 We will see now some arrangement process to ensure that safety is managed during operation. One of these first elements is what we call the periodic safety review. This is a process that should be run every ten years and the purpose is to reassess the design basis of the plant to ensure compliance of the actual plant condition with this design basis and this includes specific inspection and roll down is the plant compliant with the assumption made at the very beginning and if it is necessary the design basis of the plant should be updated because new methodologies, new computer codes could have been developed all the results of R&D because there are still a lot of R&D going on on the various safety aspects so the purpose is to update completely and to align the level of safety of the plant to the most recent standards so how to identify the potential improvement so this is done first through the probability safety assessment update because new data could have been available there are new ways of looking at the transitions so the probability safety analysis will be updated of course a very important element will be the operating experience feedback when there is a major accident last it was the case with Swim Alliance for instance the feedback was introduced directly without waiting for the periodic safety review process but there are less significant events that are worthwhile to be considered than to be feedback and these are collectively taken into consideration during this periodic safety review it is also important to compare with the current international standards where we will talk later about these standards which are also periodically updated so comparing the condition of the plant with these standards is something important and also a new plan could be built in the meantime and as the safety is a continuous improvement process it's important to make a comparison with the last plan being built and for instance in France the requirement when making a periodic safety review of operating plan to try to make modification and to increase the level of safety close to the last plant being built last but not least as I mentioned already there are some R&D results that are available through all the experiments that are continuously to be made so all these elements will help identify the potential improvements that of course will be implemented through modification in the design of the plant not only on the design but also on operating procedures or process the hardware modification usually will be made during a long outage in some country you have a sort of important outage for inspection every 10 years and so the outage is long and there is time to implement a lot of modification globally this is a lancy process to identify all this improvement and to implement it and this is the regulator is implied because it should approve the exact scope of the periodic safety review and also the results and approve also of course the modification to be made well here now I think it's important to look back and to give a sort of historic view of nuclear safety up to the 70s safety was essentially a matter of design and designer the engineer had very technically focused views and most of the safety consideration as a technical basis and there were very little consideration of the human behavior element as I say sometimes the bright engineers that design this facility just forget that they should be operated by a human so this pure technical views was shocked by the Srimal island accident and at first there was some consideration for the human aspect of the operator but the operator was seen more as a source of human error and all the improvement made after Srimal island was essentially to try to avoid human error from the operator so through the introduction of a lot of ergonomic consideration I mentioned some of them after Srimal island in previous parts and another important evolution came from the Chernobyl accident the importance of organizational as well as human factors and that was the origin of the development of the safety culture concept that we will see now in more detail so if we want to consider human factors we have to identify the various elements that could influence the human behavior and its attitude during the activities the first element is the social and cultural environment when we talk about the safety culture and important for the East culture because the culture is not the same everywhere the US culture is different from the European culture or for the Latin culture or the Japanese culture and these elements are important in the way the individual behaves another aspect is the regulatory context the nuclear industry is a very regulated industry with a lot of requirements not only on the technical aspect but also on the organizational aspects another factor is the fact that the human and operators are not working alone in a nuclear power plant they are working in a team so the organization of the team, the working methods the current practices are elements which influence the behavior and then there are also the tools, the ergonomics of the control room the tools, the procedures that you can use, the operating documentation and all elements that influence also its competencies so when we want to study this human factor and all these elements have to be taken into consideration to explain and to try to influence the behavior and the attitudes of human beings someone's now about the safety culture this concept of safety culture as mentioned has been developed after the accident of Chernobyl and a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna define the safety culture in a report called INSAG4 so safety culture is the characteristic and attitude in organization and individuals which establish that as an overriding priority nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by the significance every word is important in this definition and safety culture imply not only individual but also the management and the commitments and the policy on safety developed at the higher level of the organization at the policy level there should be a clear statement about the safety policy the management structure, the resource of the company devoted to safety should be clearly defined at the management level the responsibility should be very clearly defined there should be also a clear definition and control of safety practice the management should ensure that the staff is properly qualified and trained there should be also a policy of rewards and sanction and last but not least there should be a process of each and periodic review of the elements of the management and at the individual the commitment to safety should be proved and shown by three major elements the question in attitudes that is not satisfying of what you see but always asking himself or what if is what I see is normal, is there something that comes from is it something abnormal and reporting that what we call a rigorous and prudent approach is that things before act be prepared to do what you have to do and if anything is abnormal report and do it and the third element is communication communication between the team communication with the hierarchy and the main manager so safety in operation relies on technical aspects defined at the design stage but heavily also on the operator's behavior and attitude so safety should be managed