 And the 21st Foundation has been promoting peace across Taiwan Street. Why don't you do a survey on how people really think about peace? Do they really mean peace when they say peace? Since everybody seems to be happy if the United States show a willingness to continue selling arms to Taiwan. Everybody feels secure, everybody happy. If there's no arms, we think we will be in big trouble. But does that really mean peace? And then they will think about this, so I push them a little bit more. I say, well, remember what happened when we had this celebration in Taiwan of the hundreds anniversary of the Republic of China? On the day of the hundreds birthday of the nation, Dana Ronsfield went to see President Ma Ying-jeol. And Ma Ying-jeol bowed to him and also said that he was a second lieutenant when he retired from the army. So he was much lower than Ronsfield, so Ronsfield really senior to him. And then he awarded Ronsfield the highest national award ever given to a foreigner. And so I asked my host at dinner, does this sound like a peace-loving people to you? A country that gave an award to Ronsfield, which almost a criminal in Europe. They got a little bit interested. So I said, well, if you're willing to invest in what people really think about peace, I'm willing to design the research for you. So we did. But then what I have in mind in this research, before I started when I do my research design, what I did is to find out how much people would like to sacrifice in order to achieve political independence from China. If you compare value of peace with value of independence, how people would wait to balance them? Where's the balance? How far people are willing to go? That's what I was thinking to find out in the beginning. So I had some of the questions. A couple of questions that I asked was suggested to other large surveys, social surveys in Taiwan in the past. But most of them actually turned down my suggestion. I was actually only one to ask two questions with... Oops, let's find the question. The two questions I was really interested to ask in the beginning was, let's see, D4 here. If China resorts to armed unification and the government gives up fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means. That's one question. And the other question is... What is it? Okay, D1 here. If the government conscripts people to have war with China in order to achieve independence, people have the right to deny conscription. These are the two questions I have had in mind for a long time. But I didn't get any chance to do any survey on this. But I did write something out of this initial thinking. I called it the right to surrender. People's right to surrender to their enemies. That, of course, caused a lot of trouble in Taiwan because people think that if you have the right to surrender and the PLA comes, then would that mean that Taiwan would be part of China immediately? And I remember the Ministry of Defense held a news conference exactly to answer that question. We didn't know in the beginning why the Ministry of Defense had that specific news conference until nobody asked the question and the spokesman pointing to a military newspaper asked a generous to ask the question. The generous asked him the question that Professor Shi said that people have the right to surrender to their enemy. How the Ministry of Defense responded to that? So we know the whole purpose of that conference is to answer my question. Then, of course, they gave some standard questions. And the reason the Ministry of Defense wanted to hold the conference to answer that question was because they had mammals from legislatures telling them they will be asked this question in the next session during Q&A at the legislature. So they decided to hold a news conference to preempt the question that will be asked by the legislature. So they actually not target immediately, target the legislature. It is the legislature targeting at this question. I'm interested in people's right to surrender or people's right consciousness that they can legitimately decide whether they want to surrender or not because I think if people have the belief in their mind that they are the one deciding whether they want to fight or not, then, of course, then they can decide to surrender to whatever enemies they don't want to fight. But that doesn't necessarily mean anything specific about the future of Taiwan or relationship between Taiwan and China because if people can surrender to Chinese, then people, of course, can continuously surrender to other people. So that means that this right to surrender is a right to control life rather than the right to giving in to a specific regime. But I guess most people cannot go into the second step. They're only interested in whether or not this will allow the PLA to take over Taiwan freely. So I have these two questions in mind. I've been asking my students and other people these two questions because I think we can actually divide the world into... Let's see. Where is it? No. This is one. Yeah, but people can see, right? This is huge enough. Because if you set up a cross table from answers to these two questions, then you can see that people can be categorized into four different types of rights thinking. If people... These two questions actually ask two things. One is that if you want to initiate war in order to acquire independence, would you do it? And the other question is that if someone invades your territory, would you fight or would you give up fighting? So it's kind of different things. One thing is more active. The one question is more active. The other question is kind of a reactive. It's responsive to a situation. I would think that those people who believe that they have the rights to control in their own life, they