 Right. And that will come to you, of course, in just a moment, but let me let me get back to the initial point of the Taliban. Everybody is wondering what is on their mind. And some people have even talked about Taliban 2.0. This is a new Taliban. They have perhaps themselves learned some of the lessons throughout the first rain. They're trying to re innovate themselves, reinvent themselves to the outside world, even using social media these days. Is what do you what do you make of it? Do you think the Taliban 2.0 is a PR stunt? Do you think they have changed? What can we expect from them? I think you're right to want to talk about the future. Because we have seen that it was the death of this American neo-conservant of this theory, which actually privileges the idea that democracy is being made in relation to peace. Realists like Kissinger think that peace is the most important. The neo-conservants think that it is the idea that comes from democracy or justice that is the most important. But now this neo-conservant theory is, I think, dead. But now you have to see, indeed, the future. And personally, as a Frenchman, I am here to open our embassy in Kabul. Because we have to recognize, and in international relations, we have to recognize the States and maintain relations with the States, not with the regimes. And I am completely opposed to the American doctrine. But as soon as there is a regime that does not like the Americans, they stop maintaining diplomatic relations with this regime. This is the case, for example, of Iran. It is completely abnormal that Americans have no direct relations with Iran. They have differences. Very good. And we have to, I think, open our embassy, try to work with the Taliban, who are there for a long time, as the Chinese Communist Party is there for a long time in China. And so we do not agree with the Chinese regime, but we have to talk and maintain an embassy there. The Taliban are there for a long time. The Americans have given the country back on a silver plate. They could very well continue to have a military presence in Bagram and get the forces to have a government of the National Union. They did not. They made a choice. It is a major strategic error of Joe Biden. He will remain in the polls as a shame, but it is his problem. Today, I think we have to talk with the Taliban. And besides, it is a policy that we have not made of the time of the Mola Omar and that we will have to do, because the Mola Omar, we were able to work with him. You remember that the United Nations had asked him to eradicate the Pavo, the heroine of Afghanistan. And it is a policy that the Mola Omar has made, and it has been noticed by a mission of Lundok in 2000, that he had well eradicated the Pavo, or 80 instructions of the Pavo, of Afghanistan. He had asked in exchange that the other agencies of the United Nations help these countries, the FAO, all the organizations that take care of agriculture. And it has not achieved that for bureaucratic reasons, of the United Nations. And I think that even the Americans have made a mistake when they have, after the 11th of September, they have undermined the negotiation with the Taliban to the secret Pakistani service. It is a great mistake, because we do not know at all what the Pakistanis have been saying to the Taliban. I think they would have had to go see the Taliban themselves and tell them with a lot of humility, because when we are very strong, it must be humble, the Americans were very strong in 2001. So that's what happened in our city of New York. We have a problem. What would you do in our place, Mr. the Taliban? And make direct diplomacy with them. Today, they are there. They must speak to them. They must not isolate this country. They must continue humanity. They must not punish the Afghan population twice. We have punished them once, the Americans have punished them once by betraying their promise, because the Americans have clearly promised to the Afghans, the democracy, the emancipation of the Finns, etc. So there, they have already been betrayed. We must not punish them twice by isolating this country, by stopping humanity from this country, by stopping trade with this country. We must work best with the Taliban. It will not be easy, but it is not easy to work with the Chinese communists either. We must work with them and not punish them twice by ideology, by ideology, the Taliban. And in fact, the great mistake that the Americans have made in this war is to impregnate international relations with ideology. And that was the death of international relations, such as Kissinger wanted them, and it is Kissinger who was right, and it is not China and Romsfeld and W Bush. Let me just follow up, because you made a very unambiguous, passionate plea for the West to recognize the realities on the ground, to deal with the Taliban, said France should open, reopen its embassy there. Do you foresee, because there are differences, of course, in opinion, as always within the European Union, all countries have their own motivations, some have their different approaches. Do you think we should have a common European approach as to how to deal with the Taliban moving forward? Because it's not going to do any good if 27 EU member states are having different sorts of relationships with Afghanistan and the Taliban. Are you pleading for a unified EU response and approach, and how realistic is that? I think it's always necessary to have a unified EU response, and we have it on economic fields, we have it on the field of norms, we have it on the field of international aid, and the EU has given a lot of help to Afghanistan. But I think that the foreign policy of the EU is a dream. It's not long ago that European nations have been divided on the question of the NATO conservatism of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to have said to W. Bush to build democracy all over the Middle East. So you have on the one hand the French and the Germans. Let's focus on the European front. I don't think it's a wish in the long term. It's a pathological wish, the foreign policy of the European Union and the security