 Rwy'n cymdeithasolol i'r Fygoeddfaeth Cymru, y 22 ffôr 2018. Fygoeddfaeth Cymru wedi bod i'n rai'r ffaith i Fygoeddfaeth Cymru. Y genddau, item 1, yn ymdwylliannol o'r newid ym ymdwylliannol, mae'n ffawr i ddweud i gweithio Shona Robison ar y Fygoeddfaeth Cymru. Sona, ymdwch i gael eich cymdeithasol i'r ffawr? Nid gael eich cymdeithasol i'r ffawr. Mae'n gwar. Llyr Fygoeddfaeth Cymru yn ymdwylliannol. Rydyn ni, dwi'n gwybod ydym iawn, rydyn ni'n siŵr iawn i ddatblygu hyn ac rydyn ni'n gweld gwahoddu cyfnodau cyfnodau yn ynglyn, yn ysgolffent. Thank you. Agenda item number two is the decision on taking three items in private. Are we all agreed to take item five, which is consideration of our approach to scrutiny of the Scottish Government's draft budget 2019-20 in private? I agree. Thank you. Aelonweth angen i ddif�thoedd, aethan agorau aethonweth y rai aethon uchelwch yn dweud ddif�thoedd aethon o'r gael�u gwirionedd. Ie, nid o'r ddif�thoedd aethon o'r ddif�thoedd i ddif�thoedd aethon agorau aethon uchelwch yn ddif�thoedd aethon uchelwch yn ddif�thoedd. Diolch yn fawr. Rydym ni'n cycllaeth o Brexit o'u cymryd â'r system cyflymu gwneud yn séwn yn Scotland. I welcome Eunza Yousaf, cymayewn gyneddwch yn ysgrifescyt yn cymaint. I congratulate the new appointment. We look forward to your many appearances before the Justice Committee in the future. Ysgrifescyt yw'r cyfu yn cael eu cyfnodd, Linda Hamilton, y deputy director of defence, security and cyber resilience division, Deputy Director of Civil Law and Legal System Division Scottish Government. I also welcome the Lord Advocate, James Wolfe, QC and Helen Nisbit, head of international co-operation with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. I refer members to paper 1, which is a private paper, and I understand both the cabinet secretary and the Lord Advocate wish to make a short opening statement. Thank you very much, convener, and good morning to you and the committee. Many thanks for your kind words there, and I noticed the emphasis on many appearances before the Justice Committee, to which I look forward to. Convener, we are now less than 200 days from the day on which the UK seems destined to leave the European Union. At this late stage, it is deeply concerning that the UK Government do not know what the future relationship with the EU on justice matters will be. The lack of clarity and detail from the UK Government in relation to negotiations with the EU presents us with considerable challenges. However regrettable the position we find ourselves in, the Scottish Government and Scotland's operational partners, such as Police Scotland and the Crown Office, will continue to make responsible preparations for all exit possibilities. Planning is well underway to prepare for an unfathomable no-deal scenario. The committee will be aware of the paper that will be published in June on Scotland's place in Europe, security, judicial co-operation and law enforcement. As our paper demonstrates, Scotland greatly benefits from existing security, law enforcement and criminal justice co-operation with the EU. It underlines the importance of how those measures work together in fighting crime and keeping people safe. Anything other than full membership and participation in those measures will mean a loss of capability. Measures such as ECRIS, the European Criminal Records Information System, the Schengen Information 2 System, the alert system for missing or wanted persons and the European arrest warrant are all effective in ensuring that those accused of crime can swiftly be brought to trial. In some cases, a European arrest warrant had resulted in an arrest being made within five hours. The prospect of losing civil judicial co-operation also presents some real challenges. Reciprocal civil justice measures, such as cross-border recognition of contracts and civil orders, assist businesses, assist families and individuals by providing certainty across borders about what laws apply in different jurisdictions. The Scottish Government shares the aim of having a close relationship with the EU in relation to security, law enforcement and civil judicial co-operation. It is critical that the UK Government negotiates a future relationship with the EU, which takes account of Scotland's separate legal system at the independent role of the Lord Advocate and maintains the direct links that our justice agencies have with the EU. Given that the level of engagement from the UK has not always been consistent or meaningful, I hope that the acknowledgement of all those points in the UK Government's white paper in July signals a willingness to protect and promote Scotland's independent system amid negotiations. To conclude, convener, we remain committed to working with our partners to prepare for the risks involved in losing access to EU justice measures. We will build on existing strong links that we have within Europe to demonstrate Scotland's desire to collaborate on justice issues for the benefit of our citizens. Perhaps I could just make a few preliminary points from the perspective of my responsibilities in relation to the investigation and prosecution of crime and the associated responsibilities that I have in relation to extradition and mutual legal assistance. The first point is to stress the operational importance of mechanisms for cross-border co-operation in the criminal justice field. Some of the most serious crimes with which we deal have a transnational element—serious organised crime, human trafficking in illicit goods and cyber crime. The second point against that background is to make the point that Scottish criminal justice agencies, both the Crown Office and Procurate Fiscal Service and Police Scotland, co-operate with their counterparts in many other jurisdictions across the globe. What is special about the EU is that, within the EU, we benefit from a particularly effective legal regime and a suite of effective and practical arrangements that facilitate and underpin co-operation in the field of criminal justice. I do not think that it is controversial to observe that leaving the EU without replacing that regime would significantly and adversely affect our capabilities. From a professional criminal justice point of view, the realistic issue is the extent to which those detriments can be and will be mitigated. In thinking about that, it is helpful perhaps to distinguish between withdrawal, what will happen next March and the future relationship. The draft withdrawal agreement that the United Kingdom Government has been negotiating with the EU, which has been published, envisages that we will continue until December 2020 to maintain, broadly speaking, the current arrangements. Although there will be some detriments from our current position, for example in the potential for other member states to not to extradite their own nationals to the UK after March of 2019. Of course, if there is no withdrawal agreement, the UK would immediately lose upon leaving the EU the benefit of the current arrangements and there would be an immediate and significant impact on operational capabilities. If one turns to the future relationship, if the anticipated or withdrawal agreement was under negotiation, is entered into, that will provide time for the UK Government to negotiate on the future relationship between the UK and the EU. The committee will have seen the UK Government's ambitious proposal for a future criminal justice and security relationship, which would be significantly more far reaching than any other current arrangement in the field between the EU and a third country. I hope that, as we proceed to negotiation of the future relationships, all parties will focus on the practical imperative of putting arrangements in place that will enable us to continue to protect our citizens from crime and harm. We now move to questions. I start with a key theme, which is the benefits and costs of leaving the EU justice regime. You touched on that, but could we more specifically have some details of the things that the UK and Scotland could perhaps do differently after Brexit? I think that it is worth making the point that any dilution of the arrangements that we have currently, any stepping back from that or moving away from that, is going to be to the detriment of justice and justice capability full stop. Some of that was touched upon in Lord Advocate's statement in my statement. There will be some serious areas of risk. The European arrest warrant perhaps being one of the most obvious examples where, as I said in my statement, some criminals have been arrested within five hours of a European arrest warrant. In terms of criminal records, in terms of civil matters in relation to divorce, to child maintenance, there are huge areas of risk. I think that if I got your question correct, you asked whether there is an opportunity to do things differently. In a number of those matters, there may well be fallbacks. For example, the Hague convention may be a fallback in relation to some civil matters when it comes to European arrest warrant and not having access to European arrest warrant. We may be able to go into precedence of legislation, whether that is extradition treaties and so on and so forth, but none of them are an adequate replacement for the arrangements that we currently have. Lord Advocate. I could just add, if I may, that it is important to keep in mind that we are dealing here with mutual co-operation. By its nature, that is not something that we can do on our own. The essence of criminal justice co-operation across jurisdictions is that both parties need to be willing to co-operate and have agreed the rules upon which they are willing to co-operate. As I said in my remarks, we co-operate with our counterparts across the world under a variety of arrangements. What is markedly true about the position in relation to the EU is that we have a set of practical arrangements for co-operation, such as EuroPol and EuroJust. We also have a legal regime that underpins co-operation, such as the arrest warrant regime and the investigation order regime, which enable us to co-operate with our counterparts in a particularly effective way. From the policing perspective, of course, there is the very important set of arrangements for exchange of data in the criminal justice field. We cannot replace that unilaterally, so if the question is, could we do things differently? Insofar as we want to co-operate with our counterparts and other jurisdictions, we cannot co-operate on a basis that they are not willing to agree to co-operate with us on. Ultimately, it is going to be all about what can be agreed, what the UK will agree with the EU and what the EU will agree with the UK about the future arrangements. Yes, that is helpful. I think that you have both