 That's quite an introduction. I've never been called a wandering mercenary before. So thank you very much for your time and for coming here today. And thank you very much to everybody who's worked on setting this event up and introducing me so kindly. What I thought I could do is there's an enormous amount going on here. We've already talked about the forthcoming vote, which is going to be of critical importance, Actually, you know, it's a topic of great relevance for clean energy investment. But there's also what I thought I could try to do is talk about the industry of clean energy industry, but try to locate it in some of those issues that are very current at the moment and also on the invitation letter that I received and also as you walk in the door here this is the institute of international and European affairs. So I thought I could try and at least finish with a few remarks on some of the global activities, y cyfnod yw, yng Ngôl Eisteddf yn y cyfnod, fydd y prifesio trafodau i'r gwaith yn ymdau a'r prifesio'n gwynedd. Yn gwybod, yn y gwybod, sy'n gwybod, ond, rydw i, seith ymweld ymlaen ymweld, nid yw yn ymddi, rydw i, rydw i'n gwybod. Mae'n gwybod dda i'r gwybod, fel yna, rydw i'n gwybod, rydw i'n gwybod, mae'r gwybod, rydw i'n gwybod, rydw i'n gwybod. Ond ar y ddwy flynyddoedd ymweld, rwy'n credu gweithio'n gweithio'n gweithio'r ffinans. Rwy'n meddwl gweithio'r mynd y trolywun euro yw'r amgylch. Mae'n gweithio'r gweithio'r cymhiliadau, mae'r trolywun 300 yn euchweliadau energiadau yn ymddangos, 5 tralywun yn ymddangos i gyllideb yn ddwy flynyddol ac yn ysgrif drwy flynyddoedd. Yn gweithio ar y ddwy flynyddol, ac mae'n meddwl i'r cyfrifiad a'r cyfrifiad. Felly ychwanegau yma y bydd y gallwn thym yn fyrdych. Mae gennym gwsiedeg gan roedd cyhoi teamworkau o wahanig, gallwn oedd oedd yn grweithio y mewn gwyrdd, gwyrdd cyhoi yn sicr effeithio, wires, diolch gyda hwnnw. Mae o'r leoged a'r gyfwyrdd o'n gallu gwiriaeth. Mae'n cael ei chweithio'n gweithio ar hynny a nhw'n gweithio'n cyhoi gwirio gwirio gwasi ined, ac mae'n lle raining. Mae'n golygu i hynny yng nghirfannaeth ar ôl 50 miliwn ar y cael cael bwysig, so up to 260 billion, so approximately a 5x increase in that eight-year period. That's, that is, you can see all the trends there, you can see the glory years when it just went up. You can see the crisis and so on. Let's use that data and drill in and see a little bit at some of the drivers behind that. There you see it on a regional basis and you can see that Europe, Here was a sort of early leader and then you can see the US was probably next off the blocks and then the impact of the recession of the crisis very dramatic in the US as Lehman failed but then it recovered with stimulus funds from the administration. Yn ei hanesaf, mae'r cyfrifiadau. Mae'n olygu'r gweld y ffordd peth. Mae'n gwybod i'r Chynig, ac Chynig wedi'u gweithio'r cyfrifiadau. Chynig wedi'u gweithio cais o ddod 50 miliwn. Mae ddod 260 miliwn. Chynig wedi gweithio cais o ddod 50 miliwn. Efallai o'r 5th o'r cyfrifiadau yn cyfnwys. Yn ymgyrch chi'n amser, Chynig wedi'u gweithio'r cyfrifiadau. Mae'r bwyd wedi'u gallu gweld ffantafol y prydwyr sy'n gweithio'i ei ffrindwyr. Mae'r prydwyr yn gweithio'r prydwyr yn gweithio'r prydwyr yn gweithio'r prydwyr yn gweithio'r prydwyr. Aethon nhw yna'r rhannau'r ffordd ar gyfer cyflawni ddechrau, a'r cyfnodau yn ddweud y ffondig yn gweithio'r prydwyr. Ond rwy'n cydweithio arall y ddweud, dwi'n cael ei gael i'r Llanfaen. Mae'r cyflawnio yn cyflawni'r cyflawni ar y 2006 ymlaen, ac mae'r cyflawni ar gael. Ond mae'r cyflawni'r cyflawni, ac mae'r cyflawni'r Brasil, a'r cyflawni'r Chile, yn ysgrifennu. A'r ddweud yw Afryg, ac mae'n ddim bod nhw'n gweithio'r ysgrifennu ymlaen i'r OECD a Bricks, ond mae'r cyflawni'r proses global. Yn ymlaen i'r gwaith, y gweithio'r cyflawni'r cyflawni'r gwaith yn gweithio'r energi, a'r quellaf i fy y gallais er oed, mae'r cyflawni'r proses proses proses perenol yn ei ddech chi. Rhaidd i ni ddorog yw'r ei ddhu, ddynaeth y tŵwnu'r drillion. A'r maen nhw'n cael eu ddweud yw ymweld i'r rhower. Yn ymlaen, rwy'n cael ei ddweud y ddweud yw'r cyflosio'u systyth, eisiau o'r blwyddyn fflawni'r proses proses, oherwydd o'r blwyddyn fflawni'r proses tenon. Ond a'r proses proses proses proses proses perydau'r ddweud yw bant. As you look at any policy debate, as you look at initiatives, if there's stimulus funds that are going to be released after the vote or in response to that or not, the question is, is it of a scale that is commensurate with the level of investment that's required, because in this space billions are not cool, trillions are cool, but we have seen the first trillion that has flowed in clean energy. And so if you compare clean energy versus fossil fuels, this is just