 Section 26 of an essay concerning human understanding, Book 2 by John Locke. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Gary B. Clayton. Chapter 27 Footnote Locke Discusses the Bishop of Wooster, Part 2 The well-known tree in Epping Forest, called the King's Oak, which from not weighing an ounce at first, grew to have many tons of timber in it, was all along the same oak, the very same plant, but nobody I think will say that it was the same body when it weighed a ton as it was when it weighed but an ounce, unless he has a mind to signalize himself by saying that that is the same body which has a thousand particles of different matter in it, for one particle that is the same, which is no better than to say that a thousand different particles are but one and the same particle, and one and the same particle is a thousand different particles, a thousand times a greater absurdity than to say half is whole, or the whole is the same with the half, which will be improved ten thousand times yet farther, if a man shall say, as your Lordship seems to me to argue here, that that great oak is the very same body with the acorn it sprang from, because there was in that acorn an oak in little, which was afterwards, as your Lordship expresses it, so much in large as to make that mighty tree. For this embryo, if I may so call it, or oak in little being not the hundredth, or perhaps the thousandth part of the acorn, and the acorn being not the thousandth part of the grown oak, it will be very extraordinary to prove the acorn and the grown oak to be the same body, by a way wherein it cannot be pretended that above one particle of an hundred thousand, or a million, is the same in the one body that it was in the other. From which way of reasoning it will follow that a nurse and her suckling child have the same body, and be past doubt that a mother and her infant have the same body. But this is a way of certainty found out to establish the articles of faith, and to overturn the new method of certainty that your Lordship says, quote, I have started, which is apt to leave men's minds more downfall than before, end quote. And now I desire your Lordship to consider of what use it is to you in the present case, to quote out of my essay these words, quote, that partaking of one common life makes the identity of a plant, end quote, since the question is not about the identity of a plant, but about the identity of a body, it being a very different thing to be the same plant, and to be the same body. For that which makes the same plant, does not make the same body, the one being the partaking in the same continued vegetable life, the other the consisting of the same numerical particles of matter. And therefore your Lordship's inference from my words above quoted in these which you subjoin seems to me a very strange one, this, quote, so that in things capable of any sort of life the identity is consistent with a continued succession of parts, and so the wheat grown up is the same body with the grain that was sown, end quote. For I believe if my words from which you infer, quote, and so the wheat grown up is the same body with the grain that was sown, end quote, were put into a syllogism, this would hardly be brought to be the conclusion. But your Lordship goes on with consequence upon consequence, though I have not eyes acute enough everywhere to see the connection, till you bring it to the resurrection of the same body. The connection of your Lordship's words is as followeths, quote, and thus the alteration of the parts of the body at the resurrection is consistent with its identity, if its organization and life be the same, and this is a real identity of the body which depends not upon consciousness. Whence it follows that to make the same body no more is required but restoring life to the organized parts of it, end quote. If the question were about raising the same plant, I do not say but there might be some appearance for making such an inference from my words as this, quote, whence it follows and that to make the same plant no more is required but to restore life to the organized parts of it, end quote. About this deduction, where when, from those words of mine that speak only of the identity of a plant, your Lordship infers there is no more required to make the same body than to make the same plant. Being too subtle for me, I leave to my reader to find out. Your Lordship goes on and says that I grant likewise, quote, that the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession, vitally united to the same organized body, end quote. Answer, I speak in these words of the identity of the same man, and your Lordship thence roundly concludes, quote, so that there is no difficulty of the sameness of the body, end quote, but your Lordship knows that I do not take these two sounds, man and body, to stand for the same thing, nor the identity of the man to be the same with the identity of the body. But let us read out your Lordship's words, quote, so that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the body if life were continued, and if by divine power life be restored to that material substance which was before united by a reunion of the soul to it, there is no reason to deny the identity of the body, not from the consciousness of the soul, but from that life which is the result of the union of the soul and the body, end quote. If I understand your Lordship right, you in these words from the passages above quoted out of my book argue that from those words of mine it will follow that it is or may be the same body that is raised at the resurrection. If so, my Lord, your Lordship has then proved that my book is not inconsistent with, but conformable to this article of the resurrection of the same body, which your Lordship contends for, and will have to be an article of faith, for though I do by no means deny that the same bodies shall be raised at the last day, yet I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an article of faith. But your Lordship goes on with your proofs and says, quote, but Saint Paul still supposes that it must be that material substance to which the soul was before united. For says he, quote, it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption, it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory, it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power, it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body, end quote. Can such a material substance which was never united to the body be sown in corruption and weakness and dishonor? Either therefore he must speak of the same body or his meaning cannot be comprehended, end quote. I answer, quote, can such a material substance which was never laid in a grave be said to be sown, et cetera? For your Lordship says, quote, you do not say the same individual particles which were united at the point of death shall be raised at the last day, end quote, and no other particles are laid in the grave but such as are united at the point of death. Either therefore your Lordship must speak of another body, different from that which was sown, which shall be raised, or else your meaning, I think, cannot be comprehended. But whatever your meaning, your Lordship proves it to be Saint Paul's meaning that the same body shall be raised which was sown in these following words, quote. For what does all this relate to a conscious principle, end quote. Answer. The scripture being expressed that the same person should be raised and appear before the judgment seat of Christ that everyone may receive according to what he had done in his body. It was very well suited to common apprehensions which refined not about, quote, particles that had been vitally united to the soul, end quote, to speak of the body which each one was to have after the resurrection as he would be apt to speak of it himself. For it being his body both before and after the resurrection, everyone ordinarily speaks of his body as the same, though in a strict and philosophical sense as your Lordship speaks it be not the very same. As it is no impropriety of speech to say, quote, this body of mine which was formally strong and plump is now weak and wasted, end of quote. Though in such a sense as you are speaking here it be not the same body. Revelation declares nothing anywhere concerning the same body and your Lordship sense of the same body which appears not to have been thought of. The apostle directly proposes nothing for or against the same body as necessary to be believed. That which he is plain and direct in is his opposing and condemning such curious questions about the body, which could