 Question 142 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. By St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 142 of the vices opposed to temperance in four articles. We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether insensibility is a sin. Second, whether intemperance is a childish sin. Third, of the comparison between intemperance and timidity. Fourth, whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices. First article, whether insensibility is a vice. Objection 1. You would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible, who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly, it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters. For it is written in Daniel 10, verses 2 and 3. In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks. I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth. Neither was I anointed with ointment. Therefore insensibility is not a sin. Objection 2 further. Man's good is to be in accord with reason, according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names 4. Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most conducive to man's progress and the good of reason. For it is written in Daniel 117 that to the children who took pulse for their food, God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom. Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful. Objection 3 further. That which is a very effective means of avoiding sin, would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the philosopher says in Ethics 2.9 that if we deny ourselves pleasures, we are less liable to sin. Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility. On the contrary, nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the philosopher in Ethics 2.7 and in 3.11. Therefore insensibility is vice. I answer that whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man's life. Therefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures in so far as they are necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's preservation, he would sin as acting counter to the order of nature, and this pertains to the vice of insensibility. It must be observed, however, that it is sometimes praiseworthy and even necessary for the sake of an end to abstain from such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex, as also for the fulfillment of certain engagements. Thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures in order to fulfill their respective duties. In like manner, penitents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of insensibility because they are in accord with right reason. Reply to Objection 1. Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards. Reply to Objection 2. Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers, which need a bodily organ, as stated in the first part, question 84 articles 7 and 8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that afford pleasure, wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the body will be greater or less according as man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation and of imparting to others a spiritual good by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and carnal procreation. Reply to Objection 3. In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires. Second article. Whether Intemperance is a Childish Sin? Objection 1. It would seem that Intemperance is not a Childish Sin. For Jerome in commenting on Matthew 18.3, unless you be converted and become as little children, says that a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman, all of which is contrary to Intemperance. Therefore Intemperance is not a Childish Sin. Objection 2. Children have none but natural desires. Now, in respect of natural desires, few sin by Intemperance, according to the philosopher in Ethics 3.11. Therefore Intemperance is not a Childish Sin. Objection 3. Children should be fostered and nourished. Whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which Intemperance is concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted according to Colossians 3.5. Mortify your members upon the earth, which are concupiscence, etc. Therefore Intemperance is not a Childish Sin. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3.12 that we apply the term Intemperance to Childish Faults. Translator's note. A Colasia, which Aristotle refers to Colazzo, to punish, so that its original sense would be impunity or unrestraint. I answer that a thing is said to be Childish for two reasons. First, because it is becoming to children and the philosopher does not mean that the sin of Intemperance is Childish in this sense. Secondly, by way of likeness and it is in this sense that sins of Intemperance are said to be Childish. For the sin of Intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Telly says in his Morals 127 under the heading Thumbliness is twofold that the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man's excellence insofar as his nature differs from other animals. Now a child does not attend to the order of reason and in like manner concupiscence does not listen to reason according to Ethics 7.6. Secondly, they are alike as to the results. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed, hence it is written in Ecclesiasticus 30 verse 8. A horse not broken becomeeth stubborn and a child left to himself will become headstrong. So too concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength. Wherefore Augustine says in his Confessions 8.5 Lust served became a custom and custom not resisted became necessity. Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained, hence it is written in Proverbs 23 verses 13 and 14. Withhold not correction from a child. Thou shalt beat him with a rod and deliver his soul from hell. In like manner, by resisting concupiscence, we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says in his Treaties on Music 6.11 that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things and remain fixed thereon, the impulse of custom, that is, carnal concupiscence, is broken and being suppressed is gradually weakened. For it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed it is certainly less strong when we curb it. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 3.12 that As a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupisable to accord with reason. Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes the term childish as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness as stated above. Reply to Objection 2. A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation. And in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires according to the philosopher in Ethics 3.11. There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity. Confirm Question 167. Such as the nice, curious, preparation of food, or the adornment of women. And though children do not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above. Reply to Objection 3. That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not be fostered but corrected, as stated above. Third Article Whether cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. Objection 1. You would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above in Article 2, as well as in Question 141, Article 8. Therefore, cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. Objection 2. Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 777 that There is no wonder, in fact, it is pardonable if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains. Now, seemingly, it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions. Hence it is stated in Ethics 2.3 that it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would seem to be stronger than fear. Therefore, intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear. Objection 3. Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to be intemperant, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to cowardice. Therefore, cowardice is a more grievous sin than intemperance. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 312 that Intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice. Therefore, it is more sinful. I answer that one may be compared with another in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object. Secondly, on the part of the man who sins. And in both ways, intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice. First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life because, as stated above in Article 2, 2nd reply, intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin, the less grievous the sin. Therefore, intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice on the part of the object or motive matter. In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more grievous his sin. Wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the human mind. But not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin, the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has and this for two reasons. The first is, because actions done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethics 3.1. Whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply voluntary. The second reason is, because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters relating to cowardice because the particular action that imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance, to cast aside his shield and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance, to save himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place is simply more voluntary. Wherefore, intemperance, being simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by frequent practice in their regard to become temperate. Whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence and it is more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward. Reply to Objection 1. The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the end, which has the aspect of good, because fortitude is directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view, cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever. And from this point of view, there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand, to be overcome by a stronger force is a proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force is the proof of a greater vice. Reply to Objection 2. Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more conatural than any pleasures whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex. Although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow and fear is more occasioned by certain other evils. Reply to Objection 3. The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a general than on a particular consideration. Wherefore, in such cases, we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense. Fourth article. Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins. Objection 1. It would seem that intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. As honour is due to virtue, so is disgrace due to sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance. For instance, murder, blasphemy and the like. Therefore, intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. Objection 2. Those sins which are the more common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance are most common because they are about things connected with the common use of human life and in which many happen to sin. Therefore, sins of intemperance do not seem to be the most disgraceful. Objection 3. The philosopher says in Ethics 7.6 Temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures. Such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease, as the philosopher states in Ethics 7.5. Therefore, intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 3.10 that intemperance is justly more deserving of approach than other vices. I answer that disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above in Question 103 Article 1. And glory denotes clarity, as stated in Question 103 Article 1.3 reply. Accordingly, intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated above in Question 141 Articles 2 and 3. Wherefore it is written in Psalm 48 verse 21 Man, when he was in honor, did not understand. He hath been compared to senseless beasts and made like to them. Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man's clarity or beauty. Inasmuch as the pleasures, which are the matter of intemperance, dim the light of reason from which all clarity and beauty of virtue arises. Wherefore these pleasures are described as being most slavish. Reply to Objection 1, as Gregory says in his commentary on Job 3312. The sins of the flesh, which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although less culpable, are most disgraceful. The reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner. Reply to Objection 2. The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the nature of the vices themselves. Reply to Objection 3. When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected with human passions, which, to a certain extent, are in conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless, such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance by way of excess. For instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh or in committing the unnatural vice. The Virtue of Temperance This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triities on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Temperance, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 143 of the Parts of Temperance in General We must now consider the Parts of Temperance. We shall consider these same parts. One, in general. Two, each of them in particular. Article Whether the Parts of Temperance are rightly assigned. Objection One We would seem that Tully, in On the Art of Rhetoric 254, unbecomingly assigns the Parts of Temperance when he asserts them to be Continence, Mildness and Modesty. For Continence is reckoned to be distinct from Virtue in Ethics 7.1, whereas Temperance is comprised under Virtue. Therefore, Continence is not a Part of Temperance. Objection Two Further, Mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But Temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above in Question 141, Article 4. Therefore, Mildness is not a Part of Temperance. Objection Three Further, Modesty concerns external action, wherefor the Apostle says in Philippians 4-5, Let your modesty be known to all men. Now external actions are the matter of Justice, as stated above in Question 58, Article 8. Therefore, Modesty is a Part of Justice rather than of Temperance. Objection Four Further, Microbius reckons many more Parts of Temperance, for he says that Temperance results in modesty, shame-facedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity. Andronicus also says in On the Affections that the companions of Temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment. Therefore, it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the Parts of Temperance. I answer that, as stated above in Questions 48 and 128. A Cardinal Virtue may have three kinds of Parts, namely Integral, Subjective, and Potential. The Integral Parts of a Virtue are the conditions, the concurrence of which are necessary for Virtue. And in this respect, there are two Integral Parts of Temperance, shame-facedness whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to Temperance, and honesty whereby one loves the beauty of Temperance. For, as stated above in Question 141, Article II, Third Reply, Temperance, more than any other Virtue, lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of Intemperance excel others in disgrace. The Subjective Parts of a Virtue are its Species, and the Species of a Virtue have to be differentiated according to the Difference of Matter or Object. Now Temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment, and in these, as regards meat, there is abstinence, and as regards drink, properly, there is sobriety. Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these, as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is chastity. And as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting for instance from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have purity. The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues. For while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or another, and restrains the appetite in its impulse toward something, may be reckoned a part of temperance as a virtue annexed there too. This happens in three ways. First, in the inward movements of the soul. Secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body. Thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion, and this movement is restrained by continents. The effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by humility. The third movement is that of anger, which tends toward revenge, and this is restrained by meekness or mildness. With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of modesty, which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order and to persevere in what we do. He assigns to method. The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to refinement. The third has to do with the conservation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called gravity. With regard to external things, a two-fold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns lowliness and Andronicus contentment. Secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements and to this Macrobius assigns moderation, Andronicus simplicity. Reply to Objection 1. It is true that continents differs from virtue just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on in Question 165 Article 1. And in this sense, it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance, both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance. Reply to Objection 2. Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. In the matter of external action, justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice, but of temperance. Reply to Objection 4. Under modesty, tally includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope, which we reckoned as pertaining to humility. End of question 143. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 144. A Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triates on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Temperance. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triates on the Cardinal Virtues. The Virtue of Temperance. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 144. Of shame-facedness in four articles. We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular, and in the first place, the integral parts, which are shame-facedness and honesty. With regard to shame-facedness, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether shame-facedness is a virtue. Second, what is its object? Third, who are the cause of a man being ashamed? Fourth, what kind of people are ashamed? First, article. Whether shame-facedness is a virtue. Objection 1. It seems that shame-facedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue to observe the mean as fixed by reason. This is clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethics 2.6. Now, shame-facedness observes the mean in this way, as the philosopher observes in Ethics 2.7. Therefore, shame-facedness is a virtue. Objection 2. Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now, shame-facedness is praiseworthy, but it is not a part of virtue. For it is not part of prudence, since it is not in the reason, but in the appetite. Nor is it a part of justice. Since shame-facedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions, nor again is it a part of fortitude because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shame-facedness to recoil from something. Nor, lastly, is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shame-facedness is a kind of fear according as the philosopher states in Ethics 4.9 and Damocene in On the True Faith 2.15. Hence, it follows that shame-facedness is a virtue. Objection 3. Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully in his Morals 1.27. Now shame-facedness is a part of honesty. For Ambrose says on the duties of the clergy 1.43 that shame-facedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, a verse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety, and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful. Therefore shame-facedness is a virtue. Objection 4. Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shame-facedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shame-facedness is a virtue. Objection 5. Further, like acts beget like habits according to Ethics 2.1. Now shame-facedness implies a praiseworthy act, wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue according to the philosopher in Ethics 1.12. Therefore shame-facedness is a virtue. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 2.7 and in Ethics 4.9 that shame-facedness is not a virtue. I answer that virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly, virtue is a perfection, as stated in Physics 7.17 and 18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shame-facedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says, and on the true faith 2.15 that shame-facedness is fear of a base action. Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above in the Pars Prima Secundae, Question 40, Article 1, Question 41, Article 2, and Question 42, Article 3, when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do as being possible and arduous, that is to say, difficult for him to avoid. Nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shame-facedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue. Taken however in a broad sense, virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human actions or passions, and in this way, shame-facedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion. Reply to Objection 1. Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue's definition. But it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be an elective habit, that is to say, operating from choice. Now shame-facedness denotes not a habit, but a passion. Nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, shame-facedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated, in Question 142 Article 4, that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore, shame-facedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action, though not according to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless, insofar as the vice is opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shame-facedness may also pertain to other virtues. Reply to Objection 3. Shame-facedness fosters honesty by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty. Reply to Objection 4. Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently, it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue as regards its origin. Hence, shamelessness, insofar as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance. Reply to Objection 5. Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of shame-facedness without continuing to be ashamed in their regard. Although as a consequence of this acquired virtue a man would be more ashamed if confronted with the matter of shame-facedness. Second Article Whether shame-facedness is about a disgraceful action Objection 1. You would seem that shame-facedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the philosopher says in Ethics 4.9 that shame-facedness is fear of disgrace. Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignimony according to Psalm 67 verse 8. For thy sake I have borne reproach. Shame hath covered my face. Therefore shame-facedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. Objection 2. Nothing apparently is disgraceful, but what is sinful? Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins. For instance, when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shame-facedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. Objection 3. Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethics 1.8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds according to Luke 9.26. He that shall be ashamed of me and my words of him the son of man shall be ashamed, etc. Therefore shame-facedness is not about a disgraceful action. Objection 4. Further, if shame-facedness were properly about a disgraceful action it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins while he glories in those which are most grievous according to Psalm 51.3. Why dost thou glory in malice? Therefore shame-facedness is not properly about a disgraceful action. On the contrary, Damocene in On the True Faith 2.15 and Gregory of Nisa say that Shame-facedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done. I answer that as stated above in the parts Prima Secunde question 41 article 2 and question 42 article 3 when we were treating of the passions. Fear is properly about an arduous evil one namely that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man's ability wherefor it is not apprehended as fearful and for this reason the philosopher says in rhetoric 2.5 that such evils are not a matter of fear. The other kind of disgrace is penal, so to speak and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored and since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil just as honor has the character of an arduous good shame-facedness which is fear of disgrace regards first and foremost reproach or ignimony and since reproach is properly due to vice as honor is due to virtue it follows that shame-facedness regards also the disgrace inherent device. Hence the philosopher says in rhetoric 2.5 that a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own now shame-facedness regards fault in two ways in one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach in another way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach in the former case according to Gregory of Nisa we speak of a person blushing in the latter we say that he is ashamed hence he says that the man who is ashamed acts in secret but he who blushes fears to be disgraced reply to objection one shame-facedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect hence the philosopher says in rhetoric 2.6 that a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on account of virtue because he does not deserve it as the philosopher says of the magnanimous in ethics 4.3 thus we find it said of the apostles in Acts 5.41 that they the apostles went from the presence of the council rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus it is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue since the more virtuous a man is the more he despises external things whether good or evil wherefore it is written in Isaiah 51.7 fear ye not the reproach of man reply to objection two as stated above in question 63 article 3 though honor is not really due saved to virtue alone yet it regards a certain excellence and the same applies to reproach for though it is properly due to sin alone yet at least in man's opinion it regards any kind of defect hence a man is ashamed of poverty disrepute servitude and the like reply to objection three shame facedness does not regard a virtuous deeds as such yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds reply to objection four sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful either because they are less disgraceful as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh or because they connot a certain abundance of some temporal good thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring of theft than of robbery on account of a semblance of power the same applies to other sins third article whether man is more shame faced of those who are more closely connected with him objection one it would seem that man is not more shame faced of those who are more closely connected with him for it is stated in retrix two six that men are more shame faced of those from whom they desire approbation now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them therefore man is not more shame faced of those who are more closely connected with him objection two further seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin because according to retrix two six a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself therefore he is not more shame faced of those who are more closely connected with him objection three further the philosopher says in retrix two six that men take more shame from those who retail their information to many such as jokers and fabletellers but those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them objection four further the philosopher says in retrix two six that men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss by those of whom they ask something for the first time by those whose friends they wish to become now these are less closely connected with us therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are most closely united to him on the contrary it is stated in retrix two six that man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him I answer that since reproach is opposed to honor just as honor denotes attestation to someone's excellence especially the excellence which is according to virtue so to reproach the fear of which is shame facedness denotes attestation to a person's defect especially that which results from sin hence the more weighty a person's attestation is considered to be the more does he make another person ashamed now a person's attestation may be considered as being more weighty either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect certitude of the truth attaches to a person's attestations for two reasons first on account of the rectitude of his judgment as in the case of wise and virtuous men by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame by reason of their lack of judgment secondly on account of his knowledge of the matter attested because everyone judges well of what is known to him according to ethics one three in this way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us since they are better acquainted with our deeds whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us who are ignorant of what we do inspire us with no shame at all an attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom where for men are more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm and for this reason again in a certain respect persons connected with us make us more ashamed since we are to be continually in their society as though this entailed a continual harm to us whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once reply to objection one people of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things and in their judgment hold fast to the truth so too the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail reply to objection two we fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin because we do not think that they look upon our defect as disgraceful reply to objection three tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us reply to objection four even those among whom we have done no wrong make us more ashamed on account of the harm that would follow because to which we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful the reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first time or whose friends we wish to be is that we fear to suffer some injury by being disappointed in our request or by failing to become their friends fourth article whether even virtuous men