 Test test test check check one two ready good Welcome everyone. Thank you so much for coming. My name is Sarah Yerkes. I'm a fellow here at Carnegie First of all, let me get this book to show you all. This is the reason we're all here today First of all, I just want to congratulate my two colleagues Fred and Anwar for this fabulous book that we'll be discussing today It really was a great read and I think it offered a lot of both some sort of cross regional issues that we'll talk about I'm sure there's some very specific nuance explanations of what actually is occurring in this realm in each of the different states So let me introduce our two authors here We have to my left Fred weary who is a senior fellow in the Middle East program here at Carnegie and Anwar Bukars Who is an unresident senior fellow in the Middle East program at Carnegie as well? And they are going to first start off with giving you a little bit of an explanation of their findings in the book And then we are also joined by two distinguished guests Who will be offering some of their thoughts on the books findings as well as this issue generally of Salafism and the Maghreb So first turn over to Fred Great. Well, thank you all for coming today given what's happening in our world elsewhere We're delighted to have this opportunity to talk about the Maghreb and an area that's of interest to all of us and specifically A dimension of Islam that is often under under studied What I'd like to do is give you a sense of the purpose of our research some general findings about Salafism across the region then Two of the country cases that I focused on Mauritania and Libya I think we can all agree that the Maghreb has long been understudied Of course since 2011 that's that's changed and we've seen this obviously with Tunisia being the birthplace of the Arab Spring You know as sort of a typology For understanding the Middle East the the Maghreb encompasses a broad spectrum of regime types Different dimensions of stability, you know ranging again from You know quasi democracy democracy monarchy entrenched military run Autocracy complete failure. There are states that are fabulously rich with hydrocarbons and desperately poor And I think Islam and Islamism is obviously part of this this spectrum and I think One of our assumptions going into this study is that the the locus or the sort of Focal point for energy in Islam and Islamism in the Middle East is also shifting to the Maghreb in many respects in the way that Islamists are debating Politics the way they're participating in conflicts the way that I think they're really innovating new ideas and so we don't approach the Maghreb as simply an adjunct of the Gulf and then obviously that's a common misperception in the media and popular imagination that somehow Islam and especially Salafism is simply a projection of Gulf and Saudi influence Aren't to this region the Maghreb isn't exemplar for Islam and Islamism in both good and bad ways Obviously the Tunisian Democratic experiment is a good thing I think in terms of the participation of political Islamist but also a bad one In terms of the proponents of jihadists that have gone abroad and also Libya where the Islamic State set up It's strongest affiliate outside of Syria and Iraq Again going back to Salafism, you know, how did how did it start this notion that somehow this Region is simply a sort of passive receptacle for Saudi influence We discussed this at length in the introduction and it's patently false the Maghreb had Obviously has a rich tradition of Islam It participated in some of the reformist currents of Salafism that started in the 19 late 19th and early 20th century They had contact with the Gulf well before the injection of petrodollar So this notion that somehow Salafism in the Maghreb spread because of the petrodollar Injection is false as well And again, what we argue is is when you're looking at these movements these currents Think about localism localization has been at work we've seen this in Terms of how they negotiate clerical authority the notion that somehow Local clerics receive guidance from Saudi Arabia and simply act upon it is patently false We go through that in a number of instances. There's a great deal of pushback negotiation There's there's blatant criticism as we'll talk about in the case of of Algeria There's the influence is often bidirectional. We've seen in Mauritania Clerics that are actually in very high positions in the Emirates and Saudi Arabia So we're approaching Salafism as a rich social political and intellectual and yes Sometimes military force in these countries is certainly worthy of its study of study in its own right But it's also a window It's a window into this region's changing state society Dynamics into the grievances and aspirations of its increasingly youthful population. What does this movement tell us about? The health of regimes. What does it tell us about the propensity for Future radicalization or instability? Why are people joining it? Certainly? There's that push factor. There is money coming in there's obviously This injection of Saudi money in fact did make a difference in the 70s and 80s in terms of the Institutes that were set up, but that's only part of the story We have to look at the changing fortunes of other Variations of Islam Islamic parties Islamic movements We also have to look with regime policies in terms of supporting some of these these Salafi movements And there's also a psychological and sociological Dimension to this and we'll get into what is Salafism in just a bit But this notion of Salafism as a moral utopia right the triumphalism the saved sect It looks to an idealized past. It has a critique of corruption of a polluted moral order I think that can be very appealing in times of distress Dislocation whether that's dislocation that that arose from the disappointments of the Arab Spring or globalization Or state collapse in this in the case of of Libya So Salafism by its nature challenges hierarchies whether they're tribal sometimes even class this notion at least in theory It's de-territorialized right it's trans nationally creates this imagined community Of course what we argue throughout our case is that in practice Salafism molds itself to local contexts It's actually quite localized and it also absorbs other other traditions You know what is Salafism again? We can go into our definition of it. We do have a sort of trimmer We have seven features. We go into the intellectual genealogy of this movement going back to Ibn Taymiah Hanbali Ibn Abdul Wahab the reformist Variant and we really try to to inject some nuance into the term Salafism, but I think it's important to realize that there's no hard definition There's a there's a sort of loose consensus and even among Salafis in these country cases There is sometimes some shape-shifting they will sometimes You know not necessarily call themselves Salafis There's some accommodation with other sex and I think this is an important feature because it speaks to the the flexibility We do go into different types of Salafis and there's a very famous tripartite Typology that you're probably all familiar with that arose in the 2000s by a very noted scholar of this movement Quietest politicos and jihadists and it really speaks to the way that they approach Politics and also violence. It's it's in some sense a flawed division But what we did is we sort of canvassed the other Typologies and we didn't find anything better. So this is a very useful typology for approaching Salafism Very briefly. What does it mean the quietest as the term implies means they they avoid Active political participation. They avoid armed conflict. They're typically seen as being loyalists to an established political Authority and this particular current arose in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s as a result of more activist brotherhood inspired Saudi currents, but as we get into they're not necessarily a political right quietess if you support a sitting political ruler That means you're political. You're taking a political Stance and quietest does not mean that you're nonviolent We're seeing these so-called quietists in Libya that are actually fighting. They're taking part in the armed Conflict political Salafis. These are the ones that participate in politics and this is a huge step for them Given that in terms of many much of Salafi doctrine It's considered heretical to you know participate in forms of party activism has be but we've seen Salafi parties Has been or We've seen other Salafi parties in the Maghreb take their inspiration from Salafi parties in Kuwait So there is Salafi political activism provided. There's that democratic election Context and then the jihadist I think this is the one that most people are familiar with but we're saying