 Part 3, CHAPTER X OF CANADA'S HUNDRED DAYS. The word passed with incredible rapidity. His wind was up and he had gone back to the canal. From corps commander to men in the ranks it was a tremendous relief. The battle was won. Our sacrifices had not been in vain. Colmbray signed manual of our victory, lay within our grasp, and might be taken at any hour. As a matter of fact this was not quite the case. His power for offense was indeed broken. But for some days yet he lay sullenly on his line running across the Bantamille ravine. Only at night great fires could be seen far in his rear. Some stiff fighting had still to be done before Colmbray fell and the enemy was cleared out of the triangle on the hither side of the shelt. But on October 2, after five days of the hardest continuous fighting in which the Canadian corps had ever been engaged, knowledge came to us that the victory was ours. Four Canadian divisions with the 11th British division had met and overwhelmed 12 enemy divisions. The fight had been over his chosen ground where he had lavished every art of defense. After the initial surprise of the morning of September 27th it had all been Ding Dong uphill work, a battle entirely of infantry and artillery. So great importance had the men attached to the position that he had squandered men in its defense on a scale that recalled the early years of the war. But not then, nor for weeks afterwards did we realize the magnitude of the victory. It was the last battle on the grand scale in which the Canadian corps was engaged. Thereafter followed much hard fighting, particularly before Valence and even up to the very gates of Moll. But it was on a divisional rather than on a corps scale. The corner was turned, the enemy was so badly beaten that hereafter his one desire was to get away. And though he fought stout rearguard actions they were but in the nature of delaying battles. Pressure was too great and continuous for him to attempt to make a permanent stand. He had had his belly full of the Canadian corps. His best divisions had been washed out and could never again take their place in the battle line. The vaunted Hindenburg system was no more. With the use though he made of the country he had no prepared line, no elaborate system of trenches and wire, no nests of concrete machine gun posts on which to rally his retreating forces and make a last bid for victory. He was bankrupt both in resource and plan. He had lost so many guns that his gunners were cherry of working their batteries from advanced positions. His efforts indeed were devoted to getting back his heavier batteries to safer positions in the rear, and more and more he depended upon his devoted machine gunners. The victory was complete indeed. So far as the Canadian corps was concerned it definitely ended Field Marshal Hague's first phase, and its repercussions along the west front heartened our battling armies and brought dismay to the councils of the enemy. More perhaps than any other battle of this period it broke his spirit, weakened his stomach for the fight, and set up that general rot which so soon was to convert his retreat into what was little better than a rout. But on October 2nd we knew nothing of this. The historian, with before him the results of a battle, cannot enter into the feelings of the men who fought it. He cannot envisage their tired bodies and wearied spirits. From his wide survey he fails to realize that even as they congratulate themselves on a victory and lick their sores, they are girding themselves for the next great battle. Certainly few in the Canadian corps could then grasp its full significance. Indeed we had had such a grueling, had lost so heavily that common talk was that we should go out of the line to refit, it was said that already our first division had been taken out. We knew the Bosch was beaten, because given everything in his favour on that never to be forgotten night of October 1st and 2nd, he had failed to come again, and next day had abandoned us to the bloody field. But we quite expected him to bring up new divisions and throw them in once more. Battle vision is extremely limited. Everyone is intensely engaged on his own particular job. His concentration and preoccupation do not permit him to survey intelligently the front as a whole. He hears, but immediately forgets that so and so on our right is doing great things, and down south the Bosch have fallen back many miles. For him the enemy immediately in front is everything. That is the fellow he has to tackle and overcome, and his experience is that when he has done it once he will have to do it all over again a few miles further on. He respects the enemy, because he has come to know him as a good fighting man. He cannot understand his psychology. He cannot understand how his machine gunners, after putting up a desperate resistance and taking terrible toll of our ranks, throw up their hands to the cry of Camarad. Directly we are on them with bombs and cold steel. But brave man himself, he admits that up to a certain point, and particularly in those long waves of counter-attack, the Bosch is brave too. He cannot, in a word, conceive that the enemy he has fought four years under all sorts of conditions is about to crumple up and in six weeks' time will be content to sign a shameful armistice. He sees going over his head our propaganda balloons and has heard they are doing good work. But then he has picked up German propaganda and lit his pipe with it. Such then was the attitude of mine of the regimental officer and the men in the ranks. They were mighty pleased to have given the Bosch such a licking, but on October 2nd they were more intent on riding their way into comfortable winter quarters in Combré than on anything else. Word went round that the British corps on our left was to winter in Combré. We were very peeved. What then did we think about it all? We thought so long as fine weather lasted we should punish the Bosch as hard as we could, and finish the job next spring. And the American army would have attained great strength and gained real battle experience. Let us try to put ourselves back into that state of mind. Captured enemy orders had exhibited desperate efforts to return to the battle tactics of the successful years by abandonment of the principle of the thinly held screen of machine guns backed by great depth of defense. This system was adopted as the consequence of a weakened manpower resulting from his abortive offensive of the previous summer at the final bid for victory. His plans were then so perfected. His preparation on such a scale that he was convinced failure was impossible. He did fail. We are not here concerned with the causes. But he came so perilously near success that the strategic situation on the marne warranted his throwing in every available bayonet. And it developed that all this tremendous sacrifice of manpower had been in vain. So far from losing heart he took best measures possible to avert defeat and the annihilation of his armies. For his offensive he substituted a mobile defensive, shortening his lines and seeking in every way to economize and augment his depleted manpower. His chief surprise packet of 1918 was the enormous number of his machine guns. He proposed in fact to base his defense on machine gun posts instead of rifles and a better illustration of his system could not offer than the character of the opposition encountered by the Canadian corps during the Battle of Combre. Theoretically a machine gun every ten yards should have stopped infantry attacking over open ground, but in practice it failed. Failure thus demonstrated he sought to return to defensive by the counter offensive of field gray masses, as was shown on October 1st. Passive defense proved ruinous to his morale. To regain even local initiative he must have something like equality of manpower where its need is supreme on the shock front of battle. A document we captured at Combre instructs commanding officers that they must no longer depend on a perfunctory frontline of resistance, or on outposts of machine gunners with infantry supports and reserves deeply echelon in the rear. The danger is pointed out that the driving in of the light front line tends to create disorder and spread consternation behind. Front lines must be held in force with supports and reserves well forward. Particular attention is to be given to the protection of positions by anti-tank contrivances. Finally the troops are exhorted to die at their posts if they hope to keep the enemy out of the fatherland. The results of these admonitions was seen in the Battle of Combre. There was a return to infantry counter attacks. These in turn could be afforded only by a shortening of the line. This fierce battle, therefore, which seemed to our men engaged in it by the opening of the most intensive fighting of the campaign, in reality compelled the enemy to begin the retreat he was so soon to inaugurate. We had exhausted his reserves and he must shorten his line. With his back to his own frontier not only would his own line be considerably reduced, but he might feel he could count on a corresponding betterment in the morale of his men. From that new orientation he might reason with some plausibility that he could return with success to the counter-offensive and teach the allies such a lesson that they would be glad to conclude what he considered a reasonable peace. Well on in October, after his retreat had begun, that was how the situation appeared. If that train of reasoning had hung together, we had still before us some of the hardest fighting of the war. The question was whether the German soldier was capable of such incessant retreats without loss of fighting spirit. Could the German psychology, fed on superhuman doctrines, resist such constant sapping of its faith in its own invincibility, and, again, had foched the power to turn this ordered retreat into a route? The answers to these questions were given in the second phase, now opening for the Canadian Corps. Such were the obscurities through which we moved, but a great ray of illumination was about to break upon us had we the wit to seize its significance. This