 Good morning everybody. Congratulations everyone for making it here before the traffic descends on us. My name is Nancy Lindborg. I'm the President of the United States Institute of Peace and I'm delighted to welcome you here this morning. Both those of you in the room and those of you who are joining via webcast. We're very pleased to be able to host today a conversation with Ambassador Don Booth, the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan on his last day. I'd also like to recognize Ambassador Garong, the South Sudanese Ambassador to the U.S. Welcome. Pleased to have you here with us. As many of you know, USIP was founded in 1984 by Congress, dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible, that it is essential for national and international security, and that it's a very practical undertaking and we work with partners around the world to help equip people with the tools, the knowledge, and the training that helps them manage conflict so it doesn't become violent and to resolve it when it does. And we have had a long engagement, as many of you in this room have, with Sudan and then Sudan and South Sudan, as has our government. This has been an area of deep bipartisan concern and support for several decades. And unfortunately, despite a lot of important efforts, a lot of important results, including finally an end to a terrible North-South civil war, a peaceful referendum and election, we are still seeing continued conflict and divides that afflict both countries, including a vicious new civil war in South Sudan. And just over a month ago, we gathered here at USIP with a panel of experts who expressed a uniform deep concern about the warnings of ethnic cleansing and even possible genocide in South Sudan. And while the government of South Sudan recently announced a national dialogue, we have seen, unfortunately, little movement on either humanitarian access or the reduction in violence among the armed opposition. We're seeing ongoing fighting in Equatorious Region where families are displaced. We saw a camp in Uganda go from grasslands to a refugee camp of 500,000 displaced families in just over six months. And one-third of the population has been categorized as severely food insecure. That means nearly 5 million people are approaching famine conditions. And there are challenges in Sudan as well, where negotiations on a cessation of hostilities between the government and armed groups remain deadlocked. We see this in Darfur, Southern Kordafan and Blue Nile, and millions remain displaced as a result of sustained violent and insecurity. The U.S. administration has engaged in intensive negotiations over many months to make progress against these conditions. And in the announcement of the easing of sanctions this week, the U.S. administration noted progress in Sudan on humanitarian access, implementation of ceasefires, regional cooperation and other tracks of engagement. We know that significant work remains ahead to support the Sudanese as they seek to create an inclusive, sustainable peace. We have seen that in a cartoon-based national dialogue, there has been space for real and vibrant conversation. But we also have seen limited space for civic and political opposition to discuss or debate key issues. And many of these who are believed to be linked to recent civil disobedience or political opposition remain or have been detained. So the bipartisan support as we look ahead will be absolutely essential. We hope that soon a replacement for the essential role that has been played by Ambassador Booth will be forthcoming soon. And today we're delighted to be able to hear from Ambassador Booth. And I'm very pleased that our own Ambassador Princeton Lyman, a senior adviser here at USIP, is here with us for today's discussion. And he will moderate the conversation. I think most of you know Ambassador Lyman, his long commitment to these issues, his previous stint as a special envoy. And with that, it is my great pleasure to introduce our guest speaker, Ambassador Donald Booth. I first met Ambassador Booth in Ethiopia, where he was ambassador. He knows the region and the issues extremely well. He was appointed US Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan in August of 2013. That's a long time in this kind of a position where he's spending a lot of time on the plane and working tirelessly to address these critical and very sobering issues. This is the cap of a long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service, where in addition to Ethiopia, he served as an ambassador to Zambia and Liberia. Ambassador Booth, we deeply appreciate all that you've done on this critical portfolio and throughout your career. We thank you for tremendous amounts of dedication and commitment, and we welcome you here today to hear your reflections. Please join me in welcoming Ambassador Booth. Thank you, Nancy, for that great introduction, and thank you all for joining us today. Ambassador Lyman, I want to thank you also for agreeing to moderate the discussion after my remarks. I will start by saying that if there's one thing that I'm going to take away from my time as Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan is the depth of interest and involvement that so many people here in the United States have had on Sudan and South Sudan, which are distant and complex places. And yet all of you know and care so much about them and their people. You help inform and animate U.S. policy. And we've not always agreed, but I can say confidently that our role in the Sudan's would be much diminished without the rich debate resulting from your engagement. And so I want to say today, thank you. I'm grateful for this opportunity to offer some reflections as I step aside as Special Envoy. Since I took this job in August of 2013, a tremendous amount has happened in Sudan and South Sudan. More than I'll be able to review today, even though I will speak for about 55 minutes. So let me begin with South Sudan. The world's youngest country has known more war than peace. To understand the collapse of December 2013, we have to look at the conditions that led to it. There was historic marginalization and neglect of the South coupled with a half century of war. And that meant that the world's youngest country lacked the institutional foundation on which to build a stable modern state. This traumatic history meant the people of South Sudan never had an opportunity to forge a united national vision. Despite billions of dollars in aid designed to build state capacity, and that effort I think is worthy of the world's highest level of support for its own critical review. The nation's leaders struggle to make the transition from insurgent movement to governing class. Thus it may not be surprising that the South Sudan I encountered in 2013 featured leaders with a sense of entitlement and focused on securing power and wealth, not state building. Two years after