 So thanks. It's great to be here. Welcome. I will entertain questions any time during my remarks. So I'm going to talk and I will stop if nobody has asked any questions. I'll stop after about 20, 25 minutes and go to a dialogue. But if I'm saying something and you'd like to just say, hold it, I want to talk about that, I don't mind that. So I've been heckled actually a lot in my life as a public official. And so just a nice question is oftentimes a sweet change from being heckled. Sally talked a little bit about this boat we were on. So it was Jimmy and Roslyn Carter, Ted Turner, Madeleine Albright, Meg Whitman, who ran for governor here in California, kind of a smattering of both Republicans and Democrats. It was the lead up to the 2008 election. So there are people from the Obama team and the McCain team. Chevy Chase was there with his wife, who was an environmental educator. But it was like notables. Like that Tom Dashow was there on the boat. And I came back and I said, man, if that boat had capsized, I would have been in the paragraph also on the boat. It was just like a really impressive group. So I'm going to give a little bit of context to this if I can and tell you about our work that we're doing on a 111D. But let me build up to it just a little bit. When I was governor and I signed those 57 bills, really realized how important state policy could be in transforming an energy economy within a state. And understood that there's a lot of responsibility and authority that lies with the federal government, both on the executive side and the legislative side, but could look to the legislative side after the 2010 elections and understand that at the federal level on the legislative side, Congress was not going to act in a significant way anytime soon on comprehensive energy legislation. So I decided to start a center at Colorado State University at the invitation of the president there and to really work on governors around the United States and trying to help governors think about energy policy and understand that there was a false choice out there in the political dialogue about having, you know, good environmental policy and at the same time, being able to transition to a clean energy economy. We in Colorado were demonstrating as were states around the country that it was a false choice and you didn't have to have that. So we wanted to take that message to Republicans and Democrats alike and try and find places where we could come and ground on these issues that involve clean energy. So we really did our level best to work with Republicans and Democrats across the country on this and to understand if there could be a different conversation among governors and at the state level than what was happening in Washington DC where it was terribly politicized and the 2012 election just really made it even worse because at the federal level there was a real politicization of clean energy, cylindra being sort of the, you know, the test case for bad policymaking by the federal government. We had some successes. We did some things around the country with both as I said, Republicans and Democrats. We tried to work with Republican legislators and Democratic legislators and regulators as well. And in the midst of that, I got a call from the president and this is kind of a funny setup. I was on a short list to perhaps be the secretary of energy and understand there's a lot of people, actually you could fill graveyards with people who are on short lists out of Washington DC. So I wasn't taking it too seriously and I don't think the White House was either because they hadn't called me but I was at least on a short list in the Washington Post. And then I get this email from the White House saying, will you come to the White House and meet with the president in the Roosevelt Room? And I thought this could be it, the conversation where he asked me to be secretary of energy. So I Googled the Roosevelt Room and found out it was like 25 chairs. It's like, well, that's not that. I'm gonna be with 24 other people. And so we had this meeting. There were 14 of us from the private sector and academic sector, some from the regulatory sector, met with the president. And again, the premise was the Congress is not going to act. This was in 2013 for his term. They're not gonna act in a meaningful way on energy legislation. What would we recommend happening? At the end of that meeting, the White House asked if my center at CSU would be willing to convene people from around the country and make recommendations to the White House on how to move an energy agenda using federal agencies and the presidential authority. It's constitutional presidential authority, not acting outside the boundaries. Now, the president had already announced his climate action plan on June the 25th of 2013. Our meeting, well, our meeting was in March, but the convenings began in July of 2013. So we really have the imprimatur of the president to be able to say we're working on policies and recommendations of policies that we hope will help the president fill out his climate policy. We made 200 recommendations in a document called Powering Forward. And Sally says I'm optimistic about some of this stuff, and in part because there's so much that you could actually do in this country without Congress acting. It's a sad premise, right? It's a sad premise to think that Congress won't act. There's a book out there. If you haven't read it, you might read it. It's called It's Even Worse Than It Looks. And it's about the United States Congress. I've testified now twice in front of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, so I'm writing a sequel called It's Even Worse and it's Even Worse Than It Looks. It's really broken, that the Congress is broken. And I don't think these recent elections did much at all to sort of restore my faith in the ability of the Congress to act on environmental and energy policy and particularly act on them in a joint fashion. So we're back to where the states are, right? And so as a result of our work on this Powering Forward document, I began to understand what I think Diane said, which was this rule that the EPA was acting under, the Clean Air Act and rule 111D was really the crown jewel of the President's work on climate for the remainder of time that he's the President of the United