generating capacity now, you can see that clean energy has grown, and actually it's something like 40, 60 now investment worldwide, clean energy versus fossil, I think nuclear just doesn't appear on this chart, we probably should put a third line. It's an important chart to show, because I think a lot of people's view of wind and solar and geothermal and biomass and so on, is that it's still alternative and very minor and very, it's not the main event, actually what you see is globally it's already reached something like 40% of generating capacity investment and if you look at Europe it's already well over 40%, so it's already into the 70% plus range. So that those outside the industry who think this stuff is marginal and we don't really need to worry about it, let's fix some big things first, this is actually the big thing. Let's put it in context, renewable energy, 16% of final energy production, 19.4% of electricity, a lot of that is large hydro, but the modern forms, wind, solar, et cetera are up into the sort of 3, 4 and pushing 5% globally, by no means trivial, Germany. Now this is interesting because one of the debates in the UK and one of the debates in the US is this stuff is all expensive, we shouldn't be doing it because it's going to, we've got a fragile recovery, if a recovery at all, and clearly this shouldn't be a priority. Whereas here you have Europe's most dynamic economy, Germany, 21% of its electricity last year was renewable, so I think that the link between shifting the mix of energy towards clean sources and economic ruin has not, it's certainly not been established. And then 50% of new power capacity additions in China are renewable, we've all heard the cannot about China adding one new coal-fired power station every week. The good news is it's not actually true, it was true back in 2005, it's not true anymore, it's now one coal-fired power station every two weeks. Which always raises a smile, but it's better than one a week, it is actually half the rate of building coal-fired power stations and wind and other clean sources now 50% of capacity additions in China. So that's sort of good news, that there's money flowing and it's happening pretty much around the world, exception of Middle East Africa, which we'll come back to, but this is the valuation of clean energy companies. This is an index we publish, it's 96 constituents, and you can see going back to January 2011, it has underperformed the general stock market by a considerable margin, I think that's something like 50-60% underperformance. And so you have this kind of cognitive dissonance between this industry growing rapidly around the world attracting finance and yet it just is doing extremely badly from a valuation point of view. And obviously there's a number of factors we can look at them, this is probably the most significant is just the instability. Europe is the core market for renewable energy and renewable energy requires a lot of debt over a long time period and investors are extremely intolerant of risk. So the financial crisis has had an absolutely corrosive impact on investment levels in the sector. You can see that here, this is the same chart of investment over time but now we're doing it quarterly, the red line is four quarters smooth just taking Europe and it's all new finance through its venture capital and private equity and public market listings and so on. So you can see here this was Iberdrola, Renovablist, Big IPO, the peak month, peak quarter ever at the end of 2007. This is the impact of the crisis. What we've now got is no recovery from the crisis and in fact the last couple of quarters investment going off a cliff so that we're now back in Q1 2012 to a level of investment that we've not seen since I think the end of 2005. And clearly irrespective of what's happening in any other region if Europe had powered ahead and continued to invest even at the same level if not an increased level from 2007 then the industry would be in a very different place. That's a lot of the answer to the over capacity that there is in solar and in wind and so on was an expectation of momentum not an expectation that investment levels would drop. In the US we're in this kind of weird year. The US electoral cycle seems to have one election every four years and campaigning seems to last four years but Solindra was a solar company that was heavily supported through the loan guarantee program and went rather spectacularly bankrupt shortly after taking half a billion, half a billion dollars, not half a trillion but half a billion dollars and has become a political football. And the debate in the US is utterly toxic with on the one hand the administration which has heavily supported clean energy through the stimulus program and then