 Welcome to the fifth meeting in 2019 of the Finance and Constitution Committee. For this particular meeting, we have apologies from Neil Bibby. I just remind members to put their mobile phones on to silent, please, so they don't disrupt proceedings. The first item on agenda this morning is to take evidence on UK common frameworks. We're joined for this item by Michael Russell, who is the Cabinet Secretary for Government, Business and Constitutional Relations. The cabinet secretary is joined for this item by Scottish Government officials, Jill Glass, the UK framework unit leader. He and David are the head of the constitution and UK relations. I welcome our witnesses to the meeting and I invite Mike Russell to make an opening statement, please. Thank you very much, convener, and thanks for the invitation to be here today. Neil was reminding me when we were talking about this issue earlier this morning that I last spoke to members of this committee about this on 2 November last year, which does seem an age ago—several meaningful votes ago, certainly. I think that it is an indication of what has taken place in the last almost four months that this issue has diminished in public interest and importance during that time. Of course, that is not by our choice. It is because the prospect of what you might call a negotiated compromise or orderly exit from the EU has diminished during that time. We're not here by choice in the position that we are. We are here because, on this particular issue, we have faced being dragged out of the EU against our will and, in those circumstances, we have tried to come to a rational and reasonable conclusion with the UK Government about some of the issues that were always and should remain within the devolved settlement. We're not opposed to UK-wide frameworks. Our actions over the last two years have shown that, where they are in Scotland's interests, but at the bottom of our concern has been the key issue, that those should be negotiated and not imposed. That is the policy that we continue to pursue. Frameworks are not a policy objective of the Scottish Government. They are an unfortunate necessity given where things were. Where they are now, it is very difficult to say given the circumstances in which we are in. Let me say that as a preamble, because I think that it is important in terms of any discussion that we have today. Discussions on frameworks have been conducted at official level, overseen by the JMC-EU negotiations. There have been several rounds of intensive multilateral policy discussions, primarily focused on what became 24 policy areas where it thought legislation might be required to implement frameworks. Although, now, I think that it is a very, very much smaller number of frameworks of which that is true. Initial framework outlines in six areas were considered by JMC-EN in October 2018. It is quite important to note that that was before there was the supposed agreement between the UK Government and the EU. Those were fisheries, animal health and welfare, nutrition, hazardous substance planning, food and feed safety and hygiene and public sector procurement. The technical work by officials to complete outline templates is underpinned by the Statement of Principles, agreed by the JMC-EN in October 2017. That was a year before. It has been taken forward by agreement and is without prejudice to the views of ministers. Officials have analysed and draft outlines to draw out some high-level messages and lessons that can inform those frameworks yet to be drafted, particularly to ensure consistent approaches to governance questions. It was never the intention that frameworks would be in place by exit day and, although there is a connection between that and the necessity for various pieces of legislation to be there, it is only a connection. It is not an absolute link. Frameworks remain discrete longer-term arrangements to be put in place post Brexit. Frameworks will only be agreed when there is clarity about the UK's final agreement and future relationship with the EU and the situation in Northern Ireland. The progress on frameworks will therefore continue until the end of the implementation period, if that is December 2020, but again that is absolutely up for grabs. Officials are now turning their attention to those frameworks in the non-legislative category. Work also continues on the cross-cutting issues that are required to be worked through for frameworks to be finalised in the areas of domestic governance, international obligations, trade, the internal market and where appropriate future funding. Now we are committed to continue to work collaboratively on developing those frameworks in specific areas, but, of course, we remain resolutely opposed to section 12, and we will not discuss a framework if a restriction on those devolved powers is imposed. Now, in that light, it is good news that the second report European Union withdrawal act and common frameworks published earlier this month confirmed that the UK Government has again concluded with us that it does not need to bring forward any section 12 regulations at this juncture. That report proves in my view that section 12 was and is unnecessary. The frameworks process has demonstrated this and it vindicates the position that the Scottish Government took that section 12 wasn't necessary and should be repealed. We move to continue the process of engagement. We are keen now to engage businesses and stakeholders, but given what stakeholders are currently confronting in terms of the chaos that exists at Westminster, I think that that is not a matter that stakeholders presently will regard as a priority. I thank you, cabinet secretary. I can sense from your voice your policy carrying some sort of virus or something that is going on, so I hope that you are okay through this process. I notice from the second progress report that you just highlighted that the UK Government says that there has been significant progress in regard to common frameworks. If that is true, that is good news. It is good that there has been some good progress as far as the development of common frameworks is concerned, but it is not true to say that the development of those common frameworks was very much taken forward. With a pace of delivery, where the expected outcome was an agreement on the UK leaving the EU being signed off successfully and beyond that, following a period of transition. Common frameworks were seen as being required to be in place before the end of the transition period. My question to you, cabinet secretary, is given that the UK crashing out of the EU without a deal is still a very live prospect. What does such a scenario mean for the development of common frameworks and the timescales within which the necessary work could be required to complete it? Particularly given the evidence that we received from the