States. And you can like the President or not like him. I believe his administration considers climate his second term legacy. So healthcare was really the first term legacy. Climate and its relationship back to energy policy is his second term legacy and this 111D that he actually the President in his speech on climate said the EPA will file a rule by June the 1st of 2014 and that rule will be under their auspices of the Clean Air Act and it will be how we reduce carbon emissions in this country. So what we did in looking at our work at Powering Forward, we began to really ask what our role could be at this center that would be helpful in trying to get to a place of being able to implement this. As we looked around, we also kind of said, well, there's a lot of other institutions working on this with states but nobody's actually convening the states in the West. And so what we began to do is talk to the governors North Dakota, South Dakota, all of the intermountain West, the Pacific Northwest and California. And so we've been convening those 13 states to really look at issues common to the West and ask can we get there? Can we get to a place where we can reduce our carbon emissions 30% from 2005 levels and can the states in the West, many of which are opposed to the EPAs even have an authority over greenhouse gas regulation maybe opposed seriously. It's an existential opposition. They're opposed to the existence of the EPA and certainly the state of Wyoming as an example have reserved money to sue the EPA over this rule. And so our approach to the governors and my personal approach was to say, you need a head strategy. So you're gonna go off, you're gonna sue, we understand that, but we'd also like you to think about if the rule is going to be implemented, don't you wanna be at a table talking about how your state can participate as a state or regionally in the implementation. And so this is a series on 111D. That's the role that we're playing, but we're also working with a variety of other places. The Nicholas Institute at Duke University, the Georgetown Environmental Law Center, a group called Great Plains Institute, we're all working with different states and with different governor's offices to try and understand how as a nation we get to this place of being able to implement it. It's really important to understand a couple of things. While this is the president's crown jewel for his climate policy, this actually is not an answer to climate change. This doesn't get us all of the way that we need to get to it. If you've ever heard Gina McCarthy speak about this and I have a great deal of respect for Gina McCarthy, she says, I'm just staying in my lane. I'm just doing my work under the Clean Air Act. We actually have to have the president's entire climate action plan. This is the most important sort of thing it'll do, but we're gonna have to have that and more in order to get to the place that we need to get to to reduce emissions by 80% by 2050 and keep us at sort of this two degree cap. Partly why you've seen the president do other things, including go to China and eke out an agreement with the Chinese where we made some commitments, the Chinese made commitments, and everybody then gets castigated for the kinds of work they're doing with that. This is what's gonna be necessary to achieve this. This 111D is the most important thing, but it's not everything. This is not the thing that gets us there. So we began to work with the West. And let's just talk a little bit about how the EPA structured this. Diane made a reference to this building block approach. The EPA would say, listen, the building blocks that we suggest for states to reduce their emissions are actually a subset of what states can do to get there. And so if somebody invents in the very near future a disruptive storage technology that's not really thought about or contemplated by the rule, a state can come back and say, no, we have a whole new way of thinking about our entire portfolio and we're gonna transition much more quickly to this 24 hour solar power because of this disruptive technology, then that could be part of modifying a plan. But what they said is we are going to give you some suggestions using this building block approach about how to get to the emissions reduction that we're gonna contemplate for each of the states. They also said not all states are created equally. That there are gonna be some states that are gonna have to do more around emissions reduction. It's not gonna be a 30% across the board. So the state of Washington, which does not have very much cold fire generation in its state, is contemplating the shutdown of coal plants. They've got a 74% reduction that's required of them. The state of Wyoming has a lot of coal fire generation that they export to other states. They've got about a 21% reduction in their coal fired emissions that they're gonna have to contemplate getting to by 2030. They didn't do much to give states like Colorado and California credit for action before 2012. And this has really been a bonus contention by people who worked hard on this and did a lot before 2012 that they didn't get credit for. And I think this is part of the EPA sort of trying to push people from those 2012 action dates and say, you can do more, you can do more. But it's gonna be interesting to see comments that are filed by states that you would think would be very supportive of it because they've been pushing clean energy policy which may actually be critical of the rule because of the lack of action. So they said these four building blocks. And the first thing is we're gonna look at your coal fired generation and see if there's extra efficiency, heat efficiency to be gained by improving your coal fired generation fleet. And they looked at all the plants, they looked at the age of the plants, they looked at the cost of retrofitting the plants, the kinds of things that they thought were necessary. They made an average across the country and so I just read the PUCs, the Wyoming PUCs letter back to the EPA, their comment letter, 39 pages long. And they're pretty critical about how it affects the fleet in Wyoming because the averaging that the EPA does but that's what they said. That's your first building block. Think of your coal fired fleet and you gotta get greater efficiencies