independence, we saw critical initiatives such as the implementation and implementing economic reforms drifting and stalling. Meanwhile, the influence and authority of the security organs were expanding. The root causes of South Sudan's conflict were already manifest by the summer of 2013. Indeed, they had been present even before independence. For a time they'd been papered over by the shared goal of independence, but they were always there. Tensions over the border, the early stages of the economic crisis, ethnic conflict in Zhonglei and other areas, the proliferation of militias, inter-communal animosity and bloodshed, and political instability at the center. These were all on the rise when I began the job in August of 2013. So too was the eagerness of President Kier to eliminate alternative points of view and consolidate his own power. The July 2013 dismissal of the cabinet and the firing of Vice President Riaq Mashar jolted the country. In December, when President Kier took steps to tighten his grip on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, followed by a struggle in the presidential guard, followed by targeted killings of new air in Cuba, and that triggered the civil conflict that continues today. Those of you here are familiar with the details of that conflict and of the international efforts to bring an end to it. But I'd like to say, start by saying a word about the role of the region. It's worth emphasizing that faced with a civil war on their borders, the eagad countries did come together. They agreed to mediate between the warring parties. I was personally involved from the beginning in securing commitments from President Kier and Riaq Mashar to engage in mediated peace negotiations, and I work closely in support of that eagad mediation. I'll always appreciate the dedication of the eagad mediation team led by Seyum Mesfin, and I very much respect the work that they did. But South Sudan's leaders were not interested in compromise. So talks dragged on despite numerous emergency eagad summits. I think there were nine total during the period of negotiations. After more than a year of futile negotiations and a failed ceasefire agreement, eagad welcomed first the so-called AU5 representation from each of the five regions of Africa, and ultimately of the eagad plus, which included the United States and our Troika partners, the UK and Norway, as well as China and the European Union. The eagad plus was there to bring greater pressure to bear on South Sudan's leaders to achieve peace. I mention all this because I would argue that the future diplomacy towards South Sudan is going to require a similar complicated mixture of regional and international efforts with the United States at the forefront. Let me also say this, we have made mistakes. The events of the last six months have shown that we in the region placed too much faith in the idea that Salvekir and Riyadh Mishar could peacefully share power. At certain points, we overestimated the influence we had on South Sudan's political leaders. I wish we had taken steps earlier to forge an international consensus on the need for an arms embargo to stem the flow of weapons into South Sudan. Fundamentally, I believe we in the United States wanted peace for South Sudan far more than its leaders did. And like the people of South Sudan, we have been unable to ensure that the interests of the unarmed civilian population are valued more than those of the leaders who are empowered by personal armed forces. History shows this. In May 2014, Secretary Kerry, during his visit to Juba, secured agreement to pursue peace talks on the basis of a power sharing arrangement within a time-bound transitional government. We then championed the notion that a peace agreement had to be more than a power sharing deal among combatants, that it needed input from other South Sudanese parties and civil society organizations, and that it had to prepare the way for reforms needed to make South Sudan a viable nation. President Obama's personal efforts during a visit to the region in July 2015 spurred a final unified regional push for Kier and Mashaar to finally sign the peace agreement in August 2015. Given subsequent events, however, I recognize that there is a temptation now to discard the agreement. I would strongly caution against that. It really is more than an agreement between combatants. It's a blueprint for reforming the South Sudanese state, one that remains as valid as ever in its provisions to install in one of the world's least developed countries important constitutional, economic, security, and justice reforms and institutions. The agreement required that the combatants who signed it avoid violence long enough for these reforms to be agreed upon and implemented. But sadly, that did not happen. I recognize that at present there is no functioning ceasefire. The government is not representative of all South Sudan's political factions, and there is no serious work underway on reforms. But these remain worthy goals, and I would argue that the agreement is not a hollow accomplishment. It remains the point of reference in statements by both the government and the opposition, and we should continue to encourage a return to the foundations of that agreement, and we should be present when the conditions shift to allow for its sincere implementation. I often hear the argument that the United States is somehow not doing enough in South Sudan. It's worth recalling all we have done, both before the conflict began in December 2013 and since the signing of the peace agreement. The United States maintained its presence in South Sudan even at the most difficult and dangerous times. That was not easy. We continued to push for political agreements that would allow a cessation of hostilities to hold. We spearheaded fundraising among donors to support key institutions of the peace agreement. We sought to organize the international community to help stave off economic disaster, and we have led the international response to the humanitarian crisis that Nancy referred to. It's actually the latest estimate from the UN is 7 million people in need of emergency food help. We responded with $1.9 billion in emergency humanitarian assistance since the start of the conflict. To the accusations of South Sudanese leaders that the international community failed to fund the peace agreement, I would note that neither we nor any donor nation was ever going to fund transitional institutions that were hijacked to serve the interests of narrow political factions. If the leaders had truly embraced peace, the United States and other members of the international community were prepared to help consolidate that peace. The stale argument that somehow the breakdown of peace is the result of our inaction is illustrative of South Sudan's leader's inability to acknowledge their own culpability for the disastrous situation that South Sudan now