policy of the European Union. But I don't think it's necessary to have adoptive alliances with countries who want to do something in Afghanistan and who have the means because not all European countries have the means in Afghanistan. We French, we have a lycée in Kabul, a lycée in Kabul, where the old king Zaheer did his studies where the commander Massoud did his studies. I think we have to reopen this French lycée. We have a very important archaeological delegation. We have to reopen it. We have to continue our archaeological work. And you have highlighted it. There are several trends in the Taliban. There is a hard trend, a more open trend. But it's not in the isolation. It's not in refusing to reopen our embassy that we will allow the most moderate to keep power. So I think we have to have relations with this country. And it doesn't mean to have diplomatic relations with a country. It doesn't mean to approve the political regime of this country. Marc, I want to touch upon I give you an opportunity to respond right away. And then I have a question for you. Go ahead. Yeah, yeah, I just want to follow up on that. I mean, I agree that we should talk to the Taliban, but there's a difference between talking and an official recognition. That's the first point. The second point is that they have to walk the talk. They have now to demonstrate that what they say is efficient, is correct, and is real. So just to follow up on your example, the opening of the French high school. Let's say we do that. Then we have to say, okay, we'll do it, but we want girls to attend this high school. And then what happens if it does not happen, if they forbid that, then we'll shut down the school again. And we're back to square one. So it's not an easy task. What I mean is that once you decide to withdraw your troops and you lack leverage, you lack tools to put pressure on the actors in the country. So I think that the means we have now to put pressure on the Taliban and to have our own clout on the evolution of the country is quite limited. And it would be very cynical to say, okay, our tool to put pressure on you is the financial aid that we provide. And if we don't abide by our rules, then we'll cut the financial aid. I mean, that would be really cynical. And I think we should not go into this direction and, of course, it would be the Afghans that would suffer if we take this way forward. Gemma, I know you want to jump in, but let me bring in Tatiana. I'm going to come to you in just a second. The question is still how to deal with the Taliban moving forward, Tatiana. What is the view from Moscow? What are the approaches, the tactics? On the question of the international recognition of the Taliban, until now, Sergei Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has said, if we are not at the back of the day, and I think it is a map, a map quite unique to shoot, will be strongly negotiated by the Russians, especially to obtain an inclusive government in Afghanistan, or, to take the terms of Sergei Lavrov, to make them act in a more civilized way. So it is a map that we can shoot only once and it is extremely important. Other means of negotiating with the Taliban can be the bingruss for some to raise or the lack of sanctions, because the Russians consider that sanctions can contribute to the radicalization of the regime, which would be in favor of a financial and economic matter. And in fact, this recognition, if it is never the case, is extremely important in Russian politics because so far, we have always said, we prefer the regime the same authoritarian regime even very authoritarian to the religious, Islamic, moderate regimes. So it will be a change at the time of important rupture which can give more control in the world of Muslims in Russia. Otherwise, Russia does a lot of things on different axes, on the one hand, on their teaching with the countries of Central Asia, especially on the different groups of ethnic origin that are in Afghanistan, different terrorist movements, but they also share the teaching with the Taliban in reality. And the Russians recognized them in 2017 officially, especially on the groups of ISIS-K, the Islamic State, the groups that are in Afghanistan that consider that there is the main threat for Russia and for Central Asia countries that are certainly linked to Russia through the organization of the Treaty of Collective Security. So it's a kind of so much less, it's not exactly the article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance, but Russia can find to train, it arrived in the past in the Battle of Batken, for example, and they can train, so it's an extremely important point. They also work a lot diplomatically, so I mentioned the recognition and the potential to address the sanctions, and they also work, the military action, Russia has two military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, they work on the reinforcement of the border control, and they are extremely afraid of migrants, refugees from the country, and they do exercises in the month of August, in the month of September in a bilateral way and in the framework of the Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security to strengthen the capacity of these Central Asian allies to resist. Again, the question here that we are posing to this panel and to you in particular, how are the international community to deal with the Taliban moving forward, recognizing as Renault was pleading, recognizing the realities on the ground, what is your take? Who knows the reality on the ground? I think that's the first question that we need to address. You have the Taliban and as somebody said, is there a Taliban 2.0? How can you talk about Taliban 2.0 when the interim government within court, interim government has a whole lot of internationally identified terrorists in their ranks? And as Vitaly said a few minutes ago, they have shown no indication that they have shifted al-Qa'ab. And now we are not, it's interim, the government is interim. We don't quite know who's in power. And I think looking at it the European Union will look into this problem or somebody else