 Good evening and welcome to the Center for Strategic International Studies. My name is Andrew Schwartz and I work in External Relations here at CSIS. I think this is our 56th sellout in a row at one of these events. We've been doing this for five years and we have such a great panel lined up for tonight. We're so glad you've joined us on this beautiful evening in Washington. Unfortunately, we tried, but we're unable to get the U.S. chief envoy to North Korea to join us tonight because Dennis Rodman was not available. He sends his regrets. All joking aside, America remains intimately involved in the conflict between the two Koreas, the ongoing. The point is certainly not lost in the families of the 30,000 American men and women who are serving overseas in the Koreas. I'd like to thank Bob Schieffer and everyone at the Bob Schieffer College of Communication at TCU for their amazing partnership in bringing these dialogues to CSIS. We're so grateful to you, Bob, and to the Schieffer School, Schieffer College, and to all of our friends down in Fort Worth, GoFrogs. Finally, none of this would be possible without the generosity and the support of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation. We are so appreciative of the foundation and all that they do for CSIS and allow us to put on these terrific events. Without further ado, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the man who's number one on Washington on Sunday mornings, Bob Schieffer. What I always say about that is one Sunday at a time. We were number one last Sunday and we hope we'll be number one this Sunday. This is a great panel. You know, when you come right down to it, the news media can generally just handle one story at a time. And we've been kind of all focused so much and rightly so on what's going on in Ukraine as far as foreign policy stories. But this is a reminder that these things don't happen one at a time. Everything in the world today is connected and there's a lot going on in other places. So we really do have a great panel. Glenn Davies is the special representative for North Korea Policy at the U.S. Department of State. He was appointed in January 2012 by Secretary of State Clinton to facilitate high-level engagement with our other six-party talk partners. Special Representative Davies served as a senior emissary for U.S. engagement with North Korea. Overseas our involvement in the talks. He's a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, served as permanent rep of the United States to the Atomic Energy Commission, agency before he came to this job, and the U.N. office in Vienna. He's also has served on the National Security Council staff and was an assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Elise Lobot, am I saying that right? It's Lobot, but I've been called much worse. Nobody can ever pronounce my name. I'm sorry, Elise, I apologize. She, as of course as you all know, is CNN's award-winning foreign affairs reporter. She is based in Washington now, but she's reported from more than 75 countries, has interviewed and traveled the world with five secretaries of state since joining CNN in 2000 over more than a decade covering U.S. foreign policy. She's reported on many major global events, and prior to joining CNN, she covered the United Nations for ABC. And then over here, someone who needs no introduction, Dr. Victor Chow, Senior Advisor and Korean Chair here at CSIS. He came here in 2009 as Senior Advisor. He's also Director of Asian Studies and holds the DS Song KF Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. From 2004 to 2007, he served as Director for Asian Affairs at the White House on the National Security Council. And we could go on and on. We have more qualifications, a lot of great background for all of our people. Let me just start with you, Ambassador Davis. The United States had a summit in South Korea. The president was there. How did that go? And what do you think it was accomplished? Well, thank you very much, Pa. I appreciate that. And let me quickly give you some background on that. The president arrived just after this terrible tragedy that had struck South Korea, the sinking of the seawall of ferry, in which tragedy perished hundreds of, for the most part, very young South Koreans. And so the president arrived very shortly after that. And it was a great occasion for the president to express condolences to the people of South Korea, demonstrate the solidarity of the United States and Americans to the South Koreans as they dealt with this terrible business. So from that standpoint, the kind of the people-to-people piece of it, very important. We have a very broad agenda with South Korea. It's not just about North Korea, though I know that's one of the focuses of today. Our relationship has become almost global, quite frankly, in nature. And so whether it's working side by side in Afghanistan, working diplomatically on the Syria issue, dealing with global climate change, nuclear security, regional issues, really the world is now the stage on which South Korea and the United States together act. So it's a very important opportunity for the president to reaffirm our solidarity, our alliance with North Korea, in particular in the face of North Korea's continuing threat, but also an opportunity to discuss all of these issues, economic security and people-to-people. So we made a great deal of progress. It was a good stop by the president. And it I think is the case that South Korea is the most visited country abroad for the president of the United States, which tells you something about the importance of the relationship to the United States and I think also for South Korea. Dr. Chow, how would you assess? Just give us a broader overall view of how you think U.S.