may answer these two questions in different ways. It's not that they will answer the question specifically in a common way. If you have only one question, would you surrender if PLA attacked Taiwan? Then you have only one dimension. But if you ask these two questions, you could actually see people can be separated even though people believe they have control in their own life. They can still be broken down into different types of rights conscious. Rights conscious referring specifically to their thinking on their own subjectivity. So if people... Well, let's see. This rights to territory refers to those people who will not go out to fight for independence. If nothing happens, but they will try very hard to defend their land if invaded. That's what I call rights to territory. In Chinese, actually I was talking about this aboriginal consciousness. Meaning that people who are not interested in the life of the rest of the world are not interested in expanding or conquering the rest of the world. But you don't come in here. So I call this, in Chinese, an aboriginal consciousness. And these are people who will not fight in any... On the other side, the... Oops. But you can see my... Yeah, specifically. These are people saying that if you ask me to go out to fight for Taiwan's independence, no way, I'm not going to fight. If you're going to tell me to give up, if people invaded Taiwan, well, I'll give up. So these type of people will not fight in any case. You can call it right to surrender, but it's not necessary. They're surrendered to PLA. And there are people, of course, very strongly believing in Taiwan independence or any quest for independence in the other parts of the world. If you have to fight to get your independence, you do it. If people come in and your government decides, or your countrymen decide to give up, I'll still continue fighting. I'm looking for my own independence. And there's also interesting group of people, which is not a small number. 21%, almost a little over one-fifth of the population, or respondents, said that they would not... They would go along with the government to fight for independence, actively, aggressively. But they would also give up if the government gave up defending the invaders. I call these people ready to submit to whoever is more powerful. So if the government tells you to do this, you do this. The government tells you to do that, you do that. If the invader is stronger, you surrender. If you're ready to fight for your own independence, enter the government's leadership, you do it. So you can divide people in this way. But this is just something I want to show you what I really want to do in the beginning. But then after I got the result of all these questions, I no longer interesting in that cross table, although you can still write articles out of that cross, just breaking down of the four categories of peoples. Basically, you could see from... You could see that people are really quite strong on their belief in Taiwan's independence. Half of the people would be willing to fight, or almost half of the people would be willing to fight in any case. This is a good message for any... But that doesn't really mean, of course, if conditions really require them to fight, they would go out and fight. You don't know because people answer the question out of the context. So you really don't know what they will do in specific situations. All right, what I actually found out from this survey, and that actually lead me away from my original research design, is that I find that, first of all, I find that most people feel quite important facing cross-relationship. We could look at the... Most of the questions when asked, people show quite a pessimistic feeling. The two very dramatic ones at the bottom, we're proud of democracy and liberal democracy in Taiwan, but I'll show you really the pessimistic feel about democracy. Question seven and nine. If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports independence, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification. As you can see that with pros and cons, 80% of people say no, but that doesn't... That's common sense, right? But look at the next question. If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports unification, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification, still 51% of people say no. That should be a surprise, right? We would think that, well, if we accept unification, there will be no threats from China using force, but people say no. Suggesting that people have a very low sense of control over peace across Taiwan Strait. So that's very interesting. That means that democracy as a source of legitimacy doesn't really prompt people to assert their sense of control over things across Taiwan Strait. But on the whole, let me just quickly go over this ten question I asked, and I'll read also the original Chinese presentation of the question. So some of you may have a deeper feeling about the question if you can hear the Chinese wording of it. The first question, if the government conscripts people to have war with China in order to achieve independence, people have the right to deny conscription. I think it's not a coincidence it's become the first question because that's what I care most in the beginning. And the Chinese wording is that if someone says that if Taiwan wants to achieve independence and have a war with the mainland, the government has the right to deny conscription. Please repeat this. The next question, if China resorts to army unification and the government gives up fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means. In the Chinese wording, if someone says that if the mainland has the right to unify Taiwan even if the government gives up fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means. The next question, you've seen this before. If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports independence, China will renounce the use of forces and means of unification. In the Chinese wording, if a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports independence, the mainland will give up fighting and unify Taiwan. Please repeat this. The question that coupled with this one, if a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports unification, China will renounce the use of forces and means of unification. In the Chinese wording, if a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports unification, the mainland will renounce the use of forces and unify Taiwan. Please repeat this. The next couple, even if arms purchase were cost-tensioned with China, Taiwan should still proceed with purchase. If someone says that even if the purchase of weapons was cost-tensioned with China, Taiwan would still continue to purchase weapons. Please repeat this. The question coupled with this, if arms purchase requires a higher tax, people should still support. Someone said that in order to increase the defense power, even if the government taxes, the people should still support. Please repeat this. If the ruling party is the DPP Democratic Progressive Party, China will not force unification. Someone said that if the ruling party is the Democratic Progressive Party, the mainland will not immediately promote unification of the two parties. Please repeat this. The next one, if it is the DPP who carries out openness tool and exchange with China, people should feel safer. Someone said that if the ruling party is the DPP who carries out openness and exchange with the two parties, people should feel safer. Please repeat this. The last two questions. The longer the current situation lasts, the more bargaining chips Taiwan will have with China. Someone said that the current situation of the two parties will have more bargaining chips between Taiwan and mainland. Please repeat this. The last question. Taiwan will become independent eventually, even though China opposes. In the Chinese wording, someone said that Taiwan will always be independent. Even if the mainland is not willing to, it is useless. Please repeat this. I guess we can go through this 10 questions and show you the result. It doesn't really... I mean, most results are not very optimistic. I guess we don't really have to show the result for you to understand why people are not optimistic about it. Like, I don't have it with me. I must have it somewhere. I should have it here, but I forgot to put it in. Maybe this is the one. No, this is the one. Actually, this is the one, right? You can see from the list. You can see, for example, the one I just mentioned, Taiwan will become independent eventually, even though China opposes. 46% of people say yes. 53% of people say no. Or at different degrees, say no at different degrees. The longer the current situation lasts, the more bargaining chip Taiwan will have with China. 34% of people say yes, but 66% of people say no. So you can see, on the whole, people who are holding a pessimistic view are sometimes slightly more or sometimes much more than people holding optimistic view. How much you think DPP can help to control the still-human cross-Taiwan Strait? You have D3 and D5. D3 asks if the ruling power is DPP, China will not force unification. 27, 28% of people almost say no. Yes, 72% of people say no. If the DPP who carries our openness to an exchange with China people should feel safer, well, slightly more than the last question. The 33% of people agree, and the 63% of people almost disagree. So on the whole, you could say, oh, well, people feel they cannot control distribution across Taiwan Strait by electing a pro-independence party. People cannot have a better control over the Taiwan Strait if they wait longer. People cannot have better control over Taiwan Strait if they say they want to reunify with China. It doesn't seem to be just any way that people can really develop a sense of control over Taiwan Strait. But this is just a very superficial analysis. Just look at the immediate results from the survey. But if you go deeper, you do some other analysis. You do factor analysis, like I did. If we do factor analysis from the answers of these 10 questions, basically you'll find I never had such good statistic fit when I do factor analysis. But somehow the fit seems to be so perfect this time. You have three factors coming out of factor analysis, grouping the answers to these 10 questions into three dimensions. These three dimensions seem to be quite good in terms of explaining people's answers to their questions. Because you can see these statistic correlations quite high. Usually my past experience, if it's more than 0.3, I take it. I take it with 0.333 and 0.412. I took these two questions as one factor. I'm satisfied with 30%. But now you have 7, 0, 9, 60, 0. They're really very fit. That means that all these five questions are highly correlated with one another. Answers to these five questions are highly correlated to one another. That means that if you agree with this question, it is DPP who carries out openness to and exchanges with China, people should feel safer. If you say yes to this question, then the chance that you will say yes to some other question, like if China resorts to army invocation and the government gives a fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means. So you see there are quite good fit here. And these are the five questions. Maybe I should just read them again so you could have a stronger sense of how questions or answers to these questions related with one another positively. If the DPP carries out openness and exchanges