 Thank you very much, John. I think what is truly remarkable is that even though Bretton Woods essentially collapsed with a run out of the dollar, ever since 1973, in effect, if anything, the dominance of the dollar as a reason in international financial system, and we have seen a lot of figures that won't come back on these figures, but I think it's certainly due both to phenomena linked to network externalities and all that, but also simply to the complementarity that is very present in the use of an international currency, complementarity between the different use of a currency, if you are financing in a currency, then you want liquidity in that currency, you transact in that currency, then you want to exchange rate to be paid in that currency, then your central bank has reserved in that currency, then the transaction costs are low in that currency, etc. etc. So there are complementarities both within the private sector and across the public sector and the private sector, and this makes an equilibrium very, very hard to change. We have seen that with sterling, we are seeing that with a dollar. Now, does it matter? So in fact, if anything, I think the current research in economics in academia shows that it matters even more than what we thought in the past. So there are lots of papers now that show that this business about dominant currency invoicing the fact that a lot of goods are invoiced in dollar is very important for monetary policy. It's also important for the volume of global trade. We see this amazing correlation at this stage, I would still call them correlation between the valuation of a dollar, so for example, a dollar strengthening and the decline in global volume of trade. And the effects are, these correlations are big. So that's one. We also see these big effects of a Fed on global financial condition, the global financial cycle. And that actually affects everyone. So I would say if anything, it seems to matter more from an economic point of view than maybe what we thought before. Now, there's also obviously, and we have seen this in the 2008 crisis, the international lender of last resort function, which has proved, I would say pretty crucial, 600 billion dollar liquidity which went in central Bank swaps to help the international financial system. And obviously, so that was not the IMF because the IMF cannot print dollar, that was the Fed, which is providing the liquidity. And that means a lot from the point of view of geopolitical power, also from the point of view of economic benefits. So the system has been relatively stable since, you know, the second world war with one hegemon, the US dollar and the United States. And I guess Charles Kindleberger would agree that that's hegemonic stability for you. And that seems to have worked to some extent. But now, how long is it going to last? I guess it's a big question, right? And there I see so two reasons why things might be changing. And then I will be very brief about, you know, where we might be going. So the two reasons are one, which has already been mentioned here, which is that, you know, things are stable if you have a relatively quasi benevolent hegemon. Now, if you have a hegemon who starts being over politicizing the currency and and really using it for all kinds of purposes, trust evaporates. And that tends to to speed up the exit of the current equilibrium. And we certainly see that. OK, right now, I would say. So that's one one factor. A second factor is a little bit more of a trend. And that's what I call the new Triffin dilemma. So let me tell you what was the Triffin dilemma. And then I will tell you what the new Triffin dilemma. So if you agree with me, so the original Triffin dilemma, it was in the 1960s. And it was Robert Triffin, was professor at Yale at the time, was explaining that if you have a fixed or more or less fixed reserve of gold in the United States and the dollar was backed by gold and picked at a fixed parity, well, even equity in dollars in the rest of the world was growing and growing. Eventually, if people wanted their dollars back into gold, there wouldn't be enough gold for everyone, essentially. And therefore, that can create a crisis of confidence. You start to think that your dollar is not going to be worth the parity in gold because there's just not enough gold reserves. Hence a possible run out of a dollar, which did happen. So Triffin essentially predicted it in some sense. And that was the collapse of Bretton Woods. And there was a run out of a dollar into Deutsche Mark, et cetera. Now, we don't have any more, an international monetary system backed by your commodity. We just, just not the way it works. We have flexible exchange rate and fiat currencies. However, if you think about what is the confidence in the dollar, where essentially it's the fiscal backing of the currency. People still want dollars as a result of currency because in crisis times, and we have seen it in 2008 very much, and we still see it, when things go badly, the value of a dollar, if anything goes up, okay, and we might even fly to safety in the dollar. And this is because of the credibility in the sense of a fiscal backing of the United States. So now picture yourself a world in which we have the physical capacity of the US, okay? And we have a relative size of the US going tremendously down in the world economy. So now we have a lot of liquidity outside the US, a lot of dollar liquidity in the world. There's a huge demand for US treasuries, as we know. But we have this shrinking hegemon in the middle. The relative size of the US goes down. Now, at some points, clearly, I think there will be also a confidence crisis. There just won't be enough fiscal support to back this whole dollar liquidity in the world economy. Now, when will that happen? I have no idea. And of course, also, for the crisis of confidence to realize itself, you need to be able to run out of the dollar into something else, okay? And this is where I go to the third point. So I do believe we are going to go to a more multipolar world because of this fundamental trend and also given the behavior of the current government in the US, when I don't know. But so what will be the possible substitutes there? So clearly, number two, the euro. Okay. What's missing from the euro right now? A safe asset. It's missing to complete the financial architecture of a euro area. Okay. So for a euro to become a more important currency, we miss the same thing that would make the euro area more stable. So that would be a policy goal. And I think it had been neglected. But I think Europeans are becoming a little bit more aware of that. And there's a lot more attention given to these matters, at least I hope now. So that's the euro story. The R&B. The R&B clearly varies the political will. As we've seen from the data, we are still way below what it would require for an international currency to be viable, prime of convertibility, liquidity of market, et cetera. But there's clearly a push from the Chinese authority. And given the size of China, I think if there is, at some point, things start to move, they could move actually maybe quicker than we expect. And one reason for that was that for the moment, maybe we, you know, we see a whole area in the world economy, which is more or less pegging to the dollar, stabilizing its exchange rate with the dollar. But by doing so, it's also stabilizing its exchange rate with China because they are shadowing a little bit each other. And if at some point, we see a decoupling between China and the dollar, it could be actually the true economic area because of the trade links, et cetera, is a Chinese economic area rather than the dollar one. And so this could actually speed things up maybe quicker than we think. But we are still not there for sure. And then I would just say one last thing, which is, you know, we've seen recently some contests coming from the private sector. You know, Libra will probably not happen. We don't know that or other things like that. So why? Because these things build on an existing network. Of course, they lack any other good functions of money, et cetera. So again, I don't think it's a viable proposition. But at least in terms of scale, I think that's something that is really new because of the existing network, which could right away play in the medium of exchange function. But of course, doesn't have any fiscal backing. This is why by the way, the synthetic hegemonic or synthetic hegemonic currency of Marconi, which is like a, you know, like an SDR, but with digital currency, is also not going to fly. Because for the same reason the SDR did not fly, because it doesn't have liquidity provision and the fiscal backing.