can be ashamed objection one it would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed for contraries have contrary effects now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed according to Jeremiah 3.3 thou haddest a harlot's forehead thou wouldst not blush therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed objection two further the philosopher says in retrix 2.6 that men are ashamed not only of vice but also of the signs of evil and this happens also in the virtuous therefore virtuous men can be ashamed objection three further shame facetness is fear of disgrace according to ethics 4.9 now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious for instance if they are slandered or if they suffer reproach undeservedly therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed objection four further shame facetness is a part of temperance as stated above in question 143 now a part is not separated from its whole since then temperance is in a virtuous man it means that shame facetness is also on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 4.9 that a virtuous man is not shame facet I answer that as stated above in articles 1 and 2 shame facetness is fear of some disgrace now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared first because it is not reckoned an evil secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself or is not difficult to avoid accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways first because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame for instead of disapproving of their sins they boast of them secondly because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves or as easy to avoid in this way the old and the virtuous are not shame facet yet they are so disposed that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it where for the philosopher says in ethics 4.9 that shame is in the virtuous hypothetically reply to objection 1 lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes as is stated in the article in the average man it is found in so far as they have a certain love of good and yet are not altogether free from evil reply to objection 2 it belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice but also whatever has the semblance of vice according to first Thessalonians 5.22 from all appearance of evil refrain yourselves the philosopher 2 says in ethics 4.9 that the virtuous man should avoid not only what is really evil but also those things that are regarded as evil reply to objection 3 as stated above in article 1 first reply the virtuous man despises igninomy and reproach as being things he does not deserve where for he is not much ashamed of them nevertheless to a certain extent shame like the other passions may forestall reason reply to objection 4 shame facetness is a part of temperance not as though it entered into its essence but as a disposition to it where for Ambrose says in on the duties of the clergy shame facetness lays the first foundation of temperance by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful End of question 144 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert L.C. Question 145 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance this is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province Question 145 of honesty in four articles translators note honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness from the point of view of decorum we must now consider honesty under which head there are four points of inquiry first the relation between the honest and the virtuous second its relation with the beautiful translators note as honesty here denotes moral goodness so beauty stands for moral beauty third its relation with the useful and the pleasant fourth whether honesty is a part of temperance first article whether honesty is the same as virtue objection one you would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue for Tully says in on the art of rhetoric 253 that the honest is what is desired for its own sake now virtue is desired not for its own sake but for the sake of happiness for the philosopher says in ethics one nine that happiness is the reward and the end of virtue therefore honesty is not the same as virtue objection to further according to Isidor in his etymologies 10 honesty means an honorable state now honor is due to many things besides virtue since it is praise that is the proper do of virtue according to ethics 112 therefore honesty is not the same as virtue objection three further the principal part of a virtue is the interior choice as the philosopher says in ethics 813 but honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct according to first Corinthians 1440 let all things be done decently and according to order among you therefore honesty is not the same as virtue objection four further honesty apparently consists in external wealth according to ecclesiasticus 1114 good things and evil life and death poverty and riches are from God but virtue does not consist in external wealth therefore honesty is not the same as virtue on the contrary Tully in his morals as well as in his rhetoric 253 divides honesty into the four principal virtues into which virtue is also divided therefore honesty is the same as virtue I answer that as Isidore says in his etymologies 10 honesty means an honorable state where for a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor now honor as stated above in question 144 article 2 second reply is due to excellence and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue as stated in physics 717 therefore properly speaking honesty refers to the same thing as virtue reply to objection one according to the philosopher in ethics 17 of those things that are desired for their own sake some are desired for their own sake alone and never for the sake of something else such as happiness which is the last end while some are desired not only for their own sake in as much as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves even if no further good accrued to us through them but also for the sake of something else in as much as they are conducive to some more perfect good it is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake where for Tully says in on the art of rhetoric 252 that some things allure us by their own force and attract us by their own worth such as virtue truth knowledge and this suffices to give a thing the character of honest reply to objection two some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue namely God and happiness and such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty other things which are beneath virtue are honored in so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue such as rank power and riches for as the philosopher says in ethics 43 that these things are honored by some people but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor now a man is good in respect of virtue where for praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else while honor is due to virtue for its own sake and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty reply to objection three as we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence as stated above in question 103 articles 1 and 2 but one attests only to what one knows and the internal choice is not made known saved by external actions where for external conduct as the character of honesty in so far as it reflects internal rectitude for this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice but its expression lies in the external conduct reply to objection four it is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity second article whether the honest is the same as the beautiful objection one it would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful for the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite since the honest is what is desirable for its own sake according to Cicero