 Hello and welcome to day two of the Lowy Institute's digital conference on the Indo-Pacific Operating System, Power, Order and Rules for the 21st Century. I'm Michael Fulila, the Executive Director of the Lowy Institute. I'd like to begin by acknowledging the traditional owners of the country on which the institute stands, the Gadigal of the Eora Nation, as well as traditional owners of country throughout Australia and pay my respects to elders past and present. Yesterday we opened this conference with a conversation with Kurt Campbell, the Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the U.S. National Security Council. Kurt's remarks to me on the United States, China, Australia and AUKUS have made news around the world. We also hosted a keynote speech by French security expert and Lowy Institute non-resident fellow Nadej Roland and two panels on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. You can watch all of these sessions through the conference portal or via the Lowy Institute's YouTube channel. Shortly we'll host our third and final panel of the conference on hard power and regional order. But first, I'd like to introduce Australia's Defence Minister, the Honourable Peter Dutton MP, to deliver his ministerial remarks. Mr Dutton entered the Australian Parliament two decades ago as the member for Dixon. He served as a minister in a number of portfolios including as the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and the Minister for Home Affairs and he served on the National Security Committee of the Cabinet for the past six years. In March this year he was appointed Minister for Defence. I'd like to thank the Minister for agreeing to speak to this conference and invite him to deliver his remarks. The Lowy Institute is one of Sir Frank Lowy's great legacies to our country. Michael, you've played an essential role in bringing Sir Frank's vision to reality and building the Lowy Institute into a respected voice on both the national and international stage. The Institute helps to define and shape the Australian foreign policy and security debate. And I thank you for the invitation to address this conference on the Indo-Pacific operating system. Today our region, the Indo-Pacific, is of course far more complex and far less predictable than at any time since the Second World War. We're facing challenges including rapid military modernisation, tension over territorial claims, heightened economic coercion, undermining of international law, including the law of the sea, through to enhanced disinformation, foreign interference and cyber threats, enabled by new and emerging technologies. In the discussions I have with our like-minded friends in the region, the message comes through loud and clear. They share our interest in ensuring continued peace and prosperity. They want to see the Indo-Pacific operating system characterised by order and stability. The Australian government is stepping up its engagement with our Pacific partners and we're working even more closely with our allies and friends. These include our Five Eyes partners, NATO, the Quad, ASEAN, European countries, including Germany, which sent its first warship in 20 years for a goodwill visit to the region this year. We support ASEAN centrality in our regional security architecture. Australia continues to work constructively with our many bilateral strategic partners and with our long-standing friends and allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. We are working together to shape a prosperous and free region. Over the past few months, the Australian Defence Force took part in a number of back-to-back exercises with Allied forces in our region. It was a landmark time for a number of reasons. It was the second consecutive year that Australia had been invited to participate in Exercise Malabar with India, Japan and the United States. Exercise Besama Gold marked the golden jubilee of the five power defence arrangements with Australia joining with Malaysia, Singapore, the UK and New Zealand for a range of maritime and air exercises. The maritime partnership exercise between Australia, the US, the UK and Japan included the United Kingdom's first carrier strike group and that was deployed outside of Europe for the first time since the Falklands War. In October, HMAS Waramanga joined international efforts to enforce United States Security Council sanctions on North Korea, the sixth Australian warship to do so. And just a few days ago, we concluded annual exercise, a very significant multilateral exercise, led by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, which included Canada, Germany and the US Navy. The upshot of these complex multi-domain exercises and our flagship regional engagement activity, Indo-Pacific Endeavour, was a considerable strengthening in the integration and interoperability of our forces and greater confidence and trust in our ability to work together. The presence of the US and its military forces in our region has underpinned regional peace and prosperity for decades. In the face of new challenges, Australia's alliance with the US is the strongest it has ever been. We've just announced further enhancements to the force posture initiatives and we know that only in the last 24 hours, the United States has announced further engagement and deeper obligation to the Indo-Pacific. These include, of course, for our own country, further enhance cooperation through all domains and establishing a combined logistics, sustainment and maintenance enterprise to support high-end warfighting and combined military operations in the region. It's been welcomed by our friends and our partners as further evidence of our joint commitment to a peaceful Indo-Pacific. The decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines with our US and UK allies as the first initiative of the AUKUS Enhanced Trilateral Partnership represents a massive step forward in Australia's capability. The recent signing of the AUKUS Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement demonstrates the seriousness of all parties in accelerating Australia's acquisition of this critical capability. AUKUS is more than submarines, though. It's a framework to enable deeper practical cooperation in developing leading-edge military capabilities and technologies. It will help ensure that Australia remains a responsible and highly capable security partner in the Indo-Pacific region for decades to come. AUKUS is just one example of a broader deepening of our partnerships with others in the region. And while we all share an interest in security in the region, these partnerships are, to a very large extent, built on shared values and shared history. They've been built over time, with trust baked in at every point. The strength and durability of some partnerships, I think, is often underestimated. And their development as defence security partnerships often overlooked. For instance, Australia and Japan are obviously both very strong democracies. We both have alliances with the United States. We're both members of the Quad, and our economies are deeply intertwined with a free trade agreement that is one of the most comprehensive ever signed by Australia. Our special strategic partnership grows closer every year. At this year's 2 plus 2 meeting, we both reaffirmed our determination to deepen cooperation to promote a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific, where disputes are resolved peacefully, without the threat of all use of force or coercion. Our defence forces are also increasing their joint training and strengthening interoperability. Last year, our two prime ministers announced in principle agreement on a reciprocal access agreement. This will be a landmark bilateral agreement for both countries, facilitating cooperative activities such as joint exercises and disaster relief operations. Between the Japan Self Defence Forces and the Australian Defence Force. In this year, where we celebrate the 60th anniversary of Australian diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea, we agreed to build on South Korea's inaugural participation in exercise talisman sabre. We're also in the final steps of developing an annual bilateral infantry exercise that will commence in 2023. If we look to another successful 2 plus 2 ministerial dialogue this year, I can say that Australia and India's defence relationship is at a historic high, especially in the maritime domain. In fact, we're reinforcing each other's maritime domain awareness through increased information sharing and practical