serve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and necessary for them to believe, this a day of judgment and retribution to men in a future state, and therefore it is no wonder that mentioning their bodies he should use a way of speaking suited to vulgar notions from which it would be hard positively to conclude anything for the determining of this question, especially against expressions in the same discourse that plainly inclined to the other side in a matter which as it appears the apostle thought not necessary to determine, and the spirit of God thought not fit to gratify anyone's curiosity in. But your Lordship says, quote, the apostle speaks plainly of that body which was once quickened, and afterwards falls to corruption, and is to be restored with more noble qualities. I wish your Lordship had quoted the words of St. Paul wherein he speaks plainly of that numerical body that was once quickened. They would presently decide this question. But your Lordship proves it by these following words of St. Paul, quote, for this corruption must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality, end quote, to which your Lordship adds, quote, that you do not see how he could more expressly affirm the identity of this corruptible body with that after the resurrection, end quote. How expressly it is affirmed by the apostle shall be considered by and by. In the meantime, it is passed doubt that your Lordship best knows what you do or do not see. But this I would be bold to say that if St. Paul had anywhere in this chapter where there are so many occasions for it, if it had been necessary to have been believed, but said and expressed words that the same body should be raised, everyone else who thinks of it will see he had more expressly affirm the identity of the bodies which men now have with those they shall have after the resurrection. The remainder of your Lordship's period is, quote, and that without any respect to the principle of self-consciousness, end quote. In these words I doubt not have some meaning, but I must own I know not what. Either towards the proof of the resurrection of the same body or to show that anything I have said concerning self-consciousness is inconsistent. For I do not remember that I have anywhere said that the identity of body consisted in self-consciousness. From your preceding words, your worship concludes thus, quote, and so if the scripture be the sole foundation of our faith, this is an article of it, end quote. My Lord, to make the conclusion unquestionable, I humbly conceive the words must run thus, quote, and so if the scripture and your Lordship's interpretation of it be the sole foundation of our faith, the resurrection of the same body is an article of it, end quote. For with submission, your Lordship has neither produced express words of scripture for it, nor so approved that to be the meaning of any of those words of scripture which you have produced for it, that a man who reads and sincerely endeavors to understand the scripture cannot but find himself obliged to believe, as expressly, quote, that the same bodies of the dead, end quote, in your Lordship's sense, shall be raised as, quote, that the dead shall be raised, end quote, and I crave leave to give your Lordship this one reason for it. He who reads with attention this discourse of Saint Paul, where he discourses of the resurrection, will see that he plainly distinguishes between the dead that shall be raised and the bodies of the dead, for it is some untranslated Greek words, are the nominative cases too, some untranslated Greek words, all along, and not some untranslated Greek words, bodies, which one may with reason think would be somewhere or other have been expressed, if all this had been said to purpose it as an article of faith that the very same body should be raised, the same manner of speaking the Spirit of God observes all through the New Testament, where it is said, quote, raise the dead, quicken or make alive the dead, the resurrection of the dead, end quote, nay, these very words of our Savior, urged by your Lordship for the resurrection of the same body, run thus, some untranslated Greek words, would not a well-meaning searcher of the Scriptures be apt to think that if the thing here intended by our Savior were to teach and propose it as an article of faith necessary to be believed by everyone, that the very same bodies of the dead should be raised, would not, I say, anyone be apt to think that if our Savior meant so, the word should rather have been a few untranslated Greek words, i.e., quote, all the bodies that are in the graves, rather than, quote, all who are in the graves, end quote, which must denote persons and not precisely bodies. Another evidence, that St. Paul makes a distinction between the dead and the bodies of the dead, so that the dead cannot be taken in this. One Corinthians 15, to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead, are these words of the apostle, quote, but some men will say, how are the dead raised, and with what bodies do they come, end quote, which words, dead and they, if supposed to stand precisely for the bodies of the dead, the question will run thus, quote, how are the dead bodies raised, and with what bodies do the dead bodies come, end quote, which seems to have no very agreeable sense, this therefore being so, that the Spirit of God keeps so expressly to this phrase, or form of speaking in the New Testament, quote, of raising, quickening, rising, resurrection, etc., of the dead, end quote, where the resurrection of the last day is spoken of, and that the body is not mentioned, but in answer to this question, quote, with what bodies shall those dead who are raised come, end quote, so that by the dead cannot precisely be meant the dead bodies. I do not see but a good Christian who reads the Scripture with an intention to believe all that is there revealed to him concerning the resurrection, may acquit himself of his duty therein, without entering into the inquiry, whether the dead shall have the very same bodies or no. Which sort of inquiry the apostle by the appellation he bestows here on him that makes it seems not much to encourage, nor if he shall think himself bound to determine concerning the identity of the bodies of the dead raised at the last day, will he by the remainder of St. Paul's answer, find the determination of the apostle to be much in favor of the very same body, unless the being told that the body sown is not that body that shall be, that the body raised is as different from that which was laid down as the flesh of man is from the flesh of beasts, fishes, and birds, or as the sun, moon, and stars are different one from another, or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body is from an incorruptible, powerful, spiritual, immortal body, and lastly, as different as a body that is flesh and blood, is from a body that is not flesh and blood. Quote, for flesh and blood cannot, says St. Paul, in this very place, inherit the kingdom of God, end quote. Unless I say all this, which is contained in St. Paul's words, can be supposed to be the way to deliver this as an article of faith, which is required to be believed by everyone, this, quote, that the dead should be raised with the very same bodies that they had before in this life, end quote, which article proposed in these, or the like, plain, and express words, could have left no room for doubt in the meanest capacities, nor for contest in the most perverse minds. Your lordship adds in the next words, quote, and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church, viz, that the resurrection of the same body in your lordship's sense of the same body is an article of faith, end quote. Answer, what the Christian Church has always understood is beyond my knowledge, but for those who, coming short of your lordship's great learning, cannot gather their articles of faith from the understanding of all the whole Christian Church ever since the preaching of the Gospels, who makes a far greater part of Christians, I think I may say 999 of a thousand, but are forced to have recourse to the Scripture to find them there, I do not see that they will easily find there this proposed as an article of faith, that there shall be a resurrection of the same body, but that there shall be a resurrection of the dead without explicitly determining that they shall be raised up with bodies made up wholly of the same particles which were once vitally united to their souls in their former life, without the mixture of any one other particle of matter, which is that which your lordship means by the same body. But supposing your lordship to