-South Korean relations are right now. Well, Bob, as you know, last year we celebrated the 60th anniversary of the alliance. It has been one that has evolved from a relationship between two countries that were really just pragmatic partners in a war. They knew nothing about each other to a relationship today as Glenn described where they are operating together on the global stage, whether it's with regard to climate change or best business practices or nuclear issues, whatever it might be. And so I think this trip was a very important trip, one because it made Korea the most visited country for President Obama, I think next to Mexico, I think next to Mexico, but considering the proximity of Mexico. But more importantly, I think it was again just another sign of first how much the two leaders get along. I mean you can never overestimate that in international relations, how well the leaders get along. And I think President Obama and President Park do like each other at a personal level, but they also were able to use it as a platform to talk about the things they care about. I mean whether it's with regard to liberal trade institutions around the world or its counter-proliferation or its climate change or global health, all these issues are ones in which the two countries play very prominently on the world stage. And obviously they had issues closer to home to talk about North Korea, China, their military relationship, but overall I think it was just a validation of how strong and deep and robust the U.S. career relationship is. Alesha, what do you think are the main challenges to this relationship right now? Well, I see two things and one of the things that came out of the summit I thought was that, yes, everything is true what Glen and Victor say and I'm honored to be on the panel with them, two of the greatest minds in this town on North Korea, but I think that I can look at the relationship between South Korea and the United States like I kind of do with the relationship with India or India is a global power. There are a lot of ways that the U.S. is cooperating with India, whether it's trade, whether it's counter-terrorism, economically, people-to-people exchanges. But the relationship between India and Pakistan and what's going on in Afghanistan really dominates how people see the relationship. And I think that even though all these things are true and the U.S. and South Korea have a very robust relationship, you're never really able to transcend the idea that when the president goes to South Korea, what is coming out of it? What is making those headlines? And that's what's going on with North Korea and I think North Korea really plays upon that. I also think that the tensions between Japan and South Korea really in some ways have hampered the U.S.-Japan and South Korea alliance from really taking off at least right now. Obviously, South Korea very upset with Japan continuing to believe in its pre-colonial aggressions and there have been a lot of insults flying back and forth and for the United States, who wants this cornerstone alliance to really help the U.S. with its so-called pivot to Asia, which we've heard a lot about the pivot to Asia, but we don't see a lot about the pivot to Asia. And I think that has hampered in the United States. President Obama has tried in recent months to get South Korean and Japanese diplomats together on a lower level. He hosted a summit between the leaders of Japan and South Korea in the Hague in March before he traveled out to the region and he's trying to say, listen, you guys have to get rid of your old baggage. We have to move forward and this trilateral alliance is really the cornerstone of what we're trying to do in Asia. Well, talk about that. I'd like to hear both of you and what your thoughts are on that. Well, I mean, many of us in this room have been or are alliance managers working in the U.S. Korea, U.S. Japan, whatever alliance is. And it is frustrating at times when there's a very successful summit. They make progress on missile defense. They make progress on wartime op-con. They make progress on a bunch of different things. It's a great relationship. They're unveiling a new global health security plan. And then all everybody talks about is North Korea. North Korea kind of steals all the thunder and really sort of pervades our thinking about the Korean Peninsula. And so I think that's a real challenge. It's a real challenge for the alliance relationship. And I think for that reason, Park Geun-ae has really tried to talk about what Korea does itself on a global stage and doesn't allow simply the North Korea story to grab all the headlines. Well, what about North Korea right now? Sure. Well, we're at an interesting moment with North Korea. I mean, I think the North Koreans are acting in a kind of highly improvisational fashion. It's difficult to detect any real thematic consistency there, except that they seem to be always defaulting in the direction of provocations and threats and unable to sort of sustain any more kind of positive outreach to the outside world. And that's a huge problem. They are, of course, we all know, it's in the headlines. They are issuing threats right left and center. They're attacking the president of South Korea on a very, what's the Latin, ad hominem basis, you know, a very personal basis. Well, they're attacking President Obama. They're attacking President Obama. Exactly. A language. So, you know, it's sometimes difficult to define what it is North Korea ultimately wants. The central challenge that I face in trying to deal in particular with this nuclear problem is how do we set up a diplomatic process going forward that can deal with what is the central problem, which is North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile technologies, which threaten the region, certainly, but also threaten the world. So, it's difficult to do. We spend a lot of time, I spend a lot of time in North Asia with the Chinese, with the South Koreans, the Japanese, meet with the Russians because they're part of the process as well. And we've made a lot of progress in terms of talking about what it is we'd like to see happen where we're still working is to decide exactly how that roadmap works. And, of course, you always have in the background, as has been pointed out, North Korea trying to pull focus, provoking, threatening, launching rockets of various ranges, issuing challenges to South Korea and to Pak-Gun-A. For me, one of the most impressive actors in this entire tableau is this still relatively new president of South Korea who seems to have a really excellent feel for the