is Salafism is not Does not equal jihadism the jihadist borrow from certain Salafi ideology, but they also incorporate kutub We can talk about the you know the relationship between Saudi Salafi ideology and the propensity for violence and it's not direct Right. This is a huge Huge debate that's broader than just the Maghreb, but does Salafism You know enable one to commit acts of violence are I think Definition of it our conclusion is Salafi education certainly socializes you to certain concepts that are illiberal and Could potentially be used for violence But the decision to commit violence is a whole range of different factors many of which are rooted in very worldly concerns like corruption foreign occupation Peer pressure etc. And there's a whole literature on that I'm gonna just very briefly talk about two Of the country cases that I researched and and there's significance really for the broader You know Salafi movement or current in the Maghreb and also Maghreb stability Mauritania is a very interesting country often off off the radar. I think what's fascinating about this country You know small population desperately poor that has an incredibly rich Islamic heritage in terms of its intellectual heritage heritage. It's very unique Islamic institutions called the mahtara which are seminaries where students from around the Islamic world Come to study has a very rich Sufi tradition and what this has done I think is sort of tempered or Moderated the arrival of Salafism. So Salafis are present in Mauritania, but they've got to coexist with this very rich Islamic environment that in that dates back centuries and and it's Resulted in something of an ambiguity of Salafism, right? These Salafis often don't act Salafi Some people talk about post Salafism in Mauritania. It's very interesting Phenomenon again, why did Salafism arise in this country? There was a wave of urbanization in the 70s that sense of dislocation It was marked by the injection of funds from Saudi Arabia. So that did in fact Play a part. There was a brief democratic opening in this country where Islamists did in fact participate in elections and politics But it was quickly Crushed there was imprisonment of Islamist clerics Marked by massive corruption On top of this the country is racially stratified. So again, this is a recipe for radicalization and to be sure Mauritanian jihadists played a very significant role in al-Qaeda Often as jurists and ideologues they went to Afghanistan and From 2005 to 2011 the country faced a very real jihadist threat in terms of the number of attacks on security forces This was also inspired and the result of what was happening in Algeria and also Mali but the country defeated that and This is often held up as sort of a model for approaching jihadism But also Salafism they defeated this threat through a combination of pure force right military measures Judicial measures the threat of judicial punishment imprisonment, but also ideological, you know reformism countering violent extremism And here the Mauritanians hold this up as a model. There was some efficacy. They mobilized Salafi clerics against these these jihadists Many of them have been released, but they're they're closely Watched meanwhile the most radical Salafis are allowed certain space to preach even aren't very Abrasive topics and controversial topics provided they don't cross certain red lines And so the Mauritanian government sort of holding this up as a CBE model. How do you engage Salafi's as we'll get into in the discussion? I think this is a flawed assumption many of the drivers of radicalization are still present in Mauritania to include You know a real military autocracy and massive corruption. So how long can this balancing act last? on Libya The important thing here is the rise of a particular current of Salafism known as Marhalism Which is a quietest variant of of Salafism that arose in the latter half of later years really of Gaddafi's rule where he actually Supported this movement as a counterweight to jihadism and the Muslim Brotherhood. This movement really Exploded after the revolution you have Marhalis that are actively involved in the armed conflict now between Heftar and the GNA. They're battling for social space. They're attacking Sufi shrines. They're going after more activist clerics They're enforcing their own draconian moral norms in terms of mixing of genders But I've done a lot of fieldwork among among these Marhalis in various locations And I think the bottom line we can get into this in discussion. They're not unified Right as a monolithic block across the country, right? So a Marhali in the in the eastern part has to adapt himself to The local context there the political context the social context the tribal context and a Marhali in the West in Subrat that for instance is is also sort of limited by his towns orientation So this notion that the Marhalis are acting as a unified political force or Trojan horse is simply not borne out By reality, but they are a major social force. They're drawing a lot of concern from from liberals from opposing Islamists There's a question in the international community. What should we do about Marhalism? They're also presenting themselves as counter-terrorists. They were the ones that fought the Islamic state insert They're going after them in Tripoli as well. They're running their own re indoctrination programs in in prisons But again just to conclude Marhalism is a is a force. Why is it growing? Right? We have to ask ourselves What are the drivers for increased social conservatism in Libya today? Why are more young people joining this movement? Certainly, there's Saudi money coming in but it also reflects that that sort of psychological shift that I talked about Right, Libby is in such a state of dislocation People are gravitated to Salafism for some from some deeper reason and it's going to be here to stay The the question of addressing their use of armed force is simply fixing Libya's political problems The broader challenge of that creating a unified army and police and dealing with their use of armed force in that way Okay, I'll talk briefly on three chapters Algeria Morocco and Tunisia and throughout these these chapters, you know We try to address the complex and thorny Relationship between and among the different Salafi factions and how during Critical juncture they have positioned themselves Vis-a-vis each other and then vis-a-vis the regimes in place So let's look at the Algerian chapter in in the Algerian chapter You know, we try to examine how Salafism has evolved over time with a particular focus on the ideological fractionalization and fractionalism and Special attention is given to the quietest current because that's the one that is most dominant In Algeria the political and the jihadi variant of Salafism. I mean the remains a contentious fringe But the weakening of these two strands especially in the 2000s and Beyond the stands in sharp contrast with the gradual surge of quietest Salafists quite as Salafists who abstain from formal politics who reject violence and who advocate the spread an application of their Strictly conservative theological orientation in society So this evolving influence and the growing strength of quietest Salafist in Algeria Does not mean that this movement is a is harmonious Right, or it's even cooperative. In fact quietest Salafists. They have to grapple with leadership disputes They have among themselves. They have to grapple, you know over disagreements over agendas and strategies to pursue There are similar intentions within quietest Salafist today in Algeria between followers of Sheikh Muhammad bin-Hadi in Madkhali and then there are those that subscribe to the teachings of you know, Rabia Bin-Hadi Madkhali and These tensions between these two camps with the quietest Salafism, you know, they have evolved into a full-fledged public dispute Between these two camps Nonetheless, you know quietest Salafists they continue to expand their influence within Algeria in the post 2011 era the Algerian regime has struggled How to deal with quietest Salafists how to develop a coherent Strategy to contain their gradual Expansion in Algerian society On the one hand there are those within the Algerian regime That have been warning about You know, Salafism quietest Salafist their rigid teachings the insubordination of some Salafi clerics On the other hand that are factions within the regimes that continue to see quietest Salafist as a useful tool to deploy against political, you know Salafists against jihadists against the regional tribal and sectarian threats that Algeria faces today But whatever the truth about the regimes stands towards quietest Salafism The reality is that there is a steady expansion quietest Salafism in Algeria and why why is it expanding? Well, that's