faces. Moreover, there are recent false accusations that the Troika is plotting regime change in South Sudan are both egregious and deeply offensive. Today, South Sudan is a failing state. And unfortunately, both EGAD and the African Union are currently frozen in their response. President Kier's government appears to be counting on regional and international in action, or even turning a blind eye as it seeks to resolve the country's political crisis via military force. That is unacceptable and it also will not work. We are rightly alarmed when a senior U.N. official warns of the potential for genocide. But we should not let that word and the inevitable debate about whether or not it truly applies to distract us from what is currently and inarguably happening. Hundreds of not thousands of civilians killed monthly. Tens of thousands crossing the border as refugees and increasingly complex conflict involving an increasing number of warring parties. The United States has to seek new approaches. But without question, the United States should continue to play its prominent historical role with regard to South Sudan. Ending violence in South Sudan will require finding new ways to open channels of dialogue between all parties in conflict. The national dialogue process called by President Kier may offer a constructive alternative to violence, but only if it is impartially led and it is truly inclusive. I encourage the next administration to one, continue efforts to push the African Union toward establishment of the hybrid court for South Sudan. To achieve accountability for the abhorrent crimes committed during the conflict, including widespread and shocking sexual violence. Two, to base any support for a future DDR efforts on a realistic and affordable end state for South Sudan's security sector. South Sudan has been an over militarized state since its inception and that needs to change. Three, to press for reform of the structure of the state through a transparent and coherent constitutional drafting process. And four, to make the reform of public financial management a precondition for future support to South Sudan's development. A final thought on South Sudan. The situation that led us to seek an arms embargo and targeted sanctions at the United Nations Security Council in December has not improved since our failure to secure passage of that resolution. While we have sought to use some of the tools at our disposal, including a process to impose visa restrictions on South Sudanese figures linked to official corruption in order to address the government's policies of violence corruption. I would encourage the next administration to continue to examine seriously what we can do to incentivize the parties to choose a better path forward. I now want to turn to Sudan. My engagement with Sudan goes back a ways, goes back as far as my engagement with my friend and colleague, Ambassador Lyman. In the early 80s I was a desk officer for Sudan at a time when relations were good. It was a time that Sudan was a friend in a bipolar era. And because Sudan was on our side in that struggle, we provided aid and political support. However, as the conflict in South Sudan resumed beginning in 1983 and those supporting international terrorism gained power in cartoon we found that our government shared very few values or interests. Since that time we have sought mainly to engage cartoon through pressure, to prod them to peace talks with the South, to end support for terrorism, to stop the horrific abuses in Darfur and to allow humanitarian access to address the suffering of the Sudanese people. This approach had mixed results. We have seen incremental bursts of positive news, certainly the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005. It showed that diplomacy and the incentive of sanctions relief could bear fruit even with an unfriendly regime. We've also had setbacks such as failures of the numerous Darfur peace agreement and the renewed outbreak in 2011 of conflict in the two areas. The independence of South Sudan was a moment of great hope but also one of great tension and anxiety. Ambassador Lyman played a critical role in working through the messy post-independence period and addressing key issues that threatened to undo that accomplishment. Fortunately and thanks to efforts and the African Union high-level implementation panel, as well as Ambassador Lyman and his Troika colleagues, Juba and Khartoum signed the 2012 cooperation agreements that plotted a course for the two countries to live side-by-side in peace. Unfortunately, suspicion about support to each other's rebels continues to undermine bilateral relations, blocking progress in border demarcation, trade resolution of disputed areas, among other issues. Regrettably, we are no closer to a final resolution on the status of Abye than we were in 2013. But with a steady presence of the UN peacekeeping mission, UNISFA, and some strategic assistance from the United States, the people who actually live in Abye have been spared renewed conflict in recent years. Our legacy of pressure on Sudan and the messy process of South Sudanese independence still reverberated when I came in as envoy in 2013. I regularly heard the accusation that the United States had moved the goalposts, that is that we had failed to lift sanctions when Sudan had accepted the results of South Sudan's referendum and ultimately its secession. Of course, at that time, the war in the two areas was beginning again, which in our view is Sudan shifting the playing field rather than us moving the goalposts. This created a lack of trust that productive engagement could be possible between our countries. This meant we had no leverage or influence over Khartoum's decisions. I wanted us to go beyond this unproductive game of tit-for-tat accusations of bad faith. I believed there was an opportunity to build something that would have significant positive impact for the people of Sudan and also serve our national interests. A breakthrough came when we invited Ibrahim Ghandour who was then an advisor to President Bashir, he's now the foreign minister, to visit the United States in February of 2015. Since that visit we have engaged in frank and increasingly frequent discussions about the steps needed to build trust and allow both countries to make progress toward achieving their respective goals. In this process our goal was constant ending internal conflict in Sudan and seeing Sudanese address the root causes of instability that have plagued Sudan since independence. This required looking for ways to open new engagement with the government while also enhancing engagement with the opposition, particularly Sudan call, a coalition that includes armed and unarmed opposition and civil society. It meant working with partners to construct a viable peace process. Along with the AU and other partners we helped modify what had been a compartmentalized peace process that