was the first enemy proposal for an armistice. With the material facts accumulating, the publication of official reports, memoirs, and diaries, and those intensely interesting human documents wherein unsuccessful leaders seemed compelled to take the world into their confidence, already the task of the historian grows easier, and he is able to pierce the veil of mystery that hung before us in early October of 1918. A notable contribution of this nature is that of Colonel Bauer, head of the artillery department at great general headquarters, but who is also credited by German public opinion with having been the special confidant and political inspirer of Ludendorff. He has published in pamphlet form the German general staff's version of the events which led up to the armistice, and from the facts he relates the London Daily Telegraph has deduced that it is clear that Ludendorff realized as early as the first half of August 1918 that the war was lost, and that the request for an armistice was the result of urgent and repeated demands from general headquarters. There is nothing in this new to the reader, for we have seen in the account of the Amiens show how after the events of August 8 Ludendorff made up his mind that all hopes of gaining a military decision must be abandoned. But it is extremely interesting and instructive to gather from Colonel Bauer's narrative how the immediate effect of the storming of the Canal du Nord by the Canadian Corps was to convince Ludendorff that not a day must elapse if any part of all that had been now lost in battle could be saved by negotiation. Colonel Bauer's pamphlet is in part as follows. On June 30, 1918, Hérvon Hintz has succeeded Hérvon Klumann. It was hoped that he would succeed in spinning peace threads. But nothing became known, although the government, that is to say also Hérvon Hintz, were thoroughly acquainted with the internal and military situation. In his judgment of the situation, General Ludendorff was in complete agreement with the departmental chief's concern. As early as August 13, that is to say, as soon as he had a clear picture of the result of the reports received as to the inglorious August 8, Ludendorff invited the chancellor and Hérvon Hintz to a sitting and gave them a clear picture of the military situation. On August 14, a fresh discussion took place under the presidency of the emperor. The chief army command emphasized the necessity of an early conclusion of peace, as we were at the time still strong, but had to reckon with an increasing deterioration of the military situation. Hérvon Hintz renewed his promise to initiate peace overtures. All through September the chief army command waited full of anxiety as to what fruits the presumed activity of the foreign office would bear. But when four weeks had passed without result, Ludendorff decided, on September 28, 1918, in complete agreement with all the responsible departmental chiefs of the operations section, to report to the Field Marshal that the moment had come to submit to the imperial government the demand that peace negotiations should be inaugurated immediately, and for this purpose an armistice proposed to the entail. The Field Marshal agreed. On September 29, Admiral Hintz and Count Rodin, Imperial Ministry of Finance, who had been summoned to Spa, arrived at General Headquarters. From utterances of General Ludendorff as to his negotiations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it became known that Hintz had sketched a very gloomy picture of the internal political situation, had described revolution as being at the door, and had proposed an immediate reconstruction of the government. After this had been confirmed, the military situation and the promotion of the peace step were discussed. Thereupon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs declared that a peace opera could only be made by a new government, which must be supported by the confidence of the entire people. The old government, he said, was compromised both at home and abroad. It was regarded as mendacious and insincere. Hervon Hintz expressed the opinion that a new government could be formed by October 1. His Majesty the Emperor charged Count Rodin to take in Berlin the necessary steps for the formation of a new government. The Chief Army Command asked for an acceleration of the formation of the government. This the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs promised. He said that he anticipated no special difficulties. The Imperial Chancellor, who arrived at Spa on the afternoon of September 29, took no further action. As Ludendorff received news that the negotiations for the formation of the new government were dragging, he called up his representative in Berlin on October 1, and urged him to put pressure on the Vice Chancellor, von Peier. Now that the Chief Army Command has come to this grave decision, he said, we must insist that no time is lost. Peier replied to the representations made to him that there was no one who could sign a peace offer, as the new Chancellor had not yet been appointed, and that he was still uncertain whether he could succeed in forming a cabinet. He asked whether headquarters would not agree to a postponement of the peace offer. This suggestion brought him the same day the following pre-emptory telegram from Hindenburg. If by between 7 and 8 o'clock this evening there is the certainty that Prince Max of Baden will form a government, I agree to a postponement until tomorrow, 4 noon. Should, on the other hand, the formation of the government be in any way doubtful, I consider it necessary to issue the statement to the foreign governments tonight. Prince Max arrived in Berlin on the afternoon of October 1, but now a new difficulty arose. Before he could accept the Chancellor's ship, it was necessary for him to have the permission of the Grand Duke of Baden. This could only be obtained through the mediation of the Emperor, who was on the journey from Spa to Berlin. However, the Imperial train was stopped at Cologne, and by a strenuous use of the telephone, the Grand Duke's consent was received by midnight. On the following morning at 9 o'clock the representative of headquarters submitted to the leaders of the Reichstag parties, who met under the chairmanship of the Vice Chancellor, a report on the situation containing the following notable passages. The Chief Army Command has been compelled to take a terribly grave decision, and declare that, according to human probabilities, there is no longer any prospect of forcing peace on the enemy. Above all, two facts have been decisive for this issue. First, the tanks. The enemy has employed them in unexpectedly large numbers, where, after a very liberal clouding of our positions with artificial mist, they affected a surprise. Our men's nerves were often unequal to them. Here they broke through our first line, opened away for their infantry, appeared in the rear, created local panics, and threw the control of the fighting into confusion. Where they had once been identified, our tank defense weapons and our artillery quickly settled with them. Then, however, the misfortune had already happened, and solely the successes of the tanks explained the large number of prisoners, which so painfully reduced our strengths, and brought about a more rapid consumption of reserves than we had hitherto been accustomed to. We were not in a position to oppose to the enemy equal masses of German tanks. Their construction would have exceeded the resources of our industry, which was strained to the uttermost, and other more important things would have to be neglected. But it is the reserve situation, which has become absolutely decisive. The army entered a great battle with weak compliments. In spite of all the measures adopted, the strength of our battalions sank from about 800 in April to about 540 at the end of September. Moreover, this number could only be maintained by the dissolution of 22 infantry divisions, the equivalent of 66 infantry regiments. The Bulgarian defeat devoured seven further divisions. There is no prospect of bringing these strengths to a higher level. The current enrollments, the convalescents, and the comings out, will not even cover the losses of a tranquil winter campaign. Only the embodiment of the 1900 class will give the battalion's strengths a single increase of 100 men. Then our last reserve of men will be exhausted. The losses in the battle now in progress have been unexpectedly high, especially in officers. More than ever the troops require the example of their officers, whether in defense or attack. The officers had to, and have, recklessly risked and sacrificed themselves. The regimental commanders and higher leaders fought in the front line. Only one example. In two days of battle, one division lost. All its officers killed or wounded. Three regimental commanders were killed. The small body of active officers still available has melted away. The building up of the divisions coming from the great battle is now hardly practicable. What is true of officers is also true of non-commissioned officers. Through American help the enemy is in a position to replace his losses. American troops, as such, are not of special value to say nothing of being superior to ours, where they attained initial successes by mass tactics they were repulsed in spite of their superiority in numbers. It was, however, decisive that they were able to take over wide stretches of front, and thus give the English and French the possibility to set free their own battle tribe divisions and create for themselves almost inexhaustible reserves. So far our reserves have sufficed to fill the gaps. The railway brought them up promptly. Lots of unparalleled severity were repulsed. The battles are described as of unexampled severity. Now our reserves are coming to an end. If the enemy continues to attack, the situation may demand that we retire fighting along large stretches of the front. In this way we can continue the war for an indefinite time, impose heavy losses on the enemy, and leave behind us devastated country, but that can no longer give us victory. These