 Welcome to Global Report. I'm your host, Loli. Joining us today is Dr. Daniel Markey, who is a senior professor at John Hopkins and also an academic director of the Global Policy Program. Welcome to the show, Dan. Great to see you. Thanks. Well, you know, I'm gonna address you on a first name basis because I think we're very close in age, except when I look at your resume, you're so much more accomplished. So let me look at it again, all right? In 2003 to 2007, you were part of the policy planning staff at the State Department, and prior to that, you were the executive director of the research program at Princeton, and even earlier, you were at Harvard for Strategic Studies. And 2007 to 2015, you were at Council of Foreign Relations for India, Pakistan, and South Asia. And while you were there, you wrote a book. Yes, no exit from Pakistan. Well, that's disgusting. I mean, you must make your peers feel so unpolished. No, no, I have some wonderful peers, all very polished, but thank you. Well, I think I'm just hanging out with the wrong crowd because most of my friends, my American friends, including those in the State Department, will not be able to find Pakistan on a map. So let's just pull up the map of the world map and show people where Pakistan is. Yeah, well, if we can find India, which looks kind of orange to me, I think, maybe if we go north from there. Or maybe we'll go to China first because China's a little bit... China bright yellow, yeah. And then try to follow the line if you could imagine where the Himalayan mountains are. But if you don't know where Pakistan is, you might not know that either. But look above India. So between the yellow and the orange and keep going to the, I guess, to the west and you'll find Pakistan. There we go. And it looks like it's in green, right below Afghanistan, which of course we've heard a lot about over the past 20 years since 9-11. And along the Arabian Sea and not far from the Persian Gulf in the Middle East. So Pakistan occupies an interesting spot between South Asia and Asia and really getting into Central Asia and even into the Middle East. Well, you know, Dan, I simply stole the show title from your book title. Where did you steal it from? I stole the title from a play, a famous play, Jean-Paul Sartre's play, No Exit. And I saw in that, I don't consider myself a French literature expert, but I saw in that title and in the play itself, this kind of similarity to the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, because in the play, the central characters find themselves stuck in a room together and they're tormenting each other. And they can't seem to escape from their torment. And, you know, there's this famous line, hell is other people, reflecting how much they hate dealing with one another. And in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, it is often felt similar, really tormented. And yet in both cases, the main characters cannot really escape from one another. There's no exit from that torment. And in the case of the United States and Pakistan, what we found is even when we thought we were exiting the relationship that the United States was stepping away, we've always found ourselves pulled back into the relationship with Pakistan that's happened again and again throughout modern history. And I'm worried that it's likely to happen again. So I wanted to reflect on that and consider some of the lessons for the future. So can you tell us some of the mutual fragilities in this tormenting relationship? Yeah, we do know how to get under each other's skins, so to speak. So at the time when I wrote this, now it's been a few years, obviously one of the critical security problems for the United States was still terrorism. And of course, we still are worried about terrorism and we're worried about Afghanistan. And we still haven't found, we the United States haven't found a safe and secure way to get out of Afghanistan. And Pakistan is still central to that set of challenges, both how to leave Afghanistan in relative peace, to negotiate our way out so that we don't have to fight a war there forever. And then also once that is done to make sure that we don't face a problem of terrorism, of Islamist terrorism coming from other Afghanistan or Pakistan. But beyond that, Pakistan also is a nuclear weapons state, a state that's long been at war or near war with India or in repeated rolling crises with India. And it's a country that doesn't seem to be able to govern itself terribly effectively. So it's both in a sense a threatening place in the world, but also a weak and fragile and developing country, none of which makes its problems easy to solve. So as the United States looks at Pakistan, it sees all of these problems. And it has certainly over the last 20 years now, been very frustrated with Pakistan's lies and misdirection, suggestion that Pakistan was doing all that it could on terrorism, even though the United States throughout most of this period has known otherwise. So that's why we've been frustrated with them. The Pakistanis are also really frustrated