 So, the first thing I want to do is make a question myself to each one of you and I told you over email that you had five minutes to answer it, but you're going to have three. Yeah, because we're a little bit late and I do want to hear from the audience. So, I'm going to start in reverse order. Patricia, you have not only contributed tremendously to our knowledge of the relationship between political violence and development across many regions of the world and you showed that in your short presentation, but you have also been instrumental to increase the number of scholars that work on these issues across the world as well as to coordinate them through the creation of networks and joint initiatives. So, you have been an inspiration to many of us. So, given your knowledge of so many different contexts throughout the world and your network of co-authors, what are the main differences in the relationship between inequality and violence across the world and what might be some of the key factors that shape these regional differences? That is the question to you and I'm going to ask the other questions and then give you three minutes. So, Diana already anticipated what my question was going to be, which is, okay, so your presentation was very interesting about the diagnostics of the problem in the city of Bogota. I know, so I did my homework and I know that there are many initiatives in the secretary to address these issues. So, for instance, that primer paso and opportunities for women such as income generation and training and all that. I was particularly interested in what I saw about and I'm going to say in Spanish Apologies Casas de Igualdad de Oportunidades para las Mujeres that seems to be particularly go at the heart of what we're discussing today, Igualdad de Oportunidades and one of the issues that you do in these Casas de Oportunidades is to sensibilize women towards the reduction of violence against them. So, I want to hear a little bit about the initiatives that the secretary are doing and particularly about these initiatives that seems particularly important in this context. So, Diana, you also have been a leading expert in studying things such as subnational governance and you have challenged the conventional wisdom by showing that oftentimes rebels substitute the states in large parts of countries. So clearly the extent to which inequality triggers violence and shapes productivity depends on the underlying institutional strength and state capacity. So my question to you is how does rebel governance shape the relationship between inequality, violence and productivity in conflict affected areas? And finally, Marcella, so you devised and coordinated this regional report which argues that beyond reinforcing one another, violence and inequality are concomitant to many of the main challenges that the region faces nowadays. For example, economic growth, corruption, trust, clientelism, just to mention a few and many of these issues have been mentioned by either Anna or Patricia. So while this implies that policies to promote regional development should be coordinated across sectors and across countries of the region, this is something that in the region we rarely see. So the region lacks this coordination. How can we achieve better coordination where the main bottlenecks to that coordination and what is the UNDP or what can the UNDP do to help achieve this goal? So those are the questions. So let's start with you, Trixie. Maybe two minutes. Because as usual, this is always very scary to have Juan being the chair of these things because he asks the first question and he starts a new research program, so we could be here for a while. Maybe we'll come back in ten years, Juan, and answer that question. But one of the things that is quite striking in this literature, we started by looking at the effects of inequality on political violence but on civil wars particularly. I started looking at civil war outcomes and one of the things across the world is the lack of causal evidence. No, it doesn't seem to happen. Whereas we know from other literatures outside economics there has to be something in there. So the movement then was to start looking at first at different forms of violence and then unpacking what this inequality thing actually means. In terms, so I was very sweeping through the thing, but one of the things that seems to come across in not a very dissimilar way across all these countries is the impact of inequality seems to be stronger on lower, on events of low levels of violence like rioting, protests and so forth. There seems to be more consistency than looking at civil wars, et cetera, and of course homicides. I mean that usually, I mean in terms of criminal violence and homicides, that seems to be there as well. And it's not that different. One main difference, I'm not going to anticipate Anna's question, but one main difference has to do with the institutional capacity of countries. So if we're going to see how one thing, when inequality impacts all these kind of violent undesirable outcomes has to really do with the institutional capacity of the country to, and I'm repeating myself, to sort of maintain the social contract, ensure security, ability to make sure that services are provided to citizens, et cetera. For instance, the rising protests that we see in Latin America, which Anna showed since 2013, a lot of it is actually due to not so much shifts in inequality per se, but how the middle class has perceived their living standards in relation to, say, the upper classes. So there's been a story about the middle class as opposed to the traditional, the way we see inequality, which is the difference between the bottom and the top. So that would be my answer. So that doesn't really answer anything like I said. This is a huge research agenda to compare countries because there's so different how these things measure and then data is a mess. But if I had to say two things, it varies across different types of violence, including what the types that Anna mentioned. I just know of a project by Anko Hofla, who's looking at the impact of inequality on domestic violence and she sees effects, really strong effects, and against abuse