perceptions and events brought to maturity in the minds of the General Field Marshal and General Ludendorff the decision to propose to the Emperor to attempt to break off the struggle, in order to spare the German nation and its allies further sacrifices. Just as our great offensive of July 15th was immediately broken off when its continuation was no longer commensurate with the necessary sacrifices, even so it has now become necessary to abandon the continuation of the war as hopeless. Ashtislaus. We still have time for this. The German army is still strong enough to delay the enemy for months, to attain local successes and to confront the Entente with fresh sacrifices, but every additional day brings the enemy nearer to the goal, which will make him less inclined to conclude a peace which would be tolerable for us. Therefore no time must be lost. Many twenty-four hours may change the situation for the worse and give the enemy a chance of clearly recognizing our present weakness. That might have the most disastrous consequences for the prospects of peace as for the military situation. Commenting on this, the Daily Telegraph says, from Colonel Bauer's narrative and the documents which he cites, it is established beyond controversy that Prince Max's request for a cessation of hostilities, sent off on the night of October 4th and 5th, was the result of the action not of the politicians, but of the generals, and that the motive behind it was the realization that Germany had been beaten in the field and could only escape appalling military disaster by the transfer of the struggle from the battleground to the green table. Any hopes that Ludendorff may have had of being able to stem the tide were finally wrecked in this battle of Combre. The Canadian Corps had done far more than break down the defence on their front. They had pierced through his entire system, had cut off his armies in the north from his armies in the south, and had turned the Hindenburg Line so that there after our 3rd and 4th armies were able to march forward capturing towns and villages and encountering for the most part but enemy rear-guards, fighting delaying actions. Only at San Quanta was a real organised defence offered, and that soon broke down before the valour of British and Australian troops. End of Part 3, Chapter 10, Recording by Kathleen Nelson, Austin, Texas, July 2010. Part 3, Chapter 11 of Canada's Hundred Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Canada's Hundred Days by John Livesey. Part 3, Chapter 11, The Corps Commander. On October 3rd, the Corps Commander issued the following special order to the troops of his command. I wish to express to all troops now fighting in the Canadian Corps my high appreciation of the splendid fighting qualities displayed by them in the successful battle of the last five days. The mission assigned to the Corps was the protection of the flank of the 3rd and 4th armies in their advance, and that mission has been carried out to the complete satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief. In your advance you overcame the very formidable obstacle of the Canal du Nord. You carried by assault the fortified Burlon Wood, the Marquing Line, and seized the high ground extending along the Douai-Combre road. The towns of Oise-les-Vergers, Epenois, Hancourt, Marquion, Sainte-les-Marquions, Sainte-Court, Burlon, Fontaine Notre-Dame, Reancourt, Saïe, Saint-Oé, Nouvelle-Saint-Rémy, and Tillois are now ours, and your patrols have entered Combre itself. How arduous was the task assigned to you, and how valuable to the enemy was the ground that you captured, can be judged by the fact that whereas in the operations of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th British armies, 36 enemy divisions have been engaged to this date. Twelve of those divisions, supported by eleven independent machine-gun units, have been met and defeated by the Canadian Corps. As you formed the flank you suffered enfilade and frontal artillery fire all the way, and the hundreds of machine-guns captured testifies to the violence of the opposition from that source, every evidence confirms the fact that the enemy suffered enormous casualties. He fought stubbornly and well, and for that reason your victory is the more creditable. You have taken in this battle over 7,000 prisoners and 200 field and heavy guns, thus bringing the total captures of the Canadian Corps since August 8th of this year to 28,000 prisoners, 500 guns, over 3,000 machine-guns, and a large amount of stores of all kinds. Even of greater importance than these captures stands the fact that you have rested 69 towns and villages and over 175 square miles of French soil from the defiling hun. In the short period of the two months the Canadian Corps, to which were attached the 32nd Division for the Battle of Émile, the 4th and the 51st Divisions for the Battle of Arras, and the 11th Division for this Battle of Combré, has encountered and defeated decisively 47 German Divisions that is nearly a quarter of the total German forces on the western front. In the performance of these mighty achievements, all the arms and branches of the Corps have bent their purposeful energy, working one for all and all for one. The dash and magnificent bravery of our incomparable infantry have at all times been devotedly seconded, with great skill in daring by our machine gunners, while the artillery lent them their powerful and never-failing support. The initiative and resourcefulness displayed by the engineers contributed materially to the depth and rapidity of our advances. The devotion of the medical personnel has been, as always, worthy of our praise. The administrative services, working at all times under very great pressure and adverse conditions, surpassed their usual efficiency. The chaplain services, by their continued devotion to the spiritual welfare of the troops and their utter disregard of personal risk, have endeared themselves to the hearts of everyone. The incessant efforts of the YMCA and their initiative in bringing comforts right up to the front line, in battle, are warmly appreciated by all. The victories you have achieved are the fruit of the iron discipline you accepted freely and of the high standard you have reached in the technical knowledge of your arms and the combined tactical employment of all your resources. You must therefore with relentless energy maintain and perfect the high standard of training you have reached and guard with jealous pride your stern discipline. Under the lasting protection of Divine Providence, united in a burning desire for the victory of right over might, unselfish in your aims, you are and shall remain a mighty force admired by all, feared and respected by foes. I am proud of your deeds and I want to record here my heartfelt thanks for your generous efforts and my unbounded confidence in your ability to fight victoriously and crush the enemy wherever and whenever you meet him. The great spirit and high purpose of Sir Arthur Currie shine out through these words. He had reason indeed for pride in the achievements of his command, and he gives generous and unstinted praise to all arms. In a great measure, as we have seen, it was his own battle, planned by himself, a daring piece of strategy whose even partial failure must have meant ruin almost irretrievable. At risk he faced because of his faith in the men they led, in their courage and high state of efficiency, but in those five critical days he must have passed many anxious hours, for long victory hung in the scales. It was such a crisis as Grant had in his mind when he wrote in his memoirs that, in every well contested battle, there comes a moment when the combatants on both sides become exhausted, and the general who at that moment first finds it in his heart to make one more effort will generally succeed. By nightfall of October 1st the enemy was exhausted and the battle won. The men of the Canadian Corps were very wonderful, but they owed much more perhaps than the Canadian public realized to their commander. Even a professional army of long standing and old traditions is what its commander makes of it. But the late Colonel G. F. R. Henderson in his history, Stonewall Jackson in the American Civil War, its character sooner or later becomes the reflex of his own. From him the officers take their tone. His energy or his inactivity, his firmness or vacillation, are rapidly communicated even to the lower ranks. And so far reaching is the influence of the leader, that those who record his campaigns concern themselves but little as a rule with the men who followed him. The history of famous armies is the history of great generals, for no army has ever achieved great things unless it has been well commanded. If the general be second rate, the army also will be second rate. Mutual confidence is the basis of success in war, and unless the troops have implicit trust in the resolution and resources of their chief, hesitation and half-heartedness are sure to mark their actions. They may fight with their accustomed courage, but the eagerness of the conflict, the alacrity to support, the determination to conquer, will not be there. The indefinable quality which is expressed by the word moral will, to some degree, be affected, and the writer goes on to quote the proud words of Jackson, so applicable to the Canadian corps, my men sometimes fail to drive the enemy from his position, but to hold one never. Foche, that great master of the art of war once said in the course of his lectures to the French staff college, who says chief means a man of character? That goes without saying, but means also a man capable of understanding and contriving in order to obey, and in another place. To be disciplined does not mean that the soldier commits no fault against discipline, that he commits no disorder. To be disciplined does not mean that the soldier executes the orders received in such measure as seems convenient, just, rational, or possible, but that he enters frankly into the thought and into the views of the chief who is given the order, that he takes all the steps humanly practicable to give his chief satisfaction. To