with China, people should feel safer. Agree. Taiwan will become independent eventually, even though China opposed. Agree. If the ruling party is the Democratic Progressive Party, China will not force unification. Agree. If China resorts to armed conflict and the government gives us fighting, the people should continue to fight by all means. Agree. The longer the current situation lasts, the more bargaining chip Taiwan will have with China. Agree. Then of course you can turn around and say disagree to all these questions. The reality perhaps is that most people have said disagree to all these five questions. But since the answer comes together through factor analysis in this way, that means it's like one dimension. If you move closer to the other end, then you will probably tend to agree with all these five questions. If you move to another end, then you probably expect that you will disagree on most of these questions. So it's not looking at the macro distribution of agree and disagree to each specific question. Rather, we should look at the dimension itself. The dimension tells us that if people agree, then they tend to agree on all five questions. If they disagree, then they tend to disagree on all five questions. In other words, there is a dimension. Whatever name you give it to, there is a factor that would affect people's answer to all these five questions. That factor we could name differently. Some people suggest that we can name this factor as a resistance factor. I think it's fine that shows strong sense of resistance to China. But since I'm also interested in how people are feeling about their ability to control the results, I name it as a prospect factor. In other words, would your prospect change if you have a different ruling party, if you have a different time frame, if you have a different confrontation situation? How would that change your prospect? I call it prospect dimension. In other words, if people feel they can control cross-strait relations better via the elections of pro-independence parties, then they will feel they can fight China if they want to strive for unification. And there's the other second factor here. Second factor is also very interesting. If we look at the results of our purchase, it's interesting here. You can see that even if our purchase caused tension with China, Taiwan should still proceed with purchase. 68% people agree. 32% people disagree. But then, of course, people are pragmatic. If you ask if arms purchase requires high attacks, people will still support. Then you can see the support drop dramatically. Then you say, oh, well, then people don't want to spend money. Even so, they want to buy arms. But if you look at the factor analysis, the message is quite clear. If arms purchase requires high attacks, people should still support. Agree. If the government, even if arms purchase caused tension with China, Taiwan should still proceed with purchase. Agree. So even though you see more people decide to give up on purchase if they have to pay more tax, you can still see a factor running through the answer of these two questions. I call it a determination factor. So if you are determined, then you will answer these two questions. Agree. We agree. And there's another question highly associated with this determination factor. If the government conscript people to have war with China in order to achieve independence, people will have the right to deny conscription. No. You have no right to deny conscription for the sake of independence. So that's really determination. So if people say, we should buy arms, don't care about cross-relationship. We should pay more tax to buy arms. Don't worry about your own economic well-being. We should fight China actively, even though China did not come. We should fight if the government chose to fight. We go ahead. So this is what I call a determination factor. In other words, there is a factor which related to determination that will affect people's answers. The other factor we find, let me see here. Also in the determination factor, there is a question which statistically shows the relatedness of 0.363, which I consider good enough. And this question, I'm sure it doesn't surprise you to go along with this determination factor, is that China resorts to armyification and the government gives us fighting that people should continue to fight armies. Yes. Although this one is not strongly associated with the other, that doesn't mean there's no relationship. The third factor, which I call the legitimacy factor, do we consider legitimacy an important factor affecting cross-relationship? The two questions. If a majority of Taiwanese expressively supports unification, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification. Agree. If a majority of Taiwanese expressively support independence, China will renounce the use of force as a means of unification. Agree. That's something also interesting, I think. That means it is not your positions on independence or unifications that allows you to feel a stronger sense of control. It is the legitimacy generated by the popular pony that gives you the sense of control. That means you can affect the Chinese decision by showing that you have a popular support, despite the position is in line with the Chinese position or not. It doesn't really matter. But then, of course, you say the other side of the story is that people say no. The reality, of course, we just see a majority of people say no to both questions. But then there is a significant of responders say yes to both questions to allow. And these smaller group people must have answered these questions very consistently in order to give a very high statistic performance here. It's almost 80, and this is 0.65966. So you have a legitimacy