concentrated maybe on some of the areas where problems and probably disadvantages could occur. I wonder if I could ask you if you are both encouraged that Michelle Barney, I only yesterday said that he thought that there was a lot of common ground and security issues and that many of points of convergence, particularly on defence and security, exist between the EU and the UK. Are there anywheres that you see opportunities to build on this, perhaps even for a better session, if we look at our glass half-full as opposed to half-empty? I am an eternal optimist, I promise you, but where I get concerned is, on the one hand, yes, absolutely correct to say a reference to Michelle Barney's comments. On the other hand, the EU has been absolutely explicit that, with a quote, unquote, third country, there cannot be the same co-operation or the same access that you would have as an EU member. Let us please not be around a bush, that any detriment to the current arrangements in relation to the European arrest warrant, to the EuroPoll, to EuroJust and many other measures, any detriment to that, there is only one set of people that will benefit from that and that will be those criminals that are on the run hopping from country to country across the European continent. Nobody else will benefit from any looser arrangements. Yes, as a law advocate, articulated expertly, there is opportunity to perhaps do things in a different way, but that will involve co-operation between the two. From my perspective, when I was watching and reading over the transcript of the Secretary of State for Scotland here at the Justice Committee last week, where I would associate myself with his remarks, we want to have as close co-operation as possible, but from our perspective and the Scottish Government's perspective, clearly we would like to see arrangements as much as they can be similar to what we have. In fact, we would not want any detriment to that because of the reasons that I have pointed out here, but it also requires the EU to show some movement. I have not seen too much evidence of that thus far. Lord Advocate? Yes, I think that you are absolutely right to point out that there is a level of convergence on strategic aims in this area, and indeed that has been apparent over some period. I think that the question mark is how that convergence on strategic aims will translate into detailed provision in a way that, on the one hand, reflects the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, secondly, which fulfills any requirements of the European Union legal order, and which also meets our collective responsibilities on all sides to keep our citizens safe. From my part, as I said a moment ago, I hope that all parties will keep clearly in their mind the practical imperative of making arrangements that will continue to protect our citizens from harm and from crime. If the outcome is a partnership, an arrangement of the UK's outline, that would be a satisfactory outcome. I suppose that, at this point, that is in the future. As you said, the state-sponsored terrorism is just as likely to happen in the EU state as it is in the UK, so there is some obvious sense in co-operation and I would be very much supplementary on that. When the secretary of state for Scotland gave evidence last week, I asked him about the cost to Scotland of us leaving the EU justice regime. He said, I am not aware that the Scottish Government has identified a specific issue in relation to policing for which it would require additional funding. Can you give me your opinion of that? It seems clear that the secretary of state was saying that there would be no more money for Scotland to deal with perhaps extra border security costs, etc. Could you give me your impression of that? I know that in the transcripts of the various evidence sessions that the committee has held in relation to the topic with those involved in justice, and it would be fair to say without putting words in their mouth at all from reading the transcripts that would certainly be their view and another partner's view. We saw recent comments from the PSNI over the weekend and last week as well to the cost to their service. I believe that Mr Russell is making a statement later on to the Parliament today. I expect him to cover in more detail some of the finances and the financial aspects of that. Clearly, there are some areas that are reserved when you touch upon borders and so on and so forth. Clearly, in the justice portfolio, many issues are devolved, so we have to ensure that for that there is adequate funding. What is imperative is that we get some detail on what the deal will be on withdrawal. Once we get the detail, we are no doubt the Government and justice partners will be able to elaborate more on the costs that are involved. I do not think that there is anything that I can usefully add other than to observe that, as the committee is aware, additional funding was recently made available to the Crown Office for Procurate Fiscal Service in the year. A small part of that funding is being applied to additional resources to supplement Helen Nisbit's team in dealing with Brexit, particularly over the next period when it may be that there will be a requirement for more intensive work and engagement with a range of our counterparts. When people listen to the Brexit debate, it is very much trade and economic matters that dominate, but when you listen to the issues here in terms of protecting our citizens, access to information that will make our agencies effective and ensuring that our law has reached, especially given the increasingly international aspect of crime in this day and age, you realise that the impact of Brexit goes far beyond simply economic matters. I was just wondering if the cabinet secretary would agree with that. If so, I hear what he was saying in his earlier comments about having full access to, I think, 40 measures that are set out in the UK Government paper. It is easy to say full access or full legally binding agreement, which is the language in the UK Government's white paper, but there is an awful lot of complexity that lies beneath that. What would have to be put in place to achieve that full access or full legally binding agreement in your view? I will come to the first point and then try to address some of the second point where I can. I think that you are absolutely right, and Daniel Johnson is right. The justice measures, if we talk about criminal matters a lot, and I think that that is important, and I have touched upon one or two examples—quite high-profile cases that members around the table, but also the general public will be aware of and how justice was swiftly served because of our European co-operation. There are many examples of that. I can give literally hundreds, if you want to do so, but I will spare you so many examples. On the civil side of things, which makes it real to people when it comes to recognition of divorces, when it comes to child maintenance, or if you are a business owner that does business across Europe in terms of contractual law, procurement law, the recognition of that and due distinctions and so on and so forth. All of those are matters that could feasibly affect people in their everyday lives. He is absolutely right around some of the complexity, I suppose. The positive, of course, is that we are not a third country coming in from the outside. We are obviously a member state that has those links built in. For example, if I took just one example, Police Scotland has an embedded officer within Europol, so we have the structures in place. I suppose our plea to the UK Government and, in fairness, to the European Union negotiating partners would be that retaining all of that would be hugely desirable for justice to be served as swiftly as it currently is. I do not know whether on that my officials want to add anything more on the complexity or any other examples of how we are already embedded, but those structures already very much exist. I would hope that it would be too complex to necessarily attain them, but, clearly, that is a matter of negotiation. The other part of what you were asking about was the actual mechanism. The mechanism, effectively, is up to the UK and the EU to decide. There has been discussion about a security treaty and whether that is a mechanism for going forward or something that falls less than that, but that is effectively part of the negotiation between the UK and the EU. From the Scottish Government's perspective, as long as many of those measures are protected as possible, that is what we would hope to see. That is a very useful point. I think that one of the things that frustrates me is that we often talk in euphemisms through the Brexit debate and we talk about full legal agreements. Ultimately, what we are talking about is that there will need to be some sort of bilateral treaty in order to establish the mechanisms that are required. Given that there are some 40 mechanisms that are within the scope of that, do we have sufficient time or what sort of complexity would be involved in establishing such a treaty, given that we have, as the cabinet secretary pointed out, less than 200 days before Brexit date? Possibly a transition period beyond that, but probably that will extend to not much more than 18 months beyond those less than 200 days. Are there comparisons in terms of other treaty negotiation processes that we can learn lessons from? Is there sufficient time? How complex a treaty does the Scottish Government feel that that may be? One of the difficulties in answering your question, and absolutely the correct question to certainly be asking—I would say that time is critical, but the difficulty in answering the question—is where there is a gap and a lack of information coming from the UK Government on matters that are reserved to it, so extradition, European arrest warrant, and the big, meaty issues of which we have little detail. Quite heavy on aspiration but very light on detail, so a lot of aspiration—we saw that from the Secretary of State for Scotland—I commend that aspiration. It is good to go in with that aspiration but really light on detail. Until we have that, if we are planning on the absolute worst case scenario as we are doing and it is prudent for us as a Government to do on an unfathomable no-deal scenario, having less than 200 days to have everything tied up by then is a very big ask indeed. I wonder if I might just make a couple of points. The key point is that whatever arrangement is put in place will be a matter of, as you rightly observe, an international treaty between the UK and the EU, potentially the other member states as well. If you look at the draft withdrawal agreement, which is currently under negotiation and which is available publicly, the