a manifestation of the crisis of state institutions in the country an appreciable number of Algerians today cannot find inspiration or self-confidence in the traditional institutions of religion You know the neighborhood imams who once played an important role in shaping and molding the world views of ordinary Algerians You know have lost steam They have been increasingly contested by these quietest Salafi preachers The popular appeal of Sufism has also weakened in Algeria Mainstream Islamists do not do not fare any better I like in Tunisia and in Morocco where Islamist parties have matured into important intellectual and political forces Algerian Islamist political forces today have sunk into intellectual lethargy The Islamist parties in Algeria are largely disconnected from their electoral constituencies So this inability to adjust to major social transformations within the country has eroded, you know their social and political standing in society and That has left, you know room for quietest Salafists to expand and to grow in influence Morocco is also an interesting case You know, Salafism in Morocco has been a dynamic movement You know since before obviously Colonialism I'm not gonna go into the history, right? but for a part of the chapter special attention again is given to the quietest current because that's the most dominant in In the country more so than than the jihadist current the quietest current has for decades prohibited political Activism before succumbing to the pressure of local and regional events Two events at an impact on quietest Salafism in Morocco. First is the May 2003 terrorist attack in Casablanca and to the birth of the February 20th movement for our democracy movement in 2011 and these two Major events in the country. They shook the quietest current To its core it raised fundamental questions about, you know The adaptability of the activities of quietest Salafists, the methods of their activism The Arab appraisings of 2011 and its subsequent derailment in Syria But particularly Egypt with the coup in Egypt. It expedited the debates and fault lines Within the quietest current and also, you know some former jihadist Salafists within Morocco ultimately lead into the fracturing of this movement quietest Salafists into two camps So in the chapter, you know, I Illustrate this rift within quietest Salafism. It's not a monolithic movement by tracing You know the course of two of its most prominent figures and the critical stages that have influenced Their ideological postures their relations with the rule in the regime and the adaptability to local and and regional changes You know, there is this guy. We don't need to go into the details. I can address this very interesting Muhammad Maghrawi very influence. He's the most dominant and influential figure of quietest Salafism And then there is the second figure, Ahmad al-Qabbaj who gained visibility as his deputy You know, but they broke broke up after the coup in Egypt In 2003, but again, what's interesting about the Moroccan case is is the rise of this Reformist current within quietest Salafists, you know with the Qabbaj at its head that provides the intellectual and religious backbone for this hesitant movement of quietest Salafism towards this mix of Salafi Dawa proselytizing with political activism And again, what's interesting about about Morocco, what about this particular current is its efforts, you know, to try to reconcile Salafism with with democracy And I think that's the the the the the major finding, you know here or something to pursue I don't know how successful You know that that movement towards some kind of democracy will be Qabbaj has said that look democracy. Yes, it's a flawed system, right? But nonetheless, he said that democracy is the best thing out there because it represents You know the Islamic principles of what he said good governance fairness accountability, you know that the the the the pious Predecessors the Salaf, you know, Salih and the rightly guided Khalif have enjoined so again, it's too early to tell how successful You know this Qabbaj and and and his current will be The current draws its strength from a group of educated and middle-class youth Moroccan youths who believe that their mission might be better accomplished by participating in politics and they believe that if Morocco democratizes further then that would read down to To their to their benefits finally Tunisia Tunisia is a fascinating case obviously in several regards, right? It provides fresh insights into first Islamism and secularism and their competing claims to You know concepts of freedom and justice the Tunisian case also provides a unique context in which deep divisions among political Islamists themselves over the nature of and rules of religious activism and Mobilization played in the new Tunisia Among the tarniest issue that Islam is not by in this case, you know had to deal with after the revolution You know is how do you manage the explosion of Salafism into public life after? 2011 especially the jihadi groups that articulated the hegemonic vision of society, you know and and politics Islamists in particular was surprised You know after 2011 revolution to discover that Salafism had become a social reality in the country Especially the most disaffected areas and that Salafi jiharis. They have reaped the biggest gain You know among Salafis from the political transition and this was a unique situation in the Arab world You haven't seen something like it for the first time. We have jihadist ideologies and Democratic experience they intermingled together and that aroused you know passions and hopes and fears at the same time for a brief Moment Tunisia became a theater to test the political and ideational impact of democratization on anti-systemic groups with jihadist ideological visions So the chapter, you know examines the novelty of this case and it provides insights into or on the factors that affected and Mediated jihadist interactions with both the Islamists nada in this case let government and also their interactions with other groups with opposing moral and ideological stances So such an analysis of the intra jihadi dynamics the jihadi regime Dynamics the intergroup dynamics with other social and political actors, you know it helped To elicit dates the choices that the jihadist adopted especially and Sar Sharia You know after 2011 and how those choices that and Sar Sharia has adopted were deeply affected by the internal contradictions of the movement itself and By the ambiguities of the jihadist movement themselves. I think I'll just stop Thank you. I think I'd like now like to turn to Peter Mandeville talk Great. Thanks, sir And and thank you for the invitation to be be part of this I feel like an imposter because you move me off the stage You know otherwise have a collection of the city's finest expertise on North Africa They could go out and we bring Bill Lawrence's Algeria chops in so I kind of all respect I really want to address two aspects of this very fine book That that Fred and Anwar cover in the text itself and that Fred in particular has already touched on in his remarks first of all I think the book is valuable just because the more contextualized analysis of Salafism that we have the better just because Salafism tends to be talked about and Regarded and treated as this fairly static monolithic thing Its own claims of universality religiously often not being interrogated by those who observe and analyze it and so the more we have texts that look at the Morphology the evolution the sort of Salafism as a lived religion in specific countries region and contexts The better and I think the book does this very nicely For those of you who have always been looking for a kind of very straightforward Concise accessible and yet detailed primer on just what Salafism is the books first chapter Does that very nicely so that that first chapter alone? I think is worth the price of a In the room after our bag in the back of the room later Which you know what what what I really found valuable also is that Often the presence of Salafism in a given region and context Fred as you mentioned is Regardless evidence of Saudi or Gulf transnational influence right if you find Salafism somewhere That means that Haleegi's have been present and throwing my money around And this is a piece of mythology that needs to be dealt with and and I think you do so very nicely I'm right now working on a book that looks at the history and contemporary Forms of Saudi Religious propagation the sort of Saudi export of Wahhabism And and I'm happy to say that that many of the preliminary findings that have been come out of the research that I've done Aligned very nicely with the basic points that you're making about the ways in which You know Salafism naturally