be disciplined does not mean to keep silence, to abstain from action, or to do that only which the soldier thinks he may do without compromising himself. It is not the art of avoiding responsibilities, but rather of acting in the sense of the order received, and for that purpose of finding in the mind, by research and reflection, the possibility of carrying these orders out, of finding in the character the energy to face the risks which the execution of the orders involve. Foche quotes with approval the saying of Joseph de Mastre. A battle lost is a battle which the army believes to be lost, for a battle cannot be lost materially. Conversely, a battle gained is a battle in which the army refuses to admit itself beaten. Foche goes on to say, No victory can be won without a vigorous command, greedy of responsibilities and ready for bold enterprises, possessing and inspiring in all the energy and resolution to go to the very end. Without personal action rendered in goodwill, without judgment, without freedom of spirit, in the midst of danger, gifts natural in the highly endowed man, in the general born, advantages acquired by work and reflection in the ordinary man. Sir Arthur Currie took his life and reputation in his hands when he decided to attack the Canal du Nord at Anchi. If he had failed he would have been covered with shame and obliquely. He had been warned, as we have seen, by Sir Julian Bang, of the formidable nature of his self-appointed tasks. Indeed, it is not too much to say that at that time no other troops in Europe could have undertaken with confidence that astonishing feat of arms. Not only did the device meet with entire success, but it saved many thousands of casualties that must have been fruitlessly incurred if the corps commander had stuck by his book, by the letter of his orders, and thrown the corps into a second Passendale, at the flooded triangle of the Saucie and the Canal du Nord. He thus gave proof of the highest discipline and obedience as defined by Foch himself. But to put it mildly, this was not the definition that prevailed in the British armies, where the bad old tradition, there is not to reason why, too often and too completely obtained. The Canadian corps, with its aggressive commander, could not therefore have been popular with the higher command. It was always stepping out of its routine course, its prescribed battle area, and budding into other people's territory and field of activity, and in doing so it was inevitable that certain corns were trodden upon, certain susceptibilities bruised, certain reputations imperiled. In time the people of Canada will come to realize how great a figure Sir Arthur Currie was on the West Front, how his commanding personality on the one hand, his passionate devotion to his men on the other, coupled with unique reputation the Canadian corps had won as storm troops and its independence of command in the sense that it was not permanently attached to any particular army, but was thrown in wherever need was greatest, made him something more than a corps commander in the ordinary sense, made him in the closing months of the war a force to be reckoned with, and even on occasion placated. Had the war continued he might have gone far, his military genius recognized, his vigorous leadership proved, saved that there must have still attached to him the proud disability of being a Canadian citizen-soldier. But according to the letter of the law he is not a good subordinate. He cannot be popular with the powers that be, he is always complaining about something, getting his own way or making it unpleasant for people if he doesn't. Thus when ordered to abandon his planned offensive at Lens, and take the corps up to the salient, he refused point-blank to serve under the commander of the Fifth Army. He is placed under his old chief of First Army, looks over the ground before Passendale, and then protests against the whole operation as being useless in itself and likely to cost the corps fifteen thousand casualties. But he is told it must be done. There are compelling political reasons. For after the terrible battles of 1917 the morale of both the British and French armies is low, and it is essential to finish the season with a victory. The thrice-accursed Passendale Ridge must be taken. So he sets about to make of it the best job possible, and on that stricken field the Canadian corps plans again the standard of hope in the heart of the Allies. Then in the panic of the following March he finds the corps is being torn to pieces. Its divisions hurried here, there, and everywhere. Orders given and countermanded and then issued again. He protests strongly. The Canadian corps whose value is tested must be kept together. And he wins out. Again in the Amiens show he protests at the strength of the corps, now it has performed its allotted task being whittled away in secondary but expensive operations in front of Roy, and proposes instead a drive on Bupam. He ventures to make the suggestion that he believes if we made an attack on the Third Army front in the direction of Bupam and in conjunction with an attack by the French from their present line we could force the Bosch to evacuate the positions he holds on this side of the Somme without ever attacking him. And this is exactly what did happen, though as we have seen the Canadian corps was transferred to the Arras rather than the Albert sector. Finally, we arrive at that neck of the woods, the flooded triangle of the Somme Sea and Canal du Nord. He says that it cannot and will not be done by the Canadian corps, but he proposes an alternative and goes in and wins. After the battle a British army commander, in no way connected with the operation, said that the attack of the Canadian corps across the Canal du Nord with the subsequent extension of our line was the most brilliantly executed maneuver in the history of this war. Is all this in subordination? If so, it is a quality that makes for victory. The average Canadian is willing to take a chance, because he has confidence in himself. And the corps commander is very much a Canadian. He was not to be bound by precept nor tradition nor red tape. If he has a job to do, he must go about it in his own way and no other. As Xenophon puts it, the art of war is to guard one's liberty of action. Coswitz, in his book On War, enters very fully into the qualities of the successful commander. Military genius, he says, consists in a harmonious association of qualities of which one or another may predominate. But none must be in opposition. It is not the possession of one single quality such as courage, for this might exist while other necessary qualities of mind and soul were wanting. After discussing physical and moral courage, he proceeds. The next requisites for war are a certain strength of body and also of mind, both of which are necessary to overcome physical exertion and suffering inseparable from war. Another essential is good sound common sense. With the above qualifications a man is fairly equipped for war, but to be a great commander he requires to have his understanding highly developed. Now, if a commander is to succeed in this perpetual conflict with the unexpected, two essential qualities are what the French call coup d'oeu and resolution. By coup d'oeu is meant a correct survey not only by the physical, but also by the mental eye. A more modern expression for this is a quick and correct appreciation of the situation. Resolution is courage in the face of responsibility and springs from the understanding, but mere intelligence is not courage, and many clever men are often without resolution. We must always guard against the fact that in great emergencies a man is apt to be swayed more by his feelings than by carefully reasoned thought. Resolution is the child of the intellect, and the outcome of reasoned thought backed up by a will determined to carry out what reason dictates. If we take a general view of the four elements composing the atmosphere in which war moves, namely danger, physical effort, uncertainty, and chance, it is easy to conceive that considerable moral forces are necessary to confront them, and these qualities are best described as energy, firmness, staunchness, and strength of mind and character. All these qualities are nearly related, but are by no means the same thing. Energy is an active quality, and one which a commander who is himself imbued with it can infuse into his subordinates. Firmness denotes the resistance of the will in relation to the force of a single blow, staunchness in relation to a continuance of blows. A strong mind is one which, though capable of deep feelings, never loses its self-command, and in which the perception and judgment are able, under all conditions, to act with perfect freedom, like the needle of a compass in a storm-tossed ship, and which can retain its serenity under the most powerful excitement. Strength of character means tenacity of conviction, whether it be the result of our own or others' views. Clausewitz goes on to say how necessary it is for the commander to have an eye for country, and he points out the difference between the qualities for subordinate and high command in the following terms. It is true that a man may be a brave, plain, honest soldier, without being possessed of much power of reflection, resource, or fine education. But these qualities do not by any means suffice for a man who aspires to acquit himself, creditably, in the higher ranks of the army. Each grade of command demands different qualities in different proportions, and an extra step in rank often loses for a man the reputation he had justly earned in a subordinate position. By these standards General Currie measures high as a soldier and leader. At the beginning of the war it would have seemed incredible that a civilian could, within so short a space, rise to such military eminence. In this connection a sketch of his pre-war military career is of interest. Born at Napperton, Ontario, December 5, 1875, Arthur William Currie is of Irish-Canadian parentage, his father's family emigrating to the eastern townships of Quebec in 1830. In 1893 he went