on the art of rhetoric 253 but the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest objection to further beauty requires a certain clarity which is characteristic of glory whereas the honest regards honor since then honor and glory differ as stated above in question 103 article 1 third reply it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ objection 3 further honesty is the same as virtue as stated above in article 1 but a certain beauty is contrary to virtue where for it is written in Ezekiel 16 15 trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful on the contrary the apostle says in first Corinthians 12 verses 23 and 24 those that are our uncomly in honesta parts have more abundant comeliness honest attempt but our comely honesta parts have no need now by uncomly parts he means the baser members and by comely parts the beautiful members therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same I answer that as may be gathered from the words of Dionysius and on the divine names for beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion for he states that God is said to be beautiful as being the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned together with a certain clarity of color in like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason now this is what is meant by honesty which we have stated in article one to be the same as virtue and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man where for honesty is the same as spiritual beauty hence Augustine says in his 83 questions question 30 by honesty I mean intelligible beauty which we properly designate as spiritual and further on he adds that many things are beautiful to the eye which it would be hardly proper to call honest reply to objection one the object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended it is taken to be something becoming and good hence Dionysius says in on the divine names for that the beautiful and the good are beloved by all where for the honest in as much as it implies spiritual beauty is an object of desire and for this reason Tully says in his morals one five thou perceivest the form and the features so to speak of honesty and were it to be seen with the eye would as Plato declares arouse a wondrous love of wisdom reply to objection two as stated above in question 103 article one third reply glory is the effect of honor because through being honored or praised a person acquires clarity in the eyes of others where for just as the same thing makes a man honorable and glorious so is the same thing honest and beautiful reply to objection three this argument applies to the beauty of the body although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty according to Ezekiel 28 17 thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty third article whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant objection one it would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant for the honest is what is desirable for its own sake according to Cicero in on the art of rhetoric 253 now pleasure is desired for its own sake for it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased as the philosopher remarks in ethics 10 to therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant objection to further riches are comprised under the head of useful good for tally says in the art of rhetoric 252 there is a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own nor by its very nature but on account of its fruitfulness and utility and that is money now riches come under the head of honesty for it is written in ecclesiasticus 11 14 poverty and riches are from God and in ecclesiasticus 13 to he shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable that is richer than himself therefore the honest differs not from the useful objection three further tally proves in his morals 23 that nothing can be useful unless it be honest and Ambrose makes the same statement in on the duties of the clergy 26 therefore the useful differs not from the honest on the contrary Augustine says in his 83 questions question 30 the honest is that which is desirable for its own sake the useful implies reference to something else I answer that the honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant but it differs from them in aspect for as stated above in article two a thing is said to be honest insofar as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason now whatever is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man again it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it where for an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man and the philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue in ethics 18 yet not all that is pleasing is honest since a thing may be becoming according to the senses but not according to reason a pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his nature even virtue itself which is essentially honest is referred to something else as its end namely happiness accordingly the honest the useful and the pleasant concur in the one subject nevertheless they differ in aspect for a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its spiritual beauty while it is said to be pleasing as bringing rest to desire and useful as referred to something else the pleasant however extends to more things than the useful and the honest since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect whereas the converse does not hold according to ethics 23 reply to objection one a thing is said to be honest if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite which tends to that which is in accordance with reason while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite reply to objection to riches are denominated honesty according to the opinion of many who honor wealth or because they are intended to be the instruments of virtuous deeds as stated above in article one second reply to objection three Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful since it follows that it is contrary to man's last end which is a good in accordance with reason although it may perhaps be useful in some respect with regard to a particular end but they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest fourth article whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance objection one you would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance for it is not possible for a thing to be a part and whole in respect of one same thing now temperance is a part of honesty according to Tully and on the art of rhetoric two fifty three therefore honesty is not a part of temperance objection to further it is stated in the third Ezra three twenty one that wine makes all thoughts honest but the use of wine especially in excess in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken pertains to in temperance rather than to temperance therefore honesty is not a part of temperance objection three further the honest is that which is deserving of honor now it is the just and the brave who receive most honor according to the philosopher in rhetoric one nine therefore honesty pertains not to temperance but rather to justice and fortitude where for Ali Azar said as related in second Maccabees six twenty eight I suffer an honorable honest death for the most venerable and most holy laws on the contrary Macrobius reckons honesty a part of temperance and Ambrose in on the duties of the clergy one forty three ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance I answer that as stated above an article two honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful and opposites are most manifest of one another where for seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance since the latter appels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man namely animal lusts hence by its very name temperance is most significant of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires accordingly honesty as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance is reckoned as a part thereof not as a subjective part nor as an annexed virtue but as an integral part or condition attaching there to reply to objection one temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance reply to objection two when a man is intoxicated the wine makes his thoughts honest according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and deserving of honor reply to objection three greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance because they excel in the point of a greater good yet greater honor is due to temperance because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of approach as stated above thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the apostle in first Corinthians 1223 when he says that our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness which namely destroys whatever is uncomely end of question 145 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 146 assume a theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org summa theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of temperance by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 146 of abstinence in two articles we must now consider the subjective parts of temperance first those which are about pleasures of food secondly those which are about pleasures of sex the first consideration will include abstinence which is about meat and drink and sobriety which is specifically about drink with regard to abstinence three points have to be considered one abstinence itself two it's act which is fasting three it's opposite vice which is gluttony under the first head there are two points of inquiry first whether abstinence is a virtue second whether it is a special virtue first article whether abstinence is a virtue objection one it seems that abstinence is not a virtue for the apostle says in first Corinthians 420 the kingdom of God is not in speech but in power virtute now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence for the apostle says in Romans 1417 the kingdom of God is not meat and drink where a glass observes that justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating therefore abstinence is not a virtue objection to further Augustine says in his confessions 1011 addressing himself to God this has to thou taught me that I should set myself to take food as physics now it belongs not to virtue but to the medical art to regulate medicine therefore in like manner to regulate one's food which belongs to abstinence is not an act of virtue but of art objection three further every virtue observes the mean as stated in ethics two six and seven but abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency since it denotes retrenchment therefore abstinence is not a virtue objection for further no virtue excludes another virtue but abstinence excludes patients for Gregory says in his pastoral rule 319 that impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer's mind from its peaceful seclusion likewise he says in his pastoral rule 319 that sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer so that abstinence excludes humility therefore abstinence is not a virtue on the contrary it is written in 2 Peter 1 5 and 6 join with your faith virtue and with virtue knowledge and with knowledge abstinence where abstinence is numbered among other virtues therefore abstinence is a virtue I answer that abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways first as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act but something indifferent secondly it may be taken as regulated by reason and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act this is the meaning of Peter's words quoted above where he says that we ought to join abstinence with knowledge namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives for his own person and for the requirements of health reply to objection one the use of an abstinence from food considered in themselves do not pertain to the kingdom of God since the apostle says in first Corinthians 8 8 meet doth not commend us to God for neither if we eat not shall we have the less nor if we eat shall we have the more that is spiritually nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God insofar as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God reply to objection two the regulation of food in the point of quantity and quality belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason it belongs to abstinence hence Augustine says in his questions on the Gospel to eleven it makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives for his own person and for the requirements of his health but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain reply to objection three it belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason where for just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess from which all the parts of fortitude take their name so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency from which all its parts are denominated hence abstinence since it is a part of temperance is named from deficiency and yet it observes the mean in so far as it is an accord with right reason reply to objection four those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason for right reason makes one abstain as one ought that is with gladness of heart and for the due end that is for God's glory and not one's own second article whether abstinence is a special virtue objection one you would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue for every virtue is praiseworthy by itself but abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself for Gregory says in the pastoral rule 319 that the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues therefore abstinence is not a special virtue objection to further Augustine says that the saints abstain from meat and drink not that any creature of God is evil but merely in order to chastise the body now this belongs to chastity as its very name denotes therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity objection three further as a man should be content with moderate meat so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes according to 1st Timothy 6 8 having food and wherewith to be covered with these should we be content now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes neither therefore is there in abstinence which moderates food on the contrary Macrobius reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance I answer that as stated above in question 136 article 1 as well as in question 141 article 3 moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of reason there is need of a special virtue now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason both because they are so great and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life which he desires above all other things therefore abstinence is a special virtue reply to objection one virtues are of necessity connected together as stated above in the parts prima secunde question 65 article 1 where for one virtue receives help and commendation from another as justice from fortitude accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues reply to objection to the body is chastised by means of abstinence not only against the allurements of lust but also against those of gluttony since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony which increase in force the more he yields to them yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity since one virtue helps another reply to objection three the use of clothing was devised by art whereas the use of food is from nature hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of food and for the moderation of clothing end of question 146 read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert LC