problem and seems to understand how best to try to get at it despite North Korea's recalcitrance. So, remains a work in progress on the nuclear peace we've been at it for 25 years. I think Victor himself has written eloquently about the challenges that various administrations have faced in getting at it. And I just happen to be the latest guy kind of carrying the ball at, let's call it, the senior working level. But I remain optimistic. I think there are ways to get at it. Well, they were saying they were going to do another test here. And then they kind of postponed that. Some people say maybe they wanted to wait until the news kind of quieted down before they do that. Well, also I think that they know that the South Koreans are really diverted with this very disaster. And so what we've seen is that the North Koreans want to have maximum bang for their buck, if they say. So when you say that the news dies down, not only the news about the threats about the possible test, they do like to keep everybody off guard. But they also want to have maximum attention. And so if there is a big crisis in Ukraine or there's this thing with the Nigerian girls, I mean we talk about the fact that North Korea is this isolated place. But you can rest assured that the leader and his cronies definitely are watching the news climate. And they want to make sure that if they're going to do this, this is going to have South Korea's full attention. And right now, I don't think they do. I just want to answer what Glenn was saying about what do the North, we don't really know what the North Koreans are up to. Obviously denuclearizing North Korea is the biggest problem that the U.S. and its allies face in the region. But I think possibly in their quest to really go after the denuclearization, they're not figuring out what the North Koreans really do want. And if he loses his nukes, what is the most important thing to Kim Jong-un? No one really knows about this young leader, but they know that regime survival is the most important thing. And so there are platitudes about, you know, we're not trying to get rid of the regime, but I think the United States and its allies have to make a choice about whether they do want to get rid of the regime. If they don't, they need to make that clear and provide, you know, not just lip service, but engagement and guarantees that they're not trying to go after the regime. And maybe that's how you start. And then if you feel more comfortable and there's some kind of engagement, then you go after the nuclear program. If you do, look, we're trying, North Koreans are starting to get things smuggled into North Korea, DVDs, ISP sticks. They're learning more about the outside world. Eventually that country will topple. And the United States has a lot of activities that we've been reading about in Cuba and other countries that they could help in this regard. I think we have this tendency to focus on the nuclear issue, but maybe we've had this myopic focus and it's not really working. But I'm interested in this. I mean, would they really be, I don't think sophisticated enough, I think that's the wrong word. But would they be following the news so closely that they'd say, we're going to wait till we have a good slow news day before we're going to do this nuclear test? I mean, that's obviously what has been suggested by some. I think the answer is yes. Well, I think, you know, part of it I think, part of the answer I think is yes. I mean, I remember when I was working on this issue with the White House, they did, still to date, their largest series of ballistic missile tests on basically July 4th. Which was July 5th in North Korea, which was President Bush's birthday. So they had two meanings for them. And then, of course, the first nuclear test for the Obama administration was on Memorial Day. I remember that. So do I. So I don't think they just plucked these dates out of the air. I think there is some tactical decision-making that's done. At the same time, though, I mean, we should never discount the fact that there clearly also is not just a military but a scientific rationale for their timetable for testing. So it very well could be that the reason they may have postponed, Bob, as you said, or it appears as though they have postponed is because they might encounter some technical problem or they may be trying to do more with the next test. I think one of the things that's very clear today that was less clear when I was working this issue with people before. You know, there was much more of a debate in the policy community and the think tank community and the academic community about whether the North Koreans were pursuing these weapons for the purpose of negotiation or whether they were really pursuing them because they wanted to be a nuclear weapons state. And, you know, in a room this size, you could get 50% of the people saying it's just a bargaining chip. And that's why they pick these dates because they want to get the maximum of attention so that they can negotiate. And the other 50% would have said, no, they're doing this because they want nuclear weapons. And I think today, probably if you poll this room, it would be more like 90-10. 90% of the people believe that they are clearly focused on becoming a nuclear weapons state and therefore these tests, whether it's missile tests or nuclear tests, are not just to negotiate or bargain but because they want to be a nuclear weapons state and they want to be acknowledged as a nuclear weapons state. And this became very clear under this new leadership because they announced something called the Byung Jin strategy which is basically saying, yes, we would like economic reform and development because our economy is a basket case, but at the same time we want to do this while being a nuclear weapons state, which poses a real problem for Glenn and negotiators because for 25 years the US negotiating strategy was you can have economic development, political recognition, all these things in exchange for your nuclear weapons. Can I read just a violent agreement with much of what Victor said? I think that's right. This new leader has done us the favor in a backhanded fashion of making