this principle of determination is regarded as a supreme condition of all maxims the thing is strange enough and has no parallel and all the rest of our practical knowledge for the priori thought of a possible universal legislation which is therefore merely problematical is unconditionally commanded as a law without borrowing anything from experience or from any external will this however is not a precept to do something by which some desired effect can be attained for then the will would depend on physical conditions but a rule that determines the will of priori only so far as regards the forms of its maxims and thus it is at least not impossible to conceive that a law which only applies to the subjective form of principles yet serves as a principle of determination by means of the objective form of law in general we may call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason because we cannot reason it out from the antecedent data of reason e.g. the consciousness of freedom for this is not antecedently given but it forces itself on us as a synthetic a priori proposition which is not based on any intuition either pure or empirical it would indeed be analytical if the freedom of the will were presupposed but to presuppose freedom as a positive concept would require an intellectual intuition which cannot here be assumed however when we regard this law as given it must be observed in order not to fall into any misconception that it is not an empirical fact but the sole fact of the pure reason which thereby announces itself as originally legislative sick follow sick jubio corollary pure reason is practical of itself alone and gives to man a universal law which we call the moral law remark the fact just mentioned is undeniable it is only necessary to analyze the judgment that men pass on the lawfulness of their actions in order to find that whatever inclination may say to the contrary reason in co-operable and self constrained always confronts the maximum of the will in any action with the pure will that is with itself considering itself as a priori practical now this principle of morality just on account of the universality of the legislation which makes it the formal supreme determining principle of the will without regard to any subjective differentes is declared by the reason to be a law for all rational beings in so far as they have a will that is a power to determine their causality by the conception of rules and therefore so far as they are capable of acting according to principles and consequently also according to practical a priori principles for these alone have the necessity that reason requires in a principle it is therefore not limited to men only but applies to all finite beings that possess reason and will nay it even includes the infinite being as the supreme intelligence in the former case however the law has the form of an imperative because in them as rational beings we can suppose a pure will but being creatures affected with wants and physical motives not a holy will that is one which would be incapable of any maximum conflicting with the moral law in their case therefore the moral law is an imperative which commands categorically because the law is unconditioned the relation of such a will to this law's dependence under the name of obligation which implies a constraint to an action though only by reason in its objective law and this action is called duty because an elective will subject to pathological affections though not determined by them and therefore still free implies a wish that arises from subjective causes and therefore may often be opposed to the pure objective determining principle once it requires the moral constraint of a resistance of the practical reason which may be called an internal but intellectual compulsion in the supreme intelligence the elective will is rightly conceived as incapable of any maximum which could not at the same time be objectively a law and the notion of holiness which on that account belongs to it places it not indeed above all practical laws but above all practically restrictive laws and consequently above obligation and duty the holiness of will is however a practical idea which must necessarily serve as a type to which finite rational beings can only approximate indefinitely and which the moral law which is itself on this account called holy constantly and rightly holds before their eyes the utmost that finite practical reason can affect is to be certain of this indefinite progress of one's maxims and of their steady disposition to advance this is virtue and virtue at least as a naturally acquired faculty can never be perfect because assurance in such a case never becomes apodictic certainty and what it only amounts to persuasion is very dangerous end of section three recording by Andrea Fiori end of the critique of practical reason by Emmanuel Kant translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott section four of the critique of practical reason by Emmanuel Kant translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott first part elements of pure practical reason book one the analytic of pure practical reason chapter one of the principles of pure practical reason theorem four this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox dot org the autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of all duties which conform to them on the other hand heteronomy of the elective not only cannot be the basis of any obligation but is on the contrary opposed to the principle thereof and to the morality of the will in fact the sole principle of morality consists in the independence on all matter of the law namely a desired object and in the determination of the elective will by the mere universal legislative form of which it is a maximum must be capable now this independence is freedom in the negative sense and the self legislation of the pure and therefore practical reason is freedom in the positive sense thus the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason that is freedom and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims and on this condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law if therefore the matter of the volition which can be nothing else than the object of a desire that is connected