factor suggesting that if people feel strong about legitimacy, the power of legitimacy, then they think they can have better control of cross-strait relationship. So on the whole, from this factor analysis, we acquire three dimensions, three factors. Then we can say that if people feel they can control the cross-strait relationship via some pro-independent mechanism, either electing pro-independence party or purchase, or basically pro-independence party, or showing their determination, then they have a better sense. They can face a stronger opponent with more confidence. And secondly, if people are determined, most people perhaps are not that determined, but then if people are determined, then they probably are ready to give up their economic well-being and fight Chinese because you look at the D1. So determination factors would be related to willingness to fight and the capability to fight. The third factor is legitimacy factors. If people feel they can enhance their legitimacy through popular polling, then they feel better control of cross-strait relations. Now, this is not just cross-Taiwan-strait, I think. This is not just about Taiwan-China relationship because if you don't look at the specific contents of the questions, if you look at only these three factors, then that analysis can actually be applied to all asymmetrical relationships between Vietnam and China, Cuba and the United States. In other words, we could say that if people have determination, they will be willing to challenge the stronger party. If people can generate legitimacy in their choice, in their policy choice, then they will be willing or they'll be ready to challenge the stronger party. If people have means to give them a better prospect, then they will be willing to challenge the stronger party. So this is not just about Taiwan-China relationship. This is also about whether or not in an asymmetrical relationship the weaker party is psychologically ready to challenge the stronger party. I think that would be very, very interesting implication and I have some other interesting maneuver in here. This is the... I put these three factors in a figure. This is just for fun. We have two-dimension independence and peace where you place yourself. The three-dimension basically show you that independence and peace could go hand in hand. If you have pro-independence party, our leader, then you can have independence and peace at the same time. Determination factors, if you are ready for independence, you're willing to give up peace. That's what we show in the factors. And the legitimacy factors, as long as you have legitimacy, it doesn't matter whether you are for independence or you are against independence, you will have peace. That's just the way we put on the map. Another analysis. Factoring analysis is how you group the answers and try to figure out the statistical association among different answers. Now, I also run a cluster analysis which helps you to know how respondents, how people can be grouped together according to the way they answer the question. It's not grouping the answers. It's a group of people. I run cluster analysis along these three dimensions where you just show you through the factor analysis. Basically, cluster analysis allows you to decide how many clusters you want. This is not like factor analysis. The machine will generate factors for you. In cluster analysis, we research you have to decide how many clusters we want. So I decide to ask my assistant to run three clusters, four clusters, five, six, seven. And I have all those results and I compare them, I find. This is really lucky. I have very good feet if I have five clusters. So there's almost no problem this time just to pick up how many clusters you want. I want five because all the other three doesn't show all these good feet. These five clusters suggest to you that there is a group of people. It's a group of one. I should name it, but maybe I'll do that later on. I don't know why I didn't name them. I thought I'd love to give people names. Anyway, people who have less confidence in DPP or their chance for fighting will have stronger determination. That's interesting because since they don't think they can maintain peace, they want more arms. And of course they don't think voting matters at all. This is all very strong because beyond one, it's very good. Almost every number is greater than one. This is really lucky. And the second group of people showing negative to all three. I didn't really try to generate stories from this cluster, but I guess I could. I could have very good stories out of these five different group of people. Group one, there's a group of people doing this and this group of people doing that. This group of people, of course, is very pessimistic. Now I can do anything. There's no way legitimacy will come now. But then you see there are different kind of people there. It's not just one kind of people dominating everything. It's not just pro-unification people or pro-independence people. Pro-unification probably is too strong for you. It's not just pro-independence and neutral and non-independence people. It's not that easy. There are five group of people showing very different preference on different factors. And this fifth group is also very useful. You can see positive on all three factors. But one thing that is interesting is that although I didn't give a story to all five groups, you can see one interesting implication. For the fifth group, which is, of course, not only just pro-independence, but very confidence of the prospect for becoming independent. If they really want to mobilize people into pro-independence, they really can't do too much. If you look at the other four groups, if this group wants to stress the importance of leadership, for