Takes on characteristics and varies in many ways in its expression beliefs and practices Depending on the specifics of local context You know, it's it's never a straightforward Equation I think of the presence of Saudi influence or its lack it is absolutely the case that in many countries Salafism is present and There has and have and continue to be often cross fertilization with very Various Saudi transnational collection connections, which is sort of natural that those exist But it's never Impossible I think to simply reduce the presence of Salafism to those Saudi influences and indeed The the nature of the relationship Directions of causality if you want to give it that way are often much more complex and this idea And then one thing that's certainly coming through in the work that I'm doing is that this idea that that often seems to circulate around Saudi global Wahhabi export about you know something like a sort of Wahhabism command and control center somewhere in Riyadh or in the nage where you know a bunch of senior clerics sort of sit around and figure Out which country to target next in their export activity that just doesn't exist You know if there's one thing we need to do and we need to sort of open up the black box of the terminology of Saudi Funding for religion and country x y or z and we often lapse fairly easily I mean how often do we read something that kind of talks about Saudi funding for Islam in Indonesia or Kyrgyzstan or wherever And I think that often transmits this idea that there is this fairly unified Saudi strategy around this but once you sort of open up that black box and come to understand the enormity and the diversity of the Institutional apparatus the organizations the the kind of entities that are involved in Saudi global dawah activity You find very quickly that you know you have a wide range of yes, you know official Saudi governmental Ministries and agencies, but you also have peristatal organizations like the Muslim World League and the World Assembly Muslim youth Which are not Saudi government entities, but are funded by and strategically steered by the Saudis you have any number of Islamic private Islamic charities in in the kingdom many of which were subject to much heavier regulation after 9 11 But a good number of which continue to enjoy varying levels of royal patronage. It allowed them to operate with some measure of impunity You have institutions like the Islamic University of Medina And and one thing that's coming through very clearly in the work that I'm doing is that quite often these various Saudi Entities are competing with each other for influence in other countries meaning that what we see in other countries is often manifestations of domestic Saudi rivalries as different groups within the kingdom Often with varying interests in countries x y or z vie for influence with each other And I think this is an interesting way to think of the phenomenon of Madhalism in Libya that you've talked about right where again just the use of that term right deriving very directly from a prominent Saudi scholarly family seems to sort of be yet another manifestation of this, you know transplantation of Saudi Islam when in fact Madhalism Has its own Local Libyan logic that is shaped very much by the political environment that's currently present in that country And even though Madhali himself in Saudi Arabia has been something of the poster boy for loyalist Salafism in the kingdom That's not exactly a useful framework for understanding what Madhalism in Libya in in the early 2020 Means and looks like so these processes of local mediation and local adaptation I think are are very very important and I think you know in so far as we're talking about transnational religious influence It's it's worthwhile, you know Recognizing that within North Africa itself. I think we have some of the most important religious counterbalances to Saudi influence I think most you know those that have worked most effectively have have been Efforts that focus very much on Trying to balance Saudi influence in North Africa and it's near abroad itself I think particularly of Morocco and we look at the work of people like and Wayne Scott and Sarah allow we You know who have have written about the ways in which you know the the history and legacies of Moroccan Sufi and worried networks Have allowed Morocco to have and to continue to enjoy a very prominent influence in sort of shaping Elements and aspects of religious discourse and practice not only in Morocco and Arabic-speaking North Africa But also as we get into the the Sahel as well where those some of those same same of those same Tadeqat and Sufi Brotherhood networks are present and relevant and of course going back Fred to Libya itself You know, we we have to think of course of the influence of the Libyan world call society, you know Which under Qadhafi? Spend a lot of money engaging activities that that sort of did have the effect of in certain countries and places You would be kind of surprised to learn I think of counterbalancing Saudi influences places like the United Kingdom where where the Muslim College of London, which was the first Entity that that sought to kind of create a contextualized approach to Islam Sort of that's that would reflect the specificity of the British Muslim experience all of the funding for that came from Libya and I think was understood by the Libyans as a way to Compete with efforts on the part of Gulf countries to build in influence. So there's a you know There's a geopolitical logic to this that transcends the region itself the second thing that I wanted to touch on briefly that you also Touch on in the book is this idea of the deployment of Salafi's Salafism and Salafi scholars as a countering violent extremism cool or or tactic It's it's interesting when you think about this I think in the history of the evolution of counterterrorism and CVE policy after 9-11 because you know after a period of time where the emphasis Was primarily in Washington discourse on promoting moderate Islam Right was it was you know, we want to find the progressive liberal moderates Muslim voices to kind of you know amplify and and deploy You know against the the Salafi's and the conservatives You know, I think best embodied by that now notorious 2006 2007 Rand study building moderate Muslim network that sort of had this image of Sufis as these as these sort of cuddly Huggy, lovey peaceful Muslims, and if you just unleash the Sufis and somehow Salafi jihadism will Will will will you know be defeated and and go away? Which just is a ridiculously a historical way to think about about Sufism, which you know has been Directly tied up in some of the most, you know, well known in surgeon and militant movements in modern Islamic history Not not to speak of various contexts in South Asia today where Sufi groups, you know, are very heavily involved in in in sort of mobilizing violence at the inter-communal Level there was from the mid 2000s then I think as we get into the later aughts this idea that no actually maybe it's the Conservatives you need to focus on because their voices will be seen as more legitimate And some of this was of course tied up with phenomenon like this sort of supposed recantation documents issued by the former leadership of groups like a little bit less linear in Egypt right, you know groups that were sort of you know the forebears of Contemporaries Salafi jihadism now deciding that they were wrong and so writing documents, you know Not coincidentally from prison that kind of talked about how wrong they were that then the governments in question sought to circulate I think in in the hope that that You know people drawn to these movements would read these doctrines and say, oh, okay. No, this is not the way to go All of these approaches though both the you know, let's deploy the Salafis and let's deploy the Sufis I think suffer from some version of the same problem, which is to my taste I think putting too much emphasis on religion or religious ideas as the primary drivers of Violent extremism in there's an opposite problem, which is to just sort of ignore religion altogether The sort of see religion as wholly epiphenomenal and could claim that it has nothing to do And I you know, I think that's that's a problematic approaches as well When it comes to CT and CVE To my mind, there's there's there's there's some really important international partnership work with countries in the Middle East The most valuable of which generally I think we don't see it's it's intelligent sharing It's certain kinds of Technical cooperation a lot of it is legal work certain kinds of day marches and diplomatic Requests, but there's also a lot of sort of theater of CT and CVE performative stuff that that goes on And some of these are things like