with the law enters into the practical law as the condition of its possibility there results heteronomy of the elective will namely dependence on the physical law that we should follow some impulse or inclination in that case the will does not give itself the law but only the precept how rationally to follow pathological law and the maximum which in such a case never contains the universally legislative form not only produces no obligation but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical reason and therefore also to the moral disposition even though the resulting action may be conformable to the law hence a practical precept which contains a material and therefore empirical condition must never be reckoned a practical law for the law of the pure will which is free brings the will into a sphere quite different from the empirical and as the necessity involved in the law is not a physical necessity it can only consist in the formal conditions of the possibility of a law in general all the matter of a practical rules rests on subjective conditions which give them only a conditional universality in case I desire this or that what must I do in order to obtain it and they all turn on the principle of private happiness now it is indeed undeniable that every volition must have an object and therefore a matter but it does not follow that this is the determining principle and the condition of the maximum for if it is so then this cannot be exhibited in a universally legislative form since in that case the exception of the existence of the object would be the determining cause of the choice and the volition must presuppose the dependence of the faculty of desire on the existence of something but this dependence can only be sought in empirical conditions and therefore can never furnish a foundation for a necessary and universal rule thus the happiness of others may be the object of the will of a rational being but if it were the determining principle of the maximum we must assume that we find not only a rational satisfaction in the welfare of others but also a want such as a sympathetic disposition in some men occasions but I cannot assume the existence of this want in every rational being not at all in God the matter then of the maximum may remain but it must not be the condition of it else the maximum could not be fit for a law hence the mere form of law which limits the matter must also be a reason for adding this matter to the will not for presupposing it for example let the matter be my own happiness this rule if I attribute it to everyone as in fact I may in the case of every finite being can become an objective practical law only if I include the happiness of others therefore the law that we should promote the happiness of others does not arise from the assumption that this is an object of everyone's choice but merely from this that the form of universality which reason requires is the condition of giving to a maximum self love the objective validity of a law is the principle that determines the will therefore it was not the object the happiness of others that determined the pure will but it was the form of law only by which I restricted my maximum founded on inclination so as to give it the universality of a law and thus to adapt it to the practical reason and it is this restriction alone and not the addition of an external spring that can give rise to the notion of the obligation to extend the maximum of my self love to the happiness of others remark to the direct opposite of the principle of morality is when the principle of private happiness is made the determining principle of the will and with this is to be reckoned as I have shown above everything that places the determining principle which is to serve as a law anywhere but in the legislative form of the maximum this contradiction however is not merely logical like that which would arise between rules empirically conditioned if they were raised to the rank of necessary principles of cognition but is practical and would ruin morality altogether were not the voice of reason in reference to the will so clear so irrepressible so distinctly audible even to the commonest men it can only indeed be maintained in the perplexing speculations of the schools which are bold enough to shut their ears against that heavenly voice in order to support a theory that costs no trouble suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to attempt to justify himself to you for having born false witness first by alleging the in his view sacred duty of consulting his own happiness then by enumerating the advantages which he had gained thereby pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing himself against detection even by yourself to whom he now reveals the secret only in order that he may be able to deny it at any time and suppose he were then to affirm in all seriousness that he is fulfilled a true human duty you would either laugh in his face or shrink back from him with disgust and yet if a man has regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own advantage you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode of proceeding or suppose someone recommends you a man as a steward as a man to whom you can blindly trust all your affairs and in order to inspire you with confidence it stalls him as a prudent man who thoroughly understands his own interest and is so indefatagably active that he let slip no opportunity of advancing it lastly less you should be afraid of finding a vulgar selfishness in him praises the good taste with which he lives not seeking his pleasure in money making or in course wantonness but in the enlargement of his knowledge in instructive intercourse with the select circle and even in relieving the needy while as to the means which of course derive all their value from the end he is not particular and is ready to use other people's money for the purpose as if it were his own provided only he knows that he can do so safely and without discovery you would either believe that the recommender was mocking you or that he had lost his senses so sharply and clearly marked are the boundaries of morality self-love that even the commonest I cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or to the other the few remarks