it quite clear that he has no intention of meaningfully denuclearizing and that presents a problem, but it also is a clarifying kind of moment because it's now quite obvious what we're dealing with here, a clarifying moment when he decided to purge and execute his uncle pretty much on YouTube, all except the execution part, which we labeled instantaneously. We said this demonstrates the brutality of the regime. It was kind of like we x-rayed. We all saw what North Korea is all about. And we haven't just concentrated on the nuclear issue even though that's what I am paid to worry about every day. We've also spent a lot of time on all other aspects of this proliferation as a big part of it and that human rights is key. And I think long after these debates are over about how well we did or didn't do on denuclearization will be the question of what did you do for the 25 million people of North Korea outside the hereditary elites of Pyongyang, the other 90 plus percent. Did you do enough to keep faith with them and find ways to put up in lights what it is they're doing to their own people? And so there are a number of areas on which we work. It's not just a nuclear issue as important as that is to our security. There is an envoy for human rights that once in a lifetime gets into North Korea and is able to have some meaningless discussions. I mean the North Koreans are not interested in what anybody thinks about their human rights record. I mean this is the way that they maintain control over their people. I'm just wondering whether there is another way of approaching the problem. Even though that is true, there is human rights, there is proliferation. The main concern of this administration and of the allies is the North Korean nuclear program. And basically isolation isn't working. The sanctions continue to leak. I mean what is the administration's strategy? It seems as if there is a kind of crisis oriented, fragmented way of dealing with the problem. Glenn obviously is working hard every day and having meetings and traveling. But it's not clear to the outside world what the strategy is for the six party talks. Are they going to bring them back? Are they going to have another round? Are they going to try again? Is there a way to reach the leader? I don't think that that's really clear. And I also think that maybe the media is responsible and the academics are responsible. In a way this has become, yes it's a crisis, but it also has become a little bit of a sideshow. Let's just talk about that. What is the strategy now? Well the strategy is to ensure that starting with the three allies, but in this case because the problem is on the peninsula particularly the Republic of Korea, extending out to the five members of the six party talks, we call them our partners, there be as great unanimity as we can achieve on what it is North Korea must do. We've made great progress on that. Sadly a lot of diplomacy does have to happen behind the curtain. A lot of our talks with the Chinese were not in the business of retailing to everybody. As much as we try. As much as you try. But we have achieved a level of success in hammering out what it is we need to see happen. The problem becomes in working through what we like to call the roadmap, which is the how and the when of North Korean denuclearization. And the truth is, no secret, that the interests of the five parties are not perfectly congruent. That's just life in the North Asian mix. And so while the Chinese are mostly seized of the problem of stability because this is on their periphery, we are mostly concerned with the problem of security. And so the argument we've sought to make to the Chinese, and I first did it back in December of 2011, first trip to Beijing, is to point out to them that their so-called stability concerns and our security concerns really are kind of converging as the North Korean weapons of mass destruction program and their bad behavior, their provocative behavior continues. And it's on that track of seeking a common appreciation and a common plan for the way forward where we've made a great deal of progress. We're a quarter century into this, as Victor's pointed out in many of his writings. This wasn't done in a day, and as President Obama pointed out in Seoul, this will remain a problem of which we are seized in the United States government. I'm an optimist. I actually think there's no solution to this except a diplomatic solution. And I think we'll find a way forward and I think we're making some progress. Do you see the Six Powers Talks restarting? I mean, it's been a while, right? You know, that's up to North Korea. It won't surprise you to hear me say because North Korea needs to decide whether it wants to go down this path, rejoin the international community, live up to its obligations and its promises, its responsibilities, or doesn't wish to continue to isolate itself, seek to go its own way, acquire these technologies in contradiction to the worldwide consensus. Remember, most widely subscribed treaty in the world pretty much, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the result of the mid-20th century consensus among some very wise statesmen and women who decided we need to come up with a nuclear bargain to prevent the world from facing a couple of dozen nuclear weapons states by the end of the 20th century. Most of the bright lights of the 50s and 60s believed that by the end of the century we would have dozens of countries of nuclear weapons. We didn't. Why didn't we? Because they set up this regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime, the IAEA. It actually worked to a great extent and we didn't have that kind of breakout but there was one country among the 189 or so. One country signed the treaty, walked away from it, tore it up. The only country on the face of the earth that's exploded a nuclear device in the 21st century, it's North Korea. So this isn't a U.S.