with the United States. From as far back as the 1950s, they have tried to cultivate a relationship with us. And they've always tried to use us to help balance against India. But they also find us to be, I guess, a fickle partner, not a country that they could count on. We come in, we use Pakistan to serve our purposes, whether it was in the Cold War to help fight or draw a line against the Soviet Union. And then more recently in this war on terrorism to help us in Afghanistan. But when we're done, we forget about them. We never try to actually help Pakistan because we care about Pakistan. The Pakistanis know that and they're frustrated by us. They don't see us as a true friend, as a true partner, but kind of a more transactional partner. And so that's left frustration and anger on their side. You know, just to backtrack a little there, you mentioned Afghanistan. I'm just trying to get an idea of where things are today because I know Pakistanis were expressing their concerns over a sudden pull-up of American troops out of Afghanistan. But if you listen to Imran Khan today, he's kind of saying that, you know, things will be better if US would just leave Afghanistan. So where are we today? We get really mixed messages from the Pakistanis because, you know, on one day Imran Khan may say something like that. And another day you may hear from the Pakistani army that they would be concerned about a rapid US withdrawal of troops. So there's been some sort of a mixed messaging coming out of the Pakistani side. And this isn't just a matter of recent history. This is for years now, we've heard different sides. What the Pakistanis have been worried about all the way through is that we will leave Afghanistan more of a mess than we found it, that the terrorism from Afghanistan will come into Pakistan and destabilize Pakistan. But from a Pakistani perspective, even worse than that would be leaving Afghanistan in a way that would allow Indian influence in Afghanistan to be strong. The Pakistanis have been more worried about India than they are even about the terrorists on their doorstep. So Pakistanis prioritize, first of all, no India in Afghanistan, then they would be worried about terrorists and extremists in Afghanistan. And then after that, everything else. So US purposes in Afghanistan, Pakistan purposes in Afghanistan don't exactly align. And that's, I think, what we're hearing now. And Ron Khan doesn't want to tell Washington what to do. But I don't think he's going to be terribly happy, no matter what we do, because we just don't have quite the same interests. I think you're right to say that, because Pakistan is allowing the Haqqani network to hang out in their Northwest Frontier. And could you just mention a little bit about the LET and the TTP, because those are the two major terrorist organizations in Pakistan? Yeah, so you've now mentioned three. So the Haqqani network, basically, I think, correctly seen as part of the Afghan Taliban movement. One of the toughest parts of that, meaning they have inflicted some of the greatest casualties on US forces and Afghan forces over the years. And they've also enjoyed at times some significant backing from Pakistan a way of their inter-services intelligence, or ISI, in Pakistan. So you've got the Haqqani network. Then you mentioned the LET, La Shkari Taiba. This is an organization originally founded basically to fight in Afghanistan, but quickly in the 80s and 90s shifted over and began to orient its fighting against India. And so for that reason, it's seen as particularly problematic. It has enjoyed the support or tacit support of the Pakistani state, but it's directed its attacks against India. And in doing so has risked on a number of occasions the possibility of another major war between India and Pakistan. And then the last group you mentioned, the TTP, the Teriki Taliban Pakistan. These are the Pakistani Taliban, that is extremists based in Pakistan, who have over now the past 15 years or so turned their guns against Pakistan itself. They have found that the army was in fact, and the ISI even in most instances, was their principal enemy. And they've attacked the Pakistani state. And they've been responsible for all kinds of mayhem, even in Pakistan's biggest cities over recent decades. So very different groups, oriented in different ways, with in some ways somewhat different ideologies, but all based in Pakistan, and all have the potential along with other groups like international terrorists like ISIL or ISIS and al-Qaeda to spring mayhem, not just in Pakistan or Afghanistan, in the wider region and then beyond that. And that's why many security folks in Washington DC and elsewhere are still worried about this region. No stability in Afghanistan, no stability in Pakistan creates further opportunities for terrorism in the long run. Yeah, and just along that line, just to remind the viewers too that the mastermind of 9-11 was actually born to Pakistani parents and captured in Pakistan. And Osama bin Laden was also captured and killed in Pakistan. So it is true that the al-Qaeda