 Good afternoon everybody, my name is Michael Collins and I'm the Director General of the Institute of International and European Affairs And I'm very pleased to welcome you all to this latest IIEA webinar And we're absolutely delighted this afternoon to be joined by Tony Connolly RTE Europe editor who's been generous enough to take time out of his schedule to speak to us to talk to us on Subject matter of Brexit Tony will speak to us for about 20 minutes or so and then we will go to our usual Q&A With you our participants and you'll be able to join the discussion using the Q&A function on Zoom Which you should see on your screen Please be free to send your questions throughout the session or indeed when Tony has finished speaking And we will come to them then in the Q&A part of our event. I Reminder that today's presentation is on the record while the Q&A is off the record under chat and house rule and Please feel free to join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIEA Tony Connolly is well known to all of us. I think he's an award-winning journalist and author as Europe editor For RT news. He has been covering Europe European EU And European affairs from Brussels now for almost 20 years Since 2001 and he's reported extensively on the period before and during and after the brings a referendum and Before that covered the European refugee crisis that we debt crisis the Irish bailout and financial crisis dating back to 2008 so he's a man pretty familiar with the whole world of crisis Tony was awarded the outstanding achievement award for journalism at the UCD Spurford Business School for his coverage of key events in Europe in 2018 and he's written for numerous national and international Publications and news agencies and his most recent book Brexit in Ireland the dangers the opportunities and the inside story of the Irish response was published in October 2017 so with that I'm going to hand over to Tony and look forward to his presentation And just again to extend a very warm welcome back to him to the IIEA. So 20 floors yours Thank you very much Michael and good afternoon everybody. So we are at a very intriguing moment in the Brexit negotiations we've had a very strange period of six months when Brexit Formally happened at the end of January 31st of January Both sides drew up their negotiating mandates in February and then the negotiations got underway Proper at the beginning of March But then the global pandemic struck and that has had a huge impact on the logistics of having the negotiations and Also on the politics of whether or not the UK should seek an extension to the transition period To accommodate the disruption that the pandemic has caused in the event. We've had Four rounds of negotiations. One of them was face-to-face at the beginning of March, but then the others have been virtual meetings of the negotiating teams by video conference and of course that has had its own problems and limitations just in terms of the technology and the logistics around that but more importantly it Took away the very valuable face-to-face nuanced part of the negotiation process and diplomacy where people can start to scope out the room for maneuver when they talk in corridors or have a coffee or do that Informal side of the process sometimes the non-verbal side of the process, but all of that was not possible during the pandemic So unsurprisingly the final round of the first half of the negotiations concluded with no rail breakthrough on any of the major issues and there was indeed a fairly downbeat and A assessment of where things were at by both chief negotiators probably more on the EU side With Michelle Barnier complaining in particular that the UK was Retreating from the letter and the spirit of the political declaration, which of course accompanied the withdrawal agreement and sets out the The vision of where the future relationship should should end up And After the break of the after the final round finished There was of course a high-level meeting between Boris Johnson and the three leaders of the main institutions So Ursula von der Leyen of the Commission Cheryl Michelle of the Council and David Sassoli of the European Parliament Interestingly that high-level format was dreamed up by one Theresa May We all remember her because she was worried that after Brexit and after the UK left the EU formerly there wouldn't be a forum or a platform for a UK Prime Minister to meet the senior principles of the European institutions. So and That meeting took place Monday week ago and it was really quite a sober Event again. It was done virtually and it was it was really a stock-taking exercise with both sides Acknowledging that there hadn't been any real breakthrough and that things were not looking good but I would Qualify that fairly quickly by saying that And to a surprising degree in my view. There was a degree of optimism On the EU side, which I was not personally expecting and that was because Both sides recommitted strongly to getting a deal this year So it's clearly in in the interests of both sides to get an agreement Boris Johnson recommitted himself to the political declaration. Although again, he said it's it's not legally binding It's only a framework and the EU side said that while they believe that their mandate that they've given Michelle Barnier Shouldn't change at this point that both sides would have to compromise and including the EU side And that was seen as Certainly by me and by other observers of this process that things were not perhaps quite as bad as they had seemed Another thing worth pointing out is that in the UK's negotiating mandate. They said that if things were not going Well by June the UK would walk away from the process and start Preparing for an outcome which would mean no trade deal by the end of the year now that clearly hasn't happened So again, that's given some people signs of encouragement and in the run-up to the high-level conference And after the failure of the initial rounds the UK were pushing for an accelerated negotiating process and possibly even a Tunnel now for those of you who aren't familiar with this terminology the tunnel is where both sides get into a very intensive Highly hermetically sealed environment where they can thrash out an agreement Without necessarily having to brief their own constituencies every day or every other