obviously creating therefore through investments like Solindra an easy target for the Republicans to attack. And I think that energy has become a political football in this election to an extent that I don't have huge history of following US. I can't think of an election that I've followed where energy has been quite so much at the heart of it and quite so contentious and was quite such a little bipartisan support for initiatives which I think most people would regard as sensible. What's happening in the US is actually sort of it's an example of a broader trend. There are 96 countries around the world that have got policy support for clean energy, some tremendous work done by an organisation called REN21 to list all of these policies out. 96 countries have got some sort of support in place whether it's feed in tariffs or certificate systems or renewable portfolio standards or Dutch auctions for clean energy capacity but what we're seeing is policy weakening so whether it's stimulus programs that are expiring or whether it's tariffs being reduced there's a tendency to reduce the policy support. Now I'm going to argue that that reduction is actually less than the cost reductions that we've seen in the industry. So in other words the support is being dismantled but it's not being dismantled so fast that the industry is becoming uneconomic. But nevertheless in terms of the valuation of stocks in terms of the news flow it feels like awful news. The tariffs being reduced and removed in Germany, the retroactive tariff activity in Spain obviously very bad news in the UK solar tariffs enormous debate but as we'll see the costs actually coming down faster than any of those policies are being removed. There we go. So that's the experience. So countervailing drivers within the industry to say the costs are coming down and it's really quite extraordinary particularly what's happened in solar. 75% drop in since 2008, 45% drop in the last year. That means that around the world anybody who's looked at a solar project and decided not to do it because of the economics has to dust that dossier off and has to look at it again. This may not be of enormous relevance here in Ireland. I don't know whether you have less sun than the UK. I suspect so. But it's not a northern Europe thing. But in any sunny country this has really transformed the economics of solar. You can look at what it does. This is being fooled by the clicker which sometimes works and sometimes doesn't. So here you've got a little chart that looks at the competitiveness of solar without subsidies. And what you can see is these are broadly more sunny countries. So countries that where a solar panel can produce more output each year. And then up at the top is countries with high retail power prices. So Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and so on. These are countries where there's a high price because solar will become competitive first in places where there's lots of sun and electricity prices are high. So now that's 2010. The only place where you would do unsubsidized solar was Hawaii. If you go to 2012 Denmark and Germany not because they're very sunny but because electricity prices are high but Italy, Spain and Australia that's the beginning of an unsubsidized market for distributed solar. It has already happened. Anybody who says, oh, solar will be great when it's competitive, that actually happened 2011 and certainly into 2012. And you know you can run this thing forwards. You can run this thing forwards. There we go. And you can see what happens year on year as the costs drop. You see more and more countries where solar becomes competitive without any subsidies. So there you get to the point where Mexico, Texas, North India, big markets, Japan. Japan is now rolling out a feed-in tariff. They have to have a feed-in tariff to get investment to happen. But by 2025 no question it should be happening without that. And you see some other big markets that will still even in 2025 not make sense. But they tend to be less sunny and ones with very low possibly subsidized energy prices. When it comes to solar you've got to start thinking about tipping points. This is installation of capacity in Europe. Again probably not in Ireland but it's driven by Germany and Italy with a certain amount of Spain particularly around 2008 and now France, even Czech Republic which they then regretted and so on. But what's extraordinary here is that technology that six, seven years ago was essentially absent from the power mix is now more than half of capacity additions in Europe. Not half of energy because it's only used during the day and when it's sunny and so on but half of capacity. And this has profound implications on the economics of solar because it drives it down