west, teaching school at Sydney British Columbia, and then followed some years of active business life in real estate and financed. In 1897 he enlisted in the 5th Regiment of Canadian Garrison Artillery, and three years later qualified for his commission as a gunner, obtaining his captaincy in 1902. Always keen on the rifle, in 1905 he was elected president of the British Columbia Rifle Association, and in the following year was awarded his majority. Four years later Lieutenant Colonel Currie was appointed to the command of the 5th CGA, and in 1913 he took command of an infantry battalion, the 50th Regiment Gordon Highlanders. A few days after the war opened he took his battalion to Val Cartier. Training ground of the 1st Canadian contingent, and next month was appointed Brigadier General of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade. In February 1915 he crossed over with his command to France. Mentioned in dispatches in June for his conduct on the battlefield, General Currie in the following September was appointed commander of the 1st Canadian Division, which he held until when, after Vimy in 1917, he succeeded Sir Julian Bing in the command of the Canadian Corps. Given a natural military genius, confirmed by long years of study of military problems, and such continuity of training as our militia cadres afford, and add to these four years of actual battle experience, and the thing is not so impossible. Major Arthur Currie, indeed, is not the only example the war offers of a great citizen-soldier, but he was fortunate that throughout his successive steps in command he had at his control a weapon inferior to none. When at last he came into command of the Canadian Corps, he had the imagination to look ahead and foresee the day when it might be called upon to break down the seeming impregnable wall the enemy had built across the western front. And this purpose he kept always before him. He hardly had the bloody wounds of Passendale healed than he is at work training reinforcements, and infusing through all ranks the theory and spirit of the offensive, making ready for the day that even in those dark weeks of March he saw faintly undumbrated upon the battle scene. Nothing indeed is more characteristic than the special order he issued his troops on March 27, 1918, at an hour when many stout hearts quaked. It ran as follows. In an endeavor to reach an immediate decision the enemy has gathered all his forces and struck a mighty blow at the British Army. Overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers the British divisions in the line between the Scarpe and the Weiss have fallen back fighting hard, steady and undismayed. Measures have been taking successfully to meet this German onslaught. The French have gathered a powerful army commanded by a most able entrusted leader, and this army is now moving swiftly to our help. Fresh British divisions are being thrown in. The Canadians are soon to be engaged. Our motor machine gun brigade has already played a most gallant part and once again covered itself with glory. Looking back with pride on the unbroken record of your glorious achievements, asking you to realize that today the fate of the British Empire hangs in the balance, I place my trust in the Canadian core, knowing that where Canadians are engaged there can be no giving way. Under the orders of your devoted officers in the coming battle you will advance or fall where you stand facing the enemy. To those who will fall I say you will not die but step into immortality. Your mothers will not lament your fate but will be proud to have born such sons. Your names will be revered forever and ever by your grateful country and God will take you unto himself. Canadians, in this fateful hour I command you, and I trust you to fight as you have ever fought with all your strength, with all your determination, with all your tranquil courage. On many a hard-fought field of battle you have overcome this enemy. With God's help you shall achieve victory once more. This sincere simple piety is an essential part of the man. It is the fiber of his being and in the hour of distress he turns naturally and with complete faith to a higher power. It is impossible to be long in contact with him without being convinced that here is a rock of a man, strong of soul, direct, straightforward, marching straight to the goal, abhorrent of devious paths, yet very human, stern of purpose but with a deep well of tenderness that suffers with his men and seeks continually to spare them on any term short of treachery to the cause. Big in mind and spirit as in body he is actuated through all these hard days but by a single motive, the honour of the Canadian core and the defeat of the enemy. End of Part 3, CHAPTER XI. For some days now we had held the west side of the Sheldt Canal from the south of St. Oi through Nouveau Saint-Rémy, and continual sniping went on between troops of the 8th Brigade, CMR's, Brigadier General DC Draper, and enemy machine gunners posted opposite in the suburbs of Combre. But to storm the city by frontal attack across the canal and then to fight our way through its narrow streets must have proved a very expensive operation without any commensurate gain. Great flares showed that the enemy was systematically destroying his stores and in two or three districts the fires seemed to have hold of the houses. The city itself is dominated by the height to the southeast lying between the villages of Beersenier and Aucoin, and it was decided that our attack should await the capture of this height by the 27th core on our right. This here, however, was slow, and the combined operation set for October 8th failed to come off on that account. Had the troops on our right succeeded in capturing Aucoin in their attack of that morning the Canadian core was to attack at 9 o'clock the same evening the bridgeheads from the north under cover of darkness. But though Aucoin was not taken it was pretty certain that the attention of the enemy was focused on that battle front, and in the occasion therefore appearing propituous it was decided late the same night to attack in the small hours of the next morning. Arrangements had to be completed in a great hurry. The core commander describes the events of this period as follows. The second Canadian division had been in close support throughout the day of October 1st, and during the night October 1st and 2nd relieved the 4th Canadian division in parts of the 3rd and 1st Canadian divisions in the line from the railway south of Tilewa to Blacor Inclusive. On relief the 4th Canadian division came into core reserve in Bibwax in the Anchi-Quian area. The relief considerably thinned out the infantry and in anticipation of possible counterattacks a large number of machine gun batteries were placed in the line. October 2nd passed without any substantial change in the situation. The enemy's artillery was very active throughout the day and at 6.15 p.m. he delivered a determined counterattack with a force estimated at about a battalion strong against the ridge northeast of Tilewa on the 2nd Canadian division front. This counterattack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. During the night October 2nd and 3rd the 11th division extended its frontage to the right as far as Blacor Inclusive, relieving the remainder of the 1st Canadian division who came into core reserve west of the canal on completion of the relief. The dispositions of the Canadian core at noon October 3rd were as follows. In the line the 3rd Canadian division on the right on a one brigade front from the Arras Combre railway to the Combre Douai railway south of Tilewa. The 2nd Canadian division in the center on a two brigade front extending to the northern outskirts of Blacor and the 11th division on the left continuing the line to a point 1,000 yards south of Albin Shua Alba. In core reserves the 1st and 4th Canadian divisions. The latter was moved to billets in the Ote of Business Arras area on the night of October 7th 8th to give more opportunity to rest and refit. The period from October 3rd to 8th passed without any material changes on the core front. An enemy counter attack was beaten off by the 2nd Canadian division opposite Benton Yee on the morning of October 4th and the 11th division considerably improved the line on the northern flank by successful minor operations on October 5th and 6th. The patrol encounters took place in which some prisoners were captured and our artillery and machine guns kept the enemy under continual harassing fire day and night. In addition our heavy artillery carried out a daily program of gas concentrations and counter battery shoots. Orders were received on October 3rd for the relief of the core by the 22nd core. Concurrently with this relief and as it progressed the Canadian core was to take over the front of the 22nd core. Plans for further operations having been formulated to take place on the 3rd Army front the Canadian core was ordered on October 5th to cooperate by forcing the crossings of the Shelt Canal north of Combre and the relief contemplated was therefore postponed. The 3rd Army had been successful in crossing the Shelt Canal south of Combre between Crevecourt and Provis. The operation now contemplated had for object the capture of Combre by envelopment. This was to be carried out in two phases. In the first phase the 27th core was to capture a point by attacking from the south. The Canadian core was to cooperate by artillery demonstration. In the second phase the Canadian core was to cross the Shelt Canal and advancing rapidly capture Escadouvre joining hands with the 27th core north east of Combre. The positions occupied by the 3rd and 2nd Canadian divisions were not favourable for an attack by day. The 3rd Canadian division was in front of Combre and house to house fighting was out of the question. The 2nd Canadian division was separated from the canal by glacis-like slopes devoid of cover and on which the enemy had good observation from the numerous houses on the east side of the canal as well as from the high ground east of Escadouvre. In addition, Mauritiers, Pont-d'Aire, Ramier and the villages