day and without any media leaks in the process which would lend the process a sense of Success or give it a better chance of success This happens, of course in the withdrawal agreement last October, but It's felt here in Brussels that that was somewhat detrimental to the UK side certainly more so than to the EU side in the event There was a tunnel an agreement was done by the end of October, but Boris Johnson had to accept a Sitch a solution to the Irish question Which was quite similar to that presented by the European Commission in February of 2018 Which was you know widely and robustly rejected by Theresa May and and everybody else in the British establishment So I think Boris Johnson paid a price for the the tunnel action of last year and so in recent weeks you've heard British sources and politicians like Penny Mordent of the Cabinet Office Saying that we should get into a much more intense phase of negotiations in July so that the UK would not be stuck then in another tunnel situation at the last minute because if you're in a tunnel it's And the clock is ticking. It's very hard to have a wholesale Rewriting of a legal text. So you tend to have to go for something That's off the shelf and that would tend to favour the EU side in these negotiations So the feeling in Brussels was that there was no way that we would get into a tunnel at that point in July Mainly because the German presidency is taking over on the 1st of July and German presidency wants to exclusively concentrate on the multi-annual financial framework in other words the seven-year EU budget and of course the Coronavirus recovery fund so that's going to take up all of the EU's energies and attention in July And then after the break in August, that's the time when things would Get into that intense high gear Moment of a tunnel September October and also there was a feeling on the EU side that the UK would have to move On some of its red lines before they would get into a tunnel and in the first part of the negotiations There didn't seem to be any real evidence that that was the case certainly from from the EU side But both sides did Even though there was no tunnel set up both sides did agree to a different kind of intense intensification of The negotiations and that intensification will start on Monday. So this is a good time to be looking ahead to that And and what they've done is of course first thing to note is that this is going to be a these are going to be a face-to-face Meetings, that's not going to be virtual anymore And they've reduced the numbers of negotiators to smaller groups In the hope that they can work more productively because during the lockdown we had a Situation where there was a hundred negotiators on one side and a hundred on the other So that they've broken it down to smaller groups and on Monday a Little fewer than two dozen British officials will come over to Brussels. They'll go into the Berlin mall They'll probably be a certain protocol in terms of some sanitation and sanitization But they will get together and they're trying to create a Process whereby the two principles Michel Barnier on the EU side and David Frost on the UK side and Have a much more direct input Into this into these technical negotiations between smaller teams of negotiators and the reason for that is they're trying to scope out what are the margins for maneuver on each other's positions and if Barney and Frost are Looking over their shoulders the shoulders at that point It gives the process a bit of political cover And it means that both sides can move more quickly if they believe that pretty political cover Is there so the feeling here in Brussels is that next week will be critical It's kind of a pilot week if you like they're trying this new process out and if by the end of the week there's a good atmosphere and that's You know without both sides necessarily caving on their red lines If there is sign a sign that both sides are able to start to look at those margins for maneuver And the atmosphere is good and that will determine how the other four weeks of this new process Will unfold and of course the corollary of that is that if things are not looking good by the end of this week And both sides are kind of sticking to their Rhetorical red lines then that doesn't look good at all for the process So what are the main sticking points will of course they've been boiled down to Four key problem areas one is of course the level playing field and that includes state aid The second one is fisheries a very important subject for Ireland The third is police and judicial cooperation And criminal justice and the fourth is governance in other words How do you solve disputes in the future between both sides? What role will international arbitration have what will the dispute resolution mechanisms look like? What role will the European Court of Justice have and these are the four areas that have proved Simply unsolvable in the first part of the negotiations To put it simply of course the UK believes that the EU is asking it to Bind itself to EU regulations in perpetuity that the EU is asking it to sign up to obligations that the EU didn't impose on countries like Japan South Korea and Canada in recent free trade agreements and that's especially on state aid where The EU's negotiating mandate spells out that the UK would have to follow EU rules Be subject to the European Court of Justice when it comes to state aid And the UK is saying this is simply an affront to their newfound sovereignty and and to democracy itself The EU's I suppose understanding of the level playing field is that Of course, and we've heard this said many times the UK is not like Japan or Canada or South Korea in terms of its size In terms of its geographical proximity to the EU So therefore there has to be a much more robust Level playing field agreement between both sides and I was level playing field mean in simple terms the EU doesn't want the UK to be under cutting European companies by deregulating industries with a kind of a risk to the bottom the political declaration commits both sides to to staying at the level of The same standards when it comes to Labour law when it comes to social protection when it comes to the environment climate change and taxation in other words At the end of the transition the UK would promise not to lower its standards from