that follow may appear superfluous where truth is so plain but at least they may serve to give a little more distinctness to the judgment of common sense the principle of happiness may indeed furnish maximums but never such as would be competent to be laws of the will even if universal happiness were made the object for since the knowledge of this rest on mere empirical data since every man's judgment on it depends very much on his own particular point of view which is itself moreover very variable it can supply only general rules not universal that is it can give rules which on the average will most frequently fit but not rules which must hold good always and necessarily hence no practical laws can be founded on it just because in this case an object of choice is the foundation of the rule and must therefore proceed it the rule can refer to nothing but what is felt and therefore it refers to experience and is founded on it then the variety of judgment must be endless this principle therefore does not prescribe the same practical rules to all rational beings although the rules are all included under a common title namely that of happiness the moral law however is conceived as objectively necessary only because it holds for everyone that has reason and will the maximum of self-love or prudence only advises the law of morality commands now there is a great difference between that which we are advised to do and that to which we are obliged the commonest intelligence can easily and without hesitation see what on the principle of autonomy of the will requires to be done but on supposition of heteronomy of the will it is hard and requires knowledge of the world to see what is to be done that is to say what duty is is plain of itself to everyone but what is to bring true durable advantage such as will extend to the whole of one's existence is always veiled an impenetrable obscurity and much prudence is required to adapt the practical rule founded on it to the ends of life even tolerably by making proper exceptions but the moral law commands the most punctual obedience from everyone it must therefore not be so difficult to judge what requires to be done that the commonest unpracticed understanding even without worldly prudence should fail to apply it rightly it is always in everyone's power to satisfy the categorical command of morality whereas it is seldom possible and by no means so to everybody to satisfy the empirically conditioned preceptive happiness even with regard to a single purpose the reason is that in the former case there is question only of the maximum which must be genuine and pure but in the latter case there is question also of one's capacity and physical power to realize a desired object a command that everyone should try to make himself happy would be foolish for one never commands anyone to do what he of himself infallibly wishes to do we must only command the means or rather supply them since he cannot do everything that he wishes but to command morality under the name of duty is quite rational for in the first place not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they oppose its inclinations and as to the means of obeying this law those need not in this case be taught for in this respect whatever he wishes to do he can do he who has lost at play may be vexed at himself in his folly but if he is conscious of having cheated at play although he has gained thereby he must despise himself as soon as he compares himself with the moral law this must therefore be something different from the principle of private happiness for a man must have a different criterion when he is compelled to say to himself I am a worthless fellow though I have filled my purse and when he approves himself and says I am a prudent man for I have enriched my treasure finally there is something further in the idea of our practical reason which accompanies the transgression of a moral law namely its ill dessert now the notion of punishment as such cannot be united with that of becoming a partaker of happiness for although he who inflicts the punishment may at the same time have the benevolent purpose of directing this punishment to this end yet it must first be justified in itself as punishment i.e. as mere harm so that if it stopped there and the person punished could get no glimpse of kindness hidden behind this harshness he must yet admit that justice was done him and that his reward was perfectly suitable to his conduct in every punishment as such there must first be justice and this constitutes the essence of the notion benevolence may indeed be united with it but the man who has deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon upon this punishment then is a physical evil which though it be not connected with moral evil as a natural consequence ought to be connected with it as a consequence by the principles of a moral legislation now if every crime even without regarding the physical consequence with respect to the actor is in itself punishable that is for Fitz happiness at least partially it is obviously absurd to say that the crime consisted just in this that he has drawn punishment on himself thereby injuring his private happiness which on the principle of self-love must be the proper notion of all crime according to this view the punishment would be the reason for calling anything a crime and justice would on the contrary consist in obeying all punishment and even preventing that which naturally follows for if this were done there would no longer be any evil in the action since the harm which otherwise followed it and on account of which alone the action was called evil would now be prevented to look however on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a higher power which is to serve only to set rational creatures striving after their final end happiness this is to reduce the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom this is so evident that it need not detain us more refined though equally false is the theory of those who suppose a certain special moral sense which sense and not reason determines the moral law and in consequence of which the consciousness of virtue is supposed to be directly connected with contentment and pleasure that advice with mental dissatisfaction and pain