section on criminal justice is actually quite short because it simply identifies the legal instruments to which we will continue to be party during the period, transition period that is envisaged in that withdrawal agreement, and then identifies certain limits and constraints on our continued involvement in the legal regime. That is a relatively short instrument. What the international treaty, the security treaty that has been proposed by the UK will ultimately look like is perhaps quite a different question. It is obviously for others to negotiate that international treaty. From an operational perspective, what one would be looking for would be participation in a legal regime that is equivalent to what we currently have. It is very important to keep in mind in this area that, while I would anticipate a great deal of good will in terms of co-operation across borders between criminal justice agencies, because we are dealing with the rights of individuals, suspects and people accused of crime, you need a legal regime in place that is effective. The legal instruments have to be there, participation in institutional structures that facilitate co-operation and, from the operational perspective, access to data. One of the challenging issues that may be but really important issues is how we continue to participate in a regime that is itself dynamic. We tend to look at the current suite of 40 instruments and take that as a snapshot of things that we would like to keep. The UK and Scottish Government and myself all recognise that this is a suite of arrangements that fit together, that work together and that if you pick away at it, if you are part of it, then it is not as effective as the whole. We also need to recognise that within the EU it is also a dynamic regime where itself continues to develop and where the United Kingdom has been a leading player in terms of developing the regime. I think that the trick from the perspective of a future agreement, the challenge perhaps is whether or not and to what extent and how we are able to continue to participate in the regime as it continues to develop and to make our own contribution to that development. I think that in terms of getting that agreement right, the starting point is very critical. Therefore, the white paper that has been published, I was just wondering what the cabinet secretary and the Lord Advocate's view was in terms of that as a starting point. I hear what you are saying in terms of the lack of detail but I was also wondering whether or not you thought the scope was correct. Does it identify the correct issues, are there any thoughts or commentary that you have on it as a starting point? I think that my opening remarks will be alluded to the fact that there were some areas within the white paper and within some of what has been published by the UK Government that I see positive. For example, they have clearly taken heed of what we have been saying to them for quite some time around recognising Scotland's separate legal system, the independent role of the Lord Advocate and maintaining direct links, our own direct links with justice agencies, our justice agencies with the EU, for example, the police Scotland, the European tie-in that we already have. We also published, as I mentioned, that our paper Scotland's place in Europe, which was far more substantial than anything that was within the UK Government's paper. However, I recognised what the Secretary of State for Scotland did have to say last week, which was that some further technical notices would be imminent. It would be fair to say that the engagement on justice matters has been mixed, I would say, with the Ministry of Justice. My officials have had relatively positive discussions with the Home Office. It has been a little bit more difficult to be polite. I have also requested a discussion with the Home Secretary and myself to discuss those matters. I think that more detail is probably more feasible once the technical notices have been published. However, the lack of detail and the lack of meaningful engagement is worrying, but we are seeing some positive signs, I hope, coming forward from what the Secretary of State had to say, but clearly we will judge him on action, as opposed to simply words. The cabinet secretary just mentioned the technical notices. Have you had sight of any of those technical notices to date? If not, when would you expect or do you expect to have sight of them? If so, when? Clearly, the detail is very important, not least. David Mundell had said that I do not think that any of us could disagree with that. I am not going to suggest that not reaching an agreement on that would be anything other than sub-optimal. I think that we could all agree on that. However, the detail contained in the technical notices that are being produced or in the process of being produced, I guess that is very important that you would have sight of those as soon as possible. It has been a mixed bag, is how I can best describe it. A technical notice on civil judicial co-operation was shared on a confidential basis between officials on a matter, obviously, for the UK Government, so I cannot disclose any of the details. I understand, obviously, that the Secretary of State said that he would write to the committee for further information. Another matter, again, has been a bit more difficult, particularly on issues that we have been dealing with with the Home Office. When did we see that detail and so on and so forth? The level of engagement that we have now on justice issues, as I say, is a mixed bag, but we are certainly getting some information. It would be fair to say that it would have been helpful if that information had been shared a lot earlier for us to be able to make our necessary preparations. Certainly, again, I might defer slightly to my officials. I know in the 10 or 11 weeks that I have been in the role that there has been some information that has been shared on technical notices, but it has been a long time coming. On the justice and security side in relation to technical notices, we are not sure whether Home Office is going to produce one or not. The Secretary of State's evidence last week tended to suggest that there would be. The Cabinet Secretary for Justice wrote to the Home Secretary to seek clarification around that and to make sure that we have sight of that before it is published, hopefully with a view to feeding into that. However, we have not seen a justice and security technical notice. I understand that there will be one on firearms, which is a slightly different issue, but on the issues that we are discussing today, we, as yet, do not know whether there is one or not. It would be helpful for us to know if there is a response forthcoming from the Home Secretary and what that is. Perhaps I might just draw the committee's attention to the technical note. The question is whether the technical note is the same as a technical notice, but the technical note that the Secretary of State sent to the committee with its letter on security law enforcement and criminal justice, which sets out quite a lot of information in the particular field. The question, as the Cabinet Secretary and Ms Hamilton have observed, is whether there is another document yet to come or not. A technical notice is a formal procedure, whereas a technical note could be just a note that has been in interpretation. As I understand it, the technical note that the Lord Advocate is referring to was from May 2018, and that was a document that the UK Government produced in order to discuss those issues with the European Union. That was not shared with us in advance. The technical notice is that it is referring to a suite of documents that the UK is publishing in relation to a no-deal Brexit to inform the public about issues and ensure readiness as far as possible. I think that there is some helpful information in that technical note from May, and there is more detail in this documentation that the Scottish Government has published as well. Certainly, the Secretary of State has undertaken to come back to the committee with further information if we feel that there is something missing and that there is an opportunity to go back again and request further information. John Finnie. I would like to ask questions about the Court of Justice and, in particular, the important role of dispute resolution. Lord Advocate, you referred to a note to collectively saying that it is a particularly effective regime, as things stand at the moment. The White Paper states that the role of the European Court of Justice will come to an end, but it also recognises that, where the UK participates in an EU agency, the court is the ultimate legal authority on EU rules. The Scottish Government paper argues that the UK's opposition to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice could the result in, I quote here, a loss of vital cross-border co-operation and information sharing in other criminal justice co-operation measures. It would be grateful if you could both give me your views, particularly the compromise regarding any UK involvement in EU institutions and where do you think the squares were the position expressed by the UK Government of taking back control? I am going to treat any political comment as something for others to engage in. Perhaps I could make this point about where the Court of Justice sits in relation to criminal justice co-operation. Instruments like the European arrest warrant, European information order, and other things depend on mutual trust and confidence between the different jurisdictions. That mutual trust and confidence in terms of the jurisprudence of the Luxembourg Court is built on the fact that all the member states are signed up to a common legal regime, including a charter of fundamental rights, and a legal regime that is ultimately supervised by the Court of Justice to maintain consistency across the system. Within the context of the EU, there is a sort of integrity to the way that this fits together. The question that I think will need to be addressed in the context of the negotiation of a future security arrangement is whether or not we can sign up to a similar suite of legal arrangements without the Court of Justice playing a role. Ultimately, that is a matter for political negotiation and the question of red lines on each side. That is not ultimately for me to comment on, other than to express the hope that, on no side, those involved in negotiation will lose sight of the practical imperative, not to let artificial constraints get in the way of putting in place a regime that maintains our capabilities. To far apart in terms of our belief in that, from a Scottish Government perspective, we welcome the European Court of Justice jurisdiction. Whatever