the position that it's in and of course The position that it's in at the end of the transition will be that which has been determined by EU law And the EU even would would like a situation where both sides can every couple of years Agree to increase its stand and increase their standards raise their standards Accordingly, but of course the UK believes that it shouldn't have to follow EU standards or rules that its own standards and rules will be absolutely fine And there shouldn't be a problem Now that those are one set of issues that the EU is very concerned about They don't want to be undercut by British companies However, the issue regarding stated is is a much more fundamental one and this is probably going to be the hardest not to crack Promising that you don't lower your standards below a certain threshold when it comes to Labour law when it comes to social rights And so on is one thing but Committing to a regime where you promise as a government as a state not to step in and intervene in the economy To the benefit of one sector or one particular company That would give you a competitive edge over the EU or vice versa That's a much more tricky thing because it does encroach into The sense of sovereignty the sense that the state can do what it likes When it comes to managing its own economy and of course in the pandemic Governments across the world and in particular in the EU have been stepping in right left and centre to Intervene to Baylor sectors to Baylor companies that were threatened by the pandemic And so you could say that well How can both sides sign up to something when something like this happens when a pandemic comes along? but that Ironically is the very reason why the EU wants to have something that is understood by both sides So that when there is a shock that comes along Even if it's an asymmetric shock at least both sides will know what are the principles that they've both signed up to and How have those principles been codified in a treaty? So to explain the EU's position on state aid They want something that is long-lasting that is Clear and understandable by both sides That will be driven by a set of principles that the both sides sign up to and as I said will be Translated into a set of rules that that kind of work that people know Exactly how they will work and the UK's preference is to To go for the World Trade Organization Mechanisms which they say are robust enough to Protect against any rigging of the system by a government by the UK government stepping into bailout Certain companies or sectors the UK is very fond of reminding everybody that they are one of the Least offending member states when it comes to state aid infringement proceedings Germany and France are much more egregious in their flooding of state aid rules So therefore why should the UK not be trusted to? Be reasonable and to follow a certain pathway when it comes to to state aid But the the EU doesn't buy that for the moment and in recent days. We've had some signals from London Which have been somewhat Contradicted by David Frost in a Twitter feed yesterday This idea that both sides would sign up to an understanding on state aid and level playing field But if the UK felt the need to diverge from that particular Pathway, then they would take the pain in terms of tariffs that the EU would impose on on a particular sector that the UK has been Bailing out and now when you talk to officials here in Brussels about this particular idea We quickly get into this notion of of a marriage so the UK is almost saying well, yes, I'll marry you but I want the Possibility to sleep around from time to time and if I do sleep around and get caught Then I don't mind if you put me on the couch for a few days or if you kick me out and throw my guitar at the window That's fine by me. And so it's almost like they're pricing in What that divergence Would would allow them that they could diverge where it suits them and then pay the penalty by way of tariffs And the EU's approach to this is entirely different. They want something as I say that is long lasting that doesn't end up with a dispute resolution problem every six months and that doesn't get into an escalating tariff war and Privately officials here think that the the UK Understands that and that the UK probably doesn't want that either Which may explain why yesterday David Frost in his Twitter feed denied that the UK wanted to have a license to diverge and then to pay the price through Tariffs that would apply to particular goods or a particular sector and On fisheries briefly Yeah, again, the European Commission has been following the mandate laid down by member states on fisheries in fact When the Commission drew up its draft mandate Fisheries in one area where member states sent the mandate back and said no they want to tougher than what the Commission had Proposed originally so on fisheries the EU wants pretty much the existing quota system to to remain the status quo to continue As it as it has operated in the common fisheries policy. So Effectively the argument is that for decades perhaps centuries European fleets have had access to UK waters and they've enjoyed the ability to catch certain quota of Various species and this again was codified in the common fisheries policy And the EU is saying well We want that to continue because those are historic rights that we've had the UK position is no We're taking back control of our territorial waters. We're going to be an independent coastal state So therefore we're the ones who are going to not control all the quotas in our waters They don't have the capacity to catch all those fish, but that they would be in the driving seat and to Have discretion over who comes in how much quota they get now the approach the UK is taking is instead of relative stability Which is the mechanism Which reflects these historical quota? Share odds they want something called zonal attachment a very technical term I won't get into the details, but essentially it's using deep data To identify where exactly the fish are where they breed where they spawn where they migrate And to cut a long story short that would give the UK more quota than it gets at the moment The UK also wants an annual negotiation with the EU on the share of quotas And the EU is saying absolutely not that's never going to work Britain says well you have an annual