 I will not pause. In the case of causation. Ok, now very briefly I want to talk about why he is so interested in the notion of causation. Why does he spend all this time getting clear on it? mae angen i gynnydd o'r bwrdd, ond mae'r cyntaf gwrsdraeth, a mae'r byw i'r bydd arall nhw'n ddechreu os byddechrau y cefnodol i'n cefnodol, mae'n g lisio ddweud yma. Ac eich ddweud o'r llw'r Sol yn ddechrau'r llw'r Lwriter i'r nhw. Hwnna, mae'n dweud yw'r cyfrannu golyw'r gweithio rifiwyd yw yng ngynhau o'r cyfrannu yn cyfrannu bobl fathau. Ond y cair hyn yn ddod o gynhyrchu fe ddim yn gwneud, yjod yn elec, yn ddiweddau yn ei gilydd y gwirol a oedd yn ei ffordd. Nid ydydd hynny'n gweld yn bwysigar drw'u dweud ar wneud y byddai. Felly, o'r rhai'r hyn sydd, rhai'r peth yn gweithlo yn y ddydd yn ddangos nhw'n ddysgu, mae hi yn rhai'r peth yn y ddangos sydd yn y ddangos neb bod y rhai'r peth hyn yn ddangos nhw'n ddangos nhw. felly hoffau rhai ar hynをetbeithio'r rhai rhai yn yn y ddangos nhw. Llyr o nodi'r gorffaeth cyfoeddion yn ei gallu son o'r 17 o'n 18 oed. Rwy'n cael y hynny oherwydd rydyn ni'n yn eyhwyd Therefore yn yn rhaid o y відgryrdd ddyn nhw. is causation just is a matter of constant conjunction. It's just a matter of what's constantly conjoined. There's no reason why motion shouldn't cause thought. Deir fin by experience that they're constantly united being all the circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect we may certainly conclude that motion may be and actually is the cause of thought and perception. Constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect, so matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought. So he's appealing absolutely explicitly to his definition in terms of constant conjunction saying there you are, you can have constant conjunction there, that means you've got causation. Liberty and necessity, very similar in principle. Causation is just a matter of constant conjunction and the inference of the mind, the first definition and the second definition. They apply to the moral realm, that is the realm of human behaviour, just as much as they do to the physical realm, therefore causal necessity applies just as much. Now some people won't like that, some people will say no, there is a kind of necessity in the motion of billiard balls which goes beyond the necessity of human action. There's some kind of really deep metaphysical necessity, some inexorable force that makes it behave in the way that it does, in a way that doesn't imply to us. And here Hume says, sorry, you can't form any idea of such a necessity that goes beyond the two definitions. My opponents will deny that my definitions make the whole of necessity, but then they must show that we have an idea of something else in the actions of matter, which according to the foregoing reasoning is impossible. Now that's a rather pithy statement from the abstract, but you can see that similar thoughts are expressed repeatedly in the treatise and in the inquiry. And Hume is absolutely clear that it's his definitions of necessity that make the difference here. Our author pretends, in other words, claims that this reasoning puts the whole controversy in a new light by giving a new definition of necessity. And he says twice in the treatise in these sections. He also says twice in the inquiry that this argument turns on the fact that his definitions are specifying the very essence of necessity. He really does think he has defined what necessity is. So what's perhaps a bit odd here is that we have a form of anti-realism supporting a form of realism. Anti-realism in the following sense, Hume is denying that there is anything to causation beyond his two definitions. Realism in another sense, because the very fact that causation only requires the satisfaction of the two definitions, means that he can establish confidently that causation does apply in these areas. If causation requires something deeper, something metaphysically thick, then it will be very hard to establish where it applies. But if causation just is satisfaction of the two definitions, then he is able to show that they apply in the moral realm just as much in the physical realm. Now, I want to suggest that we can get an insight into Hume's overall vision here, which makes a lot of sense in terms of his philosophical development. He describes in the abstract of the treatise what he calls the chief argument of the treatise. And it's absolutely clear that the chief argument of the treatise is the argument concerning induction, belief and causation and liberty and necessity, free will. Applying the copy principle to the idea of necessary connection gives him a handle on what necessary connection is. That enables him both to apply it to the moral sphere as we've seen and to eliminate aprioristic causal metaphysics. Other people have said, I can understand the notion of matter and I can see that matter cannot cause thought. They're claiming to have some sort of apriori insight into the nature of matter. Hume's saying, forget that. All causation is is a matter of necessary connection. Therefore, the only way you can establish what causes what is experience, what things are in fact constantly conjoined. So aprioristic reasoning goes out of the window, and empirical reasoning comes in. And I shall end just with a suggestion. Hume, when he was young, was obviously very concerned about problems of religion. He said to Boswell, quite ironically on his deathbed, that he'd never entertained any belief in religion since he began to read Locke and Clarke. So he was reading Locke and Clarke who were arguing for the existence of God and that undermined Hume's belief in the existence of God, apparently. They were using the cosmological argument. If you're interested in the cosmological argument, you'll naturally be interested in the causal maxim. Everything must have a cause, therefore there must be a first cause, therefore God. So where does the causal maxim come from? I suggest that that may have been Hume's way into all this. Locke's chapter in which he talks about the origin of the idea of necessary connection also talks about free will. And there were very active debates going on in particular between Clarke and Collins on the notion of free will at the time. Indeed, he was intimately connected and very geographically close to some people who were involved in that debate. So I think that Hume's philosophy may have been very largely driven by the thought that pursuing the impression from which the idea of necessary connection is derived, that idea, which underlines both the cosmological argument and discussions of free will, can provide a wedge which enables him to get into aprioristic metaphysics, knock that out and at the same time establish empirical causal science. So we get an integrated vision with elements of anti-theology, pro-experimental science, anti-aprioristic metaphysics. Thank you.