cooperation. Both of us are committed to the ongoing success of exercise Malabar. And we've invited India to participate in future talisman sabre exercises to drive further operational compatibility between our defence services. You could also see these long-standing relationships of trust at work in cybercooperation. The Director-General of the Australian Signals Directorate recently described the Five Eyes as a genuine fully integrated partnership built on trust and confidence, which delivers the most impactful intelligence in the world. Australia is a leader in cyber-regional capacity and we've continued to build that through our contribution to the Pacific Cyber Security Operational Network, providing advice and assistance to our closest neighbours. It's these partnerships which build our collective cyber resilience, allowing us to defend and act against those who threaten us through cyberspace. When this government came to power in 2013, defence spending was at the lowest level since 1938 at around 1.5% of GDP. We've lifted it beyond 2% of GDP because that's what's required to equip the ADF with the kit it needs and to keep Australia safe and secure. We're maintaining our investment in our core military capabilities and continuing to develop new ones to hold a potential adversaries' forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance. Capabilities which send a clear deterrent message to any adversary, that the cost they would incur in threatening our interests outweighs the benefits of doing so. The Indo-Pacific we seek has Australia as a strong and reliable partner, a nation that more than lifts its weight in securing peace in our region. Australia can be relied upon to work for the Indo-Pacific where sovereignty is respected, which is open and free and which is stable and secure. Thank you for your remarks, Minister Dutton, and thank you, Michael. I'm Ben Scott, director of the project on Australia's security and the rules-based order and the convener of this conference. Mr Dutton's overview of Australia's military partnerships and recent capability developments, coupled with his description of the Indo-Pacific that Australia seeks, leads us straight to our third session. Our final panel is titled Hard Power and Regional Order. It'll be chaired by Dr Leslie Seebeck. Dr Seebeck is honorary professor of cybersecurity at the Australia National University. She's had a wide-ranging career across government, in private industry, and at two universities. In government, she's worked at the departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, and at the Office of National Assessments. Over to you, Leslie. Good afternoon and thank you very much, Ben. As Ben mentioned, my name is Leslie Seebeck. I'm an honorary professor at the Australian National University. We're here today to discuss Hard Power and Regional Order. After I introduce the panel, we'll have a couple of rounds of quick discussion, and then we'll take questions from the audience. So I encourage you to post your questions on the Q&A panel on your screen. I'd like to keep it fairly flexible and see where the discussion takes us. We also have a poll running, so please take a moment to respond. I'm joined this afternoon by an impressive panel. I'd like to welcome first Mr Greg Moriarty, the secretary of the Australian Department of Defence, Ms Lisa Curtis, fellow and director of the Indo-Pacific program at the Centre for New American Security, and Dr Evan Laxmana from the National University of Singapore's Lee Kwan School of Public Policy. Good afternoon to all. We've just heard from the Australia Minister for Defence, Mr Peter Dutton. Mr Dutton has reinforced some recent themes. Notably, China's development of military capability, the developing cooperation between regional partners, and Australia's continued development of classic deterrent capabilities. These themes go to the heart of our discussion. So I'd like to start by asking the panel to address those particular elements. Is the focus right? How do you see these settings change over the short, medium and long-term? And what concerns you most about meeting our objectives? Lisa, if I could pass to you in the first instance, please. Great. Well, thank you very much for having me here today. It's a real pleasure. Yeah, I think this focus is the right focus for Australia. And I think everybody is waiting to hear what the Biden administration will articulate with its China strategy and with the Indo-Pacific strategy, which of course is really a subset of its overall China strategy. And I think what you'll hear from both those strategies when they're articulated is a great deal of focus on the development of alliances and partnerships. And it really will be, particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy, the blueprint for how the administration wants to move forward with its alliances and partnerships in this vital region. And that if the goal of China is to reduce America's regional influence and create a closed operating system in the Indo-Pacific, I think that the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy will demonstrate that that goal is not going to be reached anytime soon. I think that the Indo-Pacific strategy will emphasize partnerships, as I was saying, alliances, particularly with Australia. Of course, this is one of the most important alliances for the United States as demonstrated by AUKUS. And that demonstrates a significant security commitment to Australia. So emphasizing that idea of partnership, working together, collective deterrence, that's certainly an example of that. So I think, you know, AUKUS is certainly an important military pact. But it's also important because it allows Australia to acquire different kinds of weapons systems, enhances its cyber capabilities and undersea capabilities. So it really does have the potential to transform the Australian military and provide it that ability to be able to partner with principal allies moving forward. So I think AUKUS is a great example of how our countries will be working together for collective deterrence and certainly the United States values its close partnership with Australia. Okay, thank you. Evan, if I could move to you, what's your reaction to Minister Dawson's speech? I fully agree with Lisa that the approach, the outline of the problems and the potential solutions does seem to work well for Australia and the US. I am however less convinced that it works for everybody else in Southeast Asia. I don't think that the first list of strategic challenges always includes China. The kind of particular challenge that China poses to Australia isn't always the kind of particular threat viewed by the rest of Southeast Asia. On a daily basis, Southeast Asian countries have to deal with a wide range of operational security challenges, whether it's transnational organized crime, illegal fishing and others, as well as long term strategic ones, including a potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. I think in terms of the list of things that Southeast Asian countries are worried about, I think we need to be careful that we don't always see eye to eye with Australia or the US about the things that are shaping the strategic trajectory of the region today. So because of that, I don't think that the kinds of solutions, whether it's about working together in terms of military exercises or office, we're not saying it's a bad thing, but we're not also saying that it also works best for Southeast Asian states. I think the challenge is finding a way for whatever mechanism that Australia and the US develops also works well and complement existing mechanisms that Southeast Asians prefer. And I don't think this is the end of the conversation. I think it's the beginning of the conversation, how to get there. And I think at heart, we cannot start with the premise that everyone shares the same assumptions and perception about rule space order about the strategic challenge to the rule space order, as well as the potential solution. So we shouldn't assume away the different nuances and perceptions and daily policy challenges faced by Southeast Asian countries. Okay, thank you, Evan. Greg, I'm not expecting that you're going to debate the focus of Minister Dutton's speech. So you might want to draw out particularly what concerns you about how Australia is going to deliver on this over the short to medium and even longer term. Well, thanks, Leslie. And I think from an Australian defence policy perspective, we in many ways agree with the point that Evan made that