that experience curve but also for the way that electricity markets function, the spot price of electricity on a sunny day in Europe you can pretty much guarantee is going to be zero or negative because there's so much of this stuff. And on a windy day of course you've got the issues of wind power being dumped out or available at very low marginal costs. So extremely significant there's nothing marginal or on the fringe about this sort of development. Now wind also has an experience curve. Solar experience curve is 15%, 20%, 24% different academics. We have our own figures but it's a very rapid. It feels sort of like flat screen TVs or computer. It actually shares many of the technologies with computer displays. Wind a 7% experience curve. We track this through a wind turbine price index. Solar we track through our solar price index. And you can see this is euros per megawatt hour of capacity. So the rule of thumb for quite a while was that we were shooting for one million euros per megawatt for a turbine and that would be a good price, a good rule of thumb to use. It actually started back in 1984 at 2 million per megawatt. 7%. It's a lower experience curve because of course lots of steel. You have to build foundations. It uses a lot of power electricals which just don't improve as fast. But here's the interesting thing. We did a lot of work on this in detail last year and there's something else going on which is that a 1984 wind farm looked like that and had a 21% capacity factor and a 2011 wind farm looked like that and has a 34% capacity factor. So what's really happening is there's another experience curve which is that you get more out of a megawatt of capacity. It's not just that the turbine is cheaper. It's also more efficient. It has lower downtime. It's got better power conversion. It's got better control electronics. There's better weather forecasting, etc. The turbines are higher. They're more matched to terrain and to weather conditions. And so you actually have in wind a 14% experience curve. So for every doubling of capacity of the wind industry, you have this 14% improvement in cost plus output and that's very significant because one of the issues in wind is you start to saturate the good places. People say, well, Germany's got a lot of wind. How much more can it do? Well, the answer is if those companies sell their turbines around the world, there's plenty of parts of the world where there isn't that much wind and then come back when they've doubled experience in 7, 10, 15 years, this will mean that there's a huge repowering opportunity even within those markets that are more saturated. So in other words, the price of wind energy will continue to go down. It will never max out. We'll never be at a point where we say, well, that's all we can do with wind. Now we have to look elsewhere. It will continue to get cheaper and cheaper. So where we are now already today is that the best wind farms are competitive with new coal and they're competitive with gas at about $6 per MMB tube, a million British thermal unit. And this is very poorly understood, it has to be said, by, you know, perhaps by people running utilities, but not so much by the policy makers, the regulators and the general public and the business community and certainly by voters who are worried that driving for wind pushes up electricity prices because the myth is that coal is 3 cents per kilowatt hour. Well, yes, if you've got an old coal-fired power station that's fully depreciated and you just shovel coal in, the electricity comes out, you may be at 3 cents, but new coal needs to be scrubbed, you need to pay your interest charges and so on, so you're more like 6 cents. But you're around 6 cents from the best wind farms today and by 2016 the average wind farm will be at 6 cents. And we're talking about a big wind farm that can be built without ridiculous planning constraints and where there's a demand that can use all of the power produced. The gas one is interesting because of course in the US at the moment, gas is not at $6 per million British thermal units, it's at $2, but all of the, whether it's the forward curve, whether it's the cost base of the gas industry in the US suggests that that is very much a temporary phenomenon. In fact, I looked yesterday, it was already up to 260. So gas, if it covers its cost, is at about $5 per million BTU, even in the US, using the new shale gas technologies everybody's talking about. And wind is at about 6 now. So gas is a bit cheaper in the long run, but the wind experience curve ultimately will win that one as well. So that's where we are in terms of these are levelized costs when you take into account the costs of financing etc. You can see those down there for those that can see it, there's