treated Sudan's conflicts as separate and unrelated. The DDPD Doha document for peace in Darfur and the AU high level panel process was leading for the two areas. We now have parallel cessation of hostilities discussions under the African Union high level panel that once concluded and I must say they came very close to successfully concluding in August last year. It would lead to political talks to address specific local grievances and ultimately these would lead to participation of the opposition in an inclusive national political dialogue as both government and the Sudan call committed to in the roadmap of March 2016. This national political discussion was to address the systemic roots of conflict. It is imperative that all the parties continue to adhere to that roadmap. I want to pause here and I can already sense that there might be some eyebrows raised in the audience. When I talk about the Sudanese opposition groups and I must say that I think we need to be careful not to hold them in unquestioned high esteem. I think it is important to be clear eyed about whom we are dealing with. I have found that some of the leaders of the Sudanese opposition those with guns are more than willing to ignore the interests and well-being of the ordinary civilians in favor of their own political ambitions. It seems to me that just as there are hardliners within the Sudanese government who hold on to the false notion that a military victory can be achieved so too there are leaders of the armed groups who believe that they are right to fight on no matter what the cost until they get what they want politically. Power. For example, I just returned from Paris where I met with the SPLM North which I have been negotiating with, talking with for over two months now on a proposal that would be very much of help to their people. They rejected this offer of the United States to deliver humanitarian medical assistance to people in their zones of control in the two areas. This is a huge missed opportunity to advance peace negotiations and to help the people that they claim to be fighting for. So even as we hold the government to its commitment to peace we must also demand that the opposition set aside personal political ambitions and put their people first. I also know that many here have difficulty seeing the Sudanese government as a credible partner in the peace process. I understand what drives such thinking but if we allow ourselves to be bound by a mindset such as that we lose all hope of peacefully advancing causes that are important including human rights of civilians in Sudan. We believe that there is a way forward that would motivate Sudanese government to take positive action while allowing us to advance a broad range of U.S. interests. The key was turning the latent leverage of existing sanctions into active leverage by putting sanctions relief on the table in exchange for improved behavior by the Sudanese government. We understood that if we wanted to get the government to overcome its doubts we would have to offer a real incentive and prove we meant it. The five tracks of engagement that we launched in June 2016 required Sudan to undertake and sustain a series of actions over six months. If Sudan made progress and sustained action in all those tracks we offered to provide broad sanctions relief. I want to note that this plan was initiated under a desire to end hostilities and improve humanitarian access. It was not the result of counterterrorism cooperation nor was that the priority. Many have made this assumption in recent days and I want to clarify the facts on that matter. Counterterrorism cooperation alone would not have yielded this result. This shift in U.S. policy. Since the end of June Sudan announced a unilateral cessation of hostilities in Darfur in the two areas and we have observed a significant reduction in clashes involving government forces. Moreover, Sudan has not launched the annual dry season offensive that began every December or January the latest since 2011. They now have extended their unilateral cessation of hostilities for six months and they know that any resumption of offensive military action would risk the reimposition of sanctions. Meanwhile, according to our assessment Sudan has ceased providing material support to armed groups in South Sudan. Sudan has partnered with the United States and countering ISIL and other terrorist groups as well as the threat of the Lord's Resistance Army. And finally, Sudan has taken significant steps to reduce ongoing obstructions to humanitarian access and to improve the environment for humanitarian organizations and the United Nations. However, much more progress needs to be made in the coming months. The key is to sustain momentum. We want to see Sudan make progress, not stand still and certainly not regress. We have generated some momentum for a more productive bilateral engagement. This is not to say that there has been much progress on every important issue in our bilateral relationship. But our five-track engagement showed Sudan's government that if it abided by its commitments, we would abide by ours. And it puts the incoming administration in a better position with an interlocutor that trusts working with us. The Treasury Department issued general licenses that give immediate relief from the trade embargo. The Treasury 13 executive order gives Sudan a path toward formal revocation of the trade embargo in six months. The next administration will have the ability to offer further incentives toward bilateral normalization or to reimpose some or all of the sanctions depending upon the actions of the Sudanese government. I know many of you will take issue with our argument or that it has taken actions sufficient to merit last week's announcement. I respect your position and I offer you this encouragement. Sustain your engagement with us. Continue to monitor and report on what happens on the ground and provide us that information. The executive order that requires a report by the Secretary of State in six months says it must take input information from all parties including NGOs. Please take advantage of that. When I met with President Obama in August 2013 at the beginning of my mission he gave me a simple direction. He wanted to see, he said two countries at peace internally and with each other. I wish I could say that is what we have today. It is not. But on Sudan I am optimistic. As I said we leave the incoming administration with new opportunities. Ones that would have been unimaginable eight or even four years ago. Even relations between Sudan and South Sudan are more stable today although they remain fraught with challenges such as Abye. But the recent agreement on oil revenue between the two countries is a promising sign. South Sudan is as fragile as it has been since independence. Frankly the international community struggles to find the tools to deal with leaders who hide behind the rhetoric