not all of the security challenges in the region should be seen through the lens of great competition. A lot of what Australian Defence Department and ADF has been doing with their regional partnerships in Southeast Asia has been on that broader range of security agenda. The counterterrorism work, which is deep and enduring new security challenges around cyber, a lot of the stuff on maritime domain awareness, which does help our partners around the region deal with some of those challenges of illegal fishing. Some of the people, people movements and many of the countries of Southeast Asia also still have an internal security challenges that they appropriately do, do what need to focus on. So I think our approach, our defence strategic update last year, I think said that we are going to continue to work with partners on their agenda as well as to complement with some of our broader concerns about those big strategic shifts, which we do think have eroded our strategic circumstance and to pick up Lisa's point, is our view that anything that led to a reduction in the United States presence and its multi-dimensional presence in our region would not be to the advantage of either Australia, but we would argue the broader region. So we do welcome that alliance that they have with Australia, but also the US security partnerships with a wide range of countries in Southeast Asia. We want to contribute more to collective deterrence and we certainly want to build our military capability so that we can make more of a contribution in an environment where the risk of military conflict we think has increased in recent years. This is not to say that we wish to reduce our sovereignty. We certainly don't see Orcus and the acquisition of additional capabilities. We don't see deepening our alliance with the United States as undermining our own sovereign capability. We want to take more responsibility for our own security and we think growing our conventional capabilities will allow Australia to do that, but we certainly want to talk about what we can do to make a stronger contribution to regional stability, and we think our alliance with the United States does contribute to regional stability. Okay. Greg, if I could stay with you. You've noted that we're not just interested in the region being not being shaped by great power competition or that's not the only shape of the regional order. And Orcus itself has been characterised by some as being a major shift in Australia's strategic posture. How do you think it actually complements what we're doing? Because often it's being played as this is something very different versus what we're doing on the ground in terms of things like counterterrorism, cyber, etc., humanitarian actions. Thanks, Leslie. I think Orcus will deliver capability and technology which will allow us to prosecute our strategy more effectively. In Australia we believe that in recent years we've lost capability edge and in some critical areas now we are playing catch-up in terms of high-end military capabilities. What we are very optimistic is that through Orcus we will be able to deliver some of these very exquisite military technologies with our great partners, the United States and the United Kingdom, and it will allow us to prosecute our military strategy more effectively. We are a small country with a small defence force. If we do not rely on technology, on capability edge, we will not be able to deliver the sort of deterrent effects that have long been part of our military strategy. We need to remain interoperable with the United States. We want to be able to conduct those complex high-end exercises with the United States and other partners. And I think through the Orcus agreement we will be able to acquire and develop some of those technologies which will allow Australia to continue to play that role that we've traditionally sought to in terms of the region's security. Thank you. Evan, I just want to tease out something you said before about Southeast Asia. I think it's fair to say that Southeast Asia is a pivot point of that changing strategic order. How would you characterize regional approaches to China and to shift from the global balance? I mean it's clearly a concern. How would regional nations and how can that region contribute to that change of order to the broader stability in the region? Right. Well, first of all, there is no single Southeast Asian approach to the changing power. I think it's clear that every country has its own concerns and issues. I think on one set of concerns when it comes to the US and China and their strategic competition, some Southeast Asian countries might actually see it as an opportunity to balance one power over the other while trying to benefit from both, whether it's about trade war or security partnerships. The more some countries are concerned about China, the more they can get goody bags from the US basically. So it depends on the sense of perceptions of opportunities and challenge. But others might see the US-China competition as fundamentally polarizing the region because of what is now known as issue linkages, that you cannot make a deal about infrastructure without getting pushback about that type of policy. You cannot make a deal with Huawei without a pushback on technology concerns. So these issue linkages because of the polarizing nature with our politics are also viewed in Southeast Asia as potentially bad. So it could be good or bad, depending I think on the political calculations of the individual states. The second set of concerns I think, and this is more closely about the approaches, not every country has the same set of strategic options. Some countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia are over-reliant on ASEAN and multilateral institutions and less capable of developing non-ASEAN strategic options. Other countries like Singapore and Vietnam are more willing to contemplate and formulate non-ASEAN strategic options. So the approaches I think will be shaped by these two set of issues, whether they're confident enough in their strategic autonomy to develop a wide range of strategic options and whether or not they feel they're confident in terms of exploiting the US-China competition. Because at heart, none of us feel that we can actually get the US and China to be nice to one another. That ship has sailed I think. We tried talking to them, we tried to push them in the more dialogue format. It doesn't work. So all we can do now is to deal with how things are right now. Lisa, it's an interesting point that Evans picked up about again the approaches of China and the between the US and China. Certainly the ethos that there's dominated policy to China for quite a long time, the idea of convergence, that's engagement which make China look perhaps a bit more like us or be prepared to accommodate us, has run aground. How would you describe that shift in thinking? Is that something that's really just suddenly come into play now? Is it being a growing realization? And how is that being sent or passed on to regional nations about how that shift is going to play out? Well, I think it's been growing for a while and I think I would characterize it a bit differently than Evan did. This is really about the future regional order. It's not as if the US is just engaging in competition with China for no reason. This is really about what the region is going to look like, whether it is free, open, you have freedom of navigation, free trade, or whether it's going to be a sort of closed system dominated by China, dominated by Chinese technologies, etc. So it's really about choice, about the Southeast Asian nations having choices. And nobody is trying to force them to choose between one or the other China or the United States, but rather that they can make their own choice, that they have the independence, the sovereignty to be able to make their own choices, whatever that might be. So I just wanted to make that point. But yes, I think the idea that engagement alone is going to change the character of the Chinese Communist Party has certainly proven false. And there was a growing realization, I think, happening even before the Trump administration, but it definitely crystallized during the Trump administration. And I think President Xi's ambitions have come into clear focus over the last few years. And certainly the COVID-19 pandemic, the aftermath of that pandemic, some of the aggressive behavior that China engaged in, whether it was at the border with India in the Southeast China Sea, the crackdown in Hong Kong, the