negotiation with Norway the EU says well we share seven species with Norway We share over a hundred species with the UK so technically impossible to do an annual quota negotiation for a hundred species and So again, so that's the kind of deadlock there the UK believes it is being reasonable Accepting some quota for european fleets, but not the status quo Michelle Barnier signaled on a few occasions that perhaps Zonal attachment was one criteria they could look at but they'd also have to look at the historical criteria as well I think there was an element there of Both sides inching out of their shells a little bit, but then their constituencies cried fall and Michelle Barnier then had a Apparently fairly difficult meeting with the group of the fishing countries of which Ireland is a member who told them No, you've got to stick to your mandate. This is not the time to be To be compromising on our red lines on fisheries So again, this is another issue that's going to have to come under this new procedure Next week another problem again, of course is police and judicial cooperation I'll be short here. This is a very important area for the EU because if the UK wants to have continued access to crime and Prosecution databases that the EU have there's a there's a cluster of different databases That relate to fingerprints DNA license plates criminal records These fall under different mechanisms like the prune decision and so on the shengen information system and so on and The EU is going to insist that if the UK wants access to some of those mechanisms, they're going to have to Allow European Court of Justice oversight. They're going to have to at least Make sure that the European Court of Human Rights is abided by in every decision and every mechanism that is set up And this is again is causing troubles Finally on governance the fourth of the big outstanding areas The UK wants a straightforward free trade agreement A comprehensive free trade agreement with zero tariff and zero quotas And then they want a sequence of other free standing agreements on aviation for example on fisheries on other aspects of cooperation And they want those to have their own governance regimes or umbrellas The EU on the other hand wants one overarching agreement with one clear governance system that is Clear to everyone and that works and again, you're getting into this kind of fundamental difference of Aspiration if you like the EU wants something that is going to be long lasting clear bound into a treaty that is everybody knows where they stand And does not lead to endless disputes between both sides And the UK wants something a lot a lot looser No rule whatsoever for the European Court of Justice and different governance mechanisms for different standalone agreements that that they're keen on So so those are the big outstanding issues a brief word on the Northern Ireland protocol Which I'm sure we get into in the q&a of course the UK must implement the protocol or else there will be no free trade agreements the two things are very clearly linked by the EU and it's written into the political declaration and indeed the withdrawal agreement And I'm happy to go into more detail on the Northern Ireland protocol over the q&a but that's a sense really of the new The new negotiating session we are our Segment that we're getting into now from next week and a sense of what the key outstanding issues are. Thank you And thank you Tony that's for that comprehensive and timely insight as well I really appreciate it and with lots of questions coming in but maybe just start with one In fact, it's one that I wanted to talk about myself really as well by way of an introductory question And that's the question of trust And I suppose for these negotiations and for most negotiations any negotiations to work There has to be a degree of trust between the two sides and this is a question also echoed by echoed by John O'Hagan From Trinity College in Dublin who asks can the current British government be trusted to honor fully existing agreements? To honor fully existing agreements and hence future accords if not What is the best strategy for the EU to adopt in that situation? So I suppose again there's a little bit of a track record there in terms of Explinding and that type of thing so how optimistic we could be that any any any deal it can be done and if done Will be stuck to it. Yeah The the question trust I think has has gone goes right back actually When it comes to brexit because you'll remember that When brexit happened and everybody talked about no return to the borders of the past in the Irish context The British preference for solving the Irish problem was through a free trade agreement Theresa May always believed that A future free trade agreement would be so closely Would see such close alignment between both sides that there wouldn't need to be any checks and controls on the Irish border um, you know, she believed in high alignment when it came to customs and And goods regulations even though that was very problematic for her in the conservative party but She initially couldn't understand and her team couldn't understand why the Irish question had to be settled in the divorce that they felt it was Since it was to do with trade and customs. That was all a future relationship issue But of course the EU and Ireland Felt instinctively that if they left the Irish border to the future then it would become a bargaining chip in the negotiations Uh for the UK. So that was why That that's how in a sense there was a An immediate lack of trust on the Irish and UK and EU side Going into this process because they simply didn't trust the UK not to try and make it a bargaining chip in the future relationship negotiations And so we had the withdrawal agreement concluded in October last year and the Irish protocol is part of that and we did have a period right up until May when There wasn't really a huge amount of trust on the EU side that the UK Was going to fully implement the withdrawal the Irish protocol, which is part of the withdrawal agreement Perhaps even that they didn't fully understand what they signed up to What the obligations would be in terms of customs in terms of vat and dexize in terms of regulatory alignment In northern Ireland to to the rest of the the EU single market for goods And that's because you had You know clear