of sovereignty while engaging in self-serving actions that undermine their country's future. I am confident that only a truly inclusive national political process could address the crisis in South Sudan. But I am less confident in issuing prescriptions about how to bring about such a process. Any process that simply rebuilds the SPLM, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, is doomed to fail as it will at best only solidify Sudan's status as a one-party state. Among my hopes in speaking today is to encourage the incoming administration to continue the tradition in Republican and Democratic administrations alike of serious, active engagement with Sudan and South Sudan. In Sudan we have a rare opportunity to revise dramatically the terms of a historically problematic relationship in a way that serves our interests as well as Sudan's. In South Sudan, while I do not doubt this with its leaders will continue, I see a country whose citizens still look to the United States as a true friend and a force for good. This is a trust we should not break even as we are forced to reconsider how best to help South Sudan achieve lasting peace. I want to close much as I began by saying how encouraged I am by the undiminished energy in my room and of the many people I have met during my time as special envoy who have continued despite frustrations and challenges to continue working on Sudan and South Sudan. Our missions in Juba and Khartoum under the leadership of Ambassador Mali Fee and Sharjeh Stephen Kutsis are in good hands. I am encouraged by the energy and interest of members of Congress, many of whom I've been speaking with for the past two weeks on both sides of the aisle and their interest in Sudan and South Sudan. I am now after more than three years as special envoy stepping down. It's all of you who will continue to work these issues to search for solutions to grab on to the slivers of optimism when they come and ultimately I hope find new ways to move forward. I wish you all great success. Thank you very much. Don, thank you so much for what is a really extraordinary speech. Candid, forthright, comprehensive and perhaps controversial as well. No less so than the subjects you have been dealing with over the last three-plus years. Just a note on we don't have a enormous amount of time so what we're going to do is ask a question. We're going to take written questions on cards. We have staff available so if you raise your hand a staff person will come and you write the questions and we'll take them. While that is starting, Don, let me ask a couple. Let me start with South Sudan. You've laid out extremely well the situation. You've pointed to the importance of the peace agreement of 2015 as the structure around which peace can be built. What combination of what kind of incentives then would be needed, carrots and sticks by the region, by the international community to make that process viable? That's sort of been the fundamental question of how do you incentivize South Sudan's leaders to to put aside the personal political ambitions agreed to work together to try to put South Sudan on a formal footing. The problem with coming up with carrots and I've held many, many meetings with donors and other international partners to try to see if carrots couldn't be devised but short of supporting the institutions of the peace agreement itself getting governments highly skeptical because of actions that continue on the ground by political leaders and by statements by political leaders, highly skeptical about providing that carrot, that support. I talked early on after the agreement was signed about the need for a peace dividend yet what I found was countries said we will never get through our legislatures the ability to provide more funding until we see some progress. So there's a little bit of a chicken and egg. The other thing that we tried and also didn't achieve was really to use a bit of a stick and that was the effort to in the Security Council in December last year to try to get to at least putting the arms of Argo in place to stem the ability to buy more weapons and ammunition but also to undermine the ability to use some of the most lethal weapons in the arsenal of the government and also to put a shot across the bow of a few individuals who very blatantly had argued that the way forward was fighting and through stirring up ethnic hatred and division. So that combination of carrots and sticks yes the carrots are going to be very hard until there's some progress so that's where the pressure is going to have to come and I think that pressure ultimately has to start with the region it has to start with the region and then work its way through the African Union and then the Security Council can be an effective mechanism I think for imposing that but right now the message that has been received I think the international community is not united enough to impose any penalties and is not convinced enough to provide any incentives this is a problem that we have to work through You think that it will change at all we have a new UN Secretary General who's on his way to the AU summit and then on to Juba we will have presumably at the end of the month a new commissioner at the Africa Union do you think this offers an opportunity perhaps or some renewed high level diplomacy Well the new Secretary General has already called for the Security Council to take appropriate measures to pressure the parties forward I did not specify what those might be and we certainly would hope that whoever becomes the new chairperson of the African Union will take an active role in trying to solve the problem in South Sudan the region at this point EGAD states remain once again disunited in their views on this they're pursuing their own national interests in South Sudan and so I think we need that higher level engagement of the African Union to make the breakthrough let me just ask one question also on Sudan and I will start with some of the questions coming from I think one of the questions about the engagement and the agreements that was announced in which you describe let me put it bluntly as I've seen comments from a number of organizations you have a government with a president who's been indicted by the international criminal court for genocide and other acts there have been lots of terrible acts committed over the course of the last number of years is the lifting of sanctions going to be seen in any way in Sudan as a reward as a kind of a buy for all of that because now they're on a different path with us how do you balance that history, that ongoing history, that history of indictments and this new relationship you've described well let me start by saying that the engagement of the past six months we made it very clear at the outset that there would be no change in our position vis-a-vis President Bashir and his issues with the ICC we made it clear there were other issues