have demonstrated this to be an article of faith, though I crave leave to own, that I do not see, that all that your lordship has said here makes it so much as probable, what is all this to me? Yes, says your lordship in the following words, quote, my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul, not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection, but any material substance united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, end quote. This is an argument of your lordships which I am obliged to answer to, but is it not fit I should first understand it before I answer it? Now here I do not well know what it is, quote, to make a thing not to be necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection, end quote. But to help myself out the best I can with a guess, I will conjecture which, in disputing with learned men, is not very safe. Your lordship's meaning is that, quote, my idea of personal identity makes it not necessary, end quote, that for the raising the same person the body should be the same. Your lordship's next word is, quote, but, end quote, to which I am ready to reply, but what? What does my idea of personal identity do? For something of that kind the adversive or particle, quote, but, end quote, should, in the ordinary construction of our language, introduce to make the proposition clear and intelligible, but here is no such thing. But is one of your lordship's privileged particles, which I must not meddle with, for fear your lordship complain of me again, quote, as so severe a critic that for the least ambiguity in any particle fill up pages in my answer to make my book look considerable for the bulk of it, end quote. But since this proposition here, quote, my idea of personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul not necessary to the doctrine of the resurrection, but any material's substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, end quote, is brought to prove my idea of personal identity inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. I must make it out in some direct sense or other that I may see whether it be both true and conclusive, therefore venture to read it thus, quote, my idea of personal identity makes the same body which was here united to the soul not to be necessary at the resurrection, but allows that any material's substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, ergo, my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection of the same body, end quote. If this be your lordship's sense in this passage, as I here have guessed it to be, or else I know not what it is, I answer, one, that my idea of personal identity does not allow that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body. I say no such thing in my book, nor anything from whence it may be inferred, and your lordship would have done me a favor to have set down the words where I say so, or those from which you infer so, and show how it follows from anything I have said. Two, granting that it were a consequence from my idea of personal identity, that any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, end quote. This would not prove that my idea of personal identity was inconsistent with this proposition, quote, that the same body shall be raised, end quote, but on the contrary affirms it. Since if affirm as I do, that the same person shall be raised, and it be a consequence of my idea of personal identity, that, quote, any material substance being united to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, end quote, follows that if the same person be raised, the same body must be raised, and so I have herein not only said nothing inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, but have said more for it than your lordship. For there can be nothing planer, than that in the scripture it is revealed that the same person shall be raised and appear before the judgment seat of Christ, to answer for what they have done in their bodies. If therefore whatever matter be joined to the same principle of consciousness makes the same body, it is demonstration that if the same persons are raised they have the same bodies. How then your lordship makes this an inconsistency with the resurrection is beyond my conception? Yes, says your lordship, quote, it is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same body which was here united to the soul not to be necessary, end quote. Three, I answer therefore thirdly that this is the first time I ever learned that not necessary was the same with inconsistent. I say that a body made up of the same numerical parts of matter is not necessary to the making of the same person, from whence it will indeed follow, that to the resurrection of the same person the same numerical particles of matter are not required. What does your lordship infer from hints to whip this? Therefore he who thinks that the same particles of matter are not necessary to the making of the same person cannot believe that the same persons shall be raised with bodies made of the very same particles of matter if God should reveal that it shall be so, viz, that the same persons shall be raised with the same bodies they have before. Which is all one has to say that he who thought the blowing of rams horns was not necessary in itself to the falling down of the walls of Jericho could not believe that they should fall upon the blowing of rams horns when God had declared it should be so. Your lordship says, quote, my idea of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection, end quote. The reason you ground it on is this, because it makes not the same body necessary to the making the same person. Let us grant your lordship's consequence to be good. What will follow from it? No less than this, that your lordship's notion, for I dare not say your lordship has any so dangerous things as ideas, of personal identity is inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. The demonstration of it is thus, your lordship says, quote, it is not necessary that the body to be raised at the last day should consist of the same particles of matter which were united at the point of death, for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingering disease, as if a fat man falls into a consumption. You do not say the same particles which the center had at the very time of commission of his sins, for then a long center must have a vast body considering the continual spending of particles by perspiration, end quote. And again, here your lordship says, quote, you allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several change of matter, end quote. From which words it is evident that your lordship supposes a person in this world may be continued and preserved the same in a body, not consisting of the same individual particles of matter, and hence it demonstratively follows that let your lordship's notion of personal identity be what it will, it makes, quote, the same body not to be necessary to the same person, end quote. And therefore it is by your lordship's rule inconsistent with the article of the resurrection. When your lordship shall think fit to clear your own notion of personal identity from this inconsistency with the article of the resurrection, I do not doubt but my idea of personal identity will be therefore cleared too. Till then, all inconsistency with that article which your lordship has here charged on mine will unavoidably fall upon your lordship's too. But for the clearing of both, give me leave to say my lord that what it so ever is not necessary does not thereby become inconsistent. It is not necessary to the same person that his body should always consist of the same numerical particles. This is demonstration because the particles of the bodies of the same persons in this life change every moment and your lordship cannot deny it. And yet this makes it not inconsistent with God's preserving, if he thinks fit to the same persons, bodies consisting of the same numerical particles always from the resurrection to eternity. And so likewise though I say anything that supposes it not necessary that the same numerical particles which were vitally united to the soul in this life should be reunited to it at the resurrection and constitute the body it shall then have, yet it is not inconsistent with this that God may, if he pleases, give to everyone a body consisting only of such particles as were before vitally united to his soul. And thus I think I have cleared my book from all that inconsistency which your lordship charges on it and would persuade the world it has with the article of the resurrection of the dead. Only before I leave it