thus reducing the whole to the desire of private happiness without repeating what has been said above I will hear only remark the fallacy they fall into in order to imagine the vicious man as tormented with mental dissatisfaction by the consciousness of his transgressions they must first represent him as in the main basis of his character at least in some degree morally good just as he who is pleased with the consciousness of right conduct must be conceived as already virtuous the notion of morality and duty must therefore have proceeded any regard to this satisfaction and cannot be derived from it a man must first appreciate the importance of what we call duty the authority of the moral law and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives to the person in his own eyes in order to feel the satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression it is therefore impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction prior to the knowledge of obligation or to make it the basis of the latter a man must be at least half honest in order to even be able to form a conception of these feelings I do not deny that as the human will is by virtue of liberty capable of being immediately determined by the moral law so frequent practice in accordance with this principle of determination can at least produce subjectively a feeling of satisfaction on the contrary it is a duty to establish and to cultivate this which alone deserves to be called properly the moral feeling but the notion of duty cannot be derived from it else we should have to suppose a feeling for the law as such and thus make that an object of sensation which can only be thought by the reason and this if it is not to be a flat contradiction would destroy all notion of duty and put in its place a mere mechanical play of refined inclinations sometimes contending with the coarser if we now compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical reason that of autonomy of the will with all previous material principles of morality we can exhibit them all in a table in which all possible cases are exhausted except the one formal principle and thus we can show visibly that it is vain to look for any other principle than that now proposed in fact all possible principles of determination of the will are either merely subjective and therefore empirical or are also objective and rational and both are either external or internal practical material principles of determination taken as the foundation of morality are subjective external education montana the civil constitution hutcheson internal physical feeling epicurus moral feeling hutcheson mandeville objective internal perfection wolf and the crucious and other stoics external will of God theological moralists those of the upper table are all empirical and evidently incapable of furnishing the universal principle of morality but those in the lower table are based on reason for perfection as a quality of things and the highest perfection conceived as a substance that is God can only be thought by means of rational concepts but the former notion namely that of perfection may either be taken in the theoretic signification and then it means nothing but the completeness of each thing in its own kind transcendental or that of a thing merely as a thing metaphysical and with that we are not concerned here but the notion of perfection in a practical sense is the fitness or sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of purposes this perfection as a quality of man and consequently internal is nothing but talent and what strengthens or completes this skill supreme perfection conceived as substance that is God and consequently external considered practically is the sufficiency of this being for all ends ends then must first be given relatively to which only can the notion of perfection whether internal in ourselves or external in God be the determining principle of the will but an end being an object which must proceed the determination of the will by a practical rule and contain the ground of the possibility of this determination and therefore contain also the matter of the will taken as its determining principle such an end is always empirical and therefore may serve for the principle of the happiness theory but not for the pure rational principle of morality and duty thus talents in the improvement of them because they contribute to the advantages of life or the will of God if agreement with it be taken as the object of the will without any antecedent independent practical principle can be motives only by reason of the happiness expected there from hence it follows first that all the principles here stated are material secondly that they include all possible material principles and finally the conclusion that since material principles are quite incapable of furnishing the supreme moral law as has been shown the formal practical principle the pure reason according to which the mere form of a universal legislation must constitute the supreme and immediate determining principle of the will is the only one possible which is adequate to furnish categorical imperatives that is practical laws which make actions a duty and in general to serve as the principle of morality both in criticizing conduct and also in its application to the human will to determine it and of section four section five of the critique of practical reason by Emanuel Kant translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott first part elements of pure practical reason book one the analytic of pure practical reason chapter one of the principles of pure practical reason of the deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org this analytic shows that pure reason can be practical that is can of itself determine the will independently of anything empirical and this it proves by a fact which pure reason in us proves itself actually practical namely the autonomy shown in the fundamental principle of morality by which reason determines the will to action it shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected with the consciousness of freedom of the will nay is identical with it and by this the will of irrational being although as belonging to the world of sense it recognizes itself necessarily