form is considered necessary on all those matters in order to secure and maintain as close a relationship as possible with EU injustice and insecurity matters. I should also say that I welcome any evolution in the UK Government's position from where it began initially, to that really hard, hard Brexit, to a slight shifting of the sands and the line in the sand to what Theresa May and the Prime Minister have in her checkers plan. There is no doubt that what is in that checkers plan, and it does not go as far as the Scottish Government would like it to go by any stretch, but even that small movement has clearly caused ruptions and ruptures within the Conservative Party. There may well be pressure, and I would hope that the Prime Minister would not cave into that pressure to go backwards on that. In terms of taking back control, to be honest, I do not think that there is much for me to say. I think that it is self-evident. In this world that we live in, we are interdependent and we rely on close co-operation with our neighbours, our partners and allies to be 100 per cent in control without any mutual co-operation and certainly not an isolationist approach that I would welcome by any stretch of the imagination. I welcome any movement towards our position in relation to the European Court's jurisdiction, and I hope that there is just no rolling back on that. It might be balanced, straining to be balanced, but let me say that, for instance, the Secretary of State expressed the view that by choosing to permit reference to the court of justice, the UK was maintaining control. I ask in relation to a specific factor, and that is that the rules would not give rights to individuals. That challenge could only be made in the UK courts, and perhaps the cabinet secretary expressed the view that, given that individuals can be subject to criminal penalties. You are right, in essence, in what you say. The Secretary of State stated in a quote, that any reference to the court of justice would be made by our choice. That is generally the case now. As far as references are concerned, in terms of EU law, any UK court may make a reference, and only the final court of appeal must make a reference. So what remains unclear is the extent to which the UK Government will accept the authoritative interpretation of EU law by the court. That deals with taking back a control point. For me, as I say, it really comes down, and this will undoubtedly come down, to the debate, putting it politely, that we are seeing between those who want as hard a Brexit as possible and those that, I would say, take a more pragmatic view. Those who are pushing for that hard Brexit, that ideologically hard Brexit, that isolationist Brexit, will not accept any jurisdiction of the court of justice of the European Union. If we want to be a nation that trades globally that is outward looking, then I cannot see how you would square that circle. Thank you very much. Just following up on the issue briefly before I turn to the issue of data sharing, I pursued the matter with the Secretary of State last week and was intrigued by the notion of choice and volition in cases that were referred. It seemed to apply to the areas covered by a common rulebook. I am first being interested, Lord Advocate, in your view, about the likelihood of the court of justice or our European Union partners signing up to a regime where the European court of justice had this oversight but there was no clarity around how sanctions would apply and how the verdict of that court would then be treated. It seems to me inconceivable that the court of justice would allow itself to be used in a way that was perhaps symbolic or superficial, that there would have to be a meaningful involvement and oversight over those areas of common rulebook. Is that not fair? I think that there are maybe a couple of points. One is that there has to be a system that ultimately decides what the rules mean. If, and so far as we simply continue to participate in the set of rules that already exist, we will continue to be part of the EU legal regime and it will be the court of justice that will ultimately decide what that means. A good illustration of that is what is going to happen during the so-called transition period, assuming that we have a withdrawal agreement on the lines of the one that has been published. During that period, we will continue to be subject to the rules of the EU and we will continue therefore to be subject to the interpretation that the court of justice makes of those rules. Although, during that period, we will not, in fact, have any British judges on that court. That is perhaps an illustration of how, if you want to be part of a regime of rules, you are going to be affected by the way that the court whose job it is to interpret those rules interprets them, whether we are directly involved in the court by way of having judges there or not. In terms of the future security partnership, that is yet to be negotiated. I do not think that it would be right for me to speculate about whether the respective positions or potential positions of the UK and the EU would ultimately leave that question of dispute resolution. It will be essential that there is some form of dispute resolution when we are dealing in this context as we are with the rights of individuals. It seems likely that there would need to be some form of judicial dispute resolution, but what that will look like, I think, would not be right for me to try to anticipate or speculate on. I turn to the issue of the date of sharing. You have both acknowledged in earlier comments that there is a degree of mutual interest here on both sides, perhaps more so than there are in other areas where negotiations are taking place at the moment. What does that lead you to conclude in terms of any arrangement around the sharing of data, which is absolutely critical to the co-operation between police forces? Assuming that what is in place at the moment cannot maintain, for the reasons that the cabinet secretary outlined earlier, an alternative arrangement that is considerably more than any third-party country has at the moment would clearly be necessary. Do you have a view of what that would look like? Is there something that can be lent upon to inform the committee, the wider public, about how that new arrangement might be made to work? In terms of what it would look like, I suppose that, as of today, we start from where we are and a set of arrangements for the exchange of data—a good example being the sharing information system 2, which is a system of alerts that helps to underpin the arrest warrant system. If one starts from where we are, one would envisage and one would want to have continuing access for our law enforcement agencies to those systems of data that will provide them with useful information in the context of their work, and which are two ways. The sharing information system, if we issue an arrest warrant for someone whom we want to return to Scotland and that person is picked up in another EU country, the sharing information system is the alert that alerts the police officer in whatever country it is that this is someone who is wanted under an arrest warrant back in the UK and Scotland, and that is how it ties together. Of course, it is anticipated that this is an area where there may be developments. The various databases that are available may work differently or more effectively in the future, and we would want to have access to those. Again, it is not in a sense for me to speculate, but one does not necessarily have to anticipate a whole new set of databases. It is access to the systems and arrangements that the EU has in place already. However, I suppose that the point that underlines that is that there is EU law about the transfer of data to third countries. Any arrangement that we have in place for access to these databases will have to, one would anticipate, from the EU perspective, to comply with the EU's requirements in relation to the transfer of data outside the EU, and that will require us and the UK's recognisers that this is a cross-cutting issue and that that will require the UK to maintain a data protection regime that meets the EU's requirements for the transfer of data outside the EU. I understand that the UK put forward some proposals about how that might work. The response from Monsieur Barnier or from the EU side was not wholly encouraging, but presumably that is around the rules in relation to data sharing, as opposed to the sheng and alert system, which both sides agree would be a sensible basis on which to maintain a relationship post Brexit. If I can come in as we know data protection is a matter, you are absolutely right. In fact, even the UK Government's white paper itself acknowledges that there is no or very, very limited precedent for non-sheng and third countries to participate in data exchange by their own acknowledgement. You are absolutely right that the noises are not particularly encouraging from the EU side either, and that is undoubtedly because there is an existing third-party precedent that is not necessarily helpful in this regard, but also because of the legislation and laws and rules. I just wanted to come to the second part of your first question, which is about arrangements that might exist for other countries outside of the EU, and so on and so forth. There will be other fallbacks or precedents in terms of justice and home affairs measures, but I go back to my point that they are not as swift, not as efficient. They are more cumbersome and more onerous than what we currently have at the moment. If I gave the example of the agreement that Iceland and Norway have, which is often referred to, that is, first of all, deficient in the sense that a number of countries—I think that Lord Advocate mentioned this—will not extradite their own nationals under those treaties, but also when those arrangements were made, they were made in 2006 and they have still yet to come into force. My point in using those examples, and I know that we are talking about data exchange, is that whatever we do, there is going to be complexity that will take a lot of time, and whatever measures are put in place, as good as they may well be, they will be deficient in comparison to what we currently have. I perhaps should have prefaced my remarks by making absolutely clear that I need no convincing whatsoever that the vote in 2016 was an act of self-harm on parallel in recent times, but, nevertheless, given where we are, and given that this is an area of such crucial importance, but where there does appear to be a level of mutual interest in trying to maintain as smooth a transition and on-going relationship as possible, and where, as an exiting EU member state, the UK is in a position, unlike