I will set down the remainder of what your lordship says upon this head that though I see not the coherence nor tendency of it nor the force of any argument in it against me, yet that nothing may be omitted that your lordship has thought fit to entertain your reader with on in this new point, nor anyone have reason to suspect that I have passed by any word of your lordships on this now first introduced subject wherein he might find your lordship had proved what you had promised in your title page. Your remaining words are these, quote, the dispute is not how far personal identity in itself may consist in the very same material substance for we allow the notion of personal identity to belong to the same man under several changes of matter but whether it does not depend upon a vital union between the soul and body and the life which is consequent upon it and therefore in the resurrection the same material substance must be reunited or else it cannot be called a resurrection but a renovation i.e. it may be a new life but not a raising the body from the dead. I confess I do not see how what is here ushered in by the words quote and therefore end quote is a consequence from the preceding words but as to the propriety of the name i think it will not be much questioned that if the same man rise who was dead it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead which is the language of the scripture. I must not part with this article of the resurrection without returning my thanks to your lordship for making me take notice of a fault in my essay. When I wrote that book I took it for granted as I doubt not but many others have done that the scripture had mentioned and expressed terms quote the resurrection of the body end quote but upon the occasion your lordship has given me in your last letter to look a little more narrowly into what revelation has declared concerning the resurrection and finding no such express words in the scripture as that quote the body shall rise or be raised or the resurrection of the body end quote i shall in the next edition of it change these words of my book quote the dead bodies of men shall rise end quote into these of the scripture quote the dead shall rise end quote not that i question that the dead shall be raised with bodies but in matters of revelation i think it not only safest but our duty as far as anyone delivers it for revelation to keep close to the words of the scripture unless he will assume himself the authority of one inspired or make himself wiser than the holy spirit himself if i had spoke of the resurrection and precisely scripture terms i had avoided giving your lordship the occasion of making here such a verbal reflection on my words quote what not if there be an idea of identity as to the body end quote end of section 26 recording by gary b clayton section 27 of an essay concerning human understanding book two by john lock this is a liber vox recording all liber vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit liberox.org chapter 28 of moral relations one besides the before mentioned occasions of time place and causality of comparing or referring things to one another there are as i have said infinite others somewhere of i shall mention first the first i shall name is some one simple idea which being capable of parts or degrees accords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another in respect to that simple idea vg wider sweeter equal more etc these relations depending on the equality and access of the same simple idea in several subjects maybe called if one will proportional and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection it is so evident that nothing need be said to evince it to secondly another occasion of comparing things together or considering one thing so as to include in that consideration some other thing is the circumstance of their origin or beginning which being not afterwards to be altered make the relations depending there on as lasting as the subjects to which they belong vg father and son brothers cousin germans etc which have their relations by one community of blood wherein they partake in several degrees countrymen i.e those were born in the same country or tract of ground and these i call natural relations wherein we may observe that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life and not to the truth and extent of things for it is certain that in reality the relation is the same betwixt the beginner and the begotten in the several races of other animals as well as men but yet it is seldom said this bull is the grandfather of such a calf or that two pigeons or cousin germans it is very convenient that by distinct names these relations should be observed and marked out in mankind there being occasion both in laws and other communications one with another to mention and take notice of men under these relations from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men whereas in brutes men having very little or no cause to mind these relations they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names this by the way may give us some light into the different state and growth of languages which being suited only to convenience of communication are proportioned to the notions men have and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them and not to the reality or extent of things nor to the various respects might be found amongst them nor the different abstract considerations might be framed about them where they had no philosophical notions there they had no terms to express them and it is no wonder men should have framed no names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of from whence it is easy to imagine why as in some countries they may have not so much as the name for a horse and in others where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses than of their own that there they may have not only names for particular horses but also of their several relations of kindred to one another thirdly sometimes the foundation of considering things with reference to one another is some act whereby anyone comes by a moral right power or obligation to do something thus a general is one that half power to command an army and an army under a general is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man a citizen or a burger is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place all this sort depending upon men's wills or agreement in society I call instituted or voluntary and may be distinguished from the natural in that they are most if not all of them some way or another alterable and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes belonged though neither of the substances so related be destroyed now though all these are reciprocal as well as the rest and contain in them a reference of two things one to another yet because one of the two things often wants a relative name importing that reference men usually take no notice of it and the relation is commonly overlooked VG a patron and client are easily allowed to be relations but a constable or dictator are not so readily at first hearing considered as such because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator or constable expressing a relation to either of them though it be certain that either of them have a certain power over some others and so is so far related to them as well as a patron is to his client or a general to his army for fourthly there is another sort of relation which is the conformity or disagreement men's voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred and by which they are judged of which I think may be called moral relation as being that which denominates our moral actions and deserves well to be examined there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined ideas and avoid as much as may be obscurity and confusion human actions when with their various ends objects manners and circumstances they are framed into distinct complex ideas are as has been shown so many mixed modes a great part were of have names annexed to them thus supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once when we frame these notions thus in our minds we have there so many determined ideas of mixed modes but this is not all that concerns our actions it is not enough to have determined ideas of them and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of ideas we have a farther and greater concern and that is to know whether such actions so made up are morally good or bad 5 good and evil as hath been shown are nothing but pleasure or pain or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us moral good and evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law maker which good and evil pleasure or pain attending our observance or breach of the law by the decree of the lawmaker is what we call reward and punishment 6 of these moral rules or laws to which men generally refer and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions there seem to me to be three sorts with their three different enforcements or rewards and punishments for since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of men without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will we must wherever we suppose a law suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law it would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with and punish deviation from his rule by some good and evil that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself for that being a natural convenience or inconvenience would operate of itself without a law this if I mistake not is the true nature of all law properly so called 7 the laws that men generally refer their actions to to judge of their rectitude or obliquity seem to me to be these three one the divine law two the civil law three the law of opinion or reputation if I may so call it by the relation they bear to the first of these men judge whether their actions are sins or duties by the second whether they be criminal or innocent and by the third whether they be virtues or vices 8 first the divine law whereby I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation that God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny he has a right to do it we are his creatures he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishment of infinite weight and duration in another life for nobody can take us out of his hands this is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude and by comparing them to this law it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions that is whether as duties or sins they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty 9 secondly the civil law the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it is another rule to which men refer their actions to judge whether they be criminal or no this law nobody overlooks the rewards and punishment that enforce it being ready at hand and suitable to the power that makes it which is the force of the commonwealth engaged to protect the lives liberties and possessions of those who live according to its law and has power to take away life liberty or goods from him who disobeys which is the punishment of offenses committed against this law 10 thirdly the law of opinion or reputation virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed everywhere to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong and as far as they really are so applied they so far are coincident with the divine law above mentioned but yet whatever is pretended this is visible that these names virtue and vice in the particular instances of their application through the several nations and societies of men in the world are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit nor is it to be thought strange that men everywhere should give the name of virtue to those actions which amongst them are judged praiseworthy and call that vice which they account blameable since otherwise they would condemn themselves if they should think anything right to which they allowed not condemnation anything wrong which they let pass without blame thus the measure of what is everywhere called an esteemed virtue and vice is the approbation or dislike praise or blame which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in several societies tribes and clubs of men in the world whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them according to the judgment maxims or fashions of that place for though men uniting into politics societies have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force so that they cannot employ it against any fellow citizens any farther than the law of the country directs yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst and converse with and by this approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice 11 that this is the common measure of virtue and vice will appear to anyone who considers that though that passes for vice in one country which is counted to virtue or at least not vice in another yet everywhere virtue and praise vice and blame go together virtue is everywhere that which is thought praise worthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem is called virtue virtue and praise are so united that they are called often by the same name sansua premia laudi says virtual and so Cicero nihil habit natura praistatanas quam anastatam quam laudam quam dignitatam quam desis which he tells you are all the names for the same thing this is the language of the heathen philosophers who well understood wherein their notion of virtue and vice consisted and though perhaps by the different temper education fashion maxims or interests of different sorts of men it fell out that what was thought praise worthy in one place escaped not censure in another and so in different societies virtues and vices were changed yet as to the main they for the most part kept the same everywhere for since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein everyone finds his advantage and to blame and discounten and to the contrary it is no wonder that esteem and discredit virtue and vice should in great measure everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong which the law of god hath established there being nothing that so directly invisibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world as obedience to the laws he has set them and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion as the neglect of them and therefore men without renouncing all sense and reason and their own interest which they are so constantly true to do could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side that really deserved it not nay even those men whose practice was otherwise failed not to give their approbation right few being depraved to that degree as not to condemn at least in others the faults they themselves were guilty of whereby even in the corruption of manners the true boundaries of the law of nature which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice were pretty well preferred so that even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute whatsoever is lovely whatsoever is a good report if there be any virtue if there be any praise 12 if anyone shall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law when I make a law whereby men judge of virtue and vice to be nothing else but the consent of private men who have not authority enough to make a law especially wanting that which is so necessary and essential to a law a power to enforce it I think I may say that he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse seems little skilled in the nature or history of mankind the greatest part were of he shall find to govern themselves chiefly if not solely by this law of fashion and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company little regard to the laws of gods or the magistrate the penalties that attend the breach of gods law some name perhaps most men seldom seriously reflect on and amongst those that do many whilst they break the law entertain thoughts of future reconciliation and making their peace for such breaches and as to the punishments do from the laws of the commonwealth they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity but no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps and would recommend himself to nor is there one of 10,000 who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club he must be of a strange and unusual constitution who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society solitude many men have sought and been reconciled to but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars and those he converses with this is a burden too heavy for human suffering and he must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions who can take pleasure in company and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions 13 these three then first the law of god secondly the law of politic societies thirdly the law of fashion or private censure are those to which men variously compare their actions and it is by their conformity to one of these laws that they take their measures when they would judge of their moral rectitude and denominate their actions good or bad 14 whether the rule to which as to a touchstone we bring our