Scottish Centre for European Relations, which said that a no-deal Brexit would likely result in discussions around common frameworks giving way to a crisis response needed to cope with the resulting severe legal, political and economic consequences? I think that that has already happened. I think that it started to happen in November. I think that it accelerated in December with the cancellation of the first meaningful vote and it has continued to pace during January and February. Of course, we will be in March at the end of this week. I think that it is hard, unless you spend time, as I do in White Hall, to realise how the entire machinery of government has been captured by the issue of no-deal and the chaos that exists presently. The GMCEN did not meet in December and met in November. Every meeting that I have been at in London since the middle of November has been consumed by the discussion of no-deal. There may have been other items on the agenda, but they have been largely irrelevant. I think that this issue will not re-emerge as an issue for proper attention unless and until there is an agreement on an orderly departure or until article 50 has been suspended or, preferably, revoked. However, if suspended, and there has also been a ruling out of a no-deal and a referendum. I think that we are in a period of flux. It is difficult to see when this issue will return as an issue unless there was to be a continuation of the process of trying to put in place an orderly departure. However, it is very difficult to see when that will be. Thank you, convener. Good morning, cabinet secretary. You referred to the October 2017 framework, as it were, for common frameworks, which was agreed by the GMC in that month, setting out the principles in which it is understood across Governments and the United Kingdom when common frameworks, where common frameworks will be required. The first point made in that set of principles is that frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence. I wonder if you could tell the committee what the Scottish Government's understanding is of the meaning of that phrase, the functioning of the UK internal market. I can. I think that it is important—and I am not avoiding this—to refer to principle 2, as well. Frameworks will respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability to devolved legislatures. If there was an issue in here, and there may not be an issue in here, if there was an issue, I think that the issue between the two Governments would be the priority of those two issues, whether the devolved settlements are the basis on which any new understanding of an internal market is built, or whether a new understanding of the internal market changes what devolution is and how it operates. I think that I am being quite dispassionate about that. That is at the heart of the issue, if there is an issue, to be resolved here. My understanding would be that the devolved settlements allow substantial and sometimes complete policy divergence on key issues, and that an internal market would not overrule that. An example of that would be, I think, Damian Greene's remark about jam makers in Dundee and wherever the other place he used. His understanding of an internal market is that he would have a set of rules that would apply, in this case, to jam makers, which would be both in Scotland and in England. That would allow the sale of that jam north and south of the border. My understanding of that is that there may be circumstances in which there would be different rules for jam makers north and south of the border. Those would be dictated by the requirements of devolution. Devolution might, for example, impose stronger food safety requirements for jam makers north and south of the border. That would be an acceptable exercise of devolved powers. To go to the heart of the matter, there may well be a different understanding of the internal market and how it operates, depending on whether you believe that the devolved settlement and the differences of practice and the divergencies have taken place is a thing that should underpin what we do or whether you believe that circumstances have changed and there should now be a set of rules and regulations that, despite devolved competencies, should operate and those should, in some cases, put aside devolved competencies. That is genuinely trying to be a helpful response to you. Okay, so in terms of getting into specifics, and perhaps not the specifics of the manufacturer of marmalade in Dundee, but the specifics of what has been discussed, as I understand it, Cabinet Secretary, mainly at the official level, rather than at the ministerial level so far, that the paper that the UK Government published earlier this month, which again you referred to in your opening remarks, lists seven policy areas where there have apparently been what they describe as standalone sessions. These overlap with, but are not identical to the list that you gave the committee a few moments ago. Animal health and welfare, chemicals and pesticides, plant health, food and feed hygiene, nutrition health, public procurement and fertiliser regulations. Do I take it from that list that there is acceptance across the Governments that those are elements of the UK internal market that will require common frameworks post Brexit? I think that I would want to answer that because Iain was at those sessions, but at the beginning I should say that any participation, as I indicated in my opening statement, is without prejudice to final outcomes. I am not saying that we are accepting the UK internal market in any of those areas, but I think that there are discussions being held, and those are key issues. Iain might want to tell us how that has operated. Yes, so we have had a bit of this discussion in previous sessions of the committee. It is not that those areas in their totality are subject to internal market arrangements. It is that within each of those areas, and it applies to potentially any of the 153 areas of intersection, there are aspects of policy where there may be internal market considerations and where there may indeed be considerations drawn from other parts of the principles. I do not have the detail of those aspects before me, but the obvious kinds of things that come up are about approaches to, say, food safety, that there will be a discussion about the extent to which it is necessary or desirable to have consistent regulatory regimes, consistent standards and approaches, and where indeed there may be legitimate scope for divergence and what the reasons for that divergence might be. As a small anecdote, when we had a discussion in one of the early food safety deep dives, we discovered that water is not simply water. There is spring water, there is highland water, there is tap water, there is various types of water, all possible under the existing EU