any of the third parties that have been referred to in terms of relationship, is there a way of envisaging an entirely separate, unique and bespoke third-party relationship that may not deliver all of the benefits fully except that, but which maintain a number of the most significant and can be developed perhaps over time? As Lord Advocate pointed out, this is a dynamic process where the rules whatever they are agreed now will evolve over time. I go back to Lord Advocate's point that was well made, even if we have that in place, which I also hope so. Our ability to contribute to that as it develops and evolves will undoubtedly be extremely limited. We know how quickly technology in particular moves and systems and ICT systems and everything else moves at a pace. Our ability to influence that will be extraordinarily limited. Before we go on to explain the no-deal scenario, Jenny, you had some questions on the European, the rest warrant and the EU agencies in Europe. Just with regard to the European arrest warrant specifically, cabinet secretary, you spoke in your opening statement about the swiftness of the EAW, for example, in arresting someone within five hours. You also said in response to Liam McArthur just there that Norway's perhaps closest I suppose in terms of non-membership and security co-operation but we know that it is not a full participant in Europe. It does not have access to all EU databases and it has a much more complex extradition agreement. Therefore, is there any opportunity or is there any extradition agreement that could be as effective as the European arrest warrant in your view? Not as effective, I do not believe, and as I keep making the point in a reiterate again, any arrangement that we have will be deficient in comparison to what we currently have and that can be seen time again in case example after example. It is fair to say that I believe very strongly that if we have anything, which inevitably we will, any measures, any structure, any governance, any mechanisms that are deficient in comparison to what we currently have, whether that is for European arrest warrants or Euro Paul or Euro Just, Echrys or anything, then the only people that will benefit from that will be those that are trying to evade justice. I have a certain amount of very direct practical experience of conducting extradition proceedings under what is called part 2, which is the bit of the extradition act, which deals with non-arrest warrant extraditions. Of course, I am now responsible as Lord Advocate for representing requesting states from around the world who want to extradite from the UK and also dealing with our own requests to other countries with the help of Helen and her staff. Part 2 extraditions are significantly more cumbersome than extradition on using the arrest warrant. I saw somewhere, I do not know precisely what data set was being looked at, but a statement that the average time for the execution of a European arrest warrant is 42 days and the average time for a part 2 extradition is between nine and 10 months, which gives some illustration of the difference. The reason why they operate differently is that the arrest warrant is built on effectively a system of mutual trust and confidence and is an entirely judicial process. If you are a warrant issued by the relevant authority in another member state, the working assumption is that that will be executed subject to a set of protections for suspects. We have relative speed with the arrest warrant and relative simplicity. In this context, speed is important. Justice benefits that people are brought to trial in the right forum within a reasonable time, whether they are acquitted or convicted. There is a marked practical difference between the two procedures. The other really important practical difference is that the arrest warrant is plugged into the SIST 2 system. It sits alongside the system of alerts, which means that if we issue an arrest warrant for a suspect whom we want for trial in Scotland, they may be picked up very quickly through the operation of the SIST 2 system. A good example is the man in the car chart. The man who was accused and ultimately convicted of the murder of Maureen Jones, who we issued an arrest warrant and he was picked up very quickly in his home country of Slovakia following the issue of the arrest warrant and ultimately returned for trial. While there are alert systems through Interpol, alerts do not go up on the system as quickly as they do through the SIST 2 system. In moving from the current regime under the arrest warrant to an alternative, we are working on the basis that we can fall back on the European Council Convention on Extradition, which is a treaty arrangement that applies to quite a number of countries that are not in the EU and which sit under part 2. There are some technical issues that will have to be resolved. Some member states, as I understand, have repealed their domestic legislation, which would allow them to rely on the 1957 Council Europe Convention vis-à-vis the UK. That is an issue that will need to be worked through and resolved. The other difference is that under the arrest warrant system, member states are obliged to extradite in accordance with the system, regardless of whether the person who is wanted is a national of that country or not. Outside the arrest warrant system, and we see it even in the transition arrangements that are envisaged, a number of countries within the EU will not extradite their own nationals. Germany, for example, I understand, is a constitutional bar to extraditing its own nationals, but that is trumped by the arrest warrant. I go back to Maric Harchar. I understand that Slovakia is a country that will not normally extradite its own nationals. Outside the arrest warrant system, a question would have arisen about whether we would have been able to secure the extradition of that individual. One of the concerns is that, because the arrest warrant system is relatively speedy and operates according to timetables that are laid down, that there is a risk that our extradition requests, if they are made outside that system, will not be treated with the same priority as those that sit within the system. There are a set of detriments that, from a professional criminal justice perspective, one can see if we are having to operate outside the arrest warrant system. There is at least the possibility of a no-deal scenario. The cabinet secretary talked in an opening statement about planning being under way for a no-deal. Lord Advocate talked about practical arrangements being in place. Can you tell us what practical contingency planning have you done or has the Scottish Government done for this scenario? Given the cabinet secretary's point about how explicit the EU has been throughout this, when did that contingency planning start? I will give you as much detail as I possibly can, and if you want me to supplement that, I will write to the convener and to the committee wider. In terms of our own position, he knows very well our position in relation to Scotland and not wishing to leave the EU and regrettable that we are even in a position to have to think about contingency for a no-deal scenario, but that is notwithstanding. He will be aware that, of course, Mr Russell made a statement to Parliament in June, setting out the Scottish Government's planning for all exit scenarios, which involves contingency planning for a no-deal scenario. Some of that has been made difficult because we have already talked about some of the lack of clear information that has been provided to us, but none the less we have been doing what we possibly can. Let me give some examples of how we have been preparing for that no-deal scenario. First and foremost, it has been important for us to identify where legislative deficiencies would occur within the justice portfolio upon leaving the EU. We are prioritising preparing legislation, which is absolutely necessary, to amend in the event of a no-deal, and I will revert back to the committee with more detail in due course when the legislation comes forward. That also involves discussions with the UK Government as well as internally in the Scottish Government. We are also liaising, of course, with a number of agencies and bodies, such as Police Scotland, to assist them with workforce planning in the event of a no-deal to help them to prepare for EU exit. There is a number of regular meetings to discuss that contingency planning, obviously. That very much is also focused on a possible no-deal scenario. In terms of our own readiness within the justice portfolio, we have recruited extra staff. We have now the Justice and Safer Community's EU hub. He will know of the justice board, which brings together the stakeholders, the experts and the justice field. We now have a sub-board of the justice board, so he is asking about that kind of practical action. We also have the sub-board of the justice board, which again is looking at a readiness in planning for Brexit, which, of course, includes a no-deal scenario. A number of engagements with the UK Government and other devolved administrations in that regard, right from a civil service level, where we have a directors group right the way through to he knows some of the ministerial forums that exist to discuss this issue as well. So there is a whole load of practical measures that are taking place, right from identifying the appropriate legislation that would be deficient upon EU exit, right the way through to some very practical measures for a number of justice organisations from Police Scotland to the Crown Office and anybody in between. They will have to think about that. That is very much under way and has been under way for a period of time now. Just if you could answer specifically when that planning started for no deal, because you mentioned June of this year, but one would assume that that has been gone on for some time. But then, cabinet secretary, are you able to say, does the Scottish Government intend to publish the planning for no deal such that the various agencies can prepare? If so, when? On his question of when preparations for no deal, I think that all of us around this table, regardless of where we sit on the Brexit debate, would have found that no deal scenario unfathomable, but, as we have all witnessed and we have all noticed, there has been undoubtedly some talking up of the possibility of that scenario. So my understanding is that in June that preparation began for a no deal scenario, so other contingency measures undoubtedly discussed before them, but certainly no deal scenario since then. That would not have stopped other justice agencies and bodies, for example, from exploring that specific no deal scenario before then. However, I think that doing