that were not on the table at this point such as the desire of Sudan to be removed from the state sponsor of terrorism list and the desire to be able to have the support needed to move to debt relief so there are still many points of leverage that we have with the government we also made it very clear that the performance of six months would need to continue for the sanctions relief to continue so we think we do have leverage and that leverage I believe has truly increased by the fact that instead of now saying you need to do X, Y and Z and if you do we promise we'll do something in a situation where the government would believe we would actually deliver the fact that we have done that taken that step now of sanctions relief they have something to lose now and there's also a credibility as we go forward and discuss other issues that there would be a U.S. follow-through if the Sudanese do the things that we would press them to do so I think this has really increased our leverage the Sudanese will inevitably try to portray this you know the Americans have come along to see that we're doing the right things that's clearly not the message that we are putting out publicly and privately and the actions of Sudan will be what determines whether the sanctions relief is permanent or not not the rhetoric let me turn to the essence here relating to the role of youth the role of the diaspora this is particularly I think on south Sudan obviously those are two different constituencies although they overlap but I wonder if you could speak to both we have some youth leaders here with us at USIP for a while we've done that for some time there are other programs like that so could you speak to that how do they play a role well I've met many times with diaspora groups and spoken to many of them and I've always encouraged that one if they're working together in the diaspora they can live in the United States in peace they are a model and they can show their people at home that it's possible and they should engage they also have skills that could be brought to bear at a point when south Sudan is peaceful enough to begin to go back and do the rebuilding so I think the diasporas have a useful role to play I think we need to be careful not to overplay the role that a diaspora can play however I've worked in many countries where I've seen diasporas who left during civil wars come back with their skills, with their great ideas with their American or other ways of doing things and are resented and not just by senior officials but resented by the people because they left when things were tough so it's not always easy for the diaspora to contribute and I don't think there's any magic answer for that youth just like with women's groups, religious community we tried very hard to include those voices in the peace negotiations EGAD mediators agreed with that and tried very hard for the parties themselves who insisted that if a civil society organization wanted to be at the peace talks they had to join one delegation or the other you had to take sides that's how it was done during the CPA I've heard more times, that's how it was done during the CPA so it in effect diluted those voices though I do remember one occasion during the peace negotiations when there were a number of groups including a number of the religious leaders in the room and the arguments between the government and opposition delegations became rather hot and heated and so the mediation called to break and everybody went out to get tea and the religious leaders took members of both delegations aside and gave them a piece of their minds and things calmed down so there's certainly a value in that I've also mentioned there was a youth meeting in Nairobi I think two weeks ago to try to talk about how to get a political process an inclusive political process underway in South Sudan and unfortunately the government branded that as an effort to undermine the peace agreement and subvert the government so there has to be an openness by those in power to listen to these groups and we need to continue to encourage them in that direction you mentioned the importance of constituting the hybrid court and one of the questions is what would that mean? Should the court be pursuing for example the leadership President Keeher, former Vice President Riaq Mashaar others as part of this evolutionary process and how would that impact on your vision of a peace process you said we're not for regime change but what's the role of the court in this regard the argument is often and has been made by many in South Sudan that you need peace before you can have reconciliation and accountability the problem is how do you get to peace if people see that those who committed atrocities who ordered atrocities that there's no path to them facing accountability where's the trust so the idea behind the court is it's up to the court to decide who it's going to investigate who it might indict based on that investigation there's a lot of information that's been gathered by the United Nations by the African Union's commission of inquiry led by President Al-Basemjo by civil society groups in fact the United States funded an effort to document and allow civil society to document a lot of the information on what had gone on during the conflict so there's a lot of information there that the court could draw on I'm not going to prejudge who they should or should not go after that's up to the court but the sense that those who brought the country these horrific acts can face accountability of some sort I think we'll begin to help South Sudan in the page so that people will have confidence that their leaders will actually work for them for their benefit and not just for the benefit of the leaders themselves I have several questions here about the next administration one question has this new policy on Sudan or generally on South Sudan been discussed with the new administration do you have any sense of the new administration's approach to these issues this is a question I get from the press a lot as I think does everybody else in the outgoing administration the incoming administration has been briefed on the five track engagement but I am not in a position to opine or even guess at what positions the incoming that would be inappropriate for me to do we have to let them speak for themselves as to how they're going to tackle these part of my purpose today was to give some ideas for how to move forward on Sudan and South Sudan but the main message that I wanted to convey is that these two countries there's been a lot of US engagement a lot of bipartisan interest in and we hope that the level of engagement will continue so that both of these countries can get to the point where they are indeed at peace with themselves internally and at peace with each other there are several questions about various international actors the UN the UN peacekeepers China you mentioned the