regulatory regime. There has been an awful lot of, if I can call it maybe, myth-busting about those discussions so far, so that people really do understand the extent of divergence that already exists within the EU regime and to understand what that tells us about the future. It is no surprise that there is a general degree of anxiety about what the future of those arrangements would be on leaving the EU and the sense that whatever the divergence there is now, at least there is the comfort of the certainty of an EU regulatory regime that sits behind it. It has been trying to get to the heart of those areas where we think that we need to have certainty in those areas that the Administrations will co-operate with each other. Those are a subset of the issues that come up under those areas, but it is a very long and complicated discussion to be truly honest and an awful lot. It remains in dispute, I would say, or where discussions remain on going between the Governments about when necessity and desirability about consistency lies. There are also concerns about the impact of agricultural subsidy in the future. The four Governments have different priorities in relation to agricultural support arrangements into the future. Those are entirely legitimate, driven by the conditions of agriculture in the different nations. Whilst all the Governments would accept that each Administration should have its own approach to agricultural support, based on the conditions in the country, there is anxiety about how those rub up against each other and the impact on producers in different parts of the UK and whether there could be claims of unfair competition or subsidy regimes that disadvantage others. Those are very complicated arrangements. What we have sought to do is not to leap to the conclusion that therefore there should be an imposition of uniformity across the UK, because that would be a significant backward step from the current arrangements under the EU. That is a very helpful answer, and I am grateful. I have two follow-up questions from both of which can be quick. The seven items that are listed here, why have those been the items to which discussions have turned first? Is it an indication that those are regarded by one Government or another as the most pressing issues? Is it the low-hanging fruit that is easiest to deal with first? Is it an indication of a sense that those are the areas that might need some kind of legislative common framework rather than non-legislative common framework, or is it just random? There is a subset of the 24 areas that we prioritise. Beyond that, it is simple, because there are established well-working functioning arrangements that have made it possible for those discussions to proceed more quickly than perhaps in other areas. It is not entirely random, but it does not indicate a ranking of priority of those other aspects of the 24. The final question for me on this. What are the other issues? If we were looking at this in 12 months' time, presumably the list of bullet points would be twice as long or a bit longer. What are the other issues that are forthcoming, which have not yet had their standalone sessions, but which are due to have them in the near future? All of the areas of 24 have had at least one standalone session. Those have benefited from probably half a dozen standalone sessions. I have made the progress through for us to be able to populate what is known as an outline template agreement covering all the governance areas that we have identified. We have a phased approach. There is a strong project management arrangement across the four Governments where we monitor the discussions and identify phases of discussion. Our ambition is that we conclude phase 2, which is what those areas have concluded as soon as possible. Ideally, we would like to have concluded that now, but I would hope that in the next three months we could. Given what the minister said about current circumstances, we need to be a wee bit wary of putting a fixed date to it. Thank you very much. We have published the list to 24, so we are quite happy to have that known. Can I just ask a supplementary to that? Forgive me, I am a simple person. If there are these 12 areas and 24 other areas that are required to be discussed to make sure that the internal market for one to a better description is able to operate successfully, if on 29 March we leave with no deal and there is no common framework in place, how can we have that internal market operating successfully? That is an excellent question. I have no answer to it. The UK Government has no answer to it. We have not seen statutory instruments that would give us the answer to that. We have not seen statutory instruments that have given us the answer to lots of things. For example, we have not seen statutory instruments on possible tariffs after 29 March. We would be in a position, presumably, where the UK Government would attempt to impose, and I hope that that would not be the case because we would not cooperate. I will add a couple of marks to that. Members of the committee will be familiar with the no deal legislative deficiencies work and the fixing regulations that have been made. That is an extensive programme of introducing temporary arrangements covering the deficiencies in EU law in the event of no deal. As the minister said, that programme is far from complete, but there has been an extensive programme under way. Those arrangements are those that we anticipate being in place in the event of no deal, although those do not establish longer-term foundations for frameworks. Where there are areas for co-operation that are not covered by legislative fixes—and, of course, there would be a wide range of pragmatic and practical areas where arrangements would be required—those will require to be negotiated. What we are very clear about is that those must not set a precedent for future frameworks, but they must proceed on the basis of agreement between the Administrations because they are devolved areas. There is no reason why they should not proceed by agreement, notwithstanding the circumstances, and they must not jeopardise the future frameworks, which will be required once the future relationship with the EU is clearer. That helps me to segue quite nicely into James Kelly, because he is interested in areas where we cannot find agreement and there is dispute. James? Indeed, convener. One of the issues when the withdrawal bill has been sought in terms of legislative consent to the Scottish Parliament was dispute resolution, and there was a reasonable objection to the dispute resolution process that was in place. I am interested in what progress has been made in terms of discussions with the UK Government and other devolved Administrations around the arrangements that will be in place in relation to those 24 areas where there is a disagreement