some of the more detailed work on that has been since June. On publishing, I suppose that I said a couple of things. The member had the Secretary of State for Scotland in front of his committee last week, and he mentioned that he would be publishing certain technical notices. It would be impossible for us to publish all of the detail on all of these matters if some of it relies on the information that we await from the UK Government on areas, for example, such as the European arrest warrant and extradition. Those are reserved matters. In order to do that, we would have to wait for those gaps to be filled from the UK Government and the technical notices. I do not want to pre-empt Mr Russell's statement, which is scheduled to take place later on in the Parliament. He will be touching upon contingency planning, the potential publishing of information, what I will do from my perspective and certainly from my portfolio, that when the committee asks me for particular information that is as much detail as I can give on that, I will absolutely give on what is appropriate. If there are contingencies, or what you have talked about, various contingencies are having to be made, are you able to say... It sounds as though what I am hearing is that the planning actually commenced fairly recently and is very much a fluid process, in which case, presumably, plans have not been made to quantify the spend that is required to address those practicalities. If that is right, in any event, who is expected to fund those practical contingencies? Will that be the agencies in question, or would it be the Scottish Government? Government would not expect to meet a pay-a-penny towards meeting the costs related to EU exit to Scotland must to have its fair share of any UK Government resources to support EU exit preparatory work, and that is important. Some of that will, of course, come out depending on the deal. In some respects, it is absolutely right, of course, that it is fluid depending on what type of deal we end up getting, but what we are talking about specifically here is on the worst-case scenario, that no-deal scenario, so we can make some preparations absolutely for that, but undoubtedly some of that relies on what comes forward from the UK Government in relation to the technical notices that they publish. Right then, cabinet secretary, effectively we have known for some time that there could be a no-deal scenario in six, seven, eight months, which would have a cost attached to various agencies within Scotland, but the Scottish Government does not have a concrete plan for how much that cost to each agency might be, but simply asserts that the UK Government should meet whatever that cost is. Am I summarising the position? No, the position absolutely is that we are in this situation because of the UK Government that is course negotiating on our behalf, and the preparations for a no-deal scenario, whatever costs come out of that, we would expect those costs to be met by the UK Government in terms of preparatory work for an EU exit, all of us around this. You may be interrupting, is that genuine intervention? Presumably you have made those representations to the UK Government and said that we anticipate that the cost of no-deal will be this. What do you propose in… So my point, I was coming to, and I think I made it in the first answer, was that some of this certainly relies on the UK Government coming forward with more detailed information. They are, for example, responsible for extradition when it comes to another legislative matter, so we can give some detail, and of course we share that with the UK Government, and we have, as I said, relatively good dialogue with the Ministry of Justice, not necessarily with the Home Office, so we can give some information on that, but clearly we are awaiting some of the detailed information also from the UK Government. I was just going to ask if the Crown Office had made any estimate of the cost… I was going to make an observation about the no-deal scenario, which, like the Cabinet Secretary, we all agree is not the desired outcome. The effect of a no-deal is that we effectively drop out of the existing set of arrangements for co-operation, so a significant part of the contingency planning is around identifying what alternative systems and legal instruments that are already in place that we could fall back on in relation to extradition in the Council of Europe 1957 convention. The issue there in using that convention rather than the arrest warrant system is that it is slower, more cumbersome and so on. It is a detriment in terms of the effectiveness of the system, and when we fall out of the exchange of information again, the key detriments are around effect on the overall effectiveness of the system. Contingency planning has been looking carefully at what the extent to which there are alternative arrangements that are already in place. As the Cabinet Secretary has observed, when we are dealing with areas such as extradition, we are dealing essentially with reserved areas that are for the UK Government to deal with, and my officials in the Crown Office have been, as have officials from Scottish Government, involved in contingency planning within the Home Office's judicial co-operation board in relation to those matters. Part of the contingency is also about looking at what legislative steps might be necessary in order to deal with the consequences of a no deal, and that is work that is on-going. In terms of resource, I said early on in the session that I am applying a small part of the additional funding that Scottish Government has made available to meet in-year to additional resource to support Helen and the other members of her staff who deal with the work. That is in anticipation of the potential for additional work, particularly in engaging with our counterparts, enhancing our existing good relations with our counterparts and other member states, but also in relation to individual cases, where there may be a need for more intensive discussion of counterparts for cases that may straddle the boundary. In mind, the possibility that there will be additional work on an on-going basis. Briefly, when did the Crown Office start planning for a no-deal Brexit? Will you be publishing those conclusions at any point? We have had in mind for some time the range of options. Crown Office officials have been part of the UK's contingency planning since beginning of the year. That, as I understand it, has covered the range of possible scenarios. It is the case that, over the past period, there has been an intensity of interest or focus on the no-deal scenario as we progress through this year. Cabinet Secretary, you wanted to come in and get to your supplementary questions. I am conscious of time and just two very brief points. I think that Liam Kerr asked the question very genuinely to get some reassurance for those involved in the justice sector. The reassurance that I can hopefully give is that, as Scottish ministers, we take very serious responsibilities. We are very much ensuring that resources are allocated to meet priority areas of expenditure, monitoring whether sufficient for the challenges ahead and hopefully if we get the information coming from the UK Government, we will be able to give more detail and more reassurance around the preparation for funding consequentials to portfolios, which will be confirmed as part of the autumn budget revision, which is expected to be laid before Parliament, before the end of this month. More details on that will be made available shortly. We are just worth making this latter point that the UK Government departments are only now getting to the point of costing no-deal. As Lord Advocate said, the no-deal scenario had really only been a matter of months and this has become a real possibility that we are starting to see, but hopefully that gives some element of reassurance. It is not in any sense to seek to shift responsibility to make the point that, in this area, first of all, the question of the negotiation with the EU is a matter for the UK Government and, therefore, the focus in terms of contingency planning for us in an area that is in the context of extradition and reserved area is very much our focus in which we depend on the Home Office for the approach that is being taken. I am following briefly on that theme. The Secretary of State said that the UK Government had done a gap analysis in the event of an ordeal. Was that shared with the Scottish Government? To my officials, I am not entirely sure. Not in any great detail, so what we have is on-going work with Home Office in particular on my side, where we have a judicial co-operation board that Lord Advocate talked about. That is to get to Mr Kerr's point about contingency planning for no-deal Brexit. It started on a range of different potential Brexit, but now it is focusing more heavily on a no-deal Brexit. Have we seen huge details about gap analysis? No, we haven't. What we have is an increasing amount of information that is made available but not the full analysis and data that I suspect that the Home Office has. We are working quite hard to try to tally up as much as we can to try to ensure that, for our planning purposes, for example, in terms of a no-deal impact on Europol, the Scottish Government has no control in those negotiations around what a no-deal Brexit might look like and what ultimately what those arrangements might be. We need to work closely with Home Office to try to get that information to then make sure that we are and Police Scotland are in as good a position as possible. That is where coasting and things come in. There is a whole load of work going on and we are getting ourselves as strong as a position as possible, but that information flow from Home Office, both in terms of the analysis that it is doing but also feeding back what is happening at EU level in terms of those negotiations, is crucial for us to be able to do that. Presumably more detailed analysis would help the Scottish Government to make contingency plans. Absolutely. Okay, thank you. Just on that point that I think any reasonable person listening to this evidence session would really conclude that, whether it is the Scottish Government or any other body, it is trying to plan contingency arrangements against a backdrop of various possible outcomes, and that is incredibly difficult to do. The Lord Advocate has gone into the one issue that I think is an example of the extradition. If European arrest warrant goes, would we be operating under part 2 with a longer time frame? What are, if any, the financial implications of that for Crown Office or Police Scotland? I think that, frankly, without knowing what the Home Office assessment of the implications for the English system