aggressive behavior toward Taiwan, threatening Taiwan autonomy. All of these things sort of came together in the last couple of years to really solidify the position on China. And there was some question when we had the change in administration, would the policies change? People even wondered whether the Biden administration would continue to use the Indo-Pacific terminology. But clearly what we've seen over the last nine months is that the policy is largely consistent from the previous administration. Of course, there's been some differences. I would say the Biden administration has put more time, resources and attention into building alliances and partnerships, not only in Asia, but also the transatlantic partnerships. But by and large, the policy toward China has remained the same. So again, coming back to the Indo-Pacific strategy, I think that's going to be very telling in terms of what the administration is going to look at in terms of cooperation. And it's not just a military strategy. Obviously, there's going to be quite a bit about cooperating with countries on climate change, counterterrorism, as you mentioned, economics, providing infrastructure alternatives, post-pandemic recovery. So I think there will be a lot of different elements to the Indo-Pacific strategy, but really driving toward that idea of making sure that the region evolves in a direction that maintains the traditional policies that have been in place for so many years, so many decades now, to promote the liberal, economic and political peaceful order. And that you don't have hegemonic behavior or countries trying to change the territorial status quo. I really think that's what this is about and that is what the efforts to maintain a strong U.S. presence across the political, economic, military domains is really all about in this critical Indo-Pacific region. Okay. Can I just have a quick follow-up to that? Do you see a lot of this work of the United States in the region through institutions or is it very much on a bilateral, we'll work with nations? And if through institutions, is there anything in particular that you would nominate? Well, I think certainly the Quad has become a central pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy of this administration. You know, I would note being part of the Trump administration that it was revived in 2017, the Quad was, after a 10-year hiatus. But certainly the Biden administration has taken it to the next level, holding two summit-level engagements in the six-month period, the first-ever in-person meeting at the White House on September 24th, issuing a very robust joint statement. But this is a grouping that's focused on economics, technology, global health. It's not the military pact that we see with the AUKUS. It has quite a different focus. And I know that there is skepticism of the Quad within the ASEAN countries or some fear, I guess, that the Quad would somehow usurp the role of ASEAN. But I would just make the point that the two organizations are complementary. They have two different purposes, right? ASEAN is serving a very distinct purpose, convening the Southeast Asian nations, building consensus on important issues, whereas the Quad is really asserting this very particular vision for the region and has capabilities to carry that vision out. And ASEAN can benefit from the Quad activities. I would say the two benefit from each other. And ASEAN may be the center of the contest that we're seeing in the Indo-Pacific, but it's really US partnerships with other powerful Indo-Pacific democratic nations that is going to help in winning the contest. So really, I would say that there's no contradictions between having both a strong Quad cooperation and strong ASEAN cooperation. And I think both institutions are important to the regional architecture. Okay. I'm going to go to Evan and come back to Greg in a moment. But Evan, I want to go to you because you've actually, your last piece, which you did for Lowy, was raising the point about institutions require domestic legitimacy. And you exhibited some skepticism about how some of these institutions that were being proposed, including things like the Quad, were going to move forward and be successful. Can you comment on that, please? Sure. So for me, I think now precisely because of the increasingly polarization of our politics, on the other hand, I think domestically across the region, more regional countries are becoming much more inward looking. The wave of domestic populism is becoming much stronger. Under these conditions, I think for any kind of foreign policy initiatives or engagement, including multilateral institutions like ASEAN or mini-lateral ones like Quad, I think it requires a domestic buy-in for sustainability and not just geopolitical interests and strategic challenges. And I think there are two ways in which regional institutions or mechanisms shape domestic legitimacy. One is to public goods, to what extent these regional institutions provide public goods that's visible beyond just norms building. But to what extent it can provide roads, it can provide investment and stuff like that. And secondly, of course, because this is still very much an elite driven region, to what extent these institutions provide private benefits to the domestic elites. And I think this is something that's very tricky because if China can do both, provide public goods and private benefits to the elites, it'll be harder for the U.S. to compete on those particular issue areas. So it isn't about just sidelining China because we disagree with how they do business on the infrastructure around, but what's the alternative for the domestic elites? Should they all abandon engaging China on infrastructure projects and then do what exactly for their domestic public? So for me, multilateral institutions work the same way. There's a reason studied by ASEAN secretary that actually shows interestingly in Indonesia among the next generation of students, they're actually very skeptical of what ASEAN can do for Indonesia. So there is I think a growing sense that multilateral institutions and their norms building exercises has to do more than just provide a photo opportunity and a way to discuss policies behind closed doors. But if it's not presented to the public as providing public goods and it's not being seen by the elites as providing private benefits to them, I think it will be harder to sustain. Okay, thank you. Greg, I'm going to pose to you one of the first questions we have from our audience. So this is a question from Mick Kilty. Building on Evan's observation of multi-dimensional strategic partnering by some ASEAN countries, how much should we look beyond orcas to like-minded democracies in Europe who face similar cyber and defence threats from Russia? Are we learning from their lessons and lived experiences? Well, I think we should be open to all sorts of partnerships to reinforce old ones and to develop new ones. There's a very rich depth of expertise in Europe about a number of these hybrid threats, grey zone challenges that they've had to deal with. And from Russia, we should very much be open to working with them on some of these broader international challenges. We should be open to working with old partners in terms of the five power defence arrangements. There's a number of engagements in Southeast Asia where we've had long-standing relationships that have delivered benefits, I think, to us and to our regional partners. So I don't think we in Australia are looking to be exclusionary. I think the AUKUS agreement is an amazing opportunity for Australia to work with great, very deep and old partners on incredible technologies that offer us the opportunity to enhance our security. But I think we want to do more with a range of different partners. And I think we want to work with the region across the Indo-Pacific on a number of reinforcing relationships wherever we can. Some of those are more about hard-edge military capability, and I think AUKUS is focused on that. It's about delivering high-end technologies for our defence forces. That's what I see as primary purposes, as being reinforcing old partnerships to deliver capability. It sends strong strategic messages. There's no doubt about that. But I think all the three leaders in there, when they announced AUKUS, were very clear what they suggested it should be. Our relationships with Europe would certainly welcome European interest in the Indo-Pacific, including, I should mention, with France, which is a genuine Indo-Pacific power and has very substantial