unambiguous declarations from people all the way to the top and putting Boris Johnson saying that there would be no Checks or controls no need for paperwork on goods going both ways between northern Ireland and Great Britain and also A clear sense that the UK felt that the joint committee which is there to implement the protocol and other aspects of the withdrawal agreement And that that was there really as a forum to negotiate away some of the more unpleasant obligations of the northern Ireland protocol So for those reasons There there was certainly alarm on the EU side that that Britain What was not fully Understanding what its obligations were or was signaling that it wasn't fully going to implement those obligations And that did cause quite a bit of unease and I think that's why the initial raw over the office in Belfast kind of blew up um because You know in a sense if the UK is not going to Fully implement the checks and controls that are there Then you you're going to need to have A hand on the shoulder You're going to need to have close oversight by the european commission by member state officials who who are Fully qualified in implementing EU customs and vat and animal health law and so on So I think the lack of trust was definitely there um And also was compounded by the fact that the the UK seemed to be taking forever to show That it was preparing to implement this new regime at the end of the year That it was hiring vets that it was setting up an IT system Uh and that it was going to start preparing infrastructure because this it's not just doing this at the end of the transition It has to be done You know the the process has to start by by the end of june um, so that was compounding the lack of trust I think um, but the There are certainly signs that the uk is coming forward now with with more concrete detail on on what is What it's doing but it is important as well to remember that Implementing the protocol is an international obligation that the uk has signed up to And that it can be taken to the european court of justice if it doesn't and People in the uk can take the british government to court If the protocol isn't being implemented That's all written into the the treaty that boris johnson signed So while there has been a problem with trust And there are safeguards there um, but of course If you do come to the end of this year and there are yawning gaps in implementation when it comes to the northerner protocol then The question is What leverage does the uh, eu have the nuclear option would be to say well We can't include this free trade agreement until you do x y and z at the port of larne Um or belfast or war and point Um, I don't think the eu likes to work like that. Um, but uh, it does Raise a question mark over what happens at the end of this year but certainly There are much more encouraging signs for the eu at least that that The work is now getting underway at a much greater speed Okay, thank you. Tony Questions here, maybe just uh link to them together one from patty smith the colleague journalist, of course the irish times And a second one from bobby mcdonough and just again to restate the chatting house part They were in the chatting house section of this, um engagement at the moment, but patty wants to know does Tony have a sense that Um, the pandemic the pandemic may be providing cover for brexitiers Who do not want a deal by concealing the inevitable cost of a no deal? And then bobby, uh mcdonough, what is the view and Brussels about who is really calling the shots in london is a johnson Gov are comings Okay on on the pandemic. Um, I mean certainly There has been um a belief that you could kind of smuggle the pain of a no deal brexit through under the cover of of the existing pain of of the pandemic um I mean, I think I think that belief is attributed to the true believers Of of the brexit movement, um, especially the cohort of vote leave People who have found their way inside number 10 There there was a great, um Analogy by rafael bear. I think in the guardian who said these true believers like regard a hard brexit as a as a a glass of whiskey that is better enjoyed As a straight shot down the gullet rather than to be sipped um But I don't think that their influence Um has been fully tested yet. Uh, I think in the first half of this year or else johnson was obviously preoccupied by his own illness by lots of other things and the feeling here was that he hadn't fully Engaged with the negotiating process, but that he is now much more engaged and I think the fact that Um, he agreed in the high level conference that an agreement isn't going to come out of the sky Both sides have to shift on their positions. I think people here find that encouraging um Of course, the eu has said that they know that they will have to compromise as well Qualifying that by saying compromise is not a dirty word in brussels. It's perhaps the essence of the base Um, and yet they're not going to compromise on their on their principles The role of the european court of justice and so on um so I I think the the idea that britain is going to go freewheeling towards a crash out No trade deal brexit at the end of this year has probably receded a bit after the high level conference Yeah, I do detect that it's in both sides interest to get an agreement and they do have a Mechanism now where they can test the margins and the politics of the margins more effectively When they're face-to-face when they're in smaller teams Um, I still don't think that they're going to have a magic tunnel appearing in july I think that is all going to happen in september and october and um, you know, it's it's Quite likely that the eu has self interest in that regard. Um But I think the overall Trying to use the pandemic as cover is probably a bit of a fantasy entertained by certain people in number 10, but probably won't bear out in the end So I can you remind me of bobby's question again Uh, what is the view in russians about who is really calling the shots in london? Is it johnson gove or comings? Well, certainly when donnie comings was appointed as special advisor to boros johnson There was a real sense of deflation here in brussels among member states among the working party Which is the group that brings together brexit coordinators. I mean I think british observers are always amazed at how closely the