to the north were strongly held by the enemy. In spite of the difficulties of a night operation it was decided that the 2nd Canadian division would attack by night and attempt to seize the bridges before they were blown up by the enemy. The 3rd Canadian division was to cover the right of the 2nd Canadian division by capturing the railway embankment and entering Combre as soon as possible to prevent any action of the enemy against the right flank of the 2nd Canadian division, which under the best circumstances was bound to be in the air for some time after the crossing of the canal. Brutnell's brigade was to cross the canal as soon as possible and extend the gains of the 2nd Canadian division by seizing the high ground east of Thune-Saint-Martin. Ten brigades of field artillery were available for the operation. During the previous weeks we had made a number of set attacks just before dawn, but an attack at dead of night was a novelty. The 2nd Canadian division held a line from Tillwa to just west of Blacore, and the direction of their attack, with zero at 1.30 am, was to be due east. In order to distinguish one another all the troops attacking were equipped with white brassards on both arms. The password of Combre was first selected, but owing to possible confusion with the familiar cry Camarad it was changed to Borden. There had been a careful preliminary rehearsal, in anticipation of the attack set for the previous evening, with a plotting out of positions for each platoon. For the advance must be made by compass alone, and everything depended on its orderly progress and the avoidance of confusion. The 5th Brigade, Brigadier General T. L. Tremblay, was entrusted with the attack on the right on the bridgeheads. The battalions in the line being the 25th, Nova Scotia, the 26th New Brunswick, with the 22nd French Canadians, in support, and the 24th Victoria Rifles of Montreal holding the line in reserve. In the dark it was impossible to mop up, and garrisons were left at stated intervals to deal with pockets of the enemy. Advance of the infantry through the pitch dark of a rainy night could not be synchronized to anything in the nature of a creeping barrage, and so instead the artillery laid down crashes on selected areas. Everything went well from the start. Our patrols had reported that the Bosch were holding the sunken road west of Ramier, and the road vents running along the left bank of the canal to Morin's Shea Wood. On this area our artillery laid a crash for ten minutes, then lifting their fire onto the line of the canal itself. Our men found that the enemy garrisons had been either wiped out or had fled, and advanced without opposition to the canal. The first objective, which was reached on the minute. It was of the greatest importance that a crossing should be made practical immediately, so that the attack could be pushed forward behind Combré itself. For this purpose Canadian engineers advanced with the infantry, bringing cork floats and bridging material. Pont-there is a series of three bridges leading directly into Escadouvres, and this was the scene of a brilliant exploit by an engineer officer, Captain Coulson Norman Mitchell, commanding the tunnel company, Fourth Battalion, Canadian Engineers, and a native of Winnipeg, Manitoba. He led a small party ahead of the first wave of infantry in order to examine the various bridges on the line of approach, and if possible prevent their destruction. Coming to the Pont-there he found the first bridge already blown. Under a heavy barrage he crossed to the next bridge where he cut a number of lead wires. Then, in total darkness and unaware of the position or strength of the enemy at the bridgehead, he dashed across the main bridge over the canal. This bridge was found to be heavily charged for demolition, and whilst Captain Mitchell, assisted by his NCO, was cutting the wires, the enemy attempted to rush the bridge in order to blow up the charges, whereupon he had once dashed to the help of his sentry, who had been wounded, killed three of the enemy, captured twelve and maintained the bridgehead until reinforced. Then under heavy fire he continued his task of cutting wires and removing the charges that he well knew at any moment might have been fired by the enemy, hurling his party and himself into the air. He had thus saved two of the bridges, and shortened by some hours the work of repair. The artillery now laid down a barrage for two hours along the far side of the canal, giving our engineers time to lay their crossings. Both the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth battalions crossed over the Pont d'Aire before four-thirty a.m., and proceeded to their final objective, which was reached an hour later, before dawn. This was four thousand yards beyond the shelter with outposts pushed out another one thousand yards. Strict orders had been given the fifth brigade that none of its troops were to enter Combray. Otherwise they could have penetrated from the north at the same time, as will be seen later, that the eighth brigade was making good its entry from the west. In this very brilliant night operation over three hundred prisoners were captured and many machine guns, our own casualties being practically nil. Many more prisoners were mopped up by the garrisons as soon as daylight appeared. But this feat of arms by no means exhausted the work of the second Canadian division that night. The fourth brigade, to which Brigadier General C. E. McQuague had succeeded to the command on the appointment of Brigadier General R. Rennie to a command in England, was held in reserve. But the sixth brigade, now commanded by Brigadier General A. Ross, Brigadier General A. H. Bell having been wounded, was set the important task of forming a left flank for the operation against the canal. The brigade kicked off from a line east and southeast of Sankore, and advanced to its first objective, a line a thousand yards southeast of Blacore, and then started to build up a flank from that point in a straight line to Rennie. The advance began shortly after the attack of the fifth brigade had developed, with the thirty-first battalion of Alberta on the right and the twenty-seventh battalion of Winnipeg on the left, the twenty-ninth battalion Vancouver in close support, and the twenty-eighth battalion Regina mopping up. The twenty-seventh pushed right on into Rennie, where a number of prisoners were captured. This important bridgehead being secured, the twenty-ninth and thirty-first built up the flank facing northeast. But as it was apparent that the enemy was taken completely by surprise by this unexpected night attack, our advantage was exploited to the utmost, and our troops by noon had pushed on and captured in succession Blacore, Bantonie, Cuvier, and Eswar. At the same time the eleventh British division on our left attacked and took the high ground and the hitherto impregnable village of Abancourt. Thus, at one stroke, we secured the plateau which had been the scene of such terrible fighting the previous week. The enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his forces across the shelt, and his rearguard was driven in with very little loss to ourselves. Meanwhile the third Canadian division had crossed the canal and captured the city itself. The eighth brigade was holding the west side of the canal, the fifth CMR, Eastern Townships, being at St. Oy. When at three o'clock of the same morning orders came to send a patrol across the canal with the view of establishing a bridgehead beyond. Two of our men swam the canal, landed on the other side, and proceeded to bomb out the enemy machine gun post known to be established at the railway bridgehead. But they found the post deserted. The enemy had evacuated the city half an hour after midnight. Linked arm in arm, our infantry streamed over this broken down bridge, and by 4.30 AM two companies were across. By six o'clock Canadian engineers had constructed a pontoon bridge, over which our field batteries crossed, and by 6.30 AM we had penetrated the plus arms, and an officer's patrol was sent to inform our surprised neighbors, troops of the 27th Corps on our right, that we were in possession. The fourth CMR, Central Ontario, had been simultaneously engaged in penetrating the city from the northeast, and by 10.30 AM we had pushed through to the southern and eastern outskirts. Officers consisted of an officer and thirty-five men of a guard's reserve division, left behind to complete the destruction of the city, with five guns, a pineapple, and a number of machine guns. The rest of his material the enemy had either removed or destroyed. The capture of Combre was accomplished without a single casualty. But Combre had been delivered over to destruction. We had been compelled to level with our artillery a street of houses along the canal, and had sprayed shrapnel on commanding points whence the enemy had kept up harassing machine gunfire. But otherwise we had been careful not to damage the city. As we first entered it, the darkness of night was lit up by incendiary fires, the plus arms, a noble square, on which faced the Hotel de V, and other fine buildings, was already bursting into flames, and in a few hours was a crumbling ruin. The ruins detonated in almost every quarter of the city. Walking down the Rue de Neu, and the Rue de Palais, past the cathedral one noted a dozen in a bare half hour, each followed by an outbreak of fire. Before long Canadian engineers were on the scene, searching buildings for incendiary shells set with a time fuse, the method of destruction adopted. By noon the plus arms was a scene of desolation, of charred brick and smoldering timbers. The sun hung a fiery ball amid the smoke and an atmosphere surcharged with the dust of rocking walls and charred particles. Through this ruddy haze passed Canadian soldiers wearing pickle helmets, found in abandoned quartermaster's stores, and loaded down with enemy gear. Through it hurried Canadian engineers, now bent on blowing up burning houses clustering round the ancient belfry, that that at least might be saved. Through it paced a little party headed by a venerable figure, Monsieur