long-standing presence in the region. We should be looking to cooperate with France and other European powers in our region, and more broadly. For example, Australia's bilateral defence relationship with Indonesia is very much growing in positive ways in recent years, and we see that as a broader benefit. We have largely bilateral defence relationships with the countries of Southeast Asia, apart from the five-power defence arrangements, which have historical reasons for their existence, but have been able to adjust to new circumstances. And all of the members of that grouping have found benefit in the new agenda that we've been pursuing through FPDA. So I think we are certainly open to and enthusiastic about building on traditional relationships, but also broadening networks. Okay. I'm hearing a lot of optimism about these regional groupings from both yourself, Greg and Lisa. Some skepticism from Evan. I think if you look back over a period of time in the Asia-Pacific, there is a, it has a history of these groups that keep coming up from APEC, and the FPDA you mentioned has been long-standing. Is it the case that we put too much weight on some of these things so that they collapse under the weight of expectations? It's those slower moving groupings that bear fruit longer term, and if that is the case, if you agree with that, do you think we have time for these to reach fruition to generate the outcomes we're after? I'll go to you first, Greg, and I might also pass that on to Lisa as well. Leslie, I think we are optimistic for what that network of relationships can do in terms of building resilience, but supporting the rules, the dynamic of the region which has largely and ASEAN has benefited from its focus. We all know it's evolved over time from the original reasons why ASEAN came into being, but I think we should celebrate ASEAN's achievements as much as we might wish to sort of hope that ASEAN would assert more of a sort of a strategic presence or a strategic personality. But at the end of the day, that is why I think the topic of this session is we cannot assure ourselves, we cannot assume, given the trends that we're seeing, that it will be sufficient. That is why Australia is reinvesting in defence capability. That is why we are seeking to be more interoperable with our ally, the United States. That's why we are putting more emphasis on the ability to acquire capabilities including long range strike that can hold adversaries at risk at longer distance. So, while we are optimistic about what these networks can deliver, we also believe that given what we are seeing, what we are seeing in terms of coercive activities, what we are seeing in terms of activities in the region that undermine our strategic interests, we have to invest in conventional military capability and seek to ensure deterrence, but our ability to prosecute our interests through the use of force if the circumstances ever became so appalling that we would be required to do so. Okay, thank you Lisa. Yeah, I think that it's good to have these evolving architectures or groupings and you know there's a certain organic nature to them as well. And we've talked a lot about the Quad and we've heard about Quad Plus or whether it be other countries that would come in and cooperate with Quad countries on an issue by issue basis. And I think this is very important. We are facing many challenges. And, you know, we can't ignore the fact that China in a way is is seeking to disrupt the, you know, traditional international order as we know it, and trying to, you know, stake territorial planes, trying to dominate the emerging and critical technologies. So, you know, there are good reasons for allowing these groupings to come together and to work together on some of these challenges. So, I don't really think that we have to expect, you know, a very firm or, you know, long term type of architecture. I think it's okay that we see new groupings coming up we see trilateral groupings of different, you know, countries, whether it's, you know, Japan, US Australia, or, you know, maybe Australia, India, Korea, I don't know just there's there's been several different trilateral groupings and and I think this makes sense to allow countries to come together like minded countries, even if it's around particular issues, but to work together, because I think that the challenges are great. The US is not going to be able to go it alone. Certainly, the Biden administration recognizes that, and has been working to not only build that quad grouping build its bilateral relationships with countries like Australia, Japan and others, but also working with the PN nations. The G seven, I think it was quite remarkable to see the G seven and its statement mentioning the need for a stable stable Taiwan Straits, talking about human rights issues, some of the human rights abuses we're seeing against the Uighurs and initiating the B three W build back better world initiative, which I understand we're going to hear some announcements pretty soon about what's actually happening infrastructure projects across the world. So I think, you know, quite a bit has been achieved in terms of working with other nations and other groupings. And, you know, I think it's okay that these are flexible. These are evolving and are fairly organic. And that's probably what we're going to continue to see in the coming months and years. Okay, I do want to come back to Lisa in particular around the question of technology and the effect of technology on security stability and particularly China's role. But I want to take another question from the audience. And this is to all panelists so we might start with Evan and then go down to Greg and Lisa to all panelists to maintain regional peace. Does America need to remain the strongest military power or can peace be secured by a balance of power with China. Evan. Thank you. That's a pretty difficult question. I think there are two different layers to that question. First layer is, of course, the US China strategic balance. I think clearly there's no single country in Asia that can militarily challenge China by themselves. So clearly on that front, the US remains the necessary piece of the security border. But the second layer is what what does the rest of the region do because they also cannot always rely on the US. They also have their own cons and concerns about being too dependent on the US for military assurances. So for me, I think right now, the key difficult question is if there is a prospect for for some form of multipolar security order below the level of the US and China, that would have to mean that the middle powers of the region would not only have to build their own defense capabilities, but also network among themselves separate from their own networks with the US and an extra regional powers. And I think this is the more difficult question, because I think some parts of the region still feel it's easier to just rely on the US. It's less complicated, but others who do realize that they need more options outside the US also don't have the resources and capabilities to do so, especially when their economic growth and ties are so dependent on China as well. I think this is the more difficult question, but clearly, the idea that the unipolar moment of US military power in the region has passed a stable bilateral or sorry, a stable bipolar balance of power between US and China militarily may also not be sustainable. So I think this leads us to the question of how do we get the rest of the region to step up militarily. Leslie, I think I think it's, there is a question in my mind about whether, you know, we can have a region where the great powers do cooperate compete contest in a way in which, you know, while they'll assert their strategic preferences, but can they do that in a way that enhances stability and reinforces international rules, or do we do we need to resale ourselves or reconcile ourselves to a fragile and and and brittle balance and I think that the United States from my perspective is not talking about trying to reshape the region in terms of asserting territorial claims, asserting, asserting its strategic predominance. I feel my sense is that the United States wishes to remain an Indo Pacific power and is keen to engage with regions with countries of the region around that agenda. And similarly, it's not predetermined or predestined that China must pursue its ambitions in a way which unsettles and undermines the region's security. China has choices it can make. And there's, there's aspects of China's recent