is, it is very difficult to plan the detail costs around that one issue and that one possible outcome. What would be helpful for the committee is that, when more detailed costings begin to emerge from UK departments, we would be able to get sight of as much of that information in terms of what does that then allow the Scottish Government to do in terms of detailed scenario planning for any additional costs for Police Scotland or for the courts that may emerge from extradition, to take one example. I am sure that we can furnish the committee. I look to furnish the committee with as much detail as we can, but not too much to add to Shona Robison's captures. We do not know what the deal is going to be upon withdrawal, and therefore we have to plan on a number of scenarios from the worst-case scenario, almost backwards. On just one issue, such as the European arrest warrant raises a number of other issues, let alone looking at civil law and other aspects of criminal law and legislative deficiencies and so on. I would be happy to furnish the committee with any additional information as and when we can. John Finnie Lord Advocate and Cabinet Secretary, we have talked a little about the criminal law. Can I move on to some civil law and the important issue of family law, which might not be as high-profile but has a big impact on individuals, particularly with regard to cross-border cases where there would be issues around jurisdiction, recognition and indeed enforcement. The committee held a round-table session on that particular subject, and the main options that seem to come out were replicating the EU rules in domestic law. That would require negotiation with the EU and would provide a still maintain a role for the Court of Justice. The other option and the one favour by the UK Government was a bespoke deal, or the third option, which was relying on the default rules of national law and the various Hague conventions. I am sure that we will come back to that later in this session. Can I ask for your views on the possible impact of Brexit on family law? In particular, if I may, with regard to on-going cases and the certainty around people maybe even wanting to initiate procedures, that would obviously bring in transitional arrangements. What are the discussions of any of those that have been around that, please? In my portfolio of responsibility, I think that the questions really have to be directed to the cabinet secretary. I was more deferring to your giant legal brain. I obviously have an interest in the legal issues, but I— From our perspective? I am here as head of the system of prosecution and I speak very much from that perspective. From our perspective, and I read over the transcript of the evidence session that you held, and I found it very interesting. As tends to happen when you have a number of academics, you tend to get more opinions than there are academics necessarily, but it was really interesting to read over. My understanding is that you have various fallback positions, as you've rightly talked about. You've got the Hague conventions, for example. You've got Brussels 2A, Brussels 1A and so on and so forth. There are real-life everyday issues. If I go back to Daniel Johnson's point about bringing it back to the kind of everyday, there are some real questions to ask around things like, for example, maintenance regulations that cease to apply after Brexit. There is a Hague convention, but there are deficiencies or seem to be deficiencies within that. Some of that came out in the evidence session that you held as well. On a whole host of family issues, yes, there are other fallbacks. There is no doubt that some of those were explored in your evidence session, but there are clearly matters that have to be bottomed out in relation to those. Clearly, they all form part of on-going discussions with the UK Government as well? Again, undoubtedly, and I forgot I didn't answer your point about cross-border jurisdiction, it goes back to our previous discussions. We'd obviously have to rely on mutual recognition and riparocity. I can never get that word. Mutual recognition most certainly. That's really, really important to highlight, because for each of the EU member states, there may well be constitutional differences there that, again, have to be ironed out before we're able to bottom out jurisdiction. Does the Scottish Government recognise that, for many individuals in our constituencies, because we're very multicultural and people coming from, indeed, subsequently returning to different jurisdictions, that will cause great uncertainty for a number of people? Yes, I don't doubt that for a minute. There are many case studies that I can give where there have been issues in relation to cases that have affected us here in Scotland. I've got one case example here of a mother in Hungary to children receiving child maintenance from the children's father in accordance with an order for child support made by the Hungarian courts. However, the father relocated to Glasgow where he stopped paying maintenance. The mother submitted an application under the maintenance regulation to the Hungarian central authority that helped her to complete the requisite forms and transmitted the application to the Scottish central authority. They then identified the share of court whose jurisdiction I lived in and sent the Hungarian court order for registration in the maintenance register, thus facilitating enforcement of the order here. I'm absolutely right that that affects. If I looked at the city where I belong and where I have a constituency and represent, there's just one example of how, with the mechanisms that we have in place, we were able to ensure that a mother got the support that she needed for her child, even though the father had relocated to Glasgow. There are many more examples of that right across constituencies from the south to the north to the east to the west. That would work in reverse, too, had it been a Scottish order. Can I also touch then with the issue of civil and commercial law and the importance that there is a lot of discussion around trade and the agreements that underpin that for individual businesses? The options are largely that I outlined before, with the addition of the Lugano treaty, which is a treaty between the EU and Eftar. Are you able to talk about the implications for businesses and what practical impact that could have on the uncertainty that we have? It's hugely important. When it comes to dispute resolutions—a big, big matter, of course, in business and chapters—volumes have been written on that. If there is no common agreement on the rulebook and common agreement on what happens when there are disputes, why would a business look to invest in the UK not knowing that it has a fair chance if there is a dispute or agrees with a dispute mechanism? Whereas it could invest in other parts of the EU, it could invest in parts of the EU and absolutely know what the rulebook is, know that it has an independent arbiter in the European Court. There is that element of it, the uncertainty for business. I mean, whatever the uncertainty is, business doesn't like it. I suppose that the other part of it that we haven't talked too much about and I didn't see too much in transcripts with other organisations or indeed individuals was consumer protection, which is usually important as well. There could be a profound impact on many aspects and many rights and freedoms that consumers take for granted. For example, booking holidays in EU countries may become more expensive, more bureaucratic, lack of mobile roaming charges may longer be guaranteed. We know the issues in our movements of good and services. It could limit the access or, indeed, increase the cost of a range of services from financial products to energy supply to food and drink. There is the business side of things, which is highlighted by just one example when it comes to jurisdiction of course, and then there is the consumer aspect of it as well, which I think could be undoubtedly damaged. I suspect that Mr Russell will go on this in the Parliament. He has already mentioned that there does not have to be a choice between the hardest of hard breaks that is being pushed by some and the Prime Minister's checkers plan. The Scottish Government continues to maintain that there is a sensible and pragmatic way forward that we have proposed. I can ask them about that, because people would understand that there might be new arrangements under a different regime, but the transitional arrangements are very important. As regards any on-going case, what would the position be for that, for instance, a business that is in dispute and is unlikely to resolve that dispute within the next 200 days? I do not have detail on that from the UK Government on what a transitional arrangement would look like, and that is why the need for clarity is so, so important. As Liam Kerr referred to, time on that is relatively short, and the business that we know does not like uncertainty. I am afraid that I am not in the position to give him that certainty, because it is very much relying on information from the UK Government, so it could have a profound economic impact. I have no doubt about that. I would like to ask a couple of brief questions about intergovernmental work. More broadly, it is very clear that intergovernmental co-operation is vital and key to whatever arrangements arrive at being successful. You mentioned in one of your previous answers, cabinet secretary, that co-operation and communication with the Minister for Justice was good and better than the Home Office. I was just wondering if you could elaborate a little bit on that and just highlight what those issues have been and how you seek to improve that relationship with the Home Office. I hope that the member will not mind if I defer slightly to my officials in respect. I have been in the role for a number of months, although I have sat down with them and discussed with them. It is clear that there is a pattern emerging whereby the Ministry of Justice communication flow is certainly better than the Home Office. What I have done when I have been told of that is to seek to redress that, so I have written to the Home Secretary. Of course, I will keep the committee informed of a response that I will get from the Home Secretary and, hopefully, any conversations that I have. Excuse me, but I thought that the Lord Advocate in his previous answer highlighted why effective, meaningful engagement with the Home Office is so important because of matters around extradition and so on and so forth. I do not know if my officials are on the line, so I am going to come in on that. Gavin can speak to the Ministry of Justice and I will speak to the Home Office. We have had to work quite hard to