-North Korea polemic that we will live up to our responsibilities. It's about the entire world community keeping up the pressure on North Korea. It's about China, Russia, the United States, Japan, Korea in the first instance but it's about everybody else as well, both in the region and overseas because in a globalized world where when you Google how to make a nuclear weapon you get whatever it is now, 14, 16 million hits, this is serious stuff. And this is the vision the president laid out in his Prague speech and North Korea becomes a particular challenge that everybody, all nations of the world need to work on. South Korea, the Republic of Korea has been particularly valiant on this front. They seized on that idea. They hosted the second Nuclear Security Summit. They get it. More and more world leaders do. 80 countries and international organizations condemned North Korea for their last nuclear test. So that coalition of concern is growing and that's what I think at the end of the day is going to make a difference in it. Victor, let me ask you this. We knew almost nothing about this man when he became the leader of North Korea. Have we learned anything of significance about him since he came there? Well, he likes Dennis Rodman. Do we know why? He watched a lot of basketball. His father also liked basketball. So stylistically there are big differences from the previous leaders and in that sense I guess one could argue that he is more tuned to western things and clearly shows an affinity for them. But what we know of him is largely what we know of North Korea, which is very little. And so policy often is reacting to the behavior rather than trying to figure out what is driving the behavior. And one could say that's a flaw policy but when you're talking about the hardest intelligence target in the world at the policy level you don't have much of a choice but to react to what the behavior is. And I think for that reason the administration rightly so has focused on when they did change leaders has focused on, look we don't care who's in charge, we care about the behavior. And when we see good behavior, genuine commitment, we're ready to engage. I think that makes sense. With Glenn I think diplomacy is the only way to resolve this. No one wants to see it resolved in any other way. Having said that I do think and I was a part of the Six Party Talks, part of the 2005-2007 agreements. I'm just not sure how much of the Six Party Talks is left. Your title is Envoy for North Korea, right? Not Six Party Talks. Right, I'm not the Six Party guy. I'm the Envoy for North Korea. Strictly speaking. Strictly speaking. But I know you cover it all. But if it starts I think I'll be there. Yeah, I hope so. But I mean the last meeting was 2008 I think, it's been six years. If you don't do something for six years you probably don't do it anymore. And I think the reality of course is that the North Koreans really only want to talk to one country. They may talk to South Korea on occasion. They're flirting with Japan right now a little bit. But there's only one country they really want to talk to. And it's not China. It's the United States. And in fact I think one of the, it's kind of a vicious circle because one of the successes of U.S. policy over the past years both in this administration and the previous has been the ability to work with China on the North Korea problem. But the closer that we work with China on the North Korea problem the less the North Koreans want to deal with the Chinese. Whether it's in the six-party format which they host or whether it's in a bilateral fashion. That's interesting. What do they want to talk to us about? I mean, so I think their talking point is that they would like normalized relations with the United States. They would like a peace treaty. They'd like economic assistance. They'd like to be removed completely from all the sanctions going back to the Korean War. All this sort of stuff. The problem is in exchange for what? Yeah. And I think whether it's this administration or the past administration if they were genuinely committed to putting their weapons on the table anything is possible. I would say that's the case for this administration. At least my reading of it. I would say that was the case for the past administration and I think that's the most right of what people might think. The problem is that North Korea essentially wants to have its cake and eat it too. It wants to be recognized by the United States. It does want a peace treaty. It wants all of these things. But at the same time we'd like to keep its nuclear weapons. And to the extent that they want to engage with Ambassador Davies they would like to engage with Ambassador Davies not on denuclearization talks. They'd like to engage with Ambassador Davies on arms control just as the U.S. and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War days. Now that's a pretty far out proposition. But as the negotiator that's the matrix that you have to deal with. It's challenging. It's very difficult. You all touched on this a while ago and I'd just like to ask all three of you and that is when you talked about China they're making a concern. They don't want to see this government collapse. They don't want to see this economy collapse. What is the state of North Korea? Is that likely that this whole thing might just fall in? Well I think the economic situation is not good. In the two years that the North Korean, the new North Korean leader has been in power the most disappointing thing in my opinion has not been the nuclear tests and the provocations because we expect those. It's been the absence of any real sign of economic reform. Small things here and there, but no real sign of economic reform. For a guy who supposedly was educated for part of his life outside of North Korea there are many theories bandied about and think tanks and academia about how you had this younger generation of leadership that would be interested and opening to it. All that's gone. Nobody believes that anymore. And so the economic future is not good. The only thing that they have going for them right now are a group of economic agreements they did with China from about 2008 onwards that extract a lot of the minerals out of North Korea into China. So there's money flowing in through that but there's not a broader answer to the economic problem and meanwhile on the political side this leader executed his uncle, the number two in charge. Is