about how they will operate. It is a very good point, because essentially what is being relied on at the present moment is the memorandum of understanding on devolution, which places emphasis on good communication, transparency in order to avoid disputes. Now, there is not good communication and there is not transparency. The potential for dispute is undoubtedly there. If, however, you then lean back on the dispute resolution process, the only one that exists within the JMC, then you come in the end to a process in which a decision is made by the UK Government without any ability to challenge its decision. For example, the next question of the £1 billion payment to Northern Ireland as a result of the DUP support for the Tories was raised by the Welsh Government under the dispute resolution process, saying that this is money that should be barnatised and should not be paid in the way that it is being paid. That became a non-dispute because the UK Government decided that it was not a dispute. In the end, dispute resolution runs into the sand in a court in which judge and jury are the UK Government. Now, presently, there is no system accepted by the UK Government which would trump that. That is the issue, because that goes on to the wider issue of intergovernmental relations, of which this really is part. There has been no significant or any, in my view, progress on intergovernment relations and how you get that into a new footing given the weight of devolution. That remains unresolved. We aim, within this process—and I pay tribute to Ian and his colleagues at the border—we aim, during this process, to be in a position to resolve issues by negotiation and consensus. In the end, that is up to politicians and when those issues go from official level and are escalated to politicians, there is no satisfactory mechanism in which you get a resolution. Devolved Administrations know that. You said at the start that this is the first time you have been in the committee since November. This has been an on-going issue of intergovernmental relations and how to resolve disputes. You are really saying that there has not really been any progress since November till now. Obviously, the clock continues to tick down to a potential withdrawal on the 29th of March. The Welsh Government and ourselves, Northern Ireland, does not have a functioning administration regrettably. The Welsh Government and ourselves believe that the issue of intergovernmental relations and reviewing that, even if you only believe in devolution and I believe in independence, but if you believe in devolution, requires urgent attention. That has not happened. There is a process under way that is, in my view, not moving at any pace. We would like that process to speed up. We have a particular urgency with that process, which lies in the area of the Sewell process, which we believe is broken and requires to be fixed. I have written to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, David Littington, on two, possibly three occasions recently about that. I have discussed it with him on a number of occasions. In fact, a GMC does not take place without me raising it. Nothing has yet happened. Now, one might argue that they have had bigger fish to fry and their absorption, as I said at the start, is total in the chaos that exists around Brexit, but it is a concern. First of all, there has to be a willingness to address the issue. The issue is a hard one for the UK to address because it would require the UK to accept that the UK Parliament is not sovereign or at least to allow some understanding of that. It is not a hard one in governmental terms because devolution is not about a hierarchy of Governments. It is about a hierarchy of Parliaments, but there is a strong reluctance, in my view, to address the issue. Angela Duggan, you were interested in this area. I wanted to pick up some of the issues in and around intergovernmental relationships and the mechanisms that support that. I heard with interest what the cabinet secretary said earlier about the work around common frameworks as a long-term piece of work. It was never the intention that it was going to be done and dusted by Brexit Day, but the Royal Society of Edinburgh picked up on some of the work and assessment by the PACAC Committee in Westminster that said that intergovernmental relationships and the mechanisms that support that are not fit for purpose. The Royal Society for Edinburgh has recommended an independent secretary act to manage and help to develop common frameworks. I wondered what the cabinet secretary's view of that suggestion was, given that I am assuming that he would prefer more formal arrangements as opposed to ad hoc ones and whether, within Government, we are developing a proposition to put to the UK. I mean, to some extent, we have that independent structure anyway, because officials are tasked, were tasked by JMCP in last summer, preceding December. Oh, right, so for it, sorry. Over a year have been tasked with taking those forward and it hasn't happened. The problem doesn't lie with the civil service, the problem lies with politicians. You know, this requires a sense of urgency. It requires addressed, and it is politicians who need to address it. And there needs to be a priority given by politicians. I have, for example, suggested, first of all, that the issue of SUL, which is the barrier to giving legislative consent to any Brexit legislation, could be addressed separately from this process in a temporary fix. I put forward ideas on that. Nothing has happened, so that's a politicians issue. As nothing happens in the UK Government without the Prime Minister doing it, or saying so, the problem lies with the Prime Minister, clearly, and until she is prepared to accept that change is required, change will not take place, so no matter how helpful the suggestion to the Royal Society, they should address that to the Prime Minister or run to anybody else. Okay. Picking up the point that Mr Russell made about politicians being the problem, as opposed to the civil servants and their Government structures, I assume that we wouldn't want to see local government or stakeholders in civic Scotland treated in ways that we in the past have objected to how we as parliamentarians and this institution has been treated. Notwithstanding what you are saying about priorities, for many stakeholders, the priorities just now are around the more fundamental issues around the current chaos that we are in. I wondered what views the cabinet secretary had about the role of civic Scotland, third sector and, in particular, local government, in informing and advising the informal or more ad hoc way around common frameworks in the longer term. I am absolutely open to that. I think that if those frameworks are in the end to be established, we are speculating about that, because who knows what will