a bunch of fossil power, fossil technologies. What's happening particularly if you add a cost of carbon over there or if you're in Japan or Asia where gas is very expensive, what you see now is a whole bunch of clean energy technologies that are fully competitive. These ones here, biomass, gasification, blah blah blah, geothermal, wind on the shore, that are essentially competitive today. That's a fact that is not percolated through industry and through the utility industry, nor the supply chain, nor the policy, nor the broader public. So what this looks like, if I could draw an analogy with the telecoms industry, this is a chart that I drew I think in 2010, and I said here's how to think about this stuff is that you've got in telephony, you've got a fixed telephone, you've got the cost of a fixed call, and then a mobile call gives you an extra benefit, you've got mobility, you can walk around with it, so you pay a premium. And at the time, go back to 1993 when the first mobile phones were in the market, that premium was 10x. So you were paying four and a half cents for a phone call, but if you wanted a mobile call it would be 45 cents. And then over 15 years that premium essentially disappeared. It becomes as cheap to use mobile as landline. And that's how we should think about clean energy versus dirty. And this is what we saw since then. So around 2010 I was just looking at saying the two lines are converging, they've crossed. This is Germany, this is the feed-in tariff for German solar, and it is now lower than the retail electricity price in Germany. In other words, there is now no need to pay a premium for clean energy in Germany after a mere six or seven years from the large-scale rollout. Now this is still a little bit simplistic, there's lots of, you know, there's lots of, you know, not everybody's Germany with 23 cents or 24 cent electricity prices in order they want to be and so on. But nevertheless that model of the premium for clean energy being competed away is very real. And so that, if you start, we'll talk about some of the international relations aspects, but I think it's important to have that thesis in mind, that this is a complete re-engineering of the world's energy system. This is not a marginal change and a marginal addition, this is a complete re-engineering. It's something that's going to cost trillions, not billions, and it's going to take decades. This is really difficult stuff, it's heavy engineering, it's complex systems, it's actually systems of systems. And while we do it, we don't want the lights to go out. So we've got high risks involved, political risks, economic risks, technical risks. So it will take decades to do this. We also don't want to leave huge amounts of stranded assets which are in all of our pension portfolios. So we've also got to use what we've got, so we're not just taking a wrecking ball to stuff that we've invested money in over time. And it will be funded largely by the capital markets and the secret there is in those trillions. Governments don't have trillions, well probably the Chinese do, but they're the only ones. Governments don't have the money to do this. So they can only think about frameworks and make it possible for private finance to go in and do the heavy lifting in this transformation. But this is stuff I'm confident is happening. This is the way to think about the industry worldwide. The question would be then, how fast will it happen? Will this transformation be a 75-year transformation or will it be a 25-year transformation? And I think that's the sort of range of variables that we're playing with. It's extremely hard to see the transformation happening. You'd have to define what the metric of a transformation is. But it's hard to see the scale of change coming to anything near completion within a 10, 15, 20-year timeframe. I think we are talking about 25 to 75 years. And so the question is, how fast is it happening? Is it fast enough for seeing through various different lenses? One of which, of course, is the climate lens. We did this in 2008. We did some work on this. This was the amount of investment that had gone into clean energy in the past through to 2008. You can see it started at $50 billion and it rose at that point to about $150 billion. And we said that this is the amount of investment that you need mapped onto the sectors that we were tracking. Again, back to the stuff where I started, I said it's reached $260 billion. So you sort of know the answer to what happened next, which is this. Mapped against that $260 billion, what would we need to see if we're to get emissions from the energy sector worldwide to peak before 2020 and then start to come down? And we said that, essentially, you need to get it to $500 billion, half a