Thulier, Abbe of Sainte-Ruein, surveying the ruin that had overtaken his diocesan capital. The inhabitants had been evacuated, but a few days before the miserable remnant that was left, but he had refused to go, although they threatened to shoot him, because he must stay by the bedside of a dying woman. Now he was accompanied by half a dozen shadowy figures who had remained hid in cellars, and by a bearded French officer who had arrived as representative of the French government. France can never forget, nor forgive this, remarked the officer with tears in his eyes. Torch in hand he comes offering us peace. It was a vile, purposeless act of vandalism for which General von Marwitz was the army commander responsible. A west wind was then blowing, and the entire city with its suburbs appeared doomed. A shift of wind that night, together with the tireless efforts of Canadian engineers, assisted by two of our infantry battalions detailed for the work, finally checked the conflagration. But the heart of the city was gone. Everything of interest, of historical value, saved the belfry, was destroyed. The Bosch had deliberately blown up the museum, the gallery of art and the bishop's palace. But one may be certain it was not until every article of value had been removed. All industries had been wrecked, and the machinery of the lace factories moved to Germany. And this malignant spite was by no means confined to public institutions. No sooner was the civilian population evacuated than their homes were given over to sack by the soldiery. Outwardly the streets and houses bore respectable appearance. Then all was litter and ruin, where the lust of a loot led to senseless and wanton destruction, the kicking in of furniture too heavy to move, the smashing of heavy mirrors, the slashing of family portraits. Almost every little back garden was the scene of brutal vandalism, women's clothing, children's toys, pictures ripped from their frames, broken services of China, feather beds ripped open, books, bed linen, private papers scattered from their files all piled in one common ruin. On this debris everything portable in the house had been piled, no doubt with the intention of setting it on fire. But search the heap and you will not find a single article of intrinsic value that could not find its way into a soldier's knapsack, into a Prussian officer's kit. In the park even the statues had been taken from their pedestals. We had heard of these things, but now we saw them. While Combre burned, the enemy was falling back. The Fifth Brigade had meantime pushed through the northern suburbs of Combre and Escuduvre, and crossed the railway to wear late in the day at the factory northwest of Kaurar. Our troops joined hands with elements of the 27th Corps, who after taking Owant had worked round east of the city. Patrols were pushed out but had difficulty in getting in touch with the enemy. On the left the Sixth Brigade had pushed out by night fell to the outskirts of Thun-Saint-Martin and Thun-Levec. Earlier in the day, Brutnell's brigade had seized the high ground of Croix-Saint-Hubert. As the Canadian independent force, this brigade with its powerful armored cars had done much good work in the Almian Show and elsewhere. Its mobile characteristics were to become increasingly valuable in the open fighting to follow. With the fall of Combre, the battle proper of that name may be regarded as having ended, though as we shall see during the next few days the Second Canadian Division was to continue the pursuit of the beaten enemy. Sir Arthur Currie's dispatch covering the operation of October 9th is as follows. At 4-30am, October 8th, the Third Army attacked, and at the same hour an artillery demonstration was carried out on the Canadian Corps front. The 17th Corps on the right did not reach a point, but in the evening they were ordered to continue their advance on the morning of October 9th to capture this town. Concurrently with this advance the Canadian Corps was to secure the crossings of the Shelte Canal. In spite of the darkness of a rainy night the assembly was completed, and the attack was launched successfully at 1-30am, October 9th. After progress was made and at 2-25am the Second Canadian Division had captured Ramier and established posts on the canal there, and the patrols were pushing out to the northeast. On the right the infantry, assisted by a party of engineers, rushed the crossings at Pont d'Aire, and after sharp fighting captured the bridge intact, with the exception of the Western spillway which had been partially destroyed. New cork bridges were thrown across, and by 3-35am our infantry were well established on the eastern side of the canal. The Third Canadian Division had cleared the railway, and their patrols were pushing into Combray, while the engineers were commencing work on the bridges. By 8am the Second Canadian Division had captured Escadulbray, and had established a line on the high ground immediately to the north and east. Detachments of the Third Canadian Division had by this time completely cleared Combray of the enemy, and troops of the Third Army could be seen coming up towards it from the south. Combray was to be deliberately set on fire by the enemy. Huge fires were burning in the square when our patrols went through, and many others broke out in all parts of the city. Piles of inflammable material were found ready for the torch, but the enemy was unable to carry out his intention owing to our unexpected attack and rapid progress. A party of one officer and a few men, which had been left with instructions to set fire to Combray, was discovered and dealt with before it could do any further damage. The fires were successfully checked by a large detachment of Canadian engineers who entered the city with the patrols. A considerable number of roadmines, booby traps, etc. were also located and removed. An air reconnaissance at Don indicated that the enemy had withdrawn from the area between the Shelte Canal and the Canal de la Sancée, and that all bridges over the latter had been destroyed. Brutnell's brigade, passing through the infantry of the Second Canadian Division, seized the high ground at Croix-Sainte-Hubert, and pushed cavalry patrols into Thune-Levec. The Second Canadian Division, east of the canal, progressed towards the north and occupied Thune-Levec, Thune-Saint-Martin, Le Cor, Cuvier, and Bentonny, and the 11th Division occupied Abancourt and reached the outskirts of Paleyancourt. The Third Canadian Division was withdrawn at 7.10 p.m. when the 24th Division, 17th Cor, passed through and joined up with the Second Canadian Division, and Combray and our positions to the east were taken over or occupied by the 17th Cor. The Third Canadian Division was moved on the following day to Bibwax in the Anchiquant area to rest and refit after 12 days of battle. End of Part 3, Chapter 12, Recording by Kathleen Nelson, Austin, Texas, July 2010. Part 3, Chapter 13 of Canada's 100 Days. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Canada's 100 Days by John Livese, Part 3, Chapter 13, Conclusion of the Battle of Cambrai. Although Cambrai had fallen, the battle itself is not officially regarded by the Canadian Cor as concluding until October 12. When we were five miles east of the city and the relief of the Second Canadian Division, our last division in the line was affected. It will be well to describe these concluding days before turning to the new field of operations, opened up for the Cor north of the Sensi by the First Canadian Division. On October 10, the attack was continued with the Second Canadian Division on the right and the 11th British Division on the left. The front of the Second Division was changed to north of the Cambrai-Salsoir Road, and at midnight, October 9-10, the Fourth Brigade advanced through the Fifth Brigade with the right flank on this road. The 19th Battalion, Central Ontario, on the right, jumped off at 7 a.m. from the railway cutting in front of Esquidovna and captured the village of Navs at 7.45 a.m. At 8 a.m., the 18th Battalion, Western Ontario, jumped off on the left and attacked toward Ulwi. The Fourth Brigade was in touch on the right with the Left Brigade of the Third Army just north of Ryu. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the 19th Battalion advanced another 1,000 yards and got two companies across the Erklin River. At 7 p.m. they advanced another 1,500 yards and took possession of the high ground, which was to be the assembly point for the attack on the following day. That night, a relief of the troops by the 48th British Division was ordered and the Fourth Brigade was to sideslip and attack on a narrow front along the roadway east of Ulwi. The 20th Battalion, Central Ontario and 21st Battalion, Eastern Ontario, were ordered to make the attack on 8 a.m. of October 11, with the 18th Battalion in support. As it was impossible to relieve the 19th Battalion properly, the troops of the 48th Division were to pass through them, and they were then to go into reserve. Meantime, on October 10, the 6th Brigade had attacked on the Left of the 4th Brigade the 28th Battalion of Regina on the right capturing the village of Thune-Semerte. In the face of very heavy opposition, especially in the northern end of the village, just south of Ulwi, where the enemy had an immense munition dump, while on the brigade left the 29th Battalion of Vancouver, stormed Thune-Evek. Enemy defense had now hardened, and it was apparent that the strongly held position of Ulwi could be taken only by a set battle. An arrow-neck of water, an affluent of the shell, lies in front of Ulwi, and surrounding it was a network of railway yards and sidings. Advantage of these obstacles had been taken to establish numerous machine-gun posts. The attack was made at 8 a.m. by the 49th Division on the right and the 2nd Canadian Division on the left, the latter with the 4th Brigade on its right and the 6th Brigade on its left. To deal with Ulwi first, a frontal attack was made by the 28th Battalion, while the 29th Battalion pushed forward on the left of the village. Very hard fighting ensued, but by noon the village was in