subject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes yet at the same time on the other side namely as being in itself is conscious of existing in and being determined by an intelligible order of things conscious not by virtue of a special intuition of itself but by virtue of certain dynamical laws which determine its causality in the sensible world for it has been elsewhere proved that if freedom is predicated of us it transports us into an intelligible order of things now if we compare this with the analytical part of the critique of pure speculative reason we shall see a remarkable contrast there it was not fundamental principles but pure sensible intuition space and time that was the first datum that made a priori knowledge possible though only of objects of the senses synthetical principles could not be derived from mere concepts without intuition on the contrary they could only exist with reference to this intuition and therefore to objects of possible experience since it is the concepts of the understanding united with this intuition which alone can make that knowledge possible which we call experience beyond objects of experience and therefore with regard to things as numina all positive knowledge was rightly disclaimed for speculative reason this reason however went so far as to establish with certainty the concept of numina that is the possibility may the necessity of thinking them for example it showed against all objections that the supposition of freedom negatively considered was quite consistent with those principles and limitations of pure theoretic reason but it could not give us any definite enlargement of our knowledge with respect to such objects but on the contrary cut off all view of them altogether on the other hand the moral law although it gives no view yet gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world and the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding may even defines it positively and enables us to know something of it namely a law this law as far as rational beings are concerned gives to the world of sense which is a sensible system of nature the form of a world of the understanding that is of a super sensible system of nature without interfering with its mechanism now a system of nature in the most general sense is the existence of things under laws the sensible nature of rational beings in general is their existence under laws empirically conditioned which from the point of view of reason is heteronomy this super sensible nature of the same beings on the other hand is their existence according to laws which are independent of every empirical condition and therefore belong to the autonomy of pure reason and since the laws by which the existence of things depends on cognition are practical super sensible nature so far as we can form any notion of it is nothing else than a system of nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason now the law of this autonomy is the moral law which therefore is the fundamental law of a super sensible nature and of a pure world of understanding whose counterpart must exist in the world of sense without interfering with its laws we might call the former the archetypical world natura archetypa which we only know in the reason and the latter the ectypal world natura ectypa because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former which is the determining principle of the will for the moral law in fact transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason if it were accompanied with adequate physical power would produce the sumum bottom and it determines our will to give the sensible world the form of a system of rational beings the least attention to one self proves that this idea rarely serves as the model for the determinations of our will when the maximum which I am disposed to follow in giving testimony is tested by the practical reason I always consider what it would be if it were to hold as a universal law of nature it is manifest that in this view it would oblige everyone to speak the truth for it cannot hold as a universal law of nature that statements should be allowed to have the force of proof and yet to be positively untrue similarly the maximum which I adopt with respect to disposing freely of my life is at once determined when I ask myself what it should be in order that a system of which it is the law should maintain itself it is obvious that in such a system no one could arbitrarily put an end to his own life for such an arrangement would not be a permanent order of things and so in all similar cases now in nature as it actually is an object of experience the free will is not of itself determined to maximums which could of themselves be the foundation of a natural system of universal laws or which could even be adapted to a system so constituted on the contrary its maximums are private inclinations which constitute indeed a natural whole in conformity with pathological physical laws but could not form a part of a system of nature which would only be possible through our will acting in accordance with pure practical laws yet we are through reason conscious of a law to which all our maxims are subject as though a natural order must be originated from our will this law therefore must be the idea of a natural system not given an experience and yet possible through freedom a system therefore which is supersensible and to which we give objective reality at least in a practical point of view since we look on it as an object of our will as pure rational beings hence the distinction between the laws of a natural system to which the will is subject and of a natural system which is subject to a will as far as its relation to its free actions is concerned rest on this that in the former the objects must be the causes of the ideas which determine the will whereas in the latter the will is the cause of the objects so that its causality has its determining principle solely in the pure faculty of reason which may be therefore called a pure practical reason there are therefore two very distinct problems how on the one side pure reason can cognize objects a priori and how on the other side it can be an immediate determining principle of the will that is of the causality of the rational being with