 Hi, welcome to the video abstract for our paper, Overloading the NONs, but RPRPs non-set AAD and Order Resilient Channels. This is a joint work of my advisor, Jean-Paul de Gavriel, and myself. We start by introducing a new security notion for variable input length tweakable ciphers mapping of pair of strings to pair of strings. We call this new notion RAP-sutor and implementation, or RPRP for short. The RPRP notion lies right in between the PRP notion, where the adversary is tasked with distinguishing between tweakable cipher and ideal cipher, given full access to the n-cyphering algorithm and the SPRP notion, where the adversary has the same task, but in addition has full access to the d-cyphering algorithm. In the RPRP game, the adversary has the same task and is given full access to the n-cyphering by only partial access to the d-cyphering algorithm. We show how to construct efficient RPRPs by presenting the UIV construction, which consists only of tweakable block cipher and variable output length PRF. As I said, RPRPs are a notion built for variable input length tweakable ciphers, which one can use to construct AEAD schemes using the encode-denon-cypher paradigm. Since RPRPs are weaker primitive than SPRPs, we can use them to build AEAD schemes more efficiently. First of such schemes we present is the encode-denon-cypher scheme, which you can see on the screen. If the underlying tweakable cipher is a RPRP, AEAD scheme will be misused resistant secure. Since RPRP is an asymmetric notion, we also explore the option of the encryption using the d-cyphering algorithm and the decryption using the n-cyphering algorithm. So we arrived at the encode-denon-cypher construction. It turns out, if the underlying tweakable cipher is a RPRP, AEAD scheme will be secure against release of unverified plaintext. We consider the following variant of the AEAD construction, where one encrypts denons during the encryption and during the decryption uses the nons provided to the decryption algorithm as a redundancy for the authenticity check. Once that gave rise to a new different AEAD priority, we call the non-set AEAD, where instead of a single nonce, a non-set is provided to the decryption algorithm and one text if the decrypted nonce is in the provided non-set. In comparison to conventional nonce-based AEAD syntax, the non-set AEAD decryption algorithm returns a nonce message pair if the decryption was successful. The non-set AEAD syntax proves useful in the setting of network protocols that run over unvalued transport, such as DTLS or QUICK, where the non-set roughly corresponds to the window mechanism of those protocols. Finally, we present a generic construction that transforms any non-set AEAD to a secure channel that can have many desired channel functionalities, for example protecting against replays, deciding how much reordering to tolerate, etc. This construction is much simpler to understand and analyze than for example QUICK and can be adapted to any required functionality. For any of these functionalities, the security of the channel is guaranteed by the security of the underlying non-set AEAD schemes. Thank you, we hope to see you in the live version of our talk.