up around 6%. Second building block they said is we're gonna look at the natural gas generation, the combined cycle natural gas generation. Remember natural gas is important in this discussion because while it is still a hydrocarbon, the hydrocarbons on a combined cycle plant could be 50% less than a coal fired generation. You reduce your NOx 70, 80%, you eliminate your mercury, you reduce your sulfur dioxide 70, 80%. So a lot of advantages of natural gas vis-a-vis coal, what they did was look at the existing generation and said we're gonna require you to run your natural gas plants at 70% sort of at that peaking capacity over the course of the year and that's gonna be building block two. And then what they did that was really different than anything they've ever done before, they said we're also gonna look outside the fence line and look at your ability to build out renewable generation and look at how that can take down the rate of your megawatts that you're producing and the tons of carbon, the sort of numerator and denominator, we're gonna look at you doing renewable generation and taking down sort of your rate in this important way. And then the last thing they looked at was energy efficiency. People are very critical, the critics of this rule are pretty serious in looking at this and saying, there's nothing in the Clean Air Act, it talks at all about saving energy or conserving energy. So how does the EPA get authority to use energy efficiency as part of the building blocks for rule 111D? These are all things that are fair questions and I think we'll be litigated, they'll be out there and be part of the litigation. But the fact of the matter is there's a lot we can do in this country around energy efficiency and a lot that should be done around energy efficiency. And I think the EPA was looking at this and thinking there's been two significant pieces of legislation in the Congress, one of those pieces of legislation on energy. It had majority support, it had bipartisan support, the Shaheen Portman bill, and it couldn't get passed out of the United States Senate even though it had bipartisan majority support because they couldn't get to a cloture vote and actually the majority lead in the Senate, Henry Reed, or Harry Reed didn't wanna actually bring it to the floor because he's afraid he was gonna get a Keystone writer and he was afraid of that coming into the election. So I mean, got these crazy kinds of rules where we could be doing a lot on energy efficiency on the policy side. If you look at Powering Ford, one of the recommendations we make is to have the federal government make a big push on energy efficiency just inside the federal government because of the ability for the federal government to really create a market of its own. It's the largest energy consumer in America. So anyway, the EPA looked at this and remember this is sort of in looking at it, they're understanding their context here. That they have to stay within the lane on the Clean Air Act but they are sort of the biggest part of the Obama presidency's work that really ties environmental issues but particularly climate change back to energy policy. And so they said, well, energy efficiency is a significant way to do this. So we have the proposed rule that comes that came in June. We have been working with 13 states convening those states. There are a lot of fairly interesting things that we shouldn't think about states that disagree or want to sue under the rule and just demonize them. The state of Nevada has 85% of its land as public land. I think Idaho is next with like 66%. David Hayes is here and probably knows these numbers a little better than I do but it's like 85% of Nevada, Idaho is 66%. And so Idaho has to build out renewable generation to meet its 111D compliance. So we bring in an EPA and we operate in our Chatham House rule so I can't say who says what but we have this issue in the west of saying to the EPA, listen, you want us to maximize the use of public lands but there are states where it's taken 12 or 13 years to actually permit a transmission land across public lands and so if you want us to be aggressive in building out renewables, we would say to you, EPA, work to try and streamline. And I would also say that the Obama administration in the Department of Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Energy Department, the Department of Energy have done a lot to try and streamline that process a lot to understand how we can be more aggressive using public lands for the clean energy good but these states in the west are saying we got a lot of public land, make sure the right hand and the left hand are talking to each other. The EPA can't issue this rule in a vacuum without ensuring that other parts of the federal government are actually trying to work in a pretty effective way of helping states meet their obligations under rule 111D. There's some other interesting discrepancy so if you're a state under the proposed draft rule 111D, if you're a state and you have coal-fired generation and you're exporting it like the state of Wyoming and Montana, they both export and let's just say Wyoming, exporting it to Oregon or Montana exporting it to the state of Washington then you have the burden of your emissions in your state. The emissions, the burden of the emissions don't flow to the state that's importing the coal-fired generation. And that can be kind of tough, right? Wyoming has 500,000 people in the entire state. The entire state. There are only six people per square mile in the state of Wyoming. Imagine that, huh? Compared to, you know, Los Angeles, for instance. And so they have the burden of that, those emissions, but then when they produce renewable energy, they don't necessarily get the benefit of that in their sort of numerator-denominator because the EPA said, well, we didn't want to upset what's called the regional or the, I'm sorry, the renewable energy trading market, the rec market, the credit market. And so you may or may not get the benefit of it depending upon how energy credits can be traded. So Wyoming has wind generation that's exported out of Wyoming and across state lines, but they don't necessarily get the benefit of having those renewables there and they have the burden of their coal-fired generation and we call this the great discrepancy. We