against children as well. And the role of the state in all of this as well seems to be important. But I know Anna is going to say probably more about that. So thank you, Juan. And I think I mentioned previously that Bogota clearly adopts and believes on the two fold, analyzing and addressing violence resonates with violence causes inequality and then inequality can be a causal effect of inequality or correlated. Because I insist we should make a bit of that difference constantly. And so the way to address it in some of the few things that Juan mentioned and thank you for doing your homework one, reflect how we offer those services. So let me briefly tell you. So with regards to direct services to prevent and assist or attend those who've been victims of violence. One, there's clearly Juan mentioned Dal Primer Paso. And Dal Primer Paso is a campaign that basically calls women to step out. Both women and anybody who knows of a case of violence. But then we had to expand our services. But there was also this idea that women, that we should go where women are naturally going if they're victims of violence, which implies a way of switching the mindset of how usually the public sector works, which is this is a service we have and you must adjust to it, which is not where do you need us to be. And that was our switch. So what did that imply? We created three 24 hour, seven days a week services because violence occurs everywhere in the city and it occurs at all times. And so one was the purple hotline, which is our violence hotline. And it existed previously, but it had a 30% effectiveness rates. And we increased it to an average of a 96%. Why? Because the pandemic also increased our reports on domestic violence. But we also had to what's up, expanded the what's up. Why? Because the youth that are suffering violence are not used to calling. They what's up. So we had to adjust to the ways young women are reporting cases of violence. Also sign language for death women. We had to have a way for them to report their cases of violence. Another service, and this is all to say, if you want us to, if we want you when inviting you to step out, this is what we have for you. Another service is having lawyers 24 seven at hospitals. When we compare the data of sexual violence reported to the police, the police data, in comparison to the health services data, we saw a huge gap in the graph, right? Increasing in hospital data and very flat with police data. So we realized women are not stepping out to the police. They're going to hospitals if they're victims of sexual violence. So we decided to have lawyers there next to the ER room, where we can actually help them file a case, give them a cupo and the emergency shelters. So that's another thing of how we want women to step out. We have psychological and legal aid free, which is something you mentioned in your report. We have to address the psychological and emotional and mental health burden of violence if we want to address this. So that's the way it's being addressed and having pro bono lawyers taking cases. Also, you mentioned the House of Opportunity, Las Casas de Igualdad y Oportunidades. Those are basically the, they're in all districts in Bogotá and the 20 districts and they're for women. Women feel closer. The reports show and women actually say, if they don't have to go to the big macro institution, they don't have to reach the secretary for women, but they go to homes like closer to how they feel. And that's where we also have lawyers and psychologists, both that offer these services for free, to orient victims that have been victims of violence. Oh, and the last thing we have is not everybody, not all women suffer violence in the same way. So the intersectional approach to the study of violence, which is a suggestion I have for the further reports, because I think you've made a great step in putting your focus, as I mentioned in my previous intervention, on those that are left behind. The LGBT and women from racial groups and so forth. But the intersectional impact is huge. And so Casa de Todas is where we address the violence of women engaged in prostitution and migrants, especially non legal, not in a legal status. But as I said, we resonate with the two pronged approach. So we can not only address violence, we also need to address the causes of maybe not inequality measured in the genie coefficient, which I would agree that citizens don't have it in mind, but they do feel the inequality daily. So they do feel their access, lack of access to education, lack of access to free time. And that's why in tandem with the services for violence, we're increasing the services for women who are burdened with the care burden. Because as I mentioned, and I don't have time to go into what the care system is, but if we know that the three variables that are highly correlated with the probability of being a victim of violence is your lack of education, lack of internet access, and lack of free time, that's what we're offering women through our care system. And all this to address one variable, which I think, and with this I conclude, should become even more important when we understand both inequality and violence, which is the variable of time poverty. Time poverty is a driver of inequality. And women are the main victims, or the main, those with the less lack of time. And time, if you don't have time to address a lawyer, if you never have time to go to a mental health service, if you never have time for free time, or to leave your home, all that translates as a time poverty. And I think that's the common variable that ties violence and inequality and should be put at the forefront. Okay, so thank you for the very good and very difficult question. So just to remind you the question that Juan asked is how does rebel governance, and I would add criminal governance, which applies to many other places in Latin America, impact the relationship between inequality, violence, and productivity. So the short answer is that we don't really know yet. There are several people starting research or having done for a few years research on these, that we are trying to unpack this, but so I want to start by saying why it is so