The system here in brussels follows uk politics I mean they have followed it obsessively since the referendum and they have to they have to read Uh, what their opponent is made of and the ambient forces around the their opponent Um, so nobody underestimates the the the influence of dominic comings I think they see that he was largely responsible for the decision not to extend the transition And of course that decision was taken at a time when boros johnson was either in hospital or convalescing so Certainly he has been a very important figure up to now, but I think there's a belief now that that johnson is going to be more in the driving seat As we get into the autumn I mean johnson is a Strange character in terms of his perception in brussels He is in in some ways a fairly toxic brand Given his time as foreign secretary Some of the things he said about the eu on the record But also he is perceived as one who will pragmatically You know turn on a sixpence if it means getting a deal and that was really the experience in October of last year and that might again come around to haunt boros johnson the fact that he What he swallowed last year what was really quite something given what he said on on the issue previously So I think as we get into the autumn the belief here is that johnson will be more in charge Michael gove is kind of more tied up with the implementation of the withdrawal agreement um You know that keeps him extremely busy because he's constantly being You know harangued by northern business organizations about the slow pace of detail coming out from The system and whitehall on what changes are going to have to be made um So it's not clear from my vantage point here what Influence gove is going to have on the future relationship although he is seen as You know a fairly true blue believer in in brexit and You know something of a zealot uh when it when it comes to the crunch um But I think the feeling now ultimately is that boros johnson will assume a more managerial role Once we get into the autumn that's obviously touchwood He's opposing we don't have a another second wave in the pandemic Yeah, just but with some exceptions, of course, uh, uk journalism still continues and asserts british exceptionalism And I suppose constantly obscure the realities of the uk and negotiating position I mean, how how does the commission of you are manage the shortcomings in uk media handling of issues like brexit? I mean, it must be very frustrating and when they follow Media coverage from brussel's obsessive as you say to see just the level of it, which is so It's so At times. It's just a time simply unbelievable Yeah, but I think um, you know over the years Even going back to the 1980s and certainly following the the mass trick treaty. Um I think the eu has been aware of the the force of tabloid antipathy and Uh, not just tabloid obviously broadsheet antipathy to the european project as well and I mean the impression I would get over the past couple of years is that people hear member states members of the commission Are fully aware that Britain has been in a kind of submerged civil war Since the brexit referendum and that there is so much signaling that that has to be done to one constituency or another And that's in the quiet of the negotiating room. The uk will take a more pragmatic position but you know That that tide of a pro brim Directed at europe certainly had results in terms of how people vote in the end and and you know people are sore over here But that's uh, no doubt Um, you know, it's it's expressed privately But you know, maybe publicly by people like martin schultz, uh, former president of the of the parliament um But You know, especially during therese amaze reand there there was a real understanding of the pressures that she was under and why she had to Uh, direct a certain reassurance to you know her party the european research group and her party That she was constantly trying to ride several horses at the one time and I think there was a certain amount of slack given to her but when it came to the crunch like in salzberg in In september of 2019 um Sorry 2018 You know, when the eu finally kind of spelled it out to trees amae You know, there were there was a human cry from from london that she was humiliated And uh, so on so you do get this real disconnect Uh in perspectives, um, but overall i'd say You know the commission the member states factor in that there's there's signaling going on all the time And that that might be different to what's happening in in the negotiating room Okay, thanks for the question here from to bias lock. He says the uk currently proposes The conclusion of 10 different agreements all together. Do you want only one for very good reasons? Uh, what do you expect the when do you expect the uk to climb down from that tree and exceed to the eu's demands? um well I yeah, my overall i would say That the uk is going to have to move further than the eu uh on on the big issues. Um, I mean the eu is still very united and There's more of a kind of a take it or leave it attitude in the eu You know, they like the single market and the way it functions is extremely important to member states, especially at the moment with the pandemic And the fact that so much money is going into strengthening the single market Um, that they are not going to want to take any risks with it when it comes to the autumn Um, I think on fisheries the eu is probably going to have to shift a bit more On on zonal attachment and away from the the status quo You know, okay, there there may be some areas where you know when it push comes to shove in the autumn that they may agree some separate standalone governance agreements, but You know, I think the eu does not want this relationship to be bedeviled by constant friction And constant dispute resolution over time And I think that's really is what's going to guide the eu's posture in in the autumn Thank you, tony. Just a question here from jane olmeyer in trinity. Uh, thank you for your insights, tony Have there been any discussions about the uk's involvement in research? For example, horizon europe or the erasmus exchange erasmus exchange program Um, yes, I mean those are Those are sort of ongoing issues in the negotiations And certainly if the uk wants to access horizon 2020, it'll have to pay into that's particular Fund for the