that a sign of power consolidation? A guy who's fully in control? Or is that a sign of sending a message because things are not okay inside of North Korea? So I think there have always been debates about the extent to which North Korea is ready to reform or it's about to collapse. I think there have been more predictions about reform than there have been about collapse. Those predictions about reform have been wrong. So what does that leave you with? It leaves you only with one thing and I think to the credit of a lot of countries they don't talk about it but I think they're thinking about it a lot more. We as analysts are thinking about that a lot more now. No one can predict an Arab Spring in North Korea. You're thinking about it a lot more just because all the variables are just lining up in a direction that tells you this is not going in a good way. Well, I don't think that anyone's predicting an Arab Spring in North Korea but I don't think anybody predicted an Arab Spring in the Arab world. And who would have thought that Hosni Mubarak, Moe Mar-Kedafi in particular, eventually I think everyone hopes Bashar al-Assad will fall. And as Victor said, there is a very big power struggle I think going on that a lot of us don't know about obviously the details but you can see from the execution of his uncle from the fact that he also sacked another, the number two in the country just recently one of the major military generals and is trying to replace with his own people. Recently we interviewed, CNN interviewed a former insider of Kim Jong-il, the father. And he said that Kim Jong-un, it's not the same because Kim Jong-il had this institutional framework, this intelligence network that they called the Good Old Boys Network that these were the ones that helped him get things done, that they protected him that that's where he took his power. And it built up over his life but Kim Jong-un doesn't have power that he earned or that he earned any kind of respect he was given the power symbolically and that this gentleman said well he may have friends in Swiss boarding schools but he doesn't have any friends with inside North Korea. And so as he continues to purge he has even few people to stand by him to help him get things done. And as North Korea, even though we call it the Hermit Kingdom it is opening up in the sense that some people are watching the internet, looking at the internet, watching Western films and South Korean films. I mean eventually this will continue to permeate and as that continues to be a surprise and Kim Jong-un's power continues to fall I think as he has less and less people around him I think we have to predict some kind of collapse at some point. Alright, well let's take a few questions. Here's one right here. Mike Massetic, PBS online news hour. I want to focus this back to the South. They have been through a terribly traumatic experience as revealed stem to stern failures in society and government from regulation to the inept performance of the Coast Guard. Is this going to lead to real change in governance in society or is they just going to let things go back to business as usual after the hub-up dies down? I would like to. It's a good question. I think you're right first of all. President Park when she came into office she was preparing for a crisis but this was not the crisis she was preparing for. She was preparing for the last crisis which was North Korea provocations and creating a government mechanism to respond rapidly to that. Two national security advisers all this sort of stuff and then this thing comes along which is completely unexpected. I think they're still going through a very difficult period right now and they still need to recover all the bodies, all of this but I do expect to see some major reforms in terms of public safety and qualification of people who operate these sorts of vessels. I mean one of the things that I think you can say about Korean society and Korean institutions is that they go at 100 miles an hour and something breaks down but when that thing breaks down they really try to fix it. Whether you're talking about Korean corporations after the financial crisis or a new ROE when it comes to the rule of engagement when it comes to North Korean provocations they have a system that will focus on this and will try to fix it so I think that it's not going to go back to business as usual. We're probably going to see some major major reforms inside of that country when it comes to things like public safety. I think it's not only on the kind of ferry industry but also in terms of South Korea has seen this massive growth over the last few decades and the expense of that has been kind of the regulation that the government has kind of looked the other way in a lot of terms of the regulation and I think a lot of people in South Korea are asking like what has been the cost for all of this growth? Do we need to slow down and pay more attention to quality rather than quantity? CSIS came out with a very interesting paper in the last few days about the economic impact of the ferry disaster on South Korea that this has really rocked the nation and people aren't going out as much they're staying home, they're canceling travel plans and this is going to affect business and so I think that this has been a very profound tragedy and have had a profound effect on the country. President Park's approval rating has dipped I think about 11% to a ferry disaster to about 48% which I think is an all-time low. Do either of you have any doubt that if the North should take some provocative action and I don't mean just firing shells into the sea or something like that but something like happened in the previous administration that this president will react and react strongly? Well, I think that one of the strengths that President Park has brought to this has been a real kind of clear vision about how to deal with North Korea and I think she's taken a very principled approach. She laid it all out before she came into office in a famous article in Foreign Policy and it's called Trust Policy and I think she's been tremendously sure-footed and astute about her approach to North Korea and she said while