roots is very deeply entrenched on Pakistani soil, isn't it? It is. And the fact that Osama bin Laden was killed or found and then killed in Pakistan by US forces is something that I think is tremendously important to understand in the minds of Americans broadly US policymakers, US intelligence officials, US military officers, and now the Biden administration, when they think of Pakistan, almost invariably the first thing that comes to mind is Osama bin Laden was found in Pakistan. And that, they believe, is at least partially Pakistan's fault. And so the anger and frustration that many Americans feel about Pakistan relates to that individual, because he and, you mentioned Khaled Sheikh Mohammed as well, both have connections, deep connections to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and that will not be forgotten. And that is a part of the reason why there's so little patience for Pakistan, often in American policy circles. You also mentioned the nuclear threat. I think we're not just worrying about the nuclear technologies and weapons getting into the wrong hands by accidents, but is there also a cause for concern for Pakistan selling these technologies and know how to other countries, especially anti-American regimes, do you see them doing that? I think that there is a possibility, but I think that there are many ways that anti-American regimes have already gotten their hands on nuclear technologies. And I think that Pakistan, by and large, appreciates some of the downside risks to doing this. But of course, they've done it before. And so it is possible that it could happen again. The one country that most people point to where they're most worried about nuclear technologies from Pakistan ending up is currently Saudi Arabia. Now, this isn't an American enemy. This has been traditionally an American friend, but this is, of course, very worried about an Iranian nuclear program. And so there's been some question over the years if Iran were to actually go nuclear. Of course, part of Iran's nuclear technology also came by way of Pakistan, so we shouldn't forget that. But if Iran were to go nuclear, Saudi Arabia would probably try to follow suit. And one of the few places where it might actually be able to get its hand on nuclear technologies could be Pakistan. Now, you also mentioned India. I think Pakistan's connection to India and China is also going to draw into the larger geopolitical game. Could you expand a little bit on that, please? Yeah, it's starting to get, it was always complicated between India and Pakistan, but now it's getting even more complicated because China's involvement in the region is intensifying. We're seeing this in so many parts of the world and especially throughout wider Asia where China is involved in ways that we've never seen before. It often begins with an economic push, so we've seen trade and investment spiking basically worldwide. But then in many instances, it's being followed on by some kind of political influence and in certain countries by a security and intelligence and even military involvement as well. And Pakistan is one of those. Pakistan has long been close to China, both physically being a next door neighbor, but also diplomatically and has increasingly gotten close to China over the past five years or six years as China has begun what's called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which includes promises of tens of billions of dollars of Chinese investment in Pakistan. Simultaneously, the Chinese provide significant weapons systems to the Pakistanis. They do joint production on significant missile programs, also jet fighters, tanks, and other areas as well. And China has been involved in Pakistan's nuclear program. So they are a critical partner to Pakistan. The more that China gets involved in Pakistan, who has been a long-time rival, hostile adversary to India, the more India is not only worried about Pakistan, but also increasingly worried about China. And of course, India has been worried about China growing and being a more significant player in Asia, even without Pakistan. But the added involvement of that China-Pakistan link makes India particularly nervous. And what you get when you put together Indian nervousness, Chinese ambition, and Pakistani belligerence toward India is a very dangerous mix. And that's what we're seeing right now with the potential for even a two-front crisis for India, both along its Chinese border and along its Pakistani border. This spring and summer could be a very dangerous time in that part of the world. And to add to that, I see the revitalization of the court. So as US starts inching closer to India, I think it's gonna pump up the anxiety level of Pakistan and ramp up their anti-India efforts while inching ever closer to China. How do you think you should balance that a little bit? It's really tough because of course, the United States with the Quad and with other overtures toward India over now, roughly two decades in terms of outreach from Washington, DC to New Delhi to try to cultivate India as a strategic