privilege I just from memory. I can't detect any major Controversies there And certainly the eu would want the uk with its, you know, the excellence of its universities To keep uh participating in in horizon 2020 or the new whatever the successor is um On on erasmus again, that's something that's open to the uk if they want to pay into it, but There were reports last week that the uk wants to have its own um international exchange program which Has annoyed quite a few people just from reading some of the reaction to it, but Those are two areas that have not really raised a lot of controversy so far, but um You know that that's something I can maybe come back to you in another time Yeah, okay from lee mcdonnell He says the storm and assembly had the chance to debate brexit for the first time And when it voted in favor of an extension to the transition period He says along with the dup be ready to attack the need for checks at the irc How will this affect the post? Deal politic of climate considering storm's role in the withdrawal agreement and he said a second question Are there any legal maneuvers that can be made for an extension to occur after july 1? um an intermediary uh cooperation agreement for example Well on the second one, I think All of the experts have looked at this Would agree or the experts that to my mind really matter people like jean claude pierce the former secretary general in the in the council That that there is no treaty based way to Have an extension to the transition You know at the stage the that ship has sailed The end of june was the deadline for that and the uk has clearly said they don't want an extension Um, so I don't see that being an issue um the role of storm and in overseeing and Accepting the northern island protocol. I think is a very grave Reality that's going to be there in coming years, uh, and it's I don't think it gets the the debate that it deserves In essentially there's a new consent mechanism in the irish protocol, which means that After four years storm and can give its view in a simple majority form a format Of whether or not certain provisions of the protocol articles 5 to 10 should continue. Those are the alignment Provisions of the protocol All the other parts of the protocol on north-south cooperation and so on would continue But they could vote to pull out of of those arrangements. So it's really it it puts the irish government in a slightly difficult situation because The irish government will inherit any crisis that comes around four years after the protocol takes effect so the way to avoid a crisis is for the protocol to gain acceptance to Be metabolized by the business community and by people in general And so obviously the more burdensome or bureaucratic or costly it becomes Not just for businesses, but also for consumers who might find that they're or whatever reason There there are suddenly less of a choice of projects in supermarket shelves because of The workings through of the protocol that they might turn against it as well. And so it's in everybody's interest that the protocol is Um accepted and that it works efficiently. Um, but of course the government can't go against the grain of what member states want and they just want to make sure that the protocol works that The northern island does not become a backdoor into the single market And that there can be a reasonable accounting for where goods go Whether tariffs should be paid whether parts of goods from Great britain are processed and then sold on across the border Um, you know, they want to make sure that that all of that is done according to the letter of the protocol And this all has to be worked out by the way by The joint committee. Um, what what are the criteria for judging which goods are deemed at risk of crossing the border? And which are deemed not at risk and should therefore not attract any tariff Um, but tariffs are not there are still going to be checks and controls They're still going to be, um, you know, quite considerable amount of paperwork Not just Not Great Britain to Northern Ireland also goods going from Northern Ireland to Great Britain Will according to the EU's union customs code will have to provide a an exit summary declaration Which is cumbersome and expensive. Um, but that's going to be something the EU is going to insist on um, so I think the protocol is going to be difficult and You know, we've got some of the elections coming up soon and You know, the the polarization effect of brexit doesn't end with the protocol and we're going to be living with this for some time Really? Just a question from Ted Smith relating again to the Northern Ireland protocol. I presume in particular He says Tony how much influence does support for the Good Friday Agreement by Speaker Pelosi Nancy Pelosi? And chairman, uh, Virginia have on the British government policy on Northern Ireland and its post Brexit planning, I suppose it's a london question wrong the brussel's questions Maybe but nonetheless, I'm sure you're you're fully capable of addressing it. Yeah, I mean, it's it's certainly I mean, this is a warning that comes up from time to time and is is quite a salutary Um declaration from Nancy Pelosi It's it's really hard to say something, you know, it's really hard to predict how a threat like that would um, you know Unfold during a negotiation I mean, you would have to ensure that There is a component in the UK us trade negotiations, which specifically shines a light on how the protocol is being implemented by the UK government Um, I mean, how would you do that? In a way that gives all sides clarity as to what's happening I mean, you're talking about, um, the US Congress, which Obviously has to approve a trade agreement Are they going to be sufficiently versed in the detail and complexities of the Northern Ireland protocol to say You know, we're stopping this train right here until x y and z happens at the port of larne and I mean, you could say that The protocol delivers the promise of no hard border For now, um Of course, if if storming rejects the protocol in years to come and There's no solution found in the two-year cooling off period Then we're back to square one, you know, where do the checks and controls happen? Um, that that's the I suppose that's the achilles heel of the protocol um, but for now, you know, the the promise of No hard border has