Troika how do they are they playing a role now there's been a lot of criticism of un-miss in South Sudan in terms of its ability or willingness to protect civilians you mentioned in APA evidently still doing a good job but a lot of problems with UNAMID and Darfur so you have several of these different international players how do you see those roles do they come together are they being coordinated what do you see for that in the future and that goes for Troika for China let me tackle the UN peacekeeping missions first both un-miss in South Sudan and UNAMID and Darfur face one critical challenge which is a fundamental problem in peacekeeping and that the mandates that they've been given are first and foremost protection of civilians unfortunately in both of those cases they have to protect the civilians against their own government now the UN goes into a country with the consent of the government and it's a member state and so there's this tension that exists inevitably when the UN that's there with the acquiescence of the national government has to take actions that get between the citizens to protect them and their own government there's no good answer to how to deal with that that is why those missions are perhaps more tenuous than many other peacekeeping missions where there's a clear for example in Congo where the UN is working with the government against opposition groups protecting people against the opposition groups not the government so that's a real challenge there's also at times an over-tasking of what the UN can do I mean let's remember the size of South Sudan and the fact that there are fewer than 15,000 peacekeepers that are there to do the job they get spread out very thinly Darfur the same thing to one of the brand new non-camps of people displaced by fighting in Jebel Mara and there was a reinforced company of about 120 UN peacekeepers there and they had a non-defined perimeter camp housing about 25,000 people that they had to protect against all comers if you will in the impossible situation particularly when people in the camp still had to go out to get firewood to collect water etc so I really do have to admire the efforts that the serious peacekeepers have undertaken to try to protect people in this very difficult situation the role of the international community I would say that in South Sudan the international community was actually very united and the engagement that we had with China in South Sudan was perhaps one of the best examples of cooperation between our countries and that we shared common interest in seeing a restoration of peace in a sustainable restoration of peace not simply a Band-Aid we may have come at it from slightly different national interests but those national interests coincided in South Sudan I've worked very closely with the Chinese they're a member of EGAT Plus and I've worked very closely with my Chinese counterpart Envoy counterpart likewise the Troika, the UK and Norway and the European Union all of whom have envoys and now actually in the last three months both Germany and France have appointed envoys to deal with Sudan and South Sudan so many countries are actually increasing their focus and this is quite a change from 2013 the first meeting I went to was of the Troika envoys in Oslo and my Norwegian UK and EU counterparts all announced they were leaving in two weeks and none of them had a replacement and it didn't it took the outbreak of conflict in Juba to get the UK and Norway to appoint new envoys the international community has to work with the region to work with the African Union if it's going to be effective whether it's working in support of the African Union high level panel on Sudan internal negotiations COH negotiations or on Sudan South Sudan issues we can't just go this alone it has to have the backing of those who have the most to gain and most to lose the same with South Sudan EGAT can't be ignored but at this point as I say does not have the cohesion that it had during the mediation period and so we may have to look more to the African Union to help take that leadership role forward a very specific question comes up on South Sudan again if I can it touches a little bit on your answer on the hybrid court but you said that the current government in South Sudan is not inclusive now there's some controversy about the role of the former Vice President Mishar he was forced to flee the country after the events of last year he's now I believe abroad in South Africa some people think he has to be part of the solution other people feel that it's better not but it comes back to this question of inclusiveness who represents how do you get inclusiveness does he have a role and what brings forward how does one deal with that well I'll tell you and explain why we've taken the position that we have since July and that is it's quite clear that South Iqir and Riyadh Mishar cannot coexist in the same government in the same city and both live and not have in Cuba so there's a very practical question of if you focus it on individuals and you then set yourself up for further violence if you can look at it as interest groups ethnic groups political groups then I think you can begin to have a way forward to start that dialogue if you start the dialogue to opposing polls who are going to create a clash then that dialogue won't go anywhere if you can start that dialogue with a broader group of people and the other problem is frankly in the case of Riyadh Mishar and President Iqir is this notion and this was a notion they very forcefully pushed throughout the whole mediation peace negotiations that needed to be in the room no one else you didn't need representatives of other parts of South Sudan the government claimed Equatoria is with us Equatorians don't need to be here and sadly there was one negotiating around where three governors of the Equatorian states were brought in by the government and they all basically said yes the government represents us they changed their mind a few months later at one point used to verify validate this position so it can't be binary it has to be inclusive and it's not really up to us to determine exactly how that works we want South Sudanese to begin talking about that among themselves we're encouraged by the efforts of the United Nations Special Envoy Fink Hason who has been talking to all parties to try to find a way forward again being too prescriptive is not useful but we also felt it was not useful to set up again another binary antagonistic effort to move forward when I say the peace agreement should not be abandoned you have all the reform elements of the peace agreement which remain totally valid and need to be pursued in terms of the power sharing that needs to be revised based on these more inclusive political talks so that the country can get on with the reform parts of the peace agreement there's a question that I very anxious to hear your answer and that is