thought there had to be some thinking about that burden that's placed upon a state that's generating in that state but then exporting that power to another place. And so that was, that's part of it. There's another part of this that's just some logistical stuff. They expect states to file their implementation plan a year after the final rule. Final rule comes next June. The implementation plan is due a year later which would be June of 2016 and among the states that we're dealing with, six of them don't have legislative sessions or their legislative session can only deal with budgets. And so they're not really gonna have the ability to do this. It is a strange rule in that it is an air rule but utility commissions are absolutely gonna have some sign off on this. In Colorado, there's some, you know, some tension in Colorado because the air regulators will at the end of the day probably decide how we file our implementation plan but if you're a utility that is regulated by utility commission, you have to go back to that commission and ensure that you have sort of affordability and reliability as part of the plan when you're being told by an air regulator to do it a certain way. Well, many states the way this might happen would be through legislation. Those same states may not even have a legislative session that can handle this kind of a matter and so we've actually addressed this with the EPA as well. So all this is in the mix. It's happening across the country. The thing that is also strange about these states we're dealing with. So in California, you have Cal ISO and then there are ISOs in other parts around the country, there's myso, they just filed there, there's Midwestern, stands for... Independent system operator but it involves an entire region that's transporting power, wheeling power back and forth. In the West we don't have that at all. We have no ISO, we have no regional transmission group. We have what's called 38 balancing authorities for people who understand the grid. So we're really not set up to do things regionally very well and it really is why we should as a region think about multi-state agreements, regional agreements because we don't have these other things that other parts of the country have and we're working on it, we're working hard on it. So that's sort of what's contemplated by rule 111D is this building block approach, each state, state by state, but you can have a regional or multi-state approach. You actually get two more years to file it if in fact you are working with other states and it makes a lot of sense if there's power exported across state lines, it certainly benefits the utilities to have a multi-state agreement. You could even get to the place where you could model we think a regional approach that might involve the entire region being involved in some kind of a 111D trading plan. Now we're agnostic about that because we don't want to undermine our ability to work with these states on the comment part of it, but I think it's time where states will now begin to do economic modeling around what their implementation plan looks like and have to decide if they can compare that state modeling to what a regional plan if it might benefit them to do something regionally. But the politics are pretty tough, yes. I just had a question because I know that burning natural gas is cleaner but I just read last week that actually mining and fracking creates greater CO2 than in the entire process of coal. So the question is what about the fracking and drilling process for natural gas, what we would call the extraction process and it's actually not CO2 that's the big concern, it's methane with the CH4, right? Isn't methane CH4? There you go, I'm a political scientist and so I don't often remember my periodic table or what methane is but it's CH4 and it's actually a far more significant greenhouse gas than CO2 is, doesn't stay in the atmosphere nearly as long but it's highly intensive as it's in the atmosphere. So when you frack a well, so use hydraulic fraction to go into a well, there is the possibility of methane escaping from the well. There's also the possibility that methane leaks along the way so at the processing plant or transmission lines or even again at the power plant, the Environmental Defense Fund is probably trying to, I mean they're attempting to do the most definitive study that looks at direct emissions of methane to understand what kind of methane leakage there is. There is a stunning gap in the research about methane leakage and so while there are people who have concluded that there's no climate benefit to natural gas because the amount of methane leakage, there are other people saying there's absolutely a climate benefit because the methane leakage is so small. I know a little bit about this because University of Texas finished a study that looked at direct methane leakage from the well bore, concluded that it's engineering solutions can make a big difference to that leakage that there is that it was probably less than what the EPA had estimated but the next two parts of the study actually, Colorado State University where I am have those two parts and we're looking at the transmission lines and the processing plants and I think sometime in January or early February we'll publish those, they're being peer reviewed right now but the bottom line is if you and it's hard to understand the exact amount of methane leakage but if you can keep it under 1% of methane leakage from all that you know, all you're doing in the extraction process then there is every chance that it has a good climate benefit. It may change a little bit when you compare emissions that are automotive emissions and you're talking about natural gas vehicles versus a diesel vehicle but in terms of electricity generation, methane emissions is something you have to pay attention to. If you don't pay attention to it then you can lose the climate benefit from it. This is really important internationally where you need good regulatory, good regulatory framework to regulate the extraction process both in keeping, to have well-born integrity so methane's not anywhere in the water systems but also on well completion and the EPA actually, I guess they passed a rule in January of 2012 about well completions but our rules in Colorado had been modernized early