example, if you have pro-independence party, then you can achieve independence. At least three other group people say no. If they say, well, you know, get arms from United States, then we'll fight Chinese and we'll beat them. Another three group people say no. If they say, well, you know, just vote for independence. Two group people say no. So even though the fifth group people is probably the top group of independence in Taiwan, they probably, I don't know where they are, they're definitely not in DPP because I don't see determining independence people in DPP. But they're somewhere in the society. And you can imagine why these people when they articulate their positions, they had a hard time to convince the majority of the people because whichever dimension they take on, there will be probably a significant number of people alienate from their position. So it's hard for them. That's something, I don't know, the marketing people for really pro-independence forces should look at and try to design something out of this. But this is just to tell you, it's not easy to promote pro-independence position in Taiwan. Although you find over 50% of people waiting to fight for independence, but in terms of marketing or promotion or in terms of articulation of their position, it's not easy. That basically tells all the result I have, but I forgot to make the acknowledgement in the beginning. Let me just do this. This is sponsored by 21st Century Foundation. Sorry about that. I like the foundation, but I forgot to thank them. But then this actually conducted by Professor Zhang Youzong, who in the beginning, he did a kind of experimental survey in a very creative way. He has his assistants, went to all those universities who had what do you call it, professional degree school or night school, whatever, because those schools recruit students from society everywhere. So basically it's a small society. And they are elite because you have to be college-graduated, educated before you enter this kind of professional school. So it's a good test. Out of that test, then he ran an in-house survey from the random sampling, which of course becomes extremely expensive, but because the first stage of research with all those college-educated, professional school students who are basically over 35 in terms of age, educating college, so they're like opinion leaders. We have quite good feet there, but the foundation will support us to expand into in-house survey and randomly select it from Taiwan population statistics. This is very, very expensive, but then thank you, thanks to the foundation that we're able to do this. So I don't have a really wonderful systematic theory to give you, but I think this preliminary result is already interesting enough. It generates very good feet of three factors. It shows you an overall and optimistic picture about how people feel their control over cross relations. But then it gives you a very strong hint. If people feel they are able to control, they must be performing much better on these three dimensions. So if you're Vietnamese, you want to fight against Chinese, you have to tell people, you know, if you unite together, then you will be able to fight. That's a legitimacy factor. You show your popular support that the Chinese will give you. That doesn't mean that Chinese will really give you. It just means that people will feel they are able to challenge the stronger side. But if you look at history, because of doing this project, I'm working on asymmetrical relations. I started reading literature on asymmetrical relationships, and the puzzle seems to be there for a long time. Although international relations theory generally failed to explain why in an asymmetrical relationship when the weaker party decided to challenge the stronger party, the stronger party often decides to concede. There isn't much research on that, but I think it would be interesting to look at it. If all the people in the world can be in some way caught by all these three dimensions, then that means people in the stronger power will also follow the same logic. That means that if they see the weaker party, the stronger party can gather enough group of people, popular enough to show their displeasure with the stronger party, the stronger party probably will give in, because they don't think they have legitimacy. If they don't have legitimacy, they probably will let you have what you want for time being in order to restore or at least to stabilize asymmetrical relationships. Imagine if China and Vietnam coming together and fighting over this, on the whole, but then fighting over this territorial, maritime territorial sovereignty. If the Vietnamese decide to escalate, wouldn't that be a much bigger problem for China in the longer term? Why would China sever that? Why wouldn't China just settle down on the issue by concession? Why don't they just do that? Why don't China just say, well, North Korea, you killed this guy who really pro-China, then I'll punish you? Why would China do that? So although this is a survey on the weaker power, but if you go to the stronger power, I don't know if they do the same. If you run the same survey in China against the United States, would you probably get the same thing perhaps? I don't know. That could perhaps indirectly explain why in an asymmetrical relationship the weaker party can still manipulate in certain ways in order to get concession from the stronger party. This, but of course, rely on much extensive research in the future for the time being. I think I'll stop here and hear your comments Thank you. And we take questions. Do you want me to? Anyone questions? Charles first, and anyone? We take one first. Professor, thank you for your presentation on Charles Chieng Research Associated