our hands. It was the hardest piece of fighting the 28th ever did, said one of its officers. The place was full of machine-guns, and it took us three or four hours to clean it up. It was all hand-to-hand fighting, the Bosch being stout fellows. The battalion was broken up into small parties, fighting their way from house to house. One section, under Lieutenant White of Saskatoon, captured the crews of five machine-guns itself. Altogether about five hundred prisoners were captured, with over fifty machine-guns in this very brilliant little affair. At noon the remaining battalions of the 6th Brigade, the 27th of Winnipeg, and the 31st, Southern Alberta, pushed through the 28th and 29th Battalion on the right and left, respectively, establishing a line twelve hundred yards beyond Ulwi. While this was going on, the 29th British Division, on the right, had fought its way forward to the high ground east of the village. Our 4th Brigade, advancing between this Division and Ulwi, had a very trying time, for until the village was reduced both the attacking battalions, the 20th and 21st, were exposed to heavy infallayed fire from Ulwi. Their casualties were heavy, totaling seven hundred, but nevertheless they pushed their line forward along sunken roads east of the village, and finally made good the top of Ulwi's spur. This fighting was a scene of a brilliant exploit by Lieutenant Lloyd Wallace Algee, 20th Battalion of Toronto, who showed conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice when his troops came under heavy infallayed fire from Ulwi. Rushing forward with nine volunteers, he shot the crew of an enemy machine gun, turning it on the enemy and thus enabling his party to reach the outskirts of the village. He then rushed another machine gun, killing the crew, and captured an officer and ten men, and thereby cleared the end of the village. Lieutenant Algee, having thus established his party, went back for reinforcements, but was killed when leading them forward. In the course of the day, the enemy made a strong counter attack against the front of both the 49th Division and our 4th Brigade, supported by a number of tanks. The line fell back some distance, but was later re-established. Thus the 4th Brigade, the enemy, sent five tanks, four being captured British tanks. These were beaten off by our artillery and machine gun fire, but the 5th, an uncouth German monster, was disabled, and remained stranded on the ridge, an object of curiosity to our men, its crude pattern exciting a good deal of chafing. All these tanks fired case shot, Lieutenant Cromby, when the advance of the enemy tanks had momentarily thrown our line into confusion, used an anti-tank rifle with good effect, until he was mortally wounded. When the 4th Brigade fell back before this attack, the 27th Brigade was left, for the time, in front of Ui, with its right flank in the air, but Lieutenant Colonel H. J. Riley, who had established his headquarters in Ui itself, speedily built up a protective flank with his reserve companies. During the afternoon and night, Ui and our entire line was heavily and steadily shelled by the enemy, so that it was exceedingly difficult to relieve or support units in advance of the village. But though suffering heavy loss, the 27th held the ground they had won until relieved in due course. Our troops of both the 4th and 6th Brigades were worn out by long marching and hard fighting, and had lost heavily, especially in officers and experienced NCOs. The news that the 2nd Canadian Division was to be relieved on the following day by the 51st British Division was therefore welcome. On the morning of October 12, on our left, the 5th Brigade sent the 24th Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Montreal, through the 6th Brigade and this battalion in conjunction with troops of the 51st Division, attacked in a northerly direction, capturing Hordane and pushed on to the outskirts of Bouchain, where the flooded areas of inundations and marshes put a stop to our farther advance in this direction. Patrols of the 26th Battalion, New Brunswick, and the 25th Battalion, Nova Scotia, actually pushed across the inundated area west of Bouchain. But nothing more could be done in this direction until further progress had been made south of Dwight in the operation that had now opened along the Scarpe River. That night the 2nd Canadian Division was relieved and transferred to the new core area. This change of front is described by Sir Arthur Curry as follows. The attack was continued at 6am, October 10, by the 2nd Canadian and 11th British Divisions. And good progress was made. The 2nd Canadian Division captured Naves, and by nightfall reached a point one and one-half miles northeast of the Cambrai-Salswar Road. From there our line ran westward to the Shelte Canal, exclusive of Iwi, where we were held up by machine gun fire. In this attack, Brutinelle's brigade operated along the Cambrai-Salswar Road, but finding the bridge over the Ercoran River destroyed could not get their cars further forward. This bridge, although on the outpost line under heavy fire, was immediately replaced by the engineers, a covering party being supplied by Brutinelle's brigade. Machine gun crews from the cars went forward on foot, however, and materially assisted the infantry advance at this point, and the core cavalry, by a brilliant charge, helped in the capture of the ground east of the Ryu-Iwi Road. On the left, the 11th Division cleared the enemy from the area between the Shelte Canal and the Sensi Canal, captured Pelancore and Estrin, and reached the outskirts of Hem-Lenglet, which they occupied during the night. The 49th and 51st Divisions were released from Army Reserve and transferred to the Canadian core on October 10. During the night of October 10-11, the former relieved that part of the 2nd Canadian Division east of Ryu-Iwi, and the 51st Thailand Division moved to the Esquiduva area. At 8am October 11, the Canadian core resumed the attack with the 49th Division on the right and the 2nd Canadian Division on the left. The enemy laid down a heavy artillery barrage and both divisions encountered stiff opposition. With fierce fighting, however, our attack made good progress. The 49th Division gaining the high ground east of Ryu-Iwi and the 2nd Canadian Division capturing Ryu-Iwi and the high ground to the north. About 10.30 am, the enemy delivered a heavy counterattack under an artillery barrage and supported by seven tanks under the direction of Evidence Lassek against the 49th and 2nd Canadian Divisions. Our line was forced back slightly at first, but six of the tanks were knocked out by our artillery, the assaulting infantry dispersed by our machine gun and rifle fire, and the attack repulsed. Meanwhile, on October 7-8, the 1st Canadian Division had relieved the 4th British Division, 22nd core, on the frontage between Palau and the Scarpe River and passed under the command of the GOC, 22nd core. At 5 p.m. October 11, I handed over command to the core front, lest the 11th divisional sector, to the GOC, 22nd core, and the 2nd Canadian, and 49th and 51st Divisions were transferred to the 22nd core. At the same hour, I assumed command of the former 22nd core front, and the 56th and the 1st Canadian Divisions were transferred in the line to the Canadian core. During the night of October 11-12, the 2nd Canadian Division was relieved in the east line of the Ui-Denain Railway by the 51st Highland Division, and on completion of the relief I assumed command of the remainder of the 2nd Canadian divisional front, extending from the Ui-Denain Railway exclusive to the Shelt Canal. The battle of Arras, Cambre, so fruitful in results, was now closed. Since August 26th, the Canadian core had advanced 23 miles, fighting for every foot of ground and overcoming the most bitter resistance. In that period, the Canadian core engaged and defeated decisively 31 German Divisions, reinforced by numerous marksmen, machine gun companies. These divisions were met in strongly fortified positions, and under conditions most favorable to the defense. In this battle, 18,585 prisoners were captured by us, together with 371 guns, 1,923 machine guns, and many trench mortars. Over 116 square miles of French soil containing 54 towns and villages, and including the city of Cambre, were liberated. The severity of the fighting and the heroism of our troops may be gathered from the casualties suffered between August 22 and October 11, and which are as follows. Killed officers, 296 other ranks, 4,071. Missing officers, 18 other ranks, 1,912. Wounded officers, 1230. Other ranks, 23,279. Total officers, 1,544. Other ranks, 29,262. Considering the great number of German divisions engaged and the tremendous artillery and machine gun firepower at their disposal, the comparative lightness of our casualties testified to the excellence of the precautions taken by divisional, brigade, and regimental officers to minimize the loss of life, having ever in mind the performance of their duty and the accomplishment of their heavy task. Such was the battle of Cambre. The remains only to quote the telegram sent to the core commander on October 1 by General Sir Henry E. Holm, commanding the First Army. I wish to express to you and the troops under your command a high appreciation of the determined fighting of the Canadian troops during the last five days. During this time, Canadian troops assisted by the 11th Division and portions of the 56th Division successfully carried through the difficult maneuver of forcing the crossing of the Canal de Nord in face of a determined enemy, and having captured burl on wood and the high ground north and northwest of Cambre. The importance which the enemy attached to these positions is shown by the number of divisions which he has employed and by the violence of his counterattacks during the last two days. Troops of no less than twelve hostile divisions have been engaged during this period in the attempt to stem the successful advance of the corps. End of Part 3, Chapter 13, Recording by David Lawrence in Brampton, Ontario, June 2010. End of Canada's Hundred Days, Part 3, by John Livesay.