happen tomorrow, in a month's time or three months' time, it will be important that everybody understands how they operate. Transparency is a key issue in here. Therefore, how they operate and the engagement and involvement of bodies and organisations is crucial. I have spent time briefing and discussing on this issue with a range of bodies. We are going to do more of it. We are in phase 3 of this process. It might be useful just to remind ourselves what that is. Phase 1 was the principles and the proof of concept that Adam Tomkins referred to. That phase went through. Phase 2 was the detail and the development of that detail. That by and large happened. Phase 3 is the consultation of stakeholders, among others, and that is now under way in those areas. Phase 4 is final proposals and phase 5 is post-implementation. If we ever get to implementation, phase 5 will be post-implementation. We are in the middle of that process, and the engagement of stakeholders at every level, whether there will be other elected representatives, whether there will be the third sector, whether there will be business and business organisations, needs to be engaged in it. Of course, not all organisations are involved in everything. If you look at the ones that we have already mentioned, that list of stakeholders is fairly obvious and they will be involved. It makes sense at this stage to move on to, if that is about inter-government relations, to move on to issues of how that is all going to be scrutinised. I will come to the issues of trade deals and environmental issues, which others are interested in later. Willie, you wanted to ask about scrutiny matters, and it makes sense to float in that. Thanks very much, Bruce. Cabinet Secretary, you know that the committee has been interested in his raised issue about scrutiny of the whole framework process for some time now. I invite you to gaze forward a little and see if there is anything on the horizon that is crystallising about how the committee or the Scottish Government, or indeed any levels of government, might be able to scrutinise what is going on here. If it is shared frameworks, we would assume that it will be shared scrutiny. Yes, and we have agreements with the Parliament about how that should take place. Information arrangements are the ability of the Parliament to question. I wrote to the convener last year about shared work on making sure that we were involving others. I am absolutely open to this. I think that we should have those. If those eventually happen, if we have frameworks in place and there should be a transparency about what they are, there should be a clear set of scrutiny arrangements that allow people to understand what is happening within them to question that process. You have existing scrutiny arrangements of ministers and their actions, which are there to be used, but I want to make sure that people understand how that operates. If it happens—again, I am speculating—it will be part of the machinery of government going forward. It needs to have a democratic oversight, and therefore we should find a way that that takes place. Just as a JMC process should have a democratic oversight, but so far, trying to get the JMC process on to a democratic footing has proved hard enough, but I am keen that that should happen. Of course, there is an intention to have a number of bodies that should engage the withdrawal implementation act. The involvement of the devolved administrations in those is far from guaranteed. We have seen it, for example, with the Trade Remedies Authority, that there is no structure in place to allow input to the membership of that from the devolved administrations. Even though both Wales and ourselves have made it absolutely clear that that was essential, we are going to see it on the implementation authority. There does not appear to be an acceptance that it is absolutely essential. If you are going to have the confidence of the devolved countries, you need to have that type of involvement. That has just been fought off on the basis that everything must be controlled by the Prime Minister. That is not only a fallacy, but a dangerous and self-defeating fallacy. That is what makes it particularly stupid. I want to see a much greater openness from the UK Government and an understanding that, if there are to be new democratic structures, you should build into those democratic certainly. I am very struck by what you said about phase 3, the consultation process. There does not appear to be any reference to that in the UK Government's paper published this month. Are those consultations public? No, they have not happened yet. The intention in phase 3 is to have a three-phase structure of involvement, policy development, stakeholder engagement and then some conclusion. Perhaps Ian would want to say a word about it, because he is at the heart of it. Mr Davidson, can I clarify my question then? When there is stakeholder engagement, will there be draft common frameworks to give to stakeholders to engage with? If so, will parliamentarians have sight of them as well? We have not seen any working or draft common frameworks. If there are, you will, because it would be wrong if you weren't. However, let Ian explain what is intended. We are coming to the conclusion of phase 2, and we discussed the list of areas earlier where we have made the most progress with those. The conclusion of phase 2 is, first of all, that ministers are invited to note the progress that has been made in those areas, and to sign off the next phase, which is to move to some stakeholder engagement. Ministers have not yet seen this material in the main either. It is important that, at that phase, we have a controlled process of stakeholder engagement, given the wider context that we are in, so what we are developing between the Administrations under phase 3 is a plan for that engagement, a multilateral engagement, and to test it in a couple of areas first on. We have not yet determined which areas would be, but it is likely to be from the list that we discussed earlier. It is really important that parliamentary committees are able to participate in that process as well, and we would want to discuss with you whether it would be this committee or some of the subject matter committees would wish to be involved. Alongside that, we would like to do bespoke Scottish consultation on those areas. We are talking about under phase 3, which is a joint process of all the Governments with stakeholders. We will follow up that discussion with Clacks, but I am happy to explain anything more at this stage. I want to tease that a bit further, because that could well involve in a situation where in a framework discussion, or any decision made between the UK and Scottish Government, there is some sort of constraint, possibly, on devolved powers in terms of those agreements. It is not