voluntary actions to examine them by and try their goodness and accordingly to name them which is as it were the mark of the value we set upon them whether I say we take that rule from the fashion of the country or the will of a lawmaker the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action have to it and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule and so have a notion of moral goodness or evil which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule and therefore is often called moral rectitude this rule being nothing but a collection of several simple ideas the conformity there too is but so ordering the action that the simple ideas belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires and thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on and terminated in these simple ideas we have received from sensation or reflection for example let us consider the complex idea we signify by the word murder and when we have taken it asunder and examined all the particulars we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple ideas derived from reflection or sensation the first from reflection on the operations of our own minds we have the ideas of willing considering purposing beforehand malice or wishing ill to another and also of life or perception and self-motion secondly from sensation we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man and of some action whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the same man all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder this collection of simple ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in and to be held by most men there or the praise or blame I call the action virtuous or vicious if I have the will of a supreme invisible lawgiver for my rule then as I suppose the action commanded or forbidden by God I call it good or evil sin or duty and if I compare it to the civil law the rule made by the legislative power of the country I call it lawful or unlawful a crime or no crime so that once so ever we take the rule of moral actions or by what standards so ever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices they consist only and are made up of collections of simple ideas which we originally received from sense or reflection and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law 15 to conceive rightly of moral actions we must first take notice of them under this twofold consideration first as they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple ideas thus drunkenness or lying signifies such or such a collection of simple ideas which I call mixed modes and in this sense they are as much positive absolute ideas as the drinking of a horse or speaking of a parrot secondly our actions are considered good bad or indifferent and in this respect they are relative it being their conformity to or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular good or bad and so as far as they are compared with a rule and they're upon denominated they come under relation thus the challenging and fighting with a man as it is a certain positive mode or particular sort of action by particular ideas distinguished from all others is called dueling which when considered in relation to the law of god will deserve the name sin to the law of fashion in some countries valor and virtue and to the municipal laws of some governments a capital crime in this case when the positive mode has one name and another name as it stands in relation to the law the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances where one name vg man is used to signify the thing another vg father to signify the relation 16 but because very frequently the positive idea of the action and its moral relation are comprehended together under one name and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action and its moral rectitude or obliquity therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action and the reference it has to a rule by which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term those who yield too easily to the impression of sounds and are forward to take names for things are often misled in their judgment of actions thus the taking from another what is his without his knowledge or allowance is properly called stealing but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action and to denote its contriity to the law men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called stealing as an ill action disagreeing with the rule of right and yet the private taking away his sword from a madman to prevent his doing mischief though it be properly denominated stealing as the name of such a mixed mode yet when compared to the law of God and considered in its relation to that supreme rule it is no sin or transgression though the name stealing ordinarily carries such an intimation with it 17 and thus much for the relation of human actions to a law which therefore I call moral relation it would make a volume to go over all sorts of relations it is not therefore to be expected that I should hear mention them all it suffices to our present purpose to show by these what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive consideration called relation which is so various and the occasions of it so many as many as there can be of comparing things one to another that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules or under just heads those I have mentioned I think are some of the most considerable and such as may serve to let us see from once we get our ideas of relations and wherein they are founded but before I quit this argument from what has been said give me leave to observe 18 first that it is evident that all relation terminates in and is ultimately founded on those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection so that all that we have in our thoughts ourselves if we think of anything or have any meaning or would signify to others when we use word standing for relations is nothing but some simple ideas or collections of simple ideas compared with another this is so manifest in that sort called proportional that nothing can be more for when a man says honey is sweeter than wax it is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this simple idea sweetness which is equally true of all the rest though where they are compounded or decompounded the simple ideas they are made up of are perhaps seldom taken notice of VG when the word father is mentioned first there is meant that particular species or collective ideas signified by the word man secondly those sensible simple ideas signified by the word generation and thirdly the effects of it all the simple ideas signified by the word child so the word friend being taken for a man who loves and is ready to do good to another has all these following ideas to the making of it up first all the simple ideas comprehended in the word man or intelligent being secondly the idea of love thirdly the idea of readiness or disposition fourthly the idea of action which is any kind of thought or motion fifthly the idea of good which signifies anything that may advance his happiness and terminates at last if examined in particular simple ideas of which the word good in general signifies anyone but if removed from all simple ideas quite it signifies nothing at all and thus also all moral words terminate at last though perhaps more remotely in a collection of simple ideas the immediate signification of relative words being very often other supposed known relations which if traced one to another still end in simple ideas 19 secondly that in relations we have for the most part if not always as clear a notion of the relation as we have of those simple ideas wherein it is founded agreement or disagreement where upon relation depends being things where of we have commonly as clear ideas as of any other whatsoever it being but the distinguishing simple ideas or their degrees one from another without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all for if I have a clear idea of sweetness light or extension I have two of equal or more or less of each of these if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman the sympronia I know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman sympronia and so have as clear a notion of brothers as of births and perhaps clearer for if I believed that sympronia dug Titus out of the parsley bed as they used to tell children and thereby became his mother and that afterwards in the same manner she dug Chaius out of the parsley bed I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them as if I had all the skill of a midwife the notion