will look into the problem. I think it's very premature. We need to be clear what's going to happen before we take the next step, otherwise we will do exactly like what happened with the born accord and other issues way back in the beginning of 2000. So the first and foremost idea is to get a clear picture and I don't think there is any clear picture. The Taliban itself is not united and you have Pakistan which is the creator of the Taliban. The ISI created the Taliban. It's common knowledge. It's not a great intelligent scoop to talk about it. So unless you can put some check on it. And today there is the Taliban divided between the Khweta Shura and the Miran Shah Shura. So you know the whole situation in Afghanistan you have the Taliban and weaponry to sort of get rid of the US or the NATO and US troops and they have taken control. We don't know what is to be done. I think it's premature for us to talk in terms of whether the Russians or the Europeans or the so and so will handle it. I think you need a far better understanding of what we need to do and I don't think we need to rush into the situation as if it's a problem that's going to be sorted out within the next 48 hours or the next 4 weeks etc. We need a much clearer understanding of what and I don't think anyone, no are you willing to isolate Pakistan from the situation? I don't think it's possible to do that just now. Because as long as Pakistan exists and the ISI will play a role in dealing with the Taliban and therefore at the moment the United States has said that we will not deal with Pakistan for various regions of the past, present etc. I don't know how they'll deal with the Taliban if you keep the Pakistan out of the reckoning. I would love it to happen but I don't know how practical it can be in terms of. So you need between a theoretical approach or a theoretical construct of how we should do and what we need to do on the ground we need to. I don't think that tomorrow morning we are going to open schools or open embassies and children are going to schools and colleges etc. There's nowhere just not on the horizon, there's nowhere on the scene. I would say that there is certainly a major role for South Asia and I would say West Asia to play a role this time. Please let her allow because I think there are far more. One step taken by the UAE giving Ashraf Ghani a home to go there because had he been there by now he would have been history. I think this is an understanding. It's a remarkable step that was taken with great deal we didn't require great intelligence analysis which is what the many other countries. They took a decision of it because we need to have in position people who understand the situation and I think there is a major role this time that South Asia and West Asia will have to play in any construct and I hear about the European Union etc etc. I don't think they have a role but I have a point I would think that this is an opportunity for a global concert. We had a concert of Europe as you remember many years ago so when the initial steps are taken by western South Asia then you can we need to move towards a global concert and let's see what they can do because that's not Russian this problem is going to remain if Afghanistan implode even more than it does today then I think there is a tragedy for all of us in South Asia it's easy for the rest of the world to sort of look at it but this is something that we live to we don't want it one and two are over now we don't want a three to take place so that's the point that I wish to emphasize. Thank you so much it's an important point Alzabi I know you wanted to jump in here because MK Narayanan says who knows what the reality on the ground is let the dust settle first before we make a decision and if a decision is made certainly this can no longer be as it was in the past a decision making progress that is taking place in the west it has to be a much more comprehensive approach I think all what being said is right but we have tried someone mentioned sanctions we have tried sanctions we have tried to cut diplomatic ties we have tried military operations and unfortunately none of these really had some type of success and also we have tried to engage with the government for the last two decades but these are not the Afghanistan government I can really consider it it was Kabul government governments in the capital of Afghanistan they don't have that authority really and expand it on all over Afghanistan I think now we have to find a way what we call it engagement but it has to be a comprehensive engagement it has to be parallel approaches political financial aids also a preventive measurements like what really I just give you an example I mean we are talking about tourism and extremism and we have a lot of fears and concerns that Afghanistan it might become a safe haven for tourists coming from different areas but do we have a preventive policy we use a preventive strategy in Afghanistan really educate nearly 2000 clerks religious clerks on moderate Islam and that program extended for nearly 10 years which really it was in the support of course with the Kabul governments at that time but really we realize that it has a lot of benefits for the new generations so we are talking about the new generation we are looking ahead yes Afghanistan as I mentioned before had really not that excellent history for the last 3 decades but now I think it's our responsibility and also the Taliban and the Afghanis responsibility to rebuild it again let me jump in Reino Giro for instance makes a very clear point that we the west the world should establish diplomatic relationship with the Taliban Mark Eker says not so fast let's see what the reality is on the ground if they are walking the talk if rights are being protected if the progress that has been made over the past 2 decades is not being destroyed within a few weeks what is your take I think we should be engaged and the Taliban or the government and also the people so it's not just limiting our engagement with the government I think we need Afghanistan had enough so we need to support the Afghanis people