trillion per year, by something like 2015. If we got that level of investment, then you'd be seeing the transition happening at such a speed that emissions would come down. And these are our figures, half a trillion, in the things that we track, wind, solar, efficiency, CCS. There are other figures that are bigger because once you start adding in transmission distribution and nuclear and the other pieces that are in the assumptions, then the numbers are higher. But nevertheless, just mapping like for like, you can see that we're about half of where we need to be seen through the climate lens. Now, in the developed countries, there's some things that we could do to speed that up. One of them is around subsidies. There's the IEA did this tremendous work on fossil fuel subsidies versus clean energy subsidies, clean energy 66 billion, fossil fuels 409 billion. Actually, a lot of that is in places like Turkmenistan and Iran. So it's not really fair to categorize that as a developed world issue. But clearly, if you look at how would you accelerate a transition if you are subsidizing the thing you want to move away from, that's going to slow it down. There's also some other issues in terms of it may not be that you can internalize an externality, but you should at least understand it. And maybe there are some things you can do around transparency. Straits of Hormuz gets something like, I think it's 17% or 18% of all of oil that we're burning in the world goes through that waterway there. There was a piece of work done by the Rand Corporation that said that if you didn't have to police the straits of Hormuz, if you didn't have to police the Persian Gulf, this is just for America, then the saving on the Department of Defense budget would be $83 billion per year. And that's a real, they've gone through how you would redeploy forces and what you would therefore be able to save. This isn't just saying the cost of the fifth fleet because you might do something else with it. $83 billion a year is 26 cents for every gallon of gasoline. It's 43 cents for all of the imported gasoline. $15 for every barrel of oil that goes through those straits. And of course, that doesn't appear in people's, when they go to the gas station, they don't pay that. They pay for that in their taxes. And so there's an extra, there's another subsidy here that's not really appearing in the right place. Interestingly enough, when I talk to Americans, I always make sure that I emphasize this. If you look at where the tankers, whose tankers are being protected, they're not American. Because the Americans get their oil mainly from Venezuela and Mexico and the US and Canada. So actually what they're doing is spending $83 billion a year to protect the supply chain of their strategic economic competitors, China, Korea and Japan. Because that's who's, and Europe. That's whose tankers are actually using the straits of Hormuz. And so, you know, does that seem like a smart investment when you are fiscally challenged in the US nearly as much as we are here in Europe? Another one is coal and the health costs. There's some work done by Harvard Medical School. You've seen this chart of cost. The economy is coal-fired power, which is the cheapest as long as you don't have any cost of carbon, particularly with old power stations. But here's the subsidy from health. And that is particulates, asthma, it's mercury, it's additional road accidents and it's accidents in the mining industry. This is just for the US. It doesn't count the 2,000 miners per year killed mining coal in China. Of course, we all benefit from cheap Chinese goods using energy that results. But if you just add in the US, the costs of the externality costs there, you essentially render coal completely uncompetitive. And almost every technology other than marine tidal and wave already vastly more attractive than coal. Interestingly, in the US, this year, coal use will be down 14% on last year. So the message is getting through and coal is essentially that it's going to be impossible. It's essentially already impossible to build a new coal-fired power station in the US and coal use going off a cliff. Of course, what they're looking at is exporting that coal to Asia where the demand has not dropped off. But now let's come to, how would you accelerate it? So those are some things that would give impetus if we could resolve in the developed world. But then there's also the international discussions. And particularly if you look at this chart here, of all of that investment in 2011 in clean energy, you can see OECD took 54%. Basic, so that's, it used to be brick, but Russia's not doing anything in South Africa is. So now it becomes basic. They're doing 41% and rest of the world 5%. And that is a large part of Latin America. It's all of Africa other than South Africa, and it's a large part of Southeast Asia. And it's important countries here that are neither OECD nor basic, that could be potentially very big drivers of energy demand. We've all seen those figures from IEA and so on, 40% more demand or whatever by 2050. Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, very populous countries that are getting almost no investment. And plus a whole host of smaller countries. And so then the question is, well surely we ought to all push for an agreement in the international climate negotiations because that's the way to funnel more money to those countries. And there's Rio 1992 and just so we recap, that was Kyoto 1997. And then the negotiations, these are all the COP discussions from Kyoto, Buenos Aires, the Hague, Marrakesh New Delhi. You can't keep up with it as one every year. They ended up in Copenhagen famously in 2009. Since then they've been to Cancun, they've been to Durban, wonderful place to visit by the way. And then this year it's going to be in Qatar. Now the point I'm making here is this has not been effective. This is now, Qatar will be COP 18. And so I have personally decided I'm not going to go to Qatar, I didn't go to Cancun, I didn't go to Durban because I can't see how that process is going to lead to success. But I've actually gone further than that. I now think that that process is actually harmful. Because what happens is once a year everybody gets together to fail publicly, very high profile. And to me when I see the alternatives, which is the sorts of processes, the sorts of investments that I've been talking about, then it seems to me this is an unproductive and unhelpful way to be carrying on itself. The alternative is these are national climate related policies. So these are energy efficiency, renewable energy and climate change or carbon specific policies. Over the past 13 years, 1,811 policies. This is at the national level. But there's also stuff going on at municipal level. There's the C40 cities, there's stuff that Mayor Bloomberg, my owner is doing in driving forwards. Not just in New York, but also in the broader, I think the C40 cities is now 56 cities. But then even down to at industry level, bilateral level, there's US China Energy Corporation, there's actually China Netherlands, there's Indonesia Netherlands, there's all sorts of bilaterals. And there's also in different sectors. So steel industry and cement industry, the big retailers, there's a number of forums for the utility industry. And so there are agreements and initiatives at every level that are serving to drive the investment flow that we've seen. So on the one hand, you have the UNFCCC process, which essentially now is saying that we all agree that in 2015 we will negotiate an agreement which will come into force in 2020, which may not be ambitious enough to be of any use, and it may not be ratified by key players. And if ratified, as we've seen from Canada, it may not be implemented. And I just don't want to put many eggs in that basket versus a process which has already resulted in a trillion dollars, which has already got us half of the way to where we need to be. Wouldn't it be more sensible to think about how we could accelerate initiatives that are already working and see if we couldn't just double the work rate within those processes and processes like them? And there is stuff going on on that front. So I'm involved, final slide, in this thing called Sustainable Energy for All, which is an umbrella also under the auspices of the UN, UN Secretary General. I'm on the high-level group, along with a bunch of extremely worthy US Secretary of Energy is on there and the CEO of Statoil and a number of other business leaders and also policy leaders. And it's not about trying to negotiate and nobody does anything until the negotiations are completed. It's about accelerating initiatives, sharing best practices and pushing the sector forward, raising awareness as well through the good offices of the Secretary General. There are plenty of others. There's the Clean Energy Ministerial if you like international multilateral activities. Of course there's all of the programs of the various multilateral banks, whether it's multilateral's World Bank IFC and so on, or whether it's KFW in Germany or JBIC in Japan and so on. So there's plenty of initiatives out there that are also international, not purely domestic, that are resulting in investment and moving the needle in our energy mix. And those are the ones that I tend to prefer supporting because I see them as being very effective. So I think we have, that's my prepared remarks, but I understand we have time and desire for perhaps some questions. So I'll leave it now. Thank you.