difficult to study this. So the first one is civil war, and I think organized crime, especially with the kinds of groups that we have in Latin America, is a shock that includes many different shocks, right? So it's not just the violence, it's not just the rebel governance or the criminal governance. So there are many big, deep structural changes that are happening during the war in the areas where these groups operate and isolating the effect of let's say violence or rebel governance or criminal governance is really difficult, right? The second thing is that there are impacts that happen during the war that we don't fully understand, which may or may not prevail after these groups leave. For example, there can be very important changes in the distribution when these groups create new elites. So when these groups control a territory, there are new winners and new losers. You may end up with a lot of new sectors of the population that are more vulnerable and with less representation and with less income, and you also have new elites. What happens when there aren't actors leave? That depends on a lot of things, including whether there was a peace process with real policies, for example. It also depends on people's trust in state institutions and to what extent they are willing to announce illegal behavior after the war ends, right? If these groups or these elites continue to use violence, for example, to defend their interests, there can be changes in individual behavior, how they see the state, how they see institutions. There's social behavior, which also translates into all kinds of economic outcomes, right? Whether you have people trusting each other more and engaging in new economic activities or not. What are the policy preference? Do they care about redistribution? Are they aware of redistribution locally in their municipalities? So all of these can impact many factors that in turn translate into inequality, into violence, just whether people use violence to solve conflicts, to advance their interests or not, and into productivity, right? So it's complicated. If we only focus on sort of the institutional components of rebel and criminal governance, we may think that these groups are creating institutions. They are providing order. They are reducing uncertainty. If you compare two places where these groups operate, but they are not governing, right? And there is a lot of uncertainty. People cannot make expectations about what will happen. So if we think that this operates us in peacetime, you would expect a positive relationship between say more rebel governance, what I call rebelocracy, and better outcomes, right? But if people are perceiving these institutions as being very short-term, then there is also a lot of uncertainty. So I'll end by saying that there are a few papers out there that have been trying to find these effects. With Patricia and Maria Ibañas, Juan Camilo Cárdenas, Julian Arteaga, we have a couple that show, actually against our expectations, that more rebelocracy, so more intense rebel governance leads to more resilience, to weather shocks, higher levels of trust, and social networks. There is also just, there is this paper that many of you may have seen by Antonella. What is her last name? Bandiera and co-authors that actually find that for El Salvador, places that were ruled by guerrillas are showing lower levels of economic development, right? So it's just a research agenda that is starting and there is a lot to learn. Thank you. Thank you, Ana. Thank you Juan, for when we started conceiving the regional report, we thought about factors that are behind both high inequality and low growth, and for sure there are more than the ones that we can address in the report. Picking to focus on violence has to with an intent to bring together these conversations. Out of the concern that we usually work in silos, and this is how we work in academia, but also how governments work. We usually think about the Ministry of Labor in charge of labor market regulations, sometimes in charge of social protection systems. The Ministry of Education in charge of education, but not speaking necessarily with labor market institutions and so on and so forth. This is part of a development trap, I believe. So I am very happy actually to be sitting together with you guys here, people who work on violence. I am the new one, I am the generalista of the group, but we have them speaking about economic growth, and I think we need to start crossing these conversations because I think part of the solution to development problems is there. So that's the big take on why choosing violence and why worrying about violence as a source also of low productivity and low growth. Something that if we convince people who are actually in charge of handling our countries and managing economies and the world of growth, if we are able to convince them that this is something that really matters, it will probably start climbing up in the steps of attention in terms of policy assigned. I think I will leave it there. Yeah, I think it's a, you said what can we all do? What can the UNDP, I think promote these type of interactions at all levels when we are doing research, but and also when we are actually doing operational stuff. I'm just going to close with one anecdote that I was thinking about when you asked me many, many years ago and Ebanes and I were very young economists and someone asked and so what do you do? And Anna said, she thinks about firms and I think about people. And I went like, oh my God, I've always thought about firms because I care about people. So these type of silos in which we sort of put each other into little boxes, I think they are very damaging and that's the message I would want to conclude with. So before the Q&A please join me in thanking our speakers today. So feel free to raise your hand. I'm going to ask you to ask very brief questions and we're going to collect some questions, five questions more or less before giving the floor to the speakers again. So very brief. I'm going to do my best to be brief. So thank you very much to the four of you. It was amazing to see this and I'm really happy that it's a woman panel talking about violence