partner, that always made Pakistan nervous. But now it's really ramping up in important ways, largely driven by India's frustration with China and a global sense that countries like India, this Quad that you're talking about, as well as other countries too in the region need to band together to in some ways push back against China to at the very least hold a defensive position against an increasing Chinese involvement in their neighborhoods. So as India does that, as the United States grows closer to India, this year right does make Pakistan nervous. Now Pakistan was always nervous and during the Bush administration and part of the Obama administration, there was a policy which we often called dehyphenation. And the idea of this policy was that the United States could simultaneously move closer to India and yet still maintain a good relationship with Pakistan, that the relationship between didn't have to be hyphenated, didn't have to be about the India-Pakistan conflict in all ways that we could have both. This is becoming harder and harder as China becomes closer to Pakistan. And the question is whether there's still a door open for the United States to try to find some kind of a balanced and positive relationship with Pakistan, despite the fact that it's come closer to India. And this is gonna be a real challenge for the new Biden administration to figure out is the danger, I would say, of simply relying on India is that it actually increases the likelihood of a conflict in the region. And that's not something we certainly wanna see in the near term. So some kind of a balancing, but simultaneously we don't wanna ease off our relationship with India because that looks like weakness to China. And so finding that perfect balance in this, as I say, is increasingly complicated. You know, I've actually read your book and it's an excellent book. I have an elephant memory when it comes to good book. And I recall in your book, you listed three potential options that America could look at in managing its future relations with Pakistan. Could you run us through those three options, please? Yeah, you probably have a better memory than I do. I will correct you if you say it wrongly. Okay, so I think first of all, you know, there's always the option of a kind of a disengagement. And I think that I was worried and I continued to be worried about the sense that the United States could believe that there is in fact, a way to exit from its relationship with Pakistan to say, forget it, let's leave. And I'm still nervous about this because I feel like with Pakistan, even as we're trying to navigate our way out of Afghanistan, one of the most likely outcomes is that we will become actually increasingly dependent on Pakistan to help us meet even our narrow counterterrorism agenda in the region. So exiting still not an option for even just for that reason alone, as well as the other complicated features that we've just talked about in terms of how to balance its relationship with India and avoid a wider potential for conflict in the region. I think a second option that I point to in the book, somewhat critically as well, is the idea that we could rely on the military, military to military relationship or a military first relationship. And this is one that actually is a consistent take that a lot of US governments have had with Pakistan. And it gets to some things that we haven't talked a lot about, which is the internal dynamics of Pakistan. What makes Pakistan work? What we've often come to believe is that Pakistan works because the army is in charge. And so what the army says is what happens and we need to accept that and effectively narrow our ambition to work with the Pakistani army and that includes the intelligence service and not attempt anything grander in the way of an ambition for our agenda with Pakistan. I would say in a number of critical ways the Trump administration did that. The Trump administration narrowed our focus simply to the question of counterterrorism and attempting to move forward in a negotiation with the Taliban. And there were some benefits, but what we saw over the past five years, perhaps in part because of US policy, perhaps by other things was an unfortunate narrowing of political space inside of Pakistan. The army has gotten and the government have gotten more repressive, less liberal, less democratic. And that is bad, I think, for the healthy development, not just of Pakistan's politics, but also its economy, which has become more closed and ever more dependent on dealing with China. And then the big... Sorry, just to interrupt you there, I was gonna ask you why would we consider that option because if we look back at history, if we look at Shah and Iran, Mubarak in Egypt, and even early days in Pakistan with Musharraf and Marcos in the Philippines, and now if we look at Myanmar, wouldn't it return to military lead to a very risky politicization of the military? So why would we even consider that option? The reason is because it often looks easier in the near term. Practically, the army in Pakistan is the