in the Centre. And I must say, it must be the most positive talk that I've ever heard from you. And I didn't expect to listen to so many econometrics in such a pretty good talk. And from your data, in my understanding, probably people in Taiwan can be grouped such as, you say, three clusters. And in my interpretation, I would say people would, they want peace, they desire peace for three different reasons. One is they calculate. One is they believe. One is they obey. So there are different reasons. And what impressed me is they are so different from each other because they either belong to this group or this one or the other one. There is not a significant mixture among them. So my first question, actually, I have two clusters of questions. So my first cluster is why people in Taiwan they want peace in such different ways. And what is the reason behind it? Because there must be a reason to explain why people differ each other in such a significant way. So this is the first cluster of questions. And, well, another one in this cluster is how about the KMT and the DPP? Which cluster these two main parties belong to in your theories or in your model? The second cluster of questions is already second. Another cluster, that's how do they change? There should be a time scale behind this. How come do Taiwanese people become such a model? And will they change in the future? Okay, that's two cluster of questions. You can only answer with more confidence to your last question. Will they change? Yes. If you look at the cluster analysis, that's actually the message there. You could combine your answer in very many ways and you get this five cluster. That means it's easy for people to change the position and still feel being with a group of other people. So it's not difficult for people to change. And if you look at the cluster, there are five different clusters. It's not difficult for people to change. So the structures there are ready for people who want to change the positions. I mean, the structure of population. You have five clusters showing all different combinations. But the other two questions, since this is empirical, I really can't answer where DPP or KMPT are. But you might want to ask them. I suspect that there will be widespread on all of these clusters. DPP itself or KMPT itself will be... Maybe there will be more people belonging to the fifth group in DPP. I'm not even sure of that. So really, we have to depend on... You know, I probably could get data because this is only a small part of the result. We have about 50 questions to ask in total. And we also have people's party affiliation. So maybe I can just run a party affiliation of this and depend on how much you want to pay. But I mean, this is... I actually acquire consent from the foundation to show you this. But the other part, I don't know. I don't know whether they want to show or not. Because there was someone in the foundation who wanted to run the president. I hope you know. So they probably don't want to show what the result is. Because the foundation was found by Eric Zhu's flooding law. But then the research itself is conducted by... Any questions? Can I ask one? I'm interested to know if you can... I think you probably have already in your mind. If you can tell us what's the five names you give to each cluster. No, I don't have it. I just feel I'm so somehow negligent. I should have because I love to do this. It should be quite interesting. I love to do this but then I... I don't know why I forget. How is the proportion between five different clusters? I mean, because you got a thousand people. Maybe the cluster five is very big or very small. If we don't have this information... It's the technical fault on my side because I can't do this myself. I don't know how to run SPSS. And it's not my assistant. He just... Right. Yeah, it's the technical fault on my side. I'll try to talk to Professor Zhang and see whether he can get his assistant to do this for me. Anyone? David. One of the things that you mentioned was the... You mentioned that there was a sense of pessimism and that was one of the key findings in this study. And I was wondering, even though you probably don't have the equivalent data, but to what extent is there a pattern of change there? In other words, if we did this survey mid-1990s, would the results have been very different? Because I know you've mentioned you've been talking to your students about this for a long time. Any impressions on that? I think the data itself also, I don't have this longitudinal statistics, but I think the structure of data itself already shows it's highly changeable. It's very volatile. But then this itself is very... It's a strong harbinger for anyone who tries to affect the result. On the one hand, you can say, wow, I really can mobilize people in a very short run. It appears that the society on the whole is not very fixed to any certain position. There's no structural pattern. Then I really could generate something through some perfective means in the short run. But in the long run, you'll say, gosh, I really can't do anything because this people looks like they can think in any other way tomorrow. So I guess it's a good thing for politicians that means they can manipulate. It's a bad thing for statesmen if they really want to do something. It's not something that... So even though I don't have the longitudinal statistics, you already can tell the structure is very shaky. Professor, thank you for sharing the very insightful survey with us today. And according to this survey, I wanted that could we suggest that maybe some of us could revise the previous impression of the previous argument that claiming that the people of Taiwan, the ultimate value of the people of Taiwan is to pursue the peace.