that the same woman contributed as mother equally to their births though I were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it being that on which I grounded the relation and that they agreed in that circumstance of birth let it be what it will the comparing with them in their descent from the same person without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers but though the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those who will duly consider them as those of mixed modes and more determined than those of substances yet the names belonging to relation are often as doubtful in uncertain signification as those of substances or mixed modes and much more than those of simple ideas because relative words being the marks of this comparison which is made only by men's thoughts and is an idea only in men's minds men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things according to their own imaginations which do not always correspond with those of others using the same name 20 thirdly that in these I call moral relations I have a true notion of relation by comparing the action with the rule whether the rule be true or false for if I measure anything by a yard I know whether the thing I measured be longer or shorter than that supposed yard though perhaps the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard which indeed is another inquiry for though the rule be erroneous and I'm mistaken in it yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I compare with makes me perceive the relation though measuring by a wrong rule I shall thereby be brought to judge a miss of its moral rectitude because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears the rule I compare it to which is agreement or disagreement end of section 27 section 28 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org chapter 29 of clear and obscure distinct and confused ideas 1 having shown the original of our ideas and taken a view of their several sorts considered the difference between the simple and the complex and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes substances and relations all which I think is necessary to be done by anyone who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind and its apprehension and knowledge of things it will perhaps be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas I must nevertheless crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them the first is that some are clear and others obscure some distinct and others confused 2 the perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the site we shall best understand what is meant by clear and obscure and our ideas by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight light being that which discovers to us visible objects we give the name of obscure to that which is not placed in the light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colors which are observable in it and which in a better light would be discernible in like manner our simple ideas are clear when they are such as the objects themselves from once they were taken did our mind in a well-ordered sensation or perception present them whilst the memory retains them thus and can produce them to the mind whenever it has occasion to consider them they are clear ideas so far as they either want anything of the original exactness or have lost any of their first freshness and are as it were faded or tarnished by time so far are they obscure complex ideas as they are made up of simple ones so they are clear when the ideas that go to their composition are clear and the number and order of those simple ideas that are the ingredients of any complex one is determined and certain three the causes of obscurity and simple ideas seem to be either dull organs or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects or also weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received four to return again to visible objects to help us to apprehend this matter if the organs or faculties of perception like wax over hardened with cold will not receive the impression of the seal from the usual impulse want to imprint it or like wax of a temper too soft will not hold it well when well imprinted or else opposing the wax of a temper fit but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make clear impression in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure this I suppose needs no application to make it plainer four as a clear idea is that where of the mind has such a full an evident perception as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ so a distinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other and a confused idea is such a one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different five if no idea be confused but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it should be different it will be hard may anyone say to find anywhere a confused idea for let any idea be as it will it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas which cannot be other i.e. different without being perceived to be so no idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another from which it ought to be different unless you would have it different from itself for from all other it is evidently different six to remove this difficulty and to help us to conceive or write what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with we must consider that things ranked under distinct names are supposed different enough to be distinguished and so each sort by its peculiar name may be marked and discussed of a part upon any occasion and there is nothing more evident than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things now every idea a man has being visibly what it is and distinct from all other ideas but itself that which makes it confused is when it is such that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed by the difference which keeps the things to be ranked under those two different names distinct and makes some of them belong rather to the one and some of them to the other of those names being left out and so the distinction which was intended to be kept up by those different names is quite lost seven the defaults which usually occasion this confusion I think are chiefly these following first when any complex idea for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion is made up of too small a number of simple ideas and such only as are common to other things whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name are left out thus he that has an idea made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots has but a confused idea of a leopard it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a links and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted so that such an idea that hath the peculiar name leopard is not distinguishable from those designed by the names links or panther and may as well come under the name links as leopard how much the custom of defining of words by general terms contributes to make the ideas we would express by them confused and undetermined I leave others to consider this is evident that confused ideas are such as render the use of words uncertain and take away the benefit of distinct names when ideas for which we use different terms have not a difference answerable to their distinct names and so cannot be distinguished by them there it is that they are truly confused eight secondly another fault which makes our ideas confused is when though the particulars that make up any idea are in number enough yet they are so jumbled together that it is not easily discernible whether it more belongs to the name that is given it than to any other there is nothing proper to make us conceive this confusion than a sort of picture is usually shown as surprising pieces of art when the colors as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself mark out very odd and unusual figures and have no discernible order in their position this draft thus made up of parts where no symmetry nor order appears is in itself no more a confused thing than the picture of a cloudy sky wherein though there be as little order of colors or figures to be found yet nobody thinks it a confused picture what is it thus that makes it be thought confused since the want of symmetry does not as it is plain it does not for another draft made barely an imitation of this could not be called confused I answer that which makes it be thought confused is the applying it to some name to which it does not more discernibly belong than to some other VG when it is said to be the picture of a man or Caesar than anyone