respect to the reality of objects through the mere thought of the universal validity of its own maxims as laws the former which belongs to the critique of the pure speculative reason requires a previous explanation how intuitions without which no object can be given and therefore none known synthetically are possible a priori and its solution turns out to be that these are all only sensible and therefore do not render possible any speculative knowledge which goes further than possible experience reaches and that therefore all the principles of that pure speculative reason avail only to make experiences possible either experience of given objects or of those that may be given ad infinitum but never are completely given the latter which belongs to the critique of practical reason requires no explanation how the objects of the faculty of desire are possible for that being a problem of the theoretical knowledge of nature is left to the critique of the speculative reason but only how reason can determine the maxims of the will whether this takes place only by means of empirical ideas as principles of determination or whether pure reason can be practical and be the law of a possible order of nature which is not empirically knowable the possibility of such a super sensible system of nature the conception of which can also be the ground of its reality through our own free will does not require any a priori intuition of an intelligible world which being in this case super sensible would be impossible for us for the question is only as to the determining principle of volition in its maxims namely whether it is empirical or is a conception of the pure reason having the legal character belonging to it in general and how it can be the latter it is left to the theoretic principles of reason to decide whether the causality of the will suffices for the realization of the objects or not this being an inquiry into the possibility of the objects of the volition intuition of these objects is therefore of no importance to the practical problem we are here concerned only with the determination of the will and the determining principles of its maxims as a free will not at all with the result for provided only that the will conforms to the law pure reason then let its power in execution be what it may whether according to these maxims of legislation of a possible system of nature any such system really results or not this is no concern of the critique which only inquires whether and in what way pure reason can be practical that is directly determine the will in this inquiry criticism may and must begin with pure practical laws and their reality but instead of intuition it takes as their foundation the conception of their existence in the intelligible world namely the concept of freedom for this concept has no other meaning and these laws are only possible in relation to freedom of the will but freedom being supposed they are necessary or conversely freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary being practical postulates it cannot be further explained how this consciousness of the moral law or what is the same thing of freedom is possible but that it is admissible is well established in the theoretical critique the exposition of the supreme principle of practical reason is now finished that is to say it has been shown first what it contains that it subsists for itself quite a priori and independent of empirical principles and next in what it is distinguished from all other practical principles with the deduction that is the justification of its objective and universal validity and the discernment of the possibility of such a synthetical proposition a priori we cannot expect to succeed so well as in the case of the principles of pure theoretical reason for these referred to objects of possible experience namely to phenomenon and we could prove that these phenomena could be known as objects of experience only by being brought under the categories in accordance with these laws and consequently that all possible experience must conform to these laws but I could not proceed in this way with the deduction of the moral law for this does not concern the knowledge of the properties of objects which may be given to the reason from some other source but a knowledge which can itself be the ground of the existence of the objects and by which reason in a rational being has causality i.e. pure reason which can be regarded as a faculty immediately determining the will now all our human insight is at an end as soon as we have arrived at fundamental powers or faculties for the possibility of these cannot be understood by any means and just as little should it be arbitrarily invented and assumed therefore in the theoretic use of reason it is experience alone that can justify us in assuming them but this expedient of adducing empirical proofs instead of a deduction from a priori sources of knowledge is denied us here in respect to the pure practical faculty of reason for whatever requires to draw the proof of its reality from experience must depend for the grounds of its possibility on principles of experience and pure yet practical reason by its very notion cannot be regarded as such further the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason of which we are a priori conscious and which is apodietically certain though it be granted that inexperience no example of its exact fulfillment can be found hence the objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason whether speculative or empirically supported and therefore even if we renounced its apodietic certainty it could not be proved a posteriori by experience and yet it is firmly established of itself but instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle something else is found which was quite unexpected namely that this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove but of which speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the possibility in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the unconditioned in the chain of causality so as not to contradict itself I mean the faculty of freedom the moral law which itself does not require a justification proves not merely the possibility of freedom but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law