on while I was governor so that our operators don't have to do anything new to comply with the EPA's rule. So we need to understand how to ensure the international community is doing what it can as other countries do more in the extraction business than natural gas to keep down the methane emissions. So I'm gonna go to questions now, I'm kind of tired of. So you described several states' approaches, objections, et cetera. You did address California, which I believe it's the 7-12, a cap and trade market, very aggressive reductions in emission targets, et cetera. So is California in favor of 111B opposed to it? So 111D, actually and the only reason I make that correction there is a 111B and it's about new source reviews and it's important because there's a lot of controversy about 111B that was done in September, the proposed rule I think September of 2013, 111D was June of this year and you'd have to ask people from California but they are part of our group and I would say generally they are supportive of the EPA's approach under 111D and I think probably even understand how they benefit from 111D if there is, let's say there is some kind of a greater carbon trading market that's set up, something different than the regional greenhouse gas initiative in the northeast that could actually marry a carbon trading market with what's happening in California so this market is less of a standalone market. It benefits, to broaden the market, benefits the state of California in a pretty significant way. The thing I would say they're most critical of the rule is you don't get credit for early action, for pre-2012 action. But California, you know, I mean, it has been more aggressive than any other state in the country. We did a lot to try and keep up with California. We got to a 30% renewable energy standard by 2020 and we're still behind California even with that and so I think the state can take a lot of credit for having actually pushed this agenda in a variety of places and probably look to the rule and understand that they're gonna be able to live within the rule as well as almost any state in the country. Another question? Yes, sir. So you're supposed to challenge the students to ask the questions. I'm supposed to challenge the students to ask me questions. Yes. That's okay. You talked about energy efficiency and the fact that people didn't get the fact that if you make things more efficient you reduce the amount of CO2 that's done. Has something been done to try to educate people about that? I mean we had this great thing that happened when people started to change refrigerators and increase the amount of insulation that's in them and the amount of wattage that a refrigerator went from like 100 to 50. So I mean there's a real direct correlation there so has anybody been able to explain this to them as to why energy efficiency would be part of reducing the amount of CO2 in the air? Well I think there's a lot of people that have tried. There are groups all over America who work on this. There was a lot in the stimulus funding that had to do with states being able to spend money on energy efficiency. I'll just tell you what the state of Wyoming would say is they have their biggest consumers are industrial consumers and they're just not the bang for the buck because their energy prices are so low for them to do efficiency. Now whether that's true or not, I don't know but that's sort of what's put out there. There are big industrial consumers in America that have made a lot of money on energy efficiency. I was in a panel once with a guy who is the sustainability officer for Simplot Potatoes. So if you've ever eaten a McDonald's French fry you've eaten a Simplot Potato. And they have inside their company so they're international, they make French fries all over the world and they have a culture of trying to gain energy efficiency and they have ways to incentivize all of the people in their company to save energy and they're literally saving tens of millions of dollars a year on energy efficiency measures in their plants across the country by doing energy conservation, energy efficiency. As you pointed out, when we did our powering four document, the Department of Energy had 34 different appliances where they were considering a new appliance standard to again increase the requirements on how they would conserve energy. And we've done more since 1973 to reduce carbon emissions through energy efficiency and appliances than we've done through a shift from coal to gas. It's an incredibly important part of the conversation. It hasn't been something that I think the public paid much attention to it sort of happened because of command and control. The Department of Energy and Congress in some cases passing these statutes that required the department to do a variety of things. What we've done on lighting, you look at states passed, a lot of states in this country passed energy efficiency resource standards. So like renewable energy standards where they say you have to get a certain percentage of your energy from renewable, these energy efficiency resource standards said to regulated utilities, you need to be able to reduce your customer's usage by 1.5% per year up to a certain day. Ours was 1.5% up to 2020. And largely they were able to do it just through lighting, just through changing out lighting. And this is why then you go back and testify in front of a Senate committee and they're talking about making people buy the right kind of light bulbs and are we a communist country or something like that. And it's like no, we're actually, we reduced our energy usage in this very significant way because of lighting technology in this country and some of it that was mandated and some of it that was made possible by renewable energy standards. So there's a lot of ways to do what we're doing in transforming this energy economy. Are there economists in the room? Anybody that's like, are you a PhD? Oh God, this is when I get in trouble, right? When I started talking about this, because there's command and control and it's sort of allowing the market to work. Let the market do the transition, right? But the problem with the market is that it doesn't always get the rate of change right. We're seeing a transition out of coal. That's part of the market. I mean, we're seeing a transition from