and also gender-based violence. So my question is related with the true, the report of the Commission of the truth. The report of the true commission. Like in the chapter of children and adolescents, one of the things that you can see in there is that a lot of children go to the guerrilla just because it's the only option. And I'm thinking about here in how we reduce that inequality because for us who live in Bogota, like we say there's a lot of options, but if you live in a town where the option is like not eating or go to the guerrilla and they say like okay, the meal that they eat the first day they arrive to the guerrilla is really the best meal that they have eaten in the field. So my question is, in a context like that, how do you deal with that? Because it's like you have a 2020, a cash 2020, you have violence, you have inequality, you have poverty and you have everything. So it's like, what suggestions? I don't, I know that is not an easy question, but how do you deal with that? Thank you. Great. Please coordinate among yourselves who is going to address these questions. Yes, I wanna join in thanking you for very interesting presentations, a really good mix of practice and analysis. My questions are more on the analysis and I'll try to keep them short. So Patricia referred to the fact that inequality can be measured in very different ways, but I feel that the previous Anna and Marcella referred to inequality in very general terms. And I do think that I'm not an expert on this topic, but I think on inequality as the evidence is inconclusive that there are links to conflict or violence in general, but when it comes to group-based or also horizontal inequality, there are some causal links that have been established, especially in relation to ethnic inequality. So I wanted to ask if you could be a little bit more specific on what kinds of inequality you see mattering most and not mattering. And then to Patricia on redistribution, which of course it can prevent or reduce violence, but I was wondering if when at one point where there is more redistribution and especially if redistribution comes in the form of better public services, and thus they create a demand for better services, whether this increase in expenditure in general cannot provoke protests and eventually conflict even. If there is a demand for quality, there is not yet there. Quantity has increased, but there's a quality that is not yet there. I don't know if I'm clear in this question. Thanks so much. Thank God that I asked for brevity. Sure, thank you. I think first to welcome the presentations. My question really is provoked by the remarks that Professor Justino was making around the higher demands for redistribution or the preference for redistribution and how that might explain the affinity for political violence. So one of the things you were saying there was the prospect of public provisioning, especially insofar as it creates alternative safety nets, might sort of limit the preference for armed action or violence. And I'm quite interested in why that is the case. So one, is it because the relative payoffs to armed violence are shifted when people have access to an alternative safety net? Or is it because, I guess in a sense, what happens to the armed groups or those that have a potential for violence is that the social base that they are reliant on for their criminal governance system would be attracted to forms of public provisioning or alternative safety nets, and therefore they wouldn't have some credibility or legitimacy for the violence that they have. So I'm quite interested in, I guess, what you attribute the decline in the utility of violence, in that case, and what role in redistribution is played. Is it because the relative payoffs are now sort of shifted somewhat, or is it because the social base that in a sense might legitimize that or give credibility to that armed action is effectively covered by the provisioning and some of the alternative safety nets? Okay, pass the mic all the way to the other floor. Gracias, esta es una pregunta para toda esta mesa, tan chévere, pero es una respuesta también a un estudio que se realizó en la Universidad Nacional hace algunos años sobre la violencia intrafamiliar. Y la conclusión fue que el alcohol era el generador del conflicto. Se hizo el trabajo, se presentó en las lecturas dominicales del tiempo y después nos dijeron de algún lado que debíamos calmarnos y no presentar esos trabajos así, porque recuerden que el alcohol es el que ayuda aquí a la educación y la salud en el país. Entonces, pues eso fue un trabajo que no tenía, tenía una presentación social y una presentación científica. Y precisamente hicimos las pruebas en sangre con los hombres que tomaban alcohol y cuando el hombre toma alcohol, su testosterona se convierte en progesterona. Y cuando llega a la casa, encuentra otra mujer y por eso es que empieza a pegarle, encuentra otra mujer. Entonces, pues es un punto de vista diferente desde el punto de vista económico. Pero la violencia viene desde ahí, desde el hombre cuando consume alcohol y es una acotación que quería hacer. Si tienen alguna aclaración o algo. Thank you for the question. So very briefly, the question of recruitment, that's totally true and I collected data on ex combatants many, many years ago. One of the findings was that minors and most of them joined when they are minors, joined these groups basically fleeing from poverty, domestic violence, especially women, and the violence related to the war. What can we do? I think, of course, the obvious difficult answer is we need development, which is everything, but more specifically before we get there. I think that communities that have been able to have stronger mechanisms for collective action are more able to shield a little bit their families, minors from these armed groups. So that's one thing that I think we can do sort of while we build institutions and the economy, and public goods and all of that. And then the question on inequality. Well, in my work, I actually focus on very different forms of inequality. Income is just a tiny piece. So I'm focusing on inequality in human security, in human rights, in income, health, education, local