the president was there just in the very recent past that should the North Koreans engage in a so-called strategic provocation or nuclear test or long-range missile launch that it would put in jeopardy certainly the immediate prospects for Six-Party and that there would have to be a very strong reactor to that and she would I'm sure do everything she could to ensure that the ROK was in the forefront of that so I think the North Koreans have the message that if they decide to do that again they're going to buy themselves a world of hurt but I mean what if, what if they sink the ship or something like that? Well, if they go back to the kinds of actions they took in 2010 the sinking of the Shodan, the Corvette the shelling of Waipido Island and so forth it's my belief, I'm not a military expert but that the ROK would be prepared and they've said this publicly to react very sharply, strongly and disproportionately to that and they tried to message that in you know stereophonic sound to North Korea so I think that may be one of the reasons why there could be some hesitation on the part of the regime in Pyongyang to engage in that sort of thing I mean the thing that worries me is you know Bob in terms of your question is that North Koreans do another exercise and they mean to sort of pound water and then you get a stray shell or two that hits an island and basically kills South Koreans I think you know that in a situation like that I worry very much about because I think she will she will respond immediately and vigorously perhaps disproportionately I don't know and then you get a terrible escalation dynamic I mean I agree with everybody here she's very clear headed on North Korea she is the only South Korean president that has come into office who has already visited North Korea and met with the leadership before she ever became president she did it as a politician so she doesn't come into office as previous presidents with this obsession before they leave office they've got to make the pilgrimage to the north and you know and show that they're trying to create unification been there and done that it's very different I think for her and she's a lot more clear headed Right here you had asked This spring the UN Human Rights Commission came out with an unprecedented report about human rights in North Korea including unbelievable descriptions of concentration camps indistinguishable from Nazi Germany or Pol Pot and I'm trying to figure out why you news guys haven't shined a light on that I mean even if nuclear weapons are bargained away those camps will endure and the ultimate atrocity would be to offer this regime some guarantees of non-interference of preservation that would be the ultimate human atrocity why can't we get you guys to shine a light on that report It was just too late You can take it if you want It's really hard to get into North Korea I'll be completely frank it's much easier to report about North Korea than the human rights abuses outside of North Korea Once in a while we're lucky and we'll get a defector that comes out A lot of times if journalists are loud in the country you have a mind I think that there was clearly not enough but as Bob said in the beginning of the session a lot of times international news is dominated by the news of the day I'm not disagreeing with you I'm just saying that that's a reason why if it was a slow news day maybe it would have gotten a lot of attention Recently we did something we a lot of times will use that as an opportunity to take a look at a lot of things you had these drones over the last week that were found in South Korea that were believed to be from North Korea you had these racial slurs that were coming back and forth about President Obama and President Park and then we used that to look in the human rights report this was around the time that a French photographer was able to smuggle some really shocking images of the famine and widespread damage to infrastructure and everything that's coming out it is really hard to report on North Korea we should do more we kind of do talk about the human rights as a kind of on the periphery of what's going on with the security challenges it is a challenge it's a valid criticism but you know it's a criticism you can always make there's always some story that we ought to be giving more attention to that for one reason or another we're not able to and right now I mean we're just so overloaded with news about other things that that hasn't gotten the attention that I think you're right if I could just say though I'm sorry Bob the President of the United States did talk about this I think this was a landmark report done by Justice Michael Kirby the Australian Juris who led the effort along with a group from the international community it was a great day when the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva could get this thing launched and you may know some of the machinations that went into making that possible this needs to be followed up on the government of the Republic of Korea has said a signal that they'll host this office, the permanent office to take names, hold account those responsible for these depredations I mean this is just the beginning of this process and it is something we need to talk about part and parcel of this tableau this issue, this problem, this challenge that is North Korea that is the most significant egregious outlier in the international system so we're talking about it but there are many facets to this issue when we've got to deal with all of them so we can't pick and choose along the issues that we're talking about Hi, Rachel Oswald National Journal Ambassador Davies if you could just comment on possible changes in U.S. policy toward returning to the 6th party talks it had previously been stated that the United States needed concrete proof of North Korea's intent to permanently denuclearize but recently there have been unconfirmed reports coming out of some of the bilateral talks I believe you've had with the Chinese that you could accept a return to the so-called leap day agreement the moratorium Yeah, leap day is history I mean, leap day was a valiant attempt in kind of minor key to get at this