the various Rehabilitation programs right where the the Saudis are very keen to take international visitors and show them They're amazing rehabilitation programs where 87.8% of all people who have gone through these programs have become, you know peace-loving loyal citizens of the state again having you know been retrained and reprogrammed by a What have you scholar who has you know put them on the straight path again? And coincidentally they've been given wives and cars and houses and jobs as part of the package as well You know and then there are other sort of you know programs Algeria has one Kazakhstan has one that are sort of held up as these you know That's right. This is part of the theater another part of the theater I think is this spate of summits and conferences that we've seen in places like Abu Dhabi and Dubai and and Doha in recent years that are kind of And in Marrakesh as well you may all remember the Marrakesh Decloration the you know the the forum for peace and Muslim societies You know every at every moment We seem to be planning for the next great Gulf based conference or summit on peace tolerance and coexistence And you have this sort of frequent flyer class of interfaith religious scholars that kind of meet at these beautiful hotels Have these conferences and then issue these statements, you know about how you know You know people need to respect each other's differences and we need to respect the rights of minorities And this is there's some value in that right? I'd rather they be saying that than saying no We should kill the minorities right but but the problem I think is that in in Validating and embracing this kind of Parade of tolerance Summetry This sort of declaration culture I think we run the risk of Helping a lot of these governments to sustain a smoke screen that allows them to displace onto religion Blame for problems whose more proximate causes lie within their own conduct in the region with respect to security dynamics stability Conflict quality of good governance those kinds of issues So it's it's not just a sort of analytical problem around placing too much emphasis on religion I think placing too much emphasis on religion is Waringly depoliticizing in that it forces us to take our eyes off the real source of the problem and lead us to maybe not Push and apply the right kind of pressure when it comes to questions of policy in the region, and I'll leave it at that Great Well first of all, thank you for the invitation Thank you for really the opportunity to get to read this book before it got published it As Peter has mentioned it really is a tour de force of looking into these five countries really a deep dive into these five countries on The origins and the evolution of Salafism There there are two things that I think the book does really well The first is that it brings in the history of Salafism You know the most of the the literature on Salafism tends to be about Salafi jihadis And so it starts with you know a cursory throw out to Ibn Taymiah and then Wahhabism and then a straight line to Al Qaeda and Isis And so what this book does really well is to bring in everything in between right and what I found especially fascinating was The origins of Salafism under colonialism and the goal that Salafism played in the resistance to colonialism Especially in Morocco and Algeria. I thought that was really fascinating and important to sort of connect the dots about You know connecting Wahhabism to the the Salafis that we see today So that's the first part the the second thing that the book I think is really well is that there's you know a tendency to to think of Salafis in part because Ideologically that's sort of their defining feature is their ideology. It's very extreme literalist And so the temptation is to think that their actions and their behavior stem from that ideology and that doctrine But what the book does really well is to show that actually the behavior of Salafis You know are they quietest are they jihadists are they political that is much more determined by their local context the Incentives and opportunities that are in their local environment as opposed to their doctrine or you know their literalist interpretation Of the Quran or even any fatwas that are given by by Saudi clerics And so I think the book does a very good job on that point as well. And just one anecdote that stuck with me from the Libya chapter was where the The Mughali Salafis go to Saudi Arabia and try to change the the fatwas from Mughal to allow for move from quietism to to fighting corrupt so I thought that was Very useful of an anecdote to show sort of the autonomy that the the Mughali Salafis have And sort of how they're shaped by their local environment and the incentives there as opposed to by You know fatwas or doctrines from from abroad and I want to sort of kick off the discussion with two questions if I may which was one takeaway from the book is that the Quietest Salafis are far more important than we normally think they are we kind of think of them as regime blackies and therefore Lacking in any popularity or legitimacy, but one takeaway I had from all of the chapters is that the quietest Salafis are actually fairly popular in their own right, which Sort of gives them the ability when the opportunity arises to get into politics or or or into violence In a way that maybe we wouldn't have expected since we kind of view quietest Salafis as far less important than their Jihadists or political party counterparts. And so what I'm curious about is why are the quietest Salafis? so popular especially since the The grievances that the book sort of cites as explaining why Salafism is popular tends to be grievances about the status quo Frustration with the economy frustration with the government. Why then are these somewhat status quo actors? somewhat popular when the You know worldview they're advocating is is one that is more status quo than these grievances that are looking for something new And the second sort of discussion question I would have is what do you see as the future of Salafism, especially now in Tunisia where Salafi parties perform somewhat well in these recent elections And you have the Karama coalition you have his Barahma now represented in the parliament Where do you see these new Salafi political parties going in Tunisia and also in Algeria now that you have this opening Do you see the quietest Salafis? Capitalizing in some way politically on the potential opening in Algeria as well Great, thank you I will allow you guys the chance to answer that question But I want to build on that as well one of the questions that I wanted to ask you is based on what you're saying that a lot of the Growth in Salafism is due to the inability of the state to meet the people's demands Which is something that I think you're seeing more and more of not less of do you expect to see a bigger political role? Particularly for the the quietest are we going to see more of what we're seeing in Tunisia where Salafis are becoming part of the Actually entrenched political system and also sort of the broader question about that is are the governments aware of the growing trend of The growing movements and how are they responding? What is sort of the government reaction to this? Is this something where they just sort of accept it or do they feel like there needs to be a pushback recognizing There's a totally different answer for these countries Sure, so aren't aren't quiet this again. They're you know, why are they becoming? Popular in Libya what what explains their growth again? I think it's it's partly due You know to this sense of disenchantment with the aftermath of the revolution and you know these these quietest You know during the revolution many of them You know did in fact stay loyal to Gaddafi they or they sat they sat at home They sort of were on the sidelines. They did not participate some did and were later Criticized by their peers, so there was obviously a fracturing But what you've seen and I've talked to many of them. I've talked to people that have joined my realism after the After the revolution is this sense of triumphalism, you know We were right look at what look at what has happened, you know after the revolution It was wrong to go against the Wali al-Amr, you know, and so there's this sense of You know This narrative that you know and it's part of a broader I mean broader nostalgia for for the old order in Libya or just a pure desire for for security And I think the much of these and I agree the term is actually quite problematic, you know It's interesting you you actually didn't find the term much al-ism being used in Libya until you had this sort of Schism with more activists Islamist currents some with the brother and they were the ones that started using the term in their media The