democracy and local governance. So I'm not looking at income and I'm looking at both interpersonal inequality and group inequality, because in my work, subnational inequality is very, very important. And I'll, I think you wanted to see, and I'll compliment to your question. And I think, because it still remains, today we might not be not as common for the former guerrilla to be recruiting the youth, but we have it in Bogota, transnational gangs recruiting the youth. So we still find it. And I guess the main point I want to make is if we want to tackle an issue of violence, it cannot come only from a security approach. I think that's the main lesson that this report and that on the ground lessons leave, which is it's been mainly a security approach and that's where we fail. Because I think, because we know factors that are both correlated and causal, both that constitute inequality that leads to violence or that are correlated with violence. So if you really want to change this, we need to address them in tandem. So we have to come in with more education, not only more police. We need to come in with access to opportunities, not just more of the armed forces. Thank you. Those are great questions. Let me start with the easy one. The one that I can ask, I can address Martha's point, which my answer is we can talk about during lunch more about it. It'll take a long time to answer, but yeah, it varies a lot how you measure inequality. Like for instance, what do you say? Ethnic inequality, the ethnic inequality story comes from the work by Gledesh Sederman and so forth, but it's actually about ethnic groups participating in political structures. It's a very, very specific way of dealing with that. So it doesn't apply to ethnic inequality across the world in general. It applies to very specific points. Plurization is another one. Plurization seems to be linked to inequality. Even with the horizontal inequality depends on the specific way in which it gets measured, but let's talk more. The other question, Martin also, the gentleman behind, those are related and they're great questions. The first one, interesting thing, so focus on the Latin America case, you absolutely write about the demand for exchanges in living standards will kick in. And what we have is say the cash transfer programs come, they seem to have a clear effect in at least preventing civil wars from reigniting at the very least seems to be doing that, but at the same time, we absolutely write created expectations amongst the middle classes, because these programs are really targeted at the bottom of the distribution, created expectations for better services that are not arriving and are not associating with these programs. So there is a problem there and we go to the whole debate about cash transfers versus our cash transfers, the answers to all that, because we are missing the whole state capacity and provision of services side of things. So I think you absolutely right, and I think there's a problem too that needs all the expectations about what you can do with these programs to adjust. And I know Marcel and I had a huge discussion in New York about this issue. The other question that is really excellent, I don't think I can answer. I can just speculate and it comes again to the issue about state capacity and how you see the role of the state versus the role of armed groups. And this is what Kahn and I with Anna Maria Bain has been doing for a long time. And I can only speculate that some of these programs as long as they're being seen as being implemented by the state and they're not being undermined by whatever reason could potentially reduce the legitimacy of armed groups. But also what you can't forget is more complicated because a lot of the armed groups become the state. So I mean, when I say the state, maybe cautious about what we mean by this. But the issue then is about, can you use these programs to create not a new social control set, but actually at the very minimum, stop the use of violence as being a form of governance. And create alternatives for safety that don't involve violence, et cetera. But thank you for that. I think it'll make me think much more about how to move that. It's a very good question. And I think we need to know more, much more about that. Just to close briefly. Juan Verde. Yes, I'm going to answer. No. Yes, I agree with me. I'm going to answer in Spanish. The alcohol in effect is associated with some cases of violence. But not all violence occurs as a source of alcohol. And many times there's alcohol and there's no violence. I was scared to put it in the center of the conversation in that way. Because I think it requires pedagogy and we need to know how to use it. And it wouldn't be like a propaganda for alcohol. But I think the sources of violence are much more complex than just alcohol. That's what I'm saying. I agree, but only because I agree with the conclusion and with the reaction. And both things. Alcohol is not the cause of violence. The cause of violence is machismo. And what's killing us is justifications. Every time a press release or an article says what happened in that case? It's that I was drunk. It's that I was jealous. It's that the essence is machismo. And that's how it is. The closest comparison is with the Nordic countries. They consume much more alcohol and the cases of violence are much lower. So the problem when we say jealousy, alcohol, anger, unemployment is that we're not paying attention to where it is. And the problem is machismo. But I also think that what we have to do as a society is not let one of those causal arguments happen. There may be things that increase. But the first case that is virtual is one. Women could go through the same with alcohol and there's no high violence against men. And both Nordic countries have much lower levels of violence and we look at all the graphics presented. So it's that causal effect. In fact, it gets concrete. When discussions about law are dry so there's no violence, there's no worse policy than that. Because it's dissimulating the real reason. And we're camouflaging in alcohol the real reason, which is machismo. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.