behavior which deeply concern us and militarization features in South China Sea and some other issues are deeply concerning to Australia, but I, I don't think there's it is predestined that we have a fragile and brittle balance of power in the region. There is scope for optimism but being secretary of the Department of Defense, of course, I would take the view that that robust and capable security forces are going to make a positive contribution to that and I think it's, I'm very much welcome efforts by ASEAN partners as well to develop more, more robust security forces that can deal with these security challenges. I think that there is, there's certainly a need for the countries, the member countries of ASEAN and more broadly across the Indo Pacific to have capabilities so that they are able to make a contribution and are not simply on the receiving end of the dynamics that, that the region might, might throw up. I'm looking forward to working with ASEAN partners to help shape that regional security environment. Yeah, good. Thank you, Lisa. And if you could just address the issue of technology and how China is playing in that field, that would be really interesting as well. Great. Yeah, well, look, I think US China competition is here to stay. You know, it's not going anywhere. But this doesn't mean it has to devolve into conflicts and clearly just two weeks ago we saw President Biden, President Xi engaging in a nearly four hour virtual meeting. And I think both leaders were making clear that they don't want to see conflict, that there are ways to manage the competition. So I think that, you know, that's important to remember. But as you said that the competition is increasingly revolving around critical and emerging technologies. And I think what the pandemic showed is that the United States and other countries don't want to be too heavily reliant on China for these critical and emerging technologies because they saw what happened with regard to the PBE situation. So that was really kind of a lesson that is carrying over now into the technology realm. And, you know, China has increased its digital footprint, particularly in Southeast Asia, with its, you know, 5G offerings. But I think countries are becoming more aware of the dangers on relying, you know, too heavily on Chinese technology. The opportunities for controlling that digital environment and then the vulnerabilities that the countries would face by relying on, you know, end to end 5G technology from Chinese companies. I think that there's a growing awareness about this and what we've seen our countries working together to come up with other solutions. We can talk about the Open Radio Access Network, the OpenRAN, that is becoming more and more of a viable option for countries that would sort of open the market up and allow for more market-based solutions. So I think that, you know, the technology competition, the U.S. is starting to step up in the infrastructure bill that was recently passed. There was a lot of funding put toward developing our own technology industry, encouraging innovation, research partnerships with other countries. The Quad, for instance, had a lot to say about technology cooperation when the leaders met in September. And one of the key initiatives that came out of that Quad meeting was the initiative to bring students, master students from all four countries to the United States to study in the STEM fields and sort of encouraging that cooperation and research and the synergies between the four countries on critical technologies. And this is all very important in the technology competition that we are certainly facing with China. And again, the importance of the U.S. working with critical allies and partners to meet those challenges. Okay. Do you see technology as being an empowering, primarily an empowering or destabilizing, particularly digital technologies, empowering or destabilizing a regional stability in order? I think it's both, right? Because I think the, of course, digital technologies are empowering and the kind of benefits that they can bring to societies is quite evident. But I think it's how you harness the technologies. And I think there's particular concern about artificial intelligence and, you know, how that would be used and would it be used ethically? Would it be used to promote, you know, civil freedoms and democratic systems? Or would it be used to repress society, you know, increase surveillance of individuals taking away privacy from individuals? So those are really the key questions and why it's so important for democratic countries to work together to set the norms and the standards for these emerging technologies to make sure that they're used for good in society and to benefit the people of society and not used by authoritarian regimes to repress their people. Okay. Greg, given the emphasis that AUKUS has around technology, do you see a major change to, you know, Australian US, UK force structures to take advantage of new technologies, other official intelligence cyber? Do you see rebalancing or shifting out of those? And what does that mean for things like, you know, as Kurt Campbell mentioned the other day, the melding of our militaries, for example? And doing more with each other. Where does technology route take us? Leslie, I think we are seeing some of those shifts underway already. Right, pre AUKUS that we're doing a lot of thinking in Australia about whether, what type of agile force structure do we need into the future? What these legacy platforms that we've had for a long time, I mean, there's a bit of disinformation sometimes about that, you know, large surface combatants will no longer be relevant or submarines won't be stealthy in another 20 years time, fifth generation fighters will be as easily discoverable as jumbo jets. And I'm skeptical that the revolution in technology will mean that all of those legacy platforms are no longer relevant to the future of a modern fighting force. But I certainly think in our force structure plan last year that the government announced there is more emphasis on space capability, more emphasis on cyber, more emphasis on agility, on mobility. And I think that that trend will accelerate and I think AUKUS will also contribute to its acceleration where we are going to focus on AI and I can assure the audience that ethical use of AI is something that we very much focused on the quantum technologies, additional undersea capabilities, including unmanned capabilities, some of the other potential capability acquisitions that we might look to under AUKUS will just drive that change. But I see it happening already, Leslie. So that also implies that we would be doing some of this in the absence of AUKUS as well and AUKUS is going to just give us that extra lift. Yes, I agree. I think there is some of that trend. We were looking at what capabilities we might be able to acquire to hold adversaries at risk before we thought about AUKUS. And in terms of that interoperability, particularly with the United States, we had previous OSMINS, but at the OSMIN this year, again, before AUKUS, we talked about enhancing US force posture in Australia in four key areas, enhanced air cooperation, rotational deployment of additional US aircraft, enhanced maritime cooperation, including logistics and sustainment capabilities, enhanced land cooperation, more complex and more integrated exercises, particularly at high-end warfighting and establishing combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprises. So I think there is this deep, deepening of what we call operationalizing the alliance. I think Kurt talks about those as seamless. We certainly want to be able to operate with the United States in a seamless way at a range of contingencies, but of course preserving our sovereign rights as a nation state to make decisions about how we will deploy military forces and for what purpose. But we are enthusiastic about operationalizing the alliance, and I think through AUKUS we'll do that in increasingly high-technology military capability areas. Okay, that's interesting. At this point I'm going to go to another question from the audience, and this is to Evan, and it follows on from just our discussion about technology. It's from Boris. We are hearing different things from different Indonesian leaders about AUKUS, but no criticism of China's military buildup from any of them. What does Dukasar really think about arms racing in our region? Thank you for the question. A couple of things. First, building on the conversation on technology and strategic