problem and kick start 6 party talks, it was never meant to not even on paper, it was a declaratory deal that we reached hope to create space to restart 6 party, so we don't talk in terms of leap day or return to the leap day we'll see about 6 party it does depend on whether the North Koreans will make the right choice and move back in the direction of the 5 parties position which is the denuclearization which is the bedrock of the 6 party process the Sinequanon of it the centerpiece of the September 2005 joint statement, you know accept the fact that that should be the premise to it, and in terms of the sequencing and what has to be done beforehand, what has to be done afterward but all I'll say is that it's a canard it's ridiculous to suggest that the United States is insisting North Korea must completely denuclearize before we go back to 6 party, that's not true but we need earnest money, we need to see that North Korea is serious about this we need to see that they accept that this is the fundamental premise of 6 party talks we'd like to see them take concrete actions it's important that they do so the stuff they've got to do, they know what they have to do and what they do quite frankly in the initial stages would be perfectly reversible steps that they would take declaratory steps so the fact that they're not interested in going back in that direction the fact that they're not even interested in resolving the cases of Americans who have been in prison in North Korea tells you something about their current interest in going back to multilateral diplomacy in 6 party talks that's not changed, it's been consistent over 5 years we're going to stick with it we're going to stick with our partners, our allies and the other members of the 5 parties and we're going to hold North Korea to account that's where we are and where we'll be how about on this side of the room alright, right here Sydney Friedberg, BreakingDefense.com the interests of the 5 parties are not perfectly congruent to say the least I mean we talk about Russia and China Russia has obviously been a little bit problematic lately on its western border and there are repercussions on the east China is increasingly it seems provocative including claiming bits of Ayate Iraq as well as Japanese territory with the air defense zone I mean, zooming back from the immediate problem of North Korea it seems like the regional context has gotten a lot more complicated and a lot harder than it was the last time we did the 6 party things 1 third of the 6 parties are now making a lot more trouble than they were well, can I take that on quickly Senator? Sure, just to say that you've just helped describe the degree of difficulty of the 6 party talks to some extent, but there is one issue on which we all agree and that is this issue of the necessity of denuclearization occurring on the peninsula which means North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons and despite these regional differences that continue to bubble up and sometimes bubble over we are still able to talk to Russia about North Korea to talk to China about North Korea I've had talks just in recent weeks with my opposite number the first trilateral meeting at call that ambassador level after the President of the United States brought the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of South Korea together in the Hague was my hosting my Japanese and South Korean counterparts in Washington so there is still enough commonality and I think it's growing and I think it's sufficient that despite the differences at the margins we have our strategic interests this can be done diplomacy can work there is really no magic in it but it does come down to presenting North Korea with a choice where it really only has one choice and that is to go down the peaceful diplomatic path of denuclearization that's what we're working on and I believe that someday we'll succeed I hope I'm the guy who's around to see that happen my father who's a diplomat in the 1940s through 1980 Sovietologist ended up in Poland as our ambassador retired 10 years later he saw the wall fall I mean this stuff takes time folks and the President of the United States tried to explain that in soul stuff's not self evident it's not easy you've got to use all elements of your national power military diplomatic your so-called soft power and you've got to bring it all together and you've got to work your alliances you've got to try to win people over the notion that there is a better way forward and here's how it works and here's how you wherever you are I don't care on what continent can play a role on this thing so that's what we're doing one more question and this lady right here good evening everyone I'm Jennifer Chen with China Media Group my question is under the current situation what do you think exactly the international community can do to help the people in North Korea especially on human rights issues sure thanks let me try that real quick which is to send a strong unified consistent message to Pyongyang that they need to change their behavior and how they treat their people that's key and I think it's also important to tell other regional actors including China what they think about the situation inside North Korea so you can bring about change but it can only be if the world speaks as one voice and demands it can I just say I mean so the COI report is a watershed I think that's a very important moment a very important platform on which to build more international consensus more international recognition of the human rights problem is being a major impediment to North Korea's joining the world community it's not just about nuclear weapons and so I think everybody should be pivoting if you will off the COI report I will just say as a last bit CSIS is going to be doing that very soon we're going to be announcing releasing a new project that we'll be working on with regard to looking at what the practical policy implications are that come from the commission of inquiry report so just sorry a little bit of advertising alright well on behalf of CSIS and TCU I thank you all for coming I learned a lot I hope you did thank you that was really good