coal to gas in this country that is market driven by this supply as a result of hydraulic fracturing that we've seen. You've got this steady supply. There's less volatility, price volatility. Natural gas, certainly less supply volatility. We have the ability to make it into this export commodity if we want to. That's happening. And so partly you're seeing the shutdown of coal having to do with natural gas. Problem is, if the rate is not quick enough, if what we really are concerned about is a carbon constrained future. And we understand that we've got to meet certain sort of interim targets to fully get to a carbon constrained future. We just can't go from what we are today to an 80% reduction in 2050 because of the carbon load on the atmosphere will be far too great for us to achieve that 2% cap. So we have to think not only about, what's that? Two degrees, did I say two degrees? Two degrees. We have to think not only about just how we get to that place of the transition to a clean energy economy, we have to think of the rate we get there. And one of the important things that the EPA has been criticized under 111D is that they set interim goals starting in 2020. And we saw in just working with some of the states that those interim goals have what we would call almost a cliff effect. They have to get immediately from 2019 to 2020 to this place of reducing their carbon load in a very serious way with the interim goal. And in some cases it may even impact the state's ability to have more serious carbon reductions over time. The state of Arizona is probably the best example because they looked for their combined cycle gas plants to ramp up to 70%. Arizona is a state blessed with great solar resources and if they were allowed to have their own glide path they can perhaps do as much as the EPA is gonna ask them to do by the 2030 date and not experience this cliff effect. So these are kinds of things that are sort of difficult for an agency like the EPA to think about when they're thinking about 50 different states. I'm gonna go to this gentleman first, hoping you're a student. I am. And then I'll come back to you. Yes, sir. So I've heard that with a tougher mining and generation from coal, that coal plants are, you know, have now turned sort of domestically produced coal into a global commodity, where they're now selling coal to other folks who overseas who would like it. And so is this policy taking into effect this sort of global commodity and externality of US produced coal abroad? Because overall, you know, if you don't use it domestically, use it internationally and that is sort of an externality as it concerns, as it places, you know, sort of, you know, greenhouse gas production. Yeah, great point. The answer is this rule is not. And partly it's not because as the administrator would say she's staying in her lane. She has the Clean Air Act that she's working with and that's what she has. Sally and I were talking earlier. This is why I think this agreement with China that the president announced, you know, a couple of weeks ago is so important. So if you pay any attention at all to China, it burns half the world's coal, which right now is about 3.7 billion metric tons a year. Half the world's coal. So the rest of the world outside of China burns the other half. But China is going to increase to somewhere around 4.5 billion by 2020 and that'll be kind of their cap year. They'll start coming down but they don't come down in a bell-shaped curve. They tail off and that before this agreement was announced, the government was saying there'd still be burning about 4.2 to 4.3 billion metric tons in 2040. And so a climate solution that doesn't contemplate either some way of capturing carbon coming off the smokestack or some more serious reduction on the part of China is probably not going to get us to these kinds of targets that we have set for ourselves in terms of reducing emissions. I don't know how achievable China's goal is that it made as part of its agreement. It was to me hugely important that the President of the United States went to China and eked out this agreement. China actually, I'm on the Energy Foundation and we fund clean energy projects in China at the tune of about $45 million a year. So I'm pretty familiar with some things that go on there around energy and around clean air. And China doesn't talk about climate change a lot. For them, it's public health is the bigger issue. Now, if they try and really reduce their carbon emissions to the place where their public is in a safer place, a safer zone, they'll get carbon reduction emissions that will comport with our desire to reduce their carbon and for our agreement to be sort of lived up to, but it's a public health issue more than it is, more than it's about climate change at least. And so the answer to your question is no, that wasn't contemplated by this rule, but it's interesting whether at some point in the future Congress is gonna have to entertain asking that question. Colorado is the 10th largest coal producing state in the country and our coal production has reduced 17%. We don't actually produce for Colorado. We produce for the southeast part of the country, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, where there are coal, there's coal fire generation, but no coal resources. So it goes by train. We import coal from Wyoming for our coal fire generation. And yet arch coal and looking at this market, I think two or three years ago, understanding that the market for coal was falling off began exporting to Chile. So the fact that we're looking at coal fire generation as a country and reducing its emissions doesn't mean we've thought about what we can do with the coal export market to reduce it as well. Yes, sir. First to comment, I'm really impressed with your overview of the problem and how you're working with so many different states and trying to work with so many different regulations and policies and you talk off the top of your head, lovely. But the 111D proposal has a base of using 2020 as the base to get back to, instead of 1990, and that's sort of a cheating. 