term is problematic. I use it because it is somewhat accurate, but you're absolutely right They don't just follow Marhali himself. They follow a whole range of clerics, and it's point very well taken but again the This group the Marhali's they they basically are they're setting up schools Where other schools have failed so they're offering services there They have this narrative of anti vice Libya's awash in drugs, you know guns These are the guys that are going in they're positioning themselves as the crime fighters, right? We're the SWAT team going in We're going after drugs prostitutes, and so they enjoy a certain credibility at least an image of non-corruption The police are non-existent corrupt the the Marhali's are the ones that are cleaning up the streets They run these prisons that you know are they're no kidding Hard-core jihadists inside these prisons where they apply the same sort of Saudi rehabilitation principles They give them bin bosses, you know pamphlets say you know you look you've been cured But they've also got in teenagers that have drug problems And so they're the local people say all I'll take my my kid to the Marhali Camp you know and they'll sort him out so this social service. I think is that they're providing What's the bottom line here? The states the state's non-existent. There's no state, right? So any group that comes in is going to have some credibility, but there's limits to that I mean there's profound unease distant shaman and fierce opposition to the Marhali's You know opposition to certain Sufi traditions the Prophet's birthday These are these are sacred traditions that Libyans hold that date back, you know Centuries and the Marhali assault on them is seen as something for and so again, it's a negotiation It's not that Marhalism is displacing something that's authentic. It's there is a violent Sometimes violent renegotiation of the religious field in Libya and the quietest do have a powerful card there And I think it's partly this this nostalgia that's going on You know we're in Tunisia, I mean where where do we see the future of Selephism, and if you look at the the quietest and out of the ashes of of Ansa Sharia and in this jihadist move because remember after the revolution the most Dominant strain of Selephism in Tunisia was the jihadist variant the quietest Selephist or the political Selephists did not do well. I mean they participated in politics, but they did not, you know Secure any participation. So the most vibrant is the jihadist once the movement obviously was lost militarily by 2014 because Ansa Sharia Ended 2014 What happened is that out of the ashes of this movement? There are some signs that a more conciliatory strain of Of Selephism is trying to carve a place For itself, you know in the public arena of contestation. So what we have seen is that, you know Selephists are creating associations, associations to try to defend, you know, Selephists that have been in their view illegally, you know persecuted or imprisoned because after 2013-2014, you know, the state has adopted the repressive stance, right, towards Selephists So whether you are quietists or jihadists it did not matter much. So after 2014-15 and now they have grouped in these associations in which they they try to adopt a more legalistic approach, right, towards challenging what they see as the state's excesses So they have foresworn violence and they have tried to challenge the state, you know In one aspect in this legal domain. Others is that they have created, you know, more charities Trying to proselytize, you know, trying to demonstrate that they are, you know, subscribers to this peaceful activist strain So that's healthy in some regard because the approach that the state has adopted, you know You know, there have been legitimate questions about it. You cannot just repress all Selephists, right? Even if you don't like the quietest Selephists and their doctrine, you can't lump them all together with jihadists, right? And there is a small strain that still, you know, believe that the best approach is to participate in politics since there is a democratic experiment, right? And there is an opening out there and there have been, you know, some Credence to this thesis. So it would be, you know, worthwhile to see whether that success can appeal, you know, to large swaths of Those that subscribed to Ansar Sharia, the members, tens of thousands of Tunisians they bought into Ansar Sharia's views in in 2011 and 12 and 13 Those basically are disenchanted with the democratic transition, right? They say the democratic transition has been captured by these old elites, whether it's political Islamists or secularists, I mean, nothing has been done on the economic front, on the social front, nothing basically has changed, right? In their, in their view In Algeria, it's interesting, you know, case again to see the transition, but so far most of the quietest You know, they have, in fact, they have called for people to participate in the election, not Salafist But they asked the Algerians to go and vote Why they asked them to go and vote as a show of support for the military? Because you have to read them in the eulogies about Haid-Sala and others, you know, they have portrayed Haid-Sala has this, you know, heroic nationalists, you know, who saved Algeria from, you know, down Spetal toward, towards violence, right? So, but most quietest Salafist for now, you know, they still Opposed political participation, right? Those that subscribe to politics have not done well They have not done well, but again, it's a country in transition. It's worth to see Morocco is quite, quite interested, as I said, you know, there was a Division within the quietest current after the coup in Egypt There is one current that believes that the best path is through politics and that's Hanad Qabayj You know, he still debates quietest Salafists and and he argues that, you know, democracy is not opposed to Islam and if you want to change the system, you just change it from inside I mean, if you want to proselytize, you can do it from inside, right? So and in any case the monarchy is the major player It's the dominant player. It is still the strongest player. So it's just foolish obviously to challenge it, you know Otherwise, so that's in in in Morocco, you know, this reformist current. It's interesting to to to watch Great. I'd like to open it up to all of you And there please wait for a microphone I Thanks for the shout out Peter. I don't have a book to plug but I'll give you a call But and and and and kudos to to Carnegie because not only do you Consistently do really interesting events on the Margaret, but you edifying events on the log grab and you take it to another level So I really appreciate the the collective Effort here the As I as I'm always just talking at the end I started to think about the litmus test questions I have for which categories saw a few groups and for the for the non-jiha or in general It's often like what are you trying to change and then the answer is what category following it and how you try to change it and For the jihadis, what's a legitimate target? And I was surprised you didn't get into that because the big the biggest debates underlying so many of the debates for solid jihadis Is who's a different target now? They'll often killing each other over who's legitimate to kill and and and so I find that a useful frame I also as you were talking I was thinking about the term quietness. It's always bothered me And I don't use it because I just started thinking of the Salafi protests at the end of my street in Agda when I was Outside the prison ministry those were anything the quietest rhetorically volume level and everything else and so I think the term quietest is Conceals more than it reveals And I also Applaud but also Encourage all of you to go even further in the blurring of the lines because I don't know if any of you took a glance at Heimalka's in my piece on the new Salafi jihadism from CSIS 2013 But a lot of these categories while they're useful at the beginning of a conversation quickly and that they're evolving into uselessness for all the reasons you guys have given examples of and and And so we can drop these groups temporarily in a bucket But then quickly we have to look at all the hybridization which gets me to my two questions for Fred I was wondering if you just take a glance at what just happened in sir Mary when she got back from a recent trip Mary Fitzgerald said that the real action Olivia is not on the front lines It's the back channel negotiations and suddenly we saw that the West supporting my colleagues in the 604th Brigade Shifted sides either before in the middle of the seared battle and joined Haptar's group, but I was wondering in the context of this Discussion, right and everything you