choices and autonomy. I think it's interesting because critical technologies in defense is not some free public good that everyone can access with their own choices. CATSA is one example in which technology can be used to exclude one country from the other. Access to U.S. technology for its operability also means that you have to develop certain types of arrangements. So in terms of defense technology, it's actually the clear example in which technology actually could be used to hinder strategic autonomy and choices. Now, this goes back to the question about arms race. I think the government's position that AUKUS is the beginning or sparks an arms race I think is not very accurate to say the least because where have we been for the last 15 years? There's already one unfolding for the last 10, 15 years. I think the underlying message isn't about the validity of the arms race argument itself, but it's about the concern that Indonesia is now lacking in strategic options to shape the region because the one institution that we keep harping on, which is ASEAN, is the one thing that we keep relying on as our sole strategic option. So AUKUS I think represents the most recent data point in which there is a reaction, counter-reaction in terms of great power politics, but also in terms of regional states developing non-ASEAN options. So I think for me, I would not take the argument of the Indonesian government's position of the arms race at face value. The third point I think that's relevant is the China question. I think it's certainly the case that the contrast is very strong, that we were so vocal about AUKUS and yet we were completely silent when China was harassing our oil rig in our exclusive economic zone. So on that part, I understand and I get it from Australia standpoint, but why would Australia want to be in the same position as China? China is the most domestically polarizing foreign policy issue in Indonesia. The fact that we cannot say stuff about China actually tells you how precarious and volatile China's position is. And the fact that we can criticize Australia publicly and privately, I think tells you the maturity of the relationship. So yes, there is a double standard, but why would Australia want to be in the same category as China in terms of the difficulty of the Indonesian political elites to deal with publicly? So for me, I would take the AUKUS common with a bit of a concern, I think, that Indonesia lacks the strategic options beyond ASEAN and the fact that I think the region is moving towards that trend of minilateralism in which that means Indonesia sooner or later have to think about do we need to expand our own minilateral options with regional countries? And this is something that's harder, I think, to contemplate. Greg, just on that, what would you like to see Indonesia do? You mentioned before that you'd like to see again that capability question in Indonesia. What is it you are after that? Well, Leslie, I think a strong, prosperous United Democratic Indonesia is a great strategic benefit to Australia and to ASEAN. I think a self-confident Indonesia can play. I know it's always very self-conscious about leadership in the ASEAN context, but frankly, without Indonesia being prepared to play that leadership role, I think ASEAN will not reach its potential. So a self-confident capable Indonesia and in terms of capability, I think that includes military capability and ability to contribute more to international peacekeeping, to regional stabilisation operations. And Indonesia has certainly done this over the last decade and President Yulia Yorna was very interested in growing that capability and I think Indonesia can play that role. So I'm optimistic that the modernisation of the Indonesian armed forces, the development of more conventional capability and a self-confidence about contributing regionally and globally, that will be good for Australia and for the region. That's an interesting one because when you and I both joined Defence roughly at the same time, Defence of Australia was the thing of the day. That's what everyone was thinking about and of course Indonesia had a great past in that about how we're going to interact with Indonesia. We seem to have matured considerably over those intervening period. And I think the depth of our intelligence discussions with Indonesia now, the depth of our strategic policy discussion, the quality of our leader engagements with Indonesia are very different to what they were, Leslie, when you and I were engaging on these issues several decades. Yeah, longer than I like to think about. Okay, the National Posture Review was recently completed. Lisa, I might go to you on this one. Some commentators expected to see more of a shift to Asia, but that didn't seem to be particularly forthcoming. Could you give us some context around the NPR and how it sits with things like you've mentioned before the national security strategy, which is still in development? Can we expect to see a major shift to Asia to the Indo-Pacific? Yeah, we've got so many strategies that are coming up for the national security strategy, of course, the China strategy, the Indo-Pacific strategy. Of course, the China strategy will be articulated verbally. My understanding is it won't be released as a document, but the Indo-Pacific strategy, the national security strategy will. And I think, yes, we can expect to see a major shift toward the Indo-Pacific region. And, you know, I think even going back to the national security strategy that was released in 2017 by the previous administration, which focused on great power competition, was starting to move in that direction. But I think you'll see a marked shift with the one that's about to be released. And, you know, it will, again, focus on partnerships, alliances, how we need to build those. It'll focus on the U.S. military capabilities and, you know, how those need to be geared toward Asia, you know, building that network of alliances that we've heard so much about, talking about integrated deterrence, which I understand is really talking about three levels of integrated deterrence. One, it's talking about the U.S. using all different tools of power, not just military, economic, political. So that's integrated deterrence, how we're having a sort of holistic deterrence that we're looking at. Second is integrating all types of military power, whether it's electronic warfare, conventional, nuclear, hypersonics, and making sure that there's integration of all those elements of military power. And then lastly, integrated deterrence with regard to partnerships and alliances and integrating those different partnerships. So I think we'll hear much more about that. Integrated deterrence, we'll hear about network of alliances. So, you know, I think that these are the things that we can expect from the strategies that are about to be released. And, you know, there may be some differences within the administration on certain, you know, critical issues. But I think, you know, by and large, there is this developing consensus about the need to meet the challenges from China, address the nuclear challenges and the need for strategic stability talks with China. You know, we've had strategic stability talks with Russia for years. But there is now an awareness that we need to have similar talks or at least work toward having such talks with China. Okay. So how that Greg, do we are we expecting more forward basing, more equipment, more infrastructure here in Australia from the US in particular? Yeah, I think under the enhanced US post posture cooperation that our ministers discussed at this year for Osmond, sorry. Yeah, we will. I mean, there will be that enhanced air cooperation in combined logistics, sustainment and maintenance enhance more exercises, more complex exercises, more, more exercises at high end and war fighting. I'm expecting to see in the coming years more US presence in Australia and I would also hope in the region. I think having that US military presence in the region, working with regional partners is good for the region as well. So yes, very much looking forward to growing the complexity and the nature of US posture presence in Australia, but also hoping that the US deepens its military engagement with all of the ASEAN partners as well. Okay, thank you. I should note that the last question was also from Kase. She's a member of our audience. I'm going to go to another audience question from Lai Ha. And I might pass it to Evan in this case. Will the growth of many, many lateral groupings, for example, quad