2012 is my space year. 2012 is its base year. I thought it was 2005. Well, no, the reduction of emissions of 30% uses a 2005 number. They use your portfolio in 2012 as your base year for getting to your 30% from your 2005 emissions. It would have made much better sense to go to 1990 to make it a much more deep reduction. And we don't have till 2050 to resolve this problem. We have 1,000 gigatons that we can put into the atmosphere before we reach the two degrees that you were talking about. We put in 450, we have 550 left. We're burning 32 gigatons per year. That doesn't bode well. The rate of change that you talked about that we're changing the planet needs to be matched by our rate of change to reduce our emissions and to reduce our consumption where we're heading for bad, bad places. Yeah. So again, I think that's why I said, people who mistake, you're making this mistake, but people out there who think this 111D is like what we have to do on climate change, it's not. It's what they thought they had the authority to do under the Clean Air Act. And again, the EPA gets sued. It's just like, I mean, they get sued by the environmental community. They get sued by the industry and that's part of this business. So they're just trying to figure out how can they do this and win lawsuits. In dealing with the various states, you have a sense about how many of them are looking seriously at converting the rate-based standard to a mass-based standard. If you look at the challenges of the rate-based standards and the regulatory, it's sort of a mass for a mistake moving to a mass-based standard and then they can do whatever they want to optimize it. It makes some rational sense, but do you have a good sense as to whether that's a logic that's being adopted by many of the states you're working with? So the question is, in the states, we're working with, the EPA came out with kind of what your rate would be in looking at your tons of carbon and looking at the megawatt hours produced and said, we want to get from here to this rate. And then they said they would later produce a mass-based guidance. We actually got all 13 governors in the West to agree to sign off on a letter that asked for that clarification. And I would say all of the states will look at that and I suspect we'll understand that it's an easier calculation, but it's also much easier as a regional program if you're using mass-based and utilities, I think, understand that's probably the easiest way to calculate what's happening. You can do all sorts of training. You can effectively use energy efficiency and it counts fully if it's a mass-based standard. It counts only in a quasi-way if it's a weight-based standard, so good. I'm glad to be able to do all push-ups. And so the EPA has come to all of our convenings, all except one, but they've been there. We've done convenings with CEOs of utilities, convenings with the states. We've done a lot of phone conversations, but the EPA has been willing to come and listen to these kinds of things. And I think you're right about that, both from the utilities perspective and the state's perspective. Mass-based analysis is probably most helpful, easier to do for the states, but also easier to trade. Yes, Sally? So when you look at all these potential challenges and lawsuits and all of that, and you think about the very aggressive timeline for making plans and then early implementation requirements, what are the, I know it's hard to predict the future, but what is the likelihood that we actually can even move at the fast pace or the slow pace as however you look at it that is outlined in 111D? So the question is really, can we move at the pace outlined in 111D, particularly if there's litigation that's pinning the answer is if the courts stay the rule, there's no way we can move at the pace contemplated by the rule because a court stay and then litigation that follows that will actually undermine any ability to move. If the court says, I'm gonna keep the rule in place, litigation can go forward, but understand states, you're still obligated, then there's a real opportunity I think. If states are involved in multi-state agreements, then they actually don't have to have their plan till June of 2018 and it may be tough for them to hit that first interim target of 2020, but I think there's some chance the EPA changes that, says we'll give you the ability to come and suggest your glide path in some enforcement mechanism to understand how you get there by 2030 and that's the thing that we're gonna kind of give up in this rule is that first interim target of 2020, then I think the answer is, we're gonna get there and get there. There are ways for states to get to this transition. We went from 200 megawatts of wind energy in Colorado to 2,700 in a seven-year period. From when I took office, we had I think less wind energy than the state of Rhode Island. And for those of you kind of been to the Intermountain West, Rhode Island's not even a decent-sized ranch, right in Wyoming or Montana or Colorado, and we had less wind, right? And then we grew it by a tent fold and the price of wind went from about nine and a half cents a kilowatt hour, where now the deals for wind in Colorado were three cents and less than three cents. It is intermittent, you still need a base load and you still have the production tax credit in both cases was a part of that. But wind energy is that parity or cheaper than coal-fired energy than the levelized cost of coal in Colorado. And so the answer is there's this way to transition your economy if you sort of help people along and help people think of it. Particularly regulated utilities. They are not agents of change. My favorite, there's a joke there. I'll just tell you about it. Stephen Chu said there are two CEOs of utilities who are just desperate because their world was changing underneath their feet and so they both decided to commit suicide and each one of them jumped in front of an iceberg. So. So I heard you talk a couple years ago was really impressed by the pragmatics description of making things happen in Colorado. I especially remember the Boulder Berkeley story. So could you compare that? You might even give that story if people haven't heard it. With what you're seeing with these multi-state things. How does this scale up? What's different with similar? So I was here a couple of years ago I think one of the things you're talking about is a way to try and talk to people and take the politics out of this conversation. So we talk about being able to use domestic