guys said about localized Michaelism and Michaelism not being a unified thing. What did what just happened in seared? Prove I guess about the point you're making like how do you read the fact that the The McHavies at the defeated Isis just joined Haptar who didn't fight us this much and my and my question for For on war is about our favorite group and you and I were at the day that announced the new leader of In Outside of robot bears in Salah Because they're they're another weird glory, right? They're they're they're Sufi roots. They're brotherhood, but they're kind of Salafist And and to sort of lead you towards the answer I my specialty in terms of research is youth political culture and getting back to an early point Fred made I'm as interested in What? Salafies absorb from the general culture as what the general culture absorbs from Salafi's and there tons of Salafi ideas in general Political culture now just look at the rap music. It's an easy one and you'll find all the Salafism in there now by people Who won't even profess to be Salafi's so so we have lots of blurring And I guess you know in that complex mix we get we find the mug Well, let's take one more question and then we'll Sorry If you could just wait for the microphone I think Salafism started when Saudi Arabia become more economically powerful and so there are schools and universities Students they get free education. They go through the rabbi and then that's how the Salafism From the 80s start become well known and have students from Libya from all over all over the world We go to Saudi Arabia and that's how that come We didn't know before Salafism only after When students when I mean when to to see the rabbi, so that's I think that's one of point I think maybe can discuss The second point is I think the Salafism When they went to Saudi Arabia and then became Afghanistan and Became sort of two divisions jihadist Salafism and quiet Salafism And I think that's how even jihadist. I think they have as a servant But then became when they engaged With the war in Afghanistan then becomes a haddist so I think these two things I mean two points So on the on the 604th, I mean yeah, this is this is an interesting sort of test test study I interviewed the commanders of the 604th insert in 2017 and again They're their Salafi ideology was just one facet of their of their composition there They're from the Thirjant tribe right which is the same tribe is as heftar and so They were always in somewhat of a balancing act because they They received help from the what is now or the GNA forces They received help from the Nasrattans against the Islamic State again the Islamic State You know massacred these fitters and in this particular neighborhood that was the nucleus for the 604 So the the Makhili ideology sat on top of this tribal ideology and cert is right on the fault line So what what determined whether they're gonna go which way or which was it ideology? No It was basically them testing. I think the winds and seeing heftar come up There was definitely back channel stuff humming going on something went on but the the commanders of them of the 604 told me in 2017 again, this was a completely different time They said look if heftar comes to cert with his with his Salafis with his Makhili's we're gonna tell them Don't come here. This is a hotter, you know See a sea of that what you did in Benghazi was against the coeders. That was legitimate But if you come here, you're bringing politics. We don't want you here So they were rationalizing a legitimacy in terms of religious legitimacy, but now the situation's changed I mean heftars moving in something happened You know the Mastrattans are calling crying betrayal You know we helped you against ISIS and now you're siding with so what does this tell us? I mean these guys are rational political calculating actors Same kind of rhetoric goes on with the GNA about who's the Wali al-Amir? Well, it's the one that allows you to go to the hajj. It's not the one that's I mean There's there I could splice it intellectually a thousand times the way they rationalize this again interpreting the fatwa to their local political circumstances and Yeah, I mean, it's obviously politically and militarily. It's a huge it's a huge coup for for heftar to have be now here insert and And yeah, I mean sure if he if he comes up to the to the gates of Tripoli There are gonna be groups not just Marhalis, but other groups that probably some of them will come to his side others will not I mean, that's I think it's overrated. How much will between who between? There was probably there was probably an east no the Marhalis the Marhalis I talked to insert They knew though. They were already talking to the ones in the east the two. Yeah, so there were those channels there and so again networks of Facilitation not a broad conspiracy, but but when power shifts, they're gonna have you know, is that okay? All right, yeah, for that Adwa L'Hassan I mean Adwa L'Hassan was a favorite target of most Salafists I mean until you know somewhere in 2012 2013 when when if we take the quietest Salafist when the movement bifurcated, you know, they criticized Adwa L'Hassan basically because it's a mixture of Islamism and Sufism and They attacked obviously the former leader for some of the statements he made and some of the visions he had and You know, so so so they savaged, you know, the the ideology of L'Adwa L'Hassan since the 1980s and 1990s True true in some regard, right? But the when the movements deviled or split, you know that reformist current in fact I mean a badge has been one of the most defenders of L'Adwa L'Hassan. He criticizes, you know, Salafist He says it's irresponsible. I mean to take on You know a movement that really wants, you know, the good for the country. Yes, we may disagree Theologically, I mean some of them are Sufi some believe in going and visiting saints and obviously that runs counter to what Salafist believe But Abbas said, I mean, you know, you have to focus on what you want to accomplish Right, because what some of the the quietest Salafist did after the coup in Egypt is that, you know They had a complete turnaround They support obviously the monarchy and by implication the Saudis and and the Emirates and they bless the coup Right and and some of them even if they say you shouldn't participate in politics You know, they have asked their followers to vote for parties that are close to the palace So that in rage, you know, Abbas, he said, you know, it's irresponsible to tell people to vote for a palm The palm was at the time led by what he described as a Marxist, you know, authoritarian Secularists, so he said it just doesn't make any sense. He said in fact L'Adwa L'Hassan You know and Sheikh Yassin, we may disagree, but he said these are respected Nationalists and he's a respected Islamist scholar So even if we disagree, we can't go online and just keep savaging it because that's exactly what has been done So now there is a tug of war within quite a Salafist and then with the Mughalists as well Right So that's the you know, the Moroccan case for the Saudis obviously are more of an expert He but quickly yes, I mean, they had an influence. I mean in the 70s and 80s I mean the Maghrawi obviously, you know in Morocco and Algeria, Firkus and others. I mean these are all, you know Products of Saudi Arabia. They went to school there and elsewhere, but nonetheless, I mean the local contexts matter Because the Maghrawi in 2011, you know, he is a protégé of the Saudis in 2011 when he saw, you know The protests, you know, he said I sympathize with the February movement Wow, okay He was very careful not to criticize the monarchy because these are pragmatic strategic actors of all He knows that the monarch is still has support and it's still, you know Stable, but nonetheless, he said I sympathize, you know with the movements and I hope that the monarch, you know Is is is responsive and he did that strategically and they even asked his follower to vote for the PGD the Islamists You know for logical reasons because the Islamists they stood With the Salafists after 2003 the terrorist attack in which the regime, you know clumped Down on on on most on most Salafists. So yes, the Saudis still play a role in Algeria And I'll stop here. Remember there is within the quietest Salafists there is, you know at the bait of who to follow whether it's Rabi al-Madkhali or it's Mohammed al-Madkhali, right? And they're still at it online I mean, they are just wow when you read, you know, the attacks that they trade at each other. I mean some are really Mass mean, right? So so yeah, the Saudis are still there But as you know Peter said that are intra, you know, Saudi competition as well Well, I would also say that that There are Salafi groups that existed before the current