orcus and many trilateral groupings in the region eventually undermine the function and role of traditional multilateralism? What is the prospect for both of them, the many lateral and the multilateral? I want to pick up earlier on what Lisa said about how quad and ASEAN are not actually in contradiction with one another. I would add in fact that Quad's revival is partially facilitated through ASEAN meetings that they met on the sidelines of ASEAN meetings. So in that sense, I think there's nothing that's inherently or fundamentally necessary that the growth of quad means the downfall of ASEAN. I think ideally in the past when regional policymakers have crafted the idea of an ASEAN-led regional architecture, the aspiration back then was to create in the future some sort of functional differentiation in which different issue areas would be handled by different ASEAN-led mechanisms. In some ways, ASEAN would like to be the hub and the spokes would be the East Asia Summit for kind of high level diplomatic meetings, the ADMM plus for defense issues, the ASEAN regional forum for sort of more non-traditional ones and APEC for sort of more economic ones. So that was the initial vision that ASEAN as the hub and ASEAN-led mechanisms in which regional countries are not excluded from one institution can participate. But the rise of many lateral groupings like others, I do think forces regional countries to rethink that aspiration because I think the problem with ASEAN-led mechanism is the obsession over processes that everything has to be done with consensus. And because the issues are so wide ranging, it's easier to get a consensus on lowest common denominator positions rather than difficult ones. So I think this is where the functional differentiation is now shifting rather than an ASEAN-led mechanisms for different issue areas. Right now, it's ASEAN-led mechanisms for normative diplomatic conversations and mini-lateral ones for more practical but limited security or other issue areas, whether it's quad in terms of Indo-Pacific or Indonesia's version of mini-lateral cooperation like with Malaysia and Singapore over the Malacca Straits or with the Philippines and Malaysia over the Sulu Sea. So I think mini-lateral options are good to think about right now in terms of filling specific and yet limited needs, whether in the security realm of others, while the ASEAN side kind of still deals with the normative side of things over the broader region. But the issue, I think, is not so much what ASEAN as a group can do, but who's going to lead ASEAN to do the things it needs to be done? And I think Greg mentioned it very clearly that Indonesia is supposed to be the one that's doing the leading. But right now, to be honest, we're not very energetic in that front. In fact, we seem to be more constrained by ASEAN institutions than the other way around. So this, I think, requires a more fundamental rethinking in Jakarta, not just in terms of the defense transformation process. As Greg mentioned, military capability is one element. And I think for Indonesia, military procurement alone is not the answer. We have a long list of problems on the organizational and human capital side. We have to work that. But more importantly, it's Indonesia's strategic policymaking system that needs a complete overhaul. How the defense can work together with the foreign ministry, with the economics side of things, to actually develop options in terms of institutions. Because right now, we are completing chairmanship of G20 and ASEAN in 2023 as leadership. And this is something that we have to grapple ourselves. Okay, thank you, Evan. I noticed that we're under the last four or five minutes of this panel. So I'm going to ask Greg one final question and then just ask people if they could give me their one takeaway on hard power and regional order. Before I do, I'm just noting the polls results that the outcomes are that, yes, the votes is that the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific does make the region stronger. The Quad and AUKUS makes the regional order stronger. And the overall, the highest vote has been that military conflict between US and China is unlikely in the next five years. So that's probably somewhat reassuring. Greg, I can't let you go without asking the question. Are we going to have nuclear-powered submarines in time to make a difference for the power balance in the Indo-Pacific? Well, Leslie, the government's committed to delivering the capability as early as possible, but I'd also say we have a very capable Collins-class fleet, which will remain a deliver us a regionally superior submarine capability for many years to come. But it's not just us. We have a really strong cooperation on undersea warfare with the United States, with other partners. So we believe that the Australian Defence Force, including our submarine fleet, will continue to make a difference for many years to come. Greg, thank you. OK, so if I could ask each of you for no more than, say, roughly 30 seconds, quick take on hard power regional order. Greg, I might go back to you. Thank you, Leslie. I think hard power and it needs to adapt as circumstances change. We are investing more in hard power as we've identified government has responded to the deterioration in our strategic circumstances. The multi-dimensional nature of power is essential. And that's why I think we in Australia continue to welcome the US presence in the region. It's not just US military power. It's that multi-dimensional nature of US power that we believe continues to make a strong contribution to regional stability. Great. Thank you, Lisa. Yeah, I agree with what Greg said that the hard power is about upholding the liberal political, economic order in the Indo-Pacific region, deterring any kind of aggression, hegemonic behavior or territorial, you know, trying to change the territorial status quo. This is what I think when we talk about hard power and US cooperation, particularly the AUKUS agreement, which is, it's an important part of ensuring that we maintain this liberal order in the Indo-Pacific region. And I think there are, there will be opportunities to expand AUKUS as we move forward, looking at increased interoperability, information sharing, you know, their logistics cooperation. And there are so many ways that this AUKUS can be a foundation for expanding that collective deterrence that the US is working toward. Great. Thank you, Evan. We've got about 30 seconds. I think hard power is almost always necessary for regional order, but it's rarely sufficient. The other elements of power, as Greg mentioned, whether it's economic or political and diplomatic institutions, I think remain a necessary piece of that puzzle. And second, I think regional order cannot be taken for granted that it's good and that people are willing to rally to profit. Regional order needs to be proven to the domestic constituents of regional state that it's worth fighting for. And at this point, abstract ideas of rule space order isn't just going to cut it. Okay. Well, thank you. Thank you to the panel. That was tremendous discussion. Thank you to Michael Fuller Love, Ben, for his introduction at Lowe Institute for the opportunity to have this discussion. Thank you for your time. Thank you, Leslie. I'm Ben Scott, and as a convener of this conference, I'm here now to draw it to a close. Our goal over the last two days has been to explore the concept of the Indo-Pacific operating system and to ask questions about how our region works and, more importantly, how it should work. These are complex and daunting questions. While we can't claim to have produced all the answers, our discussions have been productive and generated important new insights. For that, I would like to thank our speakers and participants, in particular our keynote speakers, Kurt Campbell, Nadezhra Lan, and Peter Dutton. And I would like to give special thanks to those who labored tirelessly behind the scenes, especially Andrea Pollard, Events Producer, Josh Goading, Digital Producer, and Sasha Fegan, Research Associate in the Rules Based Order Project. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the Australian Government through a grant by the Department of Defense for the Lowe Institute Research Project on Australia's security and the Rules Based Order. The Rules Based Order Project will continue next year. To stay up to date with this project and the rest of the Lowe Institute's work, please visit the Institute's website. For now, it's goodbye from the Lowe Institute. Thank you.