energy and what a benefit that is to a state or to the country to answering environmental challenges at the same time you're building an economy and to protecting rate payers. And sort of finding this value prism that people can generally agree upon and we had some success in Colorado where you have a pretty mixed bag in terms of the politics. We had some success of passing that agenda. And so we, this is something I'm actually thinking about all the time. How do we make this about common ground? And there are a lot of places in America where it's pretty difficult to find sort of common ground. The issue of immigration as an example. We've seen this debate at the federal level that's just broken down even the Senate passed a bill and it got to the House of Representatives and there was no real ability in the House of Representatives to find common ground. So let's just say outside of the House and the Senate where's common ground here? And it's still around the economy. The ability, we think, and I know this is like the birthplace of the carbon tax. I really believe this is the best thing you could do in America in order to really generate clean energy because it's a market solution. We're not using the market fully, right? The market's really astute right now because you're not taking an externality, carbon emissions and internalizing that into the cost of production. And that's like a market force that's not being accounted for. And so we think one of the ways to really try and talk to Republicans and conservatives who are opposed to sort of increasing taxes, saying we're world leaders in making markets work. But when you pervert a market as we have by not causing you to have some kind of a fee on carbon, then you actually have distorted results. And one of the distorted results is we're not able to use other kinds of clean energy technologies because they can't go toe-to-toe with a perverted market, the carbon market. And so... We'll make you an Honorary Economist. But that, so I mean, we need to find a way to talk across the aisle. And one of the ways, one of the really important ways is not to demonize people who think differently and not to demonize, you know, Sally and I were talking a little bit about this. We really talk about how important coal fire generation was to building a middle class in America. It was really important. So, you know, not to say coal is this awful thing that exists out there. We need to transition. And we need to transition to a carbon constrained economy, however that looks. And we need to take into account a lot of different things that include the affordability of the power, the ability to constrain the carbon that comes out of it. If somebody says, well, it's nuclear, then tell me, you know, how communities can be safe from different kinds of things that are a byproduct of that. I mean, there's a lot of policy discussions that have to happen, but it's carbon constrained is what we should focus on. One last question, I think I'm done. So, how is that all impacted by lobbying dollars from the current carbon producers? Yeah, so I think actually, I met with the energy club here at Stanford before that and they asked the same question with about the same amount of time left in the meeting. And so, the question was, how's that impacted by lobbying dollars? And this is a place, I don't know how many of you ever read Guth's Speth. He's a pretty interesting guy and not you can agree with him or disagree with him, but he says, listen, there are four crises. There is a social crisis in America because of the increasing wage gap between sort of upper and middle and even lower middle and lower class. There is a economic crisis that involves the failure of markets and sort of the big bailouts that were necessary in 2009, 2010, even 2008 when the first big stimulus package was passed, the first bailout happened. And he said there's so environmental crisis, social crisis, economic crisis, environmental crisis. And he said there's a political crisis. The political crisis really has to do with a variety of things that have happened at the federal level, particularly where there's an increasing, an increased gap between sort of how Republicans and how Democrats think about this stuff, the redistricting that's happened that have made districts sound over time, fewer and fewer districts and the amount of money flowing in. He would argue until you solve the political crisis, you actually can't solve these other things. And if you think about a midterm election where $4 billion in a midterm election were spent and in the state of Colorado, I think the two candidates together spent about 35 million but the outside expenditures that they don't have any control over were actually more than that. But I mean, there were like another 40 million like that. So it's 35 million, I think in 40 million by the outside table. And this is a state of five million people and $75 million spent on a Senate race, on a single race. And that's a problem. It's really a problem and there is a corrupting influence to money. You just can't, I mean, I was a governor, I raised $4.5 million to win the seat in 2007. Doesn't sound like a lot of money today by today's standards, but $4.5 million to have $1,000 caps. Everybody that gave you $5 wants to talk to you about it. But the outside table, they raised double that. And so anybody who put a million dollars or $500,000 into the outside table, you might think they would be anonymous, but they're not anonymous once you become governor. You know exactly who they are. And you know, as you think about running again and they say, we're not enthused by you if you don't, I mean, that has this sort of soft corruption where there's nothing indictable about that or prosecutable, but this is a serious, serious problem and relates back to this problem that has to do with energy and the environment because there is a lot of money spent by the incumbents to try and protect their incumbency. And the Koch brothers sort of, they do get demonized and we have to fix this problem. If we don't fix this problem, we have a lot of other problems that are probably not reputable at the federal level and one of the reasons that I think working at the States in the meantime is the most important thing to do. Thank you very much. It was really enjoyable.