be included in some of the planning arrangements, so that has now happened certainly in terms of the judicial co-operation board. I think that where we have found it quite difficult is where publications have happened around security. I talked earlier about a technical note and there have been other things around withdrawal agreements, future partnership papers, possible framework slides that have been published that we have had little or no input into. What has been critical for us in the justice and security sphere is to make sure that Scotland's separate legal system is factored into that wider publication, wider negotiations, that things that are bespoken special to Scotland that have developed over hundreds of years are protected and promoted in negotiations. My team and I have done that over the past two years and have effectively tried to ensure that the Scottish system is adequately represented. The cabinet secretary referenced earlier that the white paper now has mention of Scotland's separate system for the first time. We have better co-operation with the Home Office than we have. The officials there are definitely working with us in terms of their political authorising environment, but there have been times when documents have been published that we just have not seen or have not had the opportunity to feed into. What we are trying to do is to work with the UK Government and ensure that we are as possible to facilitate communication between our operational partners and those fora to make sure that their views are also represented in those discussions. I will pass over to Gavin, who can talk a bit more about the Ministry of Justice. Maybe in contrast to Home Office, which I cannot speak to at all, our relationship with the Ministry of Justice has been relatively productive and we have built reasonably good contacts with officials there and built good working relationships. There is an issue about when we get notification of documents that are to be published and so on. I cannot speak to whether that is as a consequence of late decisions being made in Whitehall or not. Our main role is ensuring accuracy and ensuring that Scotland is accurately represented in publication. We do not often cast value judgments over political documents that they are going to publish, but we welcome good contact between officials in Whitehall and we hope that that leads to better understanding for the public. Thank you very much. That provides a degree of clarity and illustration that is very helpful. Moving on from that, it is clear that any arrangement or treaty that is entered into is clearly not going to be a final destination. Therefore, it is a situation in a relationship that will evolve. Therefore, the establishment of robust inter-governmental frameworks between the Scottish Government and the UK Government is vital so that those relationships can develop. I wonder whether the Scottish Government has a view as to what features those frameworks should have, how they should work and, indeed, bearing in mind the experiences that we have just heard about, are clearly going to be instructive towards that. Initial thoughts from myself and the portfolio have been that Daniel Johnson will remember that the agreement reached at JMC in May this year. The agreement was that it would be an intensification of engagement at both ministerial level and amongst officials, but it cannot be that all engagement is done from the department to exit the cabinet office. We need experts, frankly, talking to experts, particularly in the justice domain, where many aspects of this are devolved, and the UK Government needs to ensure that it understands the difference of our legal system and the independence of Lord Advocate, etc. My understanding is that the Home Office is now putting in place some senior steering groups and expert groups to deliver some of those expert exchanges. If that is successful, I would hope that the next time that I come in front of a committee, I could be very positive. That is the kind of steps that we need to see, where it is being led by experts right the way through from the Government level to officials and outside bodies engaging between the UK and the Scottish level, in terms of common frameworks. From our perspective, I am encouraged by what I heard from the Secretary of State from Scotland last week, but I would be keen to see some more detail on some of that. Are there any proactive steps that the Scottish Government could take in terms of articulating what its view is in terms of the important or key features of any future common framework on justice matters? I understand that we have not been shy in giving our opinion on how robust those mechanisms need to be and how they need to be more meaningful. Unfortunately, we have not necessarily had the reciprocal feedback from the UK Government on willingness to engage at a level that we would like to engage in. However, as I have mentioned, there have been some positives. It would be trellis not to acknowledge some of that progress that has been made in some warm words that I thought from the Secretary of State for Scotland. Of course, when you make those warm words, they are in the record forever more, so I will look to follow up on that with the Secretary of State and with other UK Government. However, we have not been shy in coming forward, and some of the measures that we now see are because of that. It is not just the Scottish Government that should be fair to the Welsh Government, and officials from Northern Ireland have also been engaged in the process. That concludes our line of questioning. It remains to me to thank the cabinet secretary, the Lord Advocate and his officials for attending. We will now suspend to allow the witnesses to leave and for a five-minute comfort break. Agenda item 4 is consideration of two negative instruments. These are legal aid employment of Solicitor Scotland amendment regulations 2018, SSI 2018, Oblique 193 and Sheriff Court amendment order 2018, SSI 2018, Oblique 194. I refer members to paper 2, which is a note by the clerk. Do you have any comments on those instruments? Nothing substantive, but simply on the Sheriff Court fees one, it seems to be quite a major error that somebody seems to have made somewhere along the way. Going back to a point that Jenny might have made, somebody made the point about those briefings. I am curious to understand how did the error come about? Who has missed the mission of the Carvo in the original legislation? If that was this committee or this Parliament, that would be concerning. Clearly, we need something that would have flagged it up or we need to change our processes so that we are seeing that. If it wasn't us, how confident can we be that whichever agency it was is going to pick this sort of thing up in the future? The short answer is that we don't know, but we can write and get that additional information. As you say, it is important that we don't just rubber stamp those things and say that there has been a mission that would be good to find out exactly how that had occurred. If that was the case, we could delay actually approving the Sheriff Court amendment SSI today, get further information and take it from there. I will just come back on that. I think that that is sensible and I would feel much more comfortable if I knew what I was putting my name to. In terms of delaying, is that not the one that says that it needs to get the carver in as soon as possible because of the potential ramifications? We have got to 24 September, so it would allow us still to take it again next week without Anjuli affecting anything. I have no issue with what is being proposed, but mistakes happen and lots of jobs things happen. It is understandable that it is not up to schedule, but the important thing is that the mistake is being picked up and that is what we are dealing with now. In the context of what we have just been discussing in relation to Brexit, there is a Parliament that is going to have a considerable volume of statutory instruments coming before it. What that does is highlight very oppositely some of the risks that are attending on that. With my corporate body hat on, I will reflect that back to colleagues, but we need to find a way of trying to ensure that, as we are dealing with fairly weighty, substantive and complex issues, we limit the scope. John John's right errors may arise, but we absolutely need to have confidence as we go through this process. It is as robust as it possibly can be. That being the case, the committee is feeling that we want to write and just get an explanation. Mistakes do happen, but, as Liam McArthur said, we are going to be dealing with an awful lot of legislation that is coming up. If we have questions and additional questions as a result of that, it is going to be a very complex and needlessly complex transaction and activity that we are going to be undertaking. We can write and ask for a full explanation. I do not think that there is any harm in doing that. It will not affect the timing of anything and bring it back for approval next week. Are members agreed to do that with the share of court amendment? Will that affect the SSI if we get an explanation? No. Is there any point in delaying it? It is not that this is not going to change, but we will get an explanation. We will get an explanation. I think that it was really to underline the point that, if we keep just rubber-stampering those things, sooner or later, we are going to reach a mistake that is going to cause a huge delay when we know that there are so many SSIs going to be coming to this committee and other committees as a result of the Brexit settlement. I suppose that it is just making a point that we really need to know why those things happen. If it is human error, it does, but we can accept that, but we may learn something from it. I think that we definitely are making a very definite statement here. John Finnie. I would not want the term rubber-stamp misunderstood. I think that we scrutinise everything that comes before us, and the decision taken would have been taken in good faith at that time. Is the committee agreed that we will ask for an explanation and bring it back next week and take it from there, from that sheriff court order? Agreed? Agreed. Okay. In that case, in terms of legal aid employment solicitors, Scotland amendment regulations are the committee content that we make no recommendation in respect of that instrument. We are agreed. Thank you for that. We now move into private session. That concludes the public part of today's meeting. Our next meeting will be on Tuesday, 18 September, when we have our first evidence session on post-legitim scrutiny of the Police and Fire Reform Scotland Act 2012. We now move into private session.