most capable institution of the country. So if you go there and wish to get something done, that is you wanna build something or you wanna make sure that some institution works for a period of time, then you need to put the army in charge because they actually know how to do it. But you're right, this has a long-term consequence. It is a fragile and often is sort of a temporary stop-gap solution. The army should not be the best at running a country. The army should be good at defending the country and there should be a civilian government that is quite capable of managing the institutions of the state that go beyond that. Unfortunately in Pakistan, that's often been hollowed out by a repeated series of military takeovers and coups throughout its history. And even now, when we technically have civilians in charge, I think it's an open secret that the Pakistani army is actually the power player behind the throne. That is Imran Khan is indebted to and needs to pass everything through the army if he wishes to actually get anything done. So that's why a lot of Americans looking at this would tend to say, well, why not just work with the army? They're the best that Pakistan has, we should just deal with it. It's got some short-term benefits and long-term risks as you point out. I think the last sort of potential option I point to is a kind of a comprehensive approach, which focuses more on the economic and people-to-people ties and building up a kind of a wider ranging connection between the United States and Pakistan, which is something we've really never had. The people of Pakistan, the people of the United States have never connected in that way. Our economies, though we're an important economy to Pakistan, we haven't really found a complementarity. We haven't pursued opportunities that have been before us. And so I suggest that that seems like a good way to go, if not for the fact that it's just so hard to get there and it's just so frustrating. And so we've been repeatedly stymied and frustrated. I saw a tweet just the other day, or actually I wrote a tweet that was related to a new piece by a former US ambassador to Pakistan. And he was saying, if Pakistan could see through to economic reform agenda, then the United States would be interested in partnering and doing more to advance that. And my tweet was, that's a big if. That's a big if. That's a big thing that Pakistan has not been able to do. And so we're still stuck with a series of frustrating, less than perfect policy options before us. Yeah, and probably this is not a nice thing to say, but I think we need to keep at the back of our mind too that it was American money that propped up many of the repressive and anti-reformist leaders and institution in Pakistan. I mean, that includes the military and civilian elites too. So there's that. American money. Yeah, sorry. And now increasingly Chinese money as well. And I think America needs to do better with this assistant program too. There's a terrible follow through as you mentioned. And there's always this long bureaucratic delays when it comes to the release of tax dollars, of aid money. And even when those get released, you hear the people complaining on the ground that they don't see it. So the money is getting stuck somewhere. It doesn't get to the people on the ground where it needs to go to. Yeah, this has been a problem and a frustration, not just in Pakistan, but in many other countries of the world where the United States and American taxpayers have felt like we've been spending literally in some cases in Pakistan billions, tens of billions, hundreds of millions of dollars over the years. And yet it doesn't seem to add up. And you're right, it seems like it gets stuck somewhere. Many studies have been done about how much of this money doesn't actually even cycle into the local economy. It just goes from the US Treasury out to contractors who are usually international contractors who take a significant amount of the share of the money, repatriate that back to the United States or Europe or wherever. And it never actually stays in the country where we're technically donating the funds. We do need to do better at this, but it has proven very difficult. Yeah, you just reminded me of something that, first I got again, the Democratic congressman from New York, Gary Ackerman, I think was his name. He said, Pakistan is like a black hole for American age. You know, your diplomats go in, your eight professionals go in, your press go in, your hopes go in, your resources going, but nothing good ever comes out of it. But you know what, Dan, our time is up, but I'm gonna have you back on a later show because I'd like to get your take on China and Central Asia. I know you've also written a book on those places while the rest of us were parting away. So, would that be okay? It would be wonderful. Yeah, so I'll give you a lot of fun. Thank you. All right, thank you so much. And that's Dr. Daniel Markey, Senior Professor and Academic Director at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Thank you so much. Thank you.