just about consultation then. It is not about seeking agreement from parliaments, or this Parliament in particular for the Scottish Government, to any process where those agreements might constrain devolved powers, for instance. I think that I made it clear at the beginning that this is without prejudice to those decisions, and I would not sign on to those decisions without coming to Parliament for that discussion. In fact, I am highly unlikely to sign on to those decisions anyway. I certainly would not sign on to those decisions. That is about what we will have, non-legislatively, in those cases, and how we will take those forward. However, it is absolutely essential that that process involves the committees among others. Clarify. The intention at this stage is to take the outline framework template agreements that have been developed, which identify the scope of where we think a framework way may be required, the extent to which co-operation would be necessary or desirable, and the outline of the initial thinking to date of the governance arrangements that would be associated with that. It is no more at this stage than, if you like, a playing out of the thinking that has been done between the Governments. If there were any constraints on the exercise of competence in that space, they would be entirely voluntary associated with the delivery of the framework. As we have made clear all the way through this, none of that actually constrains devolved competence, because those are documents where we agree to proceed by agreement. If Parliament chose to legislate in any of those areas in the future, then, of course, it would be free to do so, but there would be reactions from others associated with that, obviously. We would immediately cease the process. Murdoch, I apologise if any of that question is straight into your area. Well, it did, actually, but I was just going to ask a question directly to Mr Davidson in relation to what you have just said, which I think is very interesting. If we have a non-legislative framework created by memorandum of understanding, there is nothing then to prevent either this Parliament or the Westminster Parliament subsequently legislating in a way that is contrary to that in the future. What is the impact of that? Indeed, that is the case, because those are devolved areas. It is about the mutuality of interest where the Governments agree that they choose to co-operate. As the section 12 report produced by the UK Government has demonstrated, the devolved Administrations have made clear that we will continue to discussions and we would not move arbitrarily to make changes in devolved law. That is all based on trust and proceeding by agreement. It is quite novel in that respect, but absolutely nothing here constrains the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and we would not be proceeding on the basis that it would. So it is in effect a self-denying ordinance but without any legal impact? Indeed. Thank you, convener, and good morning, cabinet secretary. One of the principles outlined by the GMC is to facilitate the implementation of trade deals and international agreements. I wonder if you could explain what you understand the consequences of this to be for devolution and what particular areas of devolved competency would be affected. There is a connection, a subject connection, between some of the areas that we are talking about in terms of frameworks and the issues of trade. There are wider issues that trade presents, which are addressed in our paper on trade, which I think that we published last August, if I remember, which sets the context for how we want trade to be carried forward by the UK Government. There is not a direct link between what we are talking today in each framework and the wider issue of how trade deals are come to, but there is the subject issue, which is extremely important. There is also the wider context of how countries operate in terms of trading links. Trade isn't just about one person selling something to another person. Trade is often about the way in which you encourage one person to sell something to another person, and there is a type of society in which you both live and how you grow together in that regard and encourage good practice. We would want that to be part of it. We have been very keen that we see a change in the way in which the UK Government approaches the issues of trade. In the current chaos, the debate on trade is immature, but it is based entirely on some, suppose, trading advantages that can come from Brexit, where there are none. It is based on lack of reality and falsehood. In those circumstances, we want to continue to influence that debate by saying that any new trading arrangements outside the EU—and we do not believe that they will be advantageous—would still have to pay attention to the requirements and needs of the devolved Administrations and the wider issues of the devolved settlement, not just the narrow issues of the devolved settlement. You said just a moment ago that you pay attention to the requirements and needs. It has been well documented that trade negotiations for the European Union has undertook that there have been delays in implementations and modifications as a consequence of the objections of sub-stake parliaments. I believe that Volonia was one example. Do you imagine that the Scottish Parliament has been able to exercise such influence within the UK, based on your understanding of the UK Government's position? I think that reading of the CETA process is taking the wrong lesson from the CETA process with respect. I think that the lesson that should be taken from the CETA process is that if you put all those who have responsibility for issues connected with trade in the same room to negotiate a trading agreement, you will get a trading agreement. If, however, you neglect to do so and you forget something in that process, you run into difficulty. The UK, which I think has taken the Volonia example of the CETA treaty as a fright and said, keep them out of the room, otherwise they might want you to say something, that's the wrong thing to do. They should have taken and could still take this as saying, let's make sure that we involve to the greatest degree possible the devolved administrations because of the areas for which they are responsible and to make sure that they are part of the discussion. That's the right lesson to take. If the UK keeps taking the wrong lesson from CETA, it will do the wrong things, and those things will make it harder for them to get the type of trade treaties they want. Some of those treaties are an impossibility. There simply aren't going to be the treaties they want. The discussion this week about how you get a trade treaty with Turkey, even a continuation of the existing arrangement of Turkey, and all that Liam Fox has achieved so far is to have a