been delivered through the protocol. There will not be checks or controls on the border at all Um, north-south cooperation is protected Um, in the same way it was protected under Theresa May um, and the initial, uh, protocol That the rights issue is also factored in to the protocol, although Certainly human rights activists have have reservations about how it will apply um But I I don't see any major red flags there for congress to to grab hold of um, when it comes to a free trade agreement with the uk um, just A question from portick murphy Remember the the institute obviously the former colleague. He says there are reports It is in relation to relationships in brussels and maybe unrelated to brexit, but nonetheless There are reports of jockeying for positions between charles michel and urslive underline In regard to the meeting with johnson, for example But not only that it also enriched the turkey and the rescue packet package Have been mentioned as well. Have you seen any evidence of this? I suppose friction or tension between the two of them? Um, I I haven't seen that much in in in relation to brexit. Um I mean, you're always going to get tension between the commission and the council anyway um I think Urslive underline has had a very high profile during the pandemic. She's been extremely active um, I think the commission was really stung by the shortfall or the shortcomings of the e use initial response to the pandemic um, when it comes to brexit, I mean the The way things operate is that Michelle barnier is the negotiator. He's been given his mandate by member states and As far as I can see member states, uh, which is the european council In effect They are content to let michelle barnier and the commission handle the negotiations. Um So I I haven't detected any major problems. I think there was a there was there has been a problem with um a division of labor that charles michel set up, uh between his secretary general and his sherpa over managing European summits and the I think the sherpa Resigned a few weeks ago But beyond that, I haven't seen any anything that was blown up on the brexit front between both both institutions And just um, just we're coming to the end and now to when you've got about three or four minutes left And maybe just to focus in if we could on the uh, On the german presidency of the european union, which of course begins on the uh on the first of july so we have two questions here one from John cronin and mccann's mccann for sterl and a second one from uh, brian daily of kpmg John's question is what significance will the german presidency of the eu play or have and what role will angular merkel Play and from brian, uh, does tony see the german presidency having any impact on how the process would move from here I think it's very both very interesting questions and I think it's a bit of a misconception that Presidents presidencies have played Any major role on the in the brexit process? I mean as far as I can see going back to June 2016 I I can't see any presidency that has has has made a big difference in terms of steering or influencing the um The negotiations on the withdrawal agreement and then the subsequent negotiations on the future relationship I mean kruesia is handing over obviously to germany at the moment Meant apart from the fact that saltsberg provided a very dramatic setting to a huge row that treason a had with The eu uh 27 leaders You know, you can't really point to you know a single Decisive intervention by a presidency Well, obviously a german presidency is not just a your your ordinary presidency And of course there's that added flavor of the myth of angela merkel or the german car makers coming to britain's rescue But uh, you know again michelle barnier has the mandate from member states And he's entirely supported by angela merkel and the other leaders and You know if he's gonna if he is going to Have his mandate changed then the german presidency isn't going to dictate that it'll be Something that the eu 27 through the working party through the general affairs council and then upwards to the leaders At leader level They will be the ones who decide to relax or or change his negotiating mandate. It won't be the german presidency um That being said of course angela merkel will be an extremely influential individual in Especially in the final stages I mean the There was an absolutely decisive phone call between angela merkel and boris johnson In the middle of october which changed everything and that was when she told boris johnson that his plan for a customs border on the island of ireland with uh Technological facilitations was simply not going to be accepted and Three days later we had the tharton manor encounter with um the t-shock and boris johnson so angela merkel's Voice certainly carries a lot of weight um But to be honest, I don't think the german presidency per se will make a huge amount of difference Okay, well on that note, uh, only we're just coming up to two o'clock uh double in time So, uh, we're going to draw there. There are several other questions that I haven't been able to get to Um, but um, I think you've covered the gist of many of them in any event in your presentation and in your q&a So we're grateful for that But again, well, thank you for for being with us today Pleasure for for for giving us the insights on a regular basis you do from Brussels when I wake up every saturday morning Your your dissertation. Um, I know I've had your you're depressed for the rest of the weekend No, it's it's excellent stuff and and i'm sure it's also read by by a very wide g&d not just here in ireland But also Brussels and London as well. So thank you very much. Keep up the good work there and um, the next six months again Are critical on so many fronts, but not least of all brexit people I think, you know That we frequently hear the institute that people are getting tired of brexit that the brexit issue has been over overexposed in some respects But in fact, the more you speak about the more you one realizes that There are so many issues yet to be resolved and that must be resolved in the interest not just of Ireland But of the uk and the union as a whole So thank you, tony and um, and enjoy the rest of the um, enjoy the rest of the day. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you, Michael Thanks a lot. Okay. Thank you