looking back at 15 years of Special Envoy I can't I lose track of how many we've had it depends on who you count as Special Envoy but it's at least seven or eight do we need another Special Envoy to see for a Special Envoy you've mentioned about the importance with your troika partners that they have one there was a point at which I have to say when the peace agreements were signed between Sudan and South Sudan in 2012 and then reaffirmed in 2013 that maybe the focus would be on these internal issues you would have a more normal structure and then more work is out in South Sudan so what would you say about the role should there be another Special Envoy to succeed you how would you define that role there's always got to be some dividing line between what a Special Envoy does and what are serving ambassadors in the capital state the way that I see that you need a Special Envoy as long as there are negotiations going on outside the capital outside the countries as long as there are groups outside of the country that need to be engaged so for example when the peace agreement was signed for South Sudan and the opposition went back and the transitional government was formed the view that I took was that there was actually a relatively small role left for the Special Envoy that all the political players were back inside South Sudan and it was the responsibility of the U.S. ambassador to South Sudan to deal with that where I could add value as a Special Envoy was in dealing with the broader international community to try to bring together working with my USAID colleagues bring together other potential donors and how we could support the elements of the institutions of the peace agreement and ultimately help to stabilize South Sudan economically so that's harder to do if you're a sitting ambassador now arguably that role could be fulfilled by someone else in the government the Assistant Secretary for Africa or one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries as long as there's such an intensive and time-consuming demands from one or two countries it probably makes sense to have a Special Envoy for that because it will diminish the times that they can devote to other parts of the continent. On Sudan we still have international negotiations we still have the AU High-Level Panel that's trying to bring together the opposition outside of Sudan with the government of Sudan it's trying to focus on the South Sudan relationship again very hard as a sitting ambassador to to be able to engage opposition groups out of the country often armed opposition groups once the government has put a debt sentence on the heads of how do you justify doing that and still work with the government that's something a Special Envoy can do if you're dealing between two countries negotiations again that's a place for a Special Envoy so yes I still think in the Sudan-South Sudan context there is a role for a Special Envoy I'm not saying that it couldn't be taken over by another government official but I think it would diminish the ability of that official to to be able to deal with a whole host of other hot button issues that will be on their plate You're ready to pass the baton Let me ask one last question I know we've gone over time but I think I've covered most of the issues here I wanted to ask you to put this set of countries Sudan-South Sudan into the regional context you served as Ambassador to Ethiopia you worked on that whole region etc if you're looking at it strategically from the interests of the United States and the interest stretching from Libya on one side and as hell Chad etc Ethiopia and Eritrea etc Sudan and South Sudan does that impact for example on the engagement process that you talked about opening a dialogue and beginning to have a more workable relationship is that also part of the context of the region how do you see putting this if you were explaining it not to the next administration but also to the American public so important Sudan we've seen in the past has embraced international terrorism and they could go in that direction again many of the people who were involved in that are still either in government or on the wings of government in Khartoum the problem of greater spaces we've seen that voids are filled Somalia is a perfect example so opening greater space if not active support for those who are trying to destabilize nation states to try to drive a fundamentalist vision across the whole swath of Sahelian Africa and North Africa we have this interest to find a way to prevent that this after all is becoming and I think being shown from what's happened in Syria as an existential threat to our European partners if there's mass migration as a result of conflict and so the investment that we make in trying to keep Sudan from becoming an ungoverned space if it's governed in fact that was one of the things that I really took away from my visits to four of the five Darfur states is what the people really wanted was the government to govern and protect them against people that admittedly the government itself had armed to fight the rebellion and now the government really does have a very serious task ahead which is to find a way to disarm all of these tribal militias that it has used as allies over the past years and now actually if it's going to exercise its sovereignty in Darfur it's going to have to reign them in on South Sudan again there's the problem of again failed state, ungoverned spaces that people can take advantage of but I think our engagement in South Sudan has been very much driven more from a humanitarian perspective, humanitarian impulse and you know it's interesting when the United States has a historic relationship with the country that also feeds a bit of the that country looking to the U.S. to provide help and guidance and I've served in another one of those countries Liberia where the historic relationship goes back now almost 200 years and I think again is not in our interest to just turn our backs when we did that in Liberia it descended into 14 years of brutal civil war so staying engaged and trying to do what's good for the people whose interest we have had in mind and advocated for for the past decades again just turning our back on that I think will have a cost to us and in terms of our own international prestige well Don, I have to say the country owes you a debt of gratitude I think you told me just this last year you've put in a quarter of a million miles in travel and I know how extremely hard and dedicated you have been over three and a half years it costs your family your time and effort your absolute refusal to be daunted the difficult challenges of forging new policies and relationships dealing with a range of problems you've done an extraordinary service and I think the country owes you gratitude I think the people of the region owe you gratitude and we certainly do and I would ask everybody to please thank you Don