continuation of the present arrangements with half a dozen countries. How you can get that, the Turkish Government is saying, well, you get it by making concessions and migration. That's not a surprise. That's where the Indian Government has been for a long time. Issues in trade are complex, and they need to be addressed with a type of political maturity and understanding that we haven't seen in the UK Government. When this committee began its work in common frameworks, it was under perhaps the assumption that there would be some transition or implementation period in which those frameworks could be devised and consulted upon, and it could be a great deal of engagement. However, the pool of Brexit uncertainty has increased, and we may be in a scenario either four weeks on Friday or potentially at the end of June when the UK leaves the European Union without a deal and, consequently, with no implementation or transition period. In such a case, it would be necessary for the UK to seek the most expeditious trade deals possible. Do you imagine that in such a scenario there would be, with no common frameworks having been agreed, a mechanism for this Parliament, for the Scottish Government, to be in the room with the gasseries trade deals? Have you had any indication that the UK Government would be willing to be accommodating with the wealth administration in such a scenario? No, but I don't think in those circumstances that anybody knows where the room would be or who would be in it, because I think that it's completely without any guidance as to what would take place. Many countries will step back from that. If the unspeakable situation that you are describing were to happen, I think that in the initial period many countries would simply step away from any engagement on continuing or new arrangements. They would want to allow the situation to settle down before they had a judgment as to how they should engage. So, I don't see if there were to be a no deal, and please God, there is not, because it's a terrible prospect. But if there was to be a no deal on 29 March, then I wouldn't expect any progress on this issue in the short term or even the medium term. You would have the ones that had been reached. The Faroe Islands, Palestine, Israel, one or two others would continue in existence, but I don't think that you'd have anything new. The UK would become a third country in EU terms, so there would be very considerable difficulties there, both in terms of import and export, for a period of time. That is simply reality. That's not exaggeration of any description. Patrick, you were interested in this area as well, I think? I think that the trade issues that I want to raise have been covered, but perhaps links into the environmental aspects. Do you want to kick off the environmental stuff just now, then? A large part of the contents of trade agreements and the issues that may touch on devolved competence do relate to environmental governance and regulation, and a great deal of the concern around the loss of environmental governance functions at EU level touches again on devolved areas. The Scottish Government has said that it wants to agree common approaches where appropriate in those areas, but it also wants to avoid any diminution of the very strong constraints that exist at EU level on EU member states. It seems to me that we are reaching a point where that is going to become increasingly difficult. The UK Government has published its proposals on environmental principles, which are severely limited in their application. For example, they are not going to have any application to taxation, spending or the allocation of resources within Government, which seems to suggest that the treasurer just does not want any truck with this business. The Office for Environmental Protection, the new body, is going to have its scope limited away from anything to do with novel changes in policy, anything that is not strictly environmental law. To what extent does the Scottish Government now feel that it is going to be possible both to achieve common approaches in environmental governance and regulation where appropriate and to avoid diminution, because the UK Government seems dead set on diminution? I think that the prospect of common approaches producing a continuity of standard are becoming more limited by the day. I do not think that that is the UK Government's objective. The UK Government's objective is to diminish environmental standards over a period of time, no matter what is being said, just as I believe the objective would be to diminish human rights and employment standards. I do not believe any assertions to the contrary. I was interested to note in the new BBC channel interview with the Icelandic president a clear view that she expressed that being part of environmental standards—Frice land has been very important, European environmental standards—and that, although it is a disadvantage not to be involved in setting those standards, that is why Scotland should be an independent member of the EU, it was very important to have those observed. I remain of the belief, as I believe the Scottish Government does, that continuing within European environmental standards would be the right thing to do. My colleague Roseanna Cunningham is consulting on environmental governance, and that is the right thing to do. As you know, Mr Harvey, possibilities are still in this area with the question of keeping pace powers, which was one of the many parts of the continuity bill that the Supreme Court was happy about and how we apply those and how we take that issue forward. There is a matter of a discussion between the parties. I am sure that you will want to bring to the table that issue and you will have my sympathetic support in how we find a way to do so. I would want to make sure that we continue with those in the interim period, if there is a period in which we are not a member—that is not an inevitability in my view—but if there was an interim period in which Scotland was not a member of the EU, we would want to maintain those and not diminish them in any way. Therefore, a parallel action with those who are diminishing them would simply not be possible. You have touched on the Scottish Government actions on that. Of course, if there is going to be—to whatever extent there will be—a common approach, it is about the actions of both Governments. The Scottish Government's consultation on principles has, as you say, been published. It is an open-ended consultation. It does not include specific proposals on governance. The expert round table at the Scottish Government convened agreed that, for most EU governance functions, there are no equivalent domestic bodies at present. In order to know whether it is going to be possible to achieve those objectives of maintaining standards and achieving some common approach that is