as binding on themselves the moral law is in fact a law of the causality of free agents and therefore of the possibility of a super sensible system of nature just as the metaphysical law of events in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of nature and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was compelled to leave undetermined namely the law for a causality the concept of which in the latter was only negative and therefore for the first time gives this concept objective reality this sort of credential of the moral law vis that it is set forth as a principle of the deduction of freedom which is a causality of pure reason is a sufficient substitute for all a priori justification since theoretic reason was compelled to assume at least the possibility of freedom in order to satisfy a want of its own for the moral law proves its reality so as even to satisfy the critique of the speculative reason by the fact that it adds a positive definition to a causality previously conceived only negatively the possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason which yet was compelled to suppose it for it adds the notion of a reason that directly determines the will by imposing on its maxims the condition of a universal legislative form and thus it is able for the first time to give objective though only practical reality to reason which always became transcendent when it sought to proceed speculatively with its ideas it thus changes the transcendent use of reason into an eminent use so that reason is itself by means of ideas an efficient cause in the field of experience the determination of the causality of beings in the world of sense as such can never be unconditioned and yet for every series of conditions there must be something unconditioned and therefore there must be a causality which is determined wholly by itself hence the idea of freedom as a faculty of absolute spontaneity was not found to be a want but as far as its possibility is concerned an analytic principle of pure speculative reason but as it is absolutely impossible to find in experience any example in accordance with this idea because amongst the causes of things as phenomena it would be impossible to meet with any absolutely unconditioned determination of causality we were only able to defend our supposition that a freely acting cause might be a being in the world of sense insofar as it is considered in the other point of view as a numinon showing that there is no contradiction in regarding all its actions as subject to physical conditions so far as they are phenomena and yet regarding its causality as physically unconditioned insofar as the acting being belongs to the world of understanding and in thus making the concept of freedom the regulative principle of reason by this principle I do not indeed learn what the object is to which that sort of causality is attributed but I remove the difficulty for on the one side in the explanation of events in the world and consequently also of the actions believed to the mechanism of physical necessity the right of ascending from conditioned to condition and infinitum while on the other side I keep open for speculative reason the place for which it is vacant namely the intelligent in order to transfer the unconditioned thither but I was not able to verify this supposition that is to change it into the knowledge of a being so acting not even into the knowledge of the possibility of such a being this vacant place is now filled by pure practical reason with a definite law of causality in an intelligible world causality with freedom namely the moral law speculative reason does not hereby gain anything as regards its insight but only as regards the certainty of its problematical notion of freedom which here obtains objective reality which though only practical is nevertheless undoubted even the notion of causality the application and consequently the signification of which holds properly only in relation to phenomena so as to connect them into experiences as is shown by the critique of pure reason is not so enlarged as to extend its use beyond these limits for if reason sought to do this it would have to show how the logical relation of principle and consequence can be used synthetically in a different sort of intuition from the sensible that is how a cause a numinant is possible this it can never do and as practical reason it does not even concern itself with it since it only places the determining principle of causality of man as a sensible creature which is given in pure reason which is therefore called practical and therefore it employs the notion of cause not in order to know objects but to determine causality in relation to objects in general it can abstract altogether from the application of this notion to objects with a view to theoretical knowledge since this concept is always found a priori in the understanding even independently of any intuition reason then employs it only for a practical purpose and hence we can transfer the determining principle of the will into the intelligible order of things admitting at the same time that we cannot understand how the notion of cause can determine the knowledge of these things but reason must cognize causality with respect to the actions of the will in the sensible world in a definite manner otherwise practical reason could not really produce any action but as to the notion which it forms of its own causality as numinon it need not determine it theoretically with a view to the cognition of its super sensible existence so as to give it significance in this way for it acquire significance apart from this though only for practical use namely through the moral law theoretically viewed it remains always a pure a priori concept of the understanding which can be applied to objects whether they have been given sensibly or not although in the latter case it has no definite theoretical significance or application but is only a formal though essential conception of the understanding relating to an object in general the significance which reason gives it through the moral law is merely practical in as much as the idea of the idea of the law of causality of the will has self causality or is its determining principle end of section five