hence the concept of safety management the safety management system includes those arrangements made by the operating organization for the management of safety in order to promote a strong safety culture and achieve good safety performance so the various components of the safety management have been defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in a report named INSAG 13 and it includes various elements first definition of safety requirements and organization definition of safety policies including standards, resource and target and a correct structure of the management with clearly defined responsibilities and account abilities at the second level the planning of activities should be carefully prepared including risk assessment there should be an organization to control all the activities important to safety the management should ensure competency of the staff through training and also communication and team support and beside the control for the direct hierarchy there is a need of supervision by an external organization and we will have further details on that in one of the next slides at the individual level we find again these questioning attitudes these rigorous and prudence approaches these communication needs which are the individual elements and elements of the safety culture but there is a need of closing the loop and this is done through audit review and feedback process in order to measure the performance and to take corrective action and improvement if needed so safety management is not just a separate element of management but it should be completely integrated into the overall management system but with a specific priority on safety there are a lot of standards that exist on management system there is this European Foundation for Quality Management that should standard there are the ISO standards 9000 and 40,000 on various aspects and also some requirements from the International Atomic Energy Commission we will see that a bit later that defines how to manage the facilities and activities in the system as an example of safety management I will provide you some elements of the safety organization of EDF the French utilities on the left hand side you have the line management and it starts at the level of the CEO, the president office and goes down to the management of all the operation operating plans and then at the plant level, the plant director and 24 hours in the control room, the shift manager these are the person responsible for safety the person responsible to take action and to act but in order to assume these important responsibility they need some help, some external advice some expertise and some also verification capability so at all levels you can see in this organization on the right hand side a team of people interact with the management level in order to support them or to check what they are doing and to ensure that the responsibility of the line management is fully fulfilled at the plant level there is a safety engineer who meets regularly with the shift manager at the plant level there is a safety and quality advisory unit at the national level there is also some structure including a nuclear inspectorate and also at the CEO level there is a general inspector for nuclear safety who reports to the president office but not only is this outside support there is a need to discuss safety issue because safety is not always black and white so there is a need of debate so there is a need of organizing at each level also this discussion between the person in charge and responsible for safety and the support and advisory structure so this is done at the plant level the safety engineer and the shift manager meet every day to discuss about the actual situation and the safety of the plant at the plant level there is a safety net called committees where several persons could gather and discuss safety issues and there is also a similar committee at the nuclear operation division and also at the level of the CEO so these committees gathered both the person in charge of taking the action and the responsibility of safety and those which are in charge of advising and making verification get together and ensure that the safety is optimized and that safety culture is overriding the priority to be given to safety is ensure so an important element of the safety culture is this internal transparency because we learn from good practices of course but even more for mistake and near misses and it's important that this near misses or good practices could be known this is a fundamental attitude of safety culture because from this as a good practice or near misses it's a very power tool to make safety improvement so it's important for the management to develop what we call a no blame attitudes and also being able to reward reporting events or attitudes which are in complete compliance with safety culture but of course this is sometimes difficult because it depends on the local culture and especially this no blame attitude this is something which should be specific to all industry who has some risk and it should be specifically developed in the nuclear industry so this internal transparency is a necessity for external communication nuclear energy is a high tech industry which is difficult to grasp by the general public because it's complex and retroactivity is not something that you can see so it's very important to be open and to try to as much as possible communicate with the public because hiding things can only develop fear in public opinion so it's important to report incidents to make periodic reports available to the public all of the actual planned conditions the events that occurs and the release that are made and so on this open communication is a condition to counter rumors and false information so there are some specific arrangements around nuclear plants to communicate with the public through not only these local information committees which gather the main stakeholder public officials but also NGOs who could participate in this committee where the plant operator comes and reports and questions on what happens on the plant in terms of reporting events the International Atomic Energy Agency developed a communication scale called the International Nuclear Event Scale to categorize the various events that could happen on the plant according to their consequences and there are seven levels in this communication scale coming from the small anomaly without any consequence it's just the fact that something happens which put the plant behind the authorized operating regime this is a level 1 level 2 or incidents includes a significant failure of safety system level 3 became to be something a little bit serious because there have been some impact on workers those incurred by some staff all that safety barriers have been affected at level 4 it begins to have some impact of sight and because of some release which still remain in the authorized limits but with outside consequences the fifth release the fifth level implies some off-site impact still minor and typical 3 mile island accident was categorized as level 5 the level 6 yes it's categorized by releases that implies some countermeasure on the public Fukushima was first classified at this level 6 before being upscaled to the level 7 and this level 7 implies major release and impact and typical channel bill was categorized as level 7