appropriate, we not only need to hear a critique of the UK Government's proposals, but we need to have some clarity about when the Scottish Government is going to come forward with its proposals, not just on the principles but on the governance structures and how they will exercise robust powers, particularly in times when the Government might not want them to. As the next Environment Minister, I am familiar with that concept. I have to say on both sides of it. I think that it is important that the Cabinet Secretary for the Environment addresses those issues with you. I should not speak for her in areas of her policy, but I am convinced that her objectives are the same as mine. Those objectives are to maintain the highest standards, to ensure that those standards are enforced and that it would not be to allow any drift or determined drive downwards. Those should then lead to decisions on the areas that you are talking about. She will be mindful of what you have asked me here. I will make sure that she is aware of that, and I am sure that she will want to respond to it. I am interested in the clarity over protected geographical indicator status, and how does that fit in with common frameworks that might be an internal market issue? PGIs are about promoting the provenance of the produce in Scotland—beef, lamb, salmon and whisky, of course—and, because they contribute to our food and drink industry £14 billion a year, it is really important to protect our rural economy, our Scottish economy, our jobs and everything. I know that you have talked about the progress that has been made already with food and feed hygiene and safety law on animal health and welfare. Progress has been made already. I am interested in the fact that, if there is no deal, we will not have any protection at all for the PGIs, and they are in the current withdrawal agreement. People have told me that that would be devastating for our businesses, so I would be interested to hear about some further assurances of equivalent schemes or PGIs or where we are with that. I would be interested to hear those assurances, too. The UK Government has offered no such assurances. It has published some proposals last week or the week before, without consultation. I think that that is a very serious situation. The European PGI system has been extremely good for these businesses. The ones that you mentioned, yes, but the story of a black pudding are both smokies and dim-lop cheese. Those are products that are the highest reputation and standard that have benefited from European protected geographical indicator status. It is yet another example of how mad the process is that that would be thrown away in these circumstances and even madder if there was to be a no deal and that protection was removed. I am not saying that there are horrors of people ready to fabricate false black pudding, but this is an important part of the market and it is easy to diminish it. There is a serious issue about what, for example, American producers of whisky might want to call their product in order to sell it as something that is not. That is what this is about. You should not be selling things on a false prospectus and unable to match the quality, taste and provenance of those items. If there is a no deal, clearly one of the things that we will require to do, obviously that is of an urgency, is to try and find some protection, but it is difficult for us to bring that protection just immediately. It will not have the reputation that the European system has. The European system works for two reasons. It has a reputation and it is European wide, but also it is enforceable. That is a key issue. It is enforceable. You cannot just call something having PGI status. If you do it falsely, then you are in trouble. We would want to do what we could to help, but it does illustrate how this issue goes down to every level. A cheesemaker in and lop is going to be disadvantaged by the chaos that has been created at Whitehall. I am aware that the American Beef Lobby has lobbied their trading consultation to say that the beef coming from America to Europe has flatlined, so they are seeking to reduce the welfare, so that would mean hormone-injected beef that we do not want in this country, or other approaches. I am aware of dairy farms and somatic sale counts, which is an issue that I have looked at. Having a PGI status in a wider European context would protect our produce. There is a high standard in food safety and there is a high standard in terms of reputation and provenance. That is really important. That is an approach that has been built over many years. In the past 12 years of SNP Government, the issue of Scottish food and drink and export has become a huge one. The percentage of the Scottish economy devoted to this is much greater than it is south of the border. That is also true in Wales and in Northern Ireland. In those circumstances, we should do everything that we can to support and develop those industries. Actions that do not do that should be roundly condemned. We should also refuse to accept lower standards. Patrick Harvie has been talking about lower environmental standards, which is part of the same argument. How on earth have we got to a situation in which we are actively trying to negotiate lower standards in every part of our national life, including training? How on earth could we get there? That is where we are today. I have one final question. You referred a number of times in your contributions to section 12 of the EU withdrawal act and the freezing powers. Have you had any discussions at any stage with the UK government about the nature and type of progress that has been made that we have been hearing about from Ian in regard to common frameworks that might give them sufficient comfort to be able to repeal those powers? As we do not require the powers as legitimate anyway, we do not accept that the powers are necessary. We have not said so in any formal stick-way in recent months. I cannot remember doing so, so please repeal these. What we have said to them is that if you use those powers, then what that does is that it freezes our co-operation. We stop co-operating with you on that issue immediately. So far, so good. There is a half empty and half full glass here. In a wider sense, in which there is a drought on all of this, there is a small amount of positivity about the fact that we have been able to agree two quarterly reports on the basis that they have not used the powers and do not need to and do not anticipate using them. That is good news, but it is up to them whether they keep the act or not. It is dead to us and we do not acknowledge its legitimacy. Okay, cabinet secretary. I thank you and your officials for giving evidence this morning. The committee previously agreed to take the next item in private, so I close this public part of the meeting.