Saudi state even consolidated So as Stefan Lacroix's work on Egypt has shown in the 1920s, you had Saudi religious scholars engaging with Religious groups and scholars in Egypt who in terms of Aqidah and Fiqh Are absolutely yes, absolutely and and in South Asia and Pakistan you have the Ahle Hadith They don't call themselves a Salafia, but again in terms of Aqidah and Fiqh they're anti-Madhab They are they are effectively Salafi and there's certainly cross-fertilization with the Saudis But you can't say that they exist because of Saudi Arabia. Also There's enormous upsurge of interest in Salafism by young people young Muslims around the world today Some people see this as evidence of Saudi influence. I think there's a separate Sociology around religious knowledge consumption that is separate from Saudi influence that explains this which is young people seeking information about Islam Online on the internet that find 8,000 answers to every question they ask Fatwa fatwa fatwa kida kida kida it's all correct It all sites hadith and the prophet it all looks legitimate and they don't know what to believe I think part of the appeal of Salafism today is that it's able to represent itself as more authentic Right and so young people are drawn to that because it absolves them of the need of having to figure out Which of these six million interpretations of Islam is is correct? And so I think there's a certain aesthetic appeal to the way that Salafism Represents itself that that has nothing to do with the influence of Saudi Arabia today It will take a couple more questions Monday Thank you. I'm on duty from the Libyan American Alliance Just I'm interested in in and they didn't read the book, but I'm looking forward to it If you if you looked into the influence of Salafism within some of the Islamic movement Whether it's a nahda or others in in the migrat I mean I remember back in the The Congress of another ninth one the one that took place in 2012 I attended the Congress and within the Congress itself there were you know If you can call them nahdawi Salafists who were trying to influence the outcome of some of the Decisions were made within within that Congress by passing leaflets that talks about Sharia and how we need to advance it within the current situation in Tunis. I mean it was a defeated eventually, but That kind of influence that I'm looking at it within these Islamic movements Hi, my name is Shardib. I'm a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute I've actually a I think a similar question, which is What is your reading of the this dynamic between the Yihwani movement like the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliates and these different branches of Salafism as he was mentioned there are many examples where There is a link and you have Salafi branches in Yihwani parties and We've seen in Egypt for instance how Salafi Political Salafis can go against the Yihwani. I mean we've seen different Political confrontations and the alliances can go in all direction basically depending on the context but my question refers more to the The ideology and the political principles that each branch or each trend is trying to develop How do you see this? Evolving and basically do you see clear ideological lines developing Allowing for instance more alliances between Salafis and Yihwanis or do you think that the trend is more and more divisions between these Actors in the different scenes because I guess from the outside It looks sometimes very messy and there are a lot of nuances that you have to be familiar with to understand the logic But are there like some key elements you you have highlighted in the book that can help making these differences Yeah, sure the terms of the The alliances I mean context matters, you know, and and there have been alliances and to go back to the Moroccan case right after 2011 I mean the most of Quietest Salafis the Marawi himself right before he had his turn around in 2014 because the geopolitical, you know context has changed he turned against Democratization and elsewhere. I mean he asked his followers. I mean to vote for the PGD Which they did and we have evidence that they did because they swept in Marrakesh and other hubs Where Salafis are known right to have a base in there So this is in the record. There wasn't an alliance Tactical alliance there right between the quietest said that tactical alliance fractured after the coup in Egypt in 2013 because the regime in Morocco after the Salafis Quietest voted for the PGD what they did is that they went and closed their schools and they cracked down on the Right, so in 2013 there was the strategic calculus that doesn't make sense to stay in alliance with the PGD, right and how powerless it is to Stop the closing of our schools and mosques with a few to do much 2013 and 2014 or we do a turn around so there was again a fracture between the PGD and And quietest Salafis the reformist a badge You know, he said that we need to keep that alliance and in fact he wanted to participate in the elections Under the PGD banner, which he did but the interior ministry banned you know, the regime is still not yet ready to allow Quietest in this case the reformists even if they are pro-monarchy to participate in politics Tunisia is also an interesting case. I mean remember there are divisions which you know best within this, you know When Salafism you know exploded in 2011. They were there were three schools within Mbada of what to do with these guys Right, I mean the nooshi one he said look we need to engage them, right? We cannot just replicate the Ben Ali method and crack down will end up radicalizing these guys So, you know, this is just a moment of further, you know, and and after their pent up frustration is let out They will like what we did in the 70s. They will realize that ideological access does not take you, you know Anywhere so probably they will become like us. There was a second school that said look, I mean this They can be our allies ideologically Right and in fact, we need to co-opt this movement if we can get them to vote for us and we shared some ideological you know similarities with them then then then then why not so this school supported, you know Electoral and doctrinal alliances between Islamism and Salafism said dog. Sure. Oh, obviously It was the most representative right of this of this trend the third trend that said look I mean we should just stay away from Salafism. They could you just take us into trouble, right? And that's the The former prime minister I so but there is potential there for alliances between Islamists and and and and Salafism Morocco is a good case in point Tunisia, you know, was also somewhat a case in point Algeria is still still different the quietest. They believe that the army is still in charge And so it's a way to see and the Islamists anyway, they have lost much of the alarm, you know The Islamists in Algeria can't compare them with PGD or not these are much more mature intellectual and politically than their counterparts In I mean, there are examples in in Mauritania of Coalitions and sort of idea of barriers being being breached between the Salafis and the Iqwan. I mean, I was just Thinking recently to some statements by Abu Hafsid more than he was a well-known former al-Qaeda ideologue he was actually critiquing a decision by the Mauritanian government to allow Visit of a of a of a sheikh from al-Azhar and you had Him basically the statement he made matched ex almost exactly Something that was issued by the Brotherhood affiliate in In Mauritanian and so it's an interesting coal convergence of inch of Alignments there of interest and there's been histories. There's been history of this in Mauritania a small country the Islamists many of them even the sort of hadaki or sort of Activists they all studied at this Saudi Institute in the 70s You have someone like the do who's this this very famous cleric who it's it's hard to call him a Salafi He's sort of Sahwa. He's reached out to this the Sufi So my point again is sort of shape-shifting depending on the local context The other end of the spectrum is Libya where you've got intense political fragmentation, you know, very vicious fighting There's no coalitions ongoing right now I mean, there's an intense struggle for religious institutions for social space a struggle over the al-Khaf I mean the Brotherhood basically told me like look we're at war with these these mudhalis. I mean, it's intense It's mapped on to the broader political Split between heftar and and and the GNA but again, it's I I'm hard-pressed to find any example of any coalition For a shot and Peter transfer any final comment No, thank you, please join me in thanking our panel and thank you Go get your own coffee back there Yeah, I Wrote it man. Be careful. I'm here