with reason counts it confused because it is not discernible in that state to belong more to the name man or Caesar than to the name baboon or Pompeii which are supposed to stand for different ideas from those signified by man or Caesar but when a cylindrical mirror placed right hath reduced those irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion then the confusion ceases and the eye presently sees that it is a man or Caesar i.e. that it belongs to those names and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon or Pompeii i.e. from the ideas signified by those names just thus it is with our ideas which are as it were the pictures of things no one of these mental drafts however the parts are put together can be called confused for they are plainly discernible as they are till it be ranked under some ordinary name to which it cannot be discerned to belong any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification 9 thirdly a third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our ideas is when any one of them is uncertain and undetermined thus we may observe men who not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language till they have learned their precise signification change the idea they make this or that term stand for almost as often as they use it hithat does this out of uncertainty of what he should leave out or put into this idea of church or idolatry every time he thinks of either and holds not steady to any one precise combination of ideas that makes it up is said to have a confused idea of idolatry or the church though this be still for the same reason as the former namely because a mutable idea if we will allow it to be one idea cannot belong to one name rather than another and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for 10 by what has been said we may observe how much names as supposed steady signs of things and by their difference to stand for and keep things distinct that in themselves are different are the occasion of denominating ideas distinct or confused by a secret and unobserved reference the mind makes of its ideas to such names this perhaps will be fuller understood after what I say of words in the third book has been read and considered without taking notice of such a reference of ideas to distinct names as the signs of distinct things it will be hard to say what a confused idea is and therefore when a man designs by any name a sort of things or any one particular thing distinct from all others the complex idea he annexes to that name is the more distinct the more particular the ideas are and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is wherever it is made up for the more it has of these the more it has still the perceivable differences whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all ideas belonging to other names even those that approach nearest to it and thereby all confusion with them is avoided 11 confusion making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated concerns always two ideas and those most which most approach one another whenever therefore we suspect any idea to be confused we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with or which it cannot easily be separated from and that will always be found an idea belonging to another name and so should be a different thing from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct being either the same with it or making a part of it or at least as properly called by that name as the other it is ranked under and so keeps not that difference from the other idea which the different names import 12 this I think is the confusion proper to ideas which still carries with it a secret reference to names at least if there be any other confusion of ideas this is that which most of all disorders men's thoughts and discourses ideas is ranked under names being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves and always those which they commune about with others and therefore where there are supposed two different ideas marked by two different names which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them there never fails to be confusion and where any ideas are distinct as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by there can be between them no confusion the way to prevent it is to collect and unite into one complex idea as precisely as is possible all those ingredients whereby it is different from others and to them so united in a determinant number and order apply steadily the same name but this neither accommodating men's ease or vanity or serving any design but that of naked truth which is not always the thing aimed for such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for and since the loose application of names to undetermined variable and almost no ideas served both to cover our own ignorance as well as to perplex and confound others which goes for learning and superiority and knowledge it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves whilst they complain of it and others though I think no small part of the confusion to be found in the notions of men might by care and ingenuity be avoided yet I am far from concluding it everywhere willful some ideas are so complex and made up of so many parts that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas under one name much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex idea such a name stands in another man's use of it from the first of these follows confusion in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself from the latter frequent confusion and discoursing and arguing with others but having more large treated of words their defects and abuses in the following book I shall hear say no more of it 13 our complex ideas being made up of collections and so a variety of simple ones may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part and very obscure and confused in another in a man who speaks of Achillea drawn or a body of a thousand sides the ideas of the figure may be very confused though that of the number be very distinct so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea which depends upon the number of a thousand he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of Achillea drawn though it would be plain he has no precise idea of this figure so as to distinguish it by that from one that has but 999 sides and not observing where of causes no small error in men's thoughts and confusion in their discourses 14 he that thinks he has a distinct idea of the figure of Achillea drawn let him for trial's sake take another parcel of the same uniform matter namely gold or wax of an equal bulk and make it into a figure of 999 sides he will I doubt not be able to distinguish these two ideas one from another by the number of sides and reason and argue distinctly about them whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these ideas which is contained in their numbers as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers and of the others not etc but when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure he will there be presently at a loss and not be able I think to frame in his mind two ideas one of them distinct from the other by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold as he could if the same parcels of gold were made into a cube the other a figure of five sides in which incomplete ideas we are very apt to impose on ourselves and wrangle with others especially where they have particular and familiar names for being satisfied in that part of the idea which we have clear and the name which is familiar to us being applied to the whole containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure we are apt to use it for that confused part and draw deductions from it in the obscure part of its signification as confidently as we do from the other 15 having frequently in our mouths the name eternity we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive idea of it which is as much as to say that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our idea it is true that he that thinks so may have a clear idea of duration he may also have a very clear idea of a very great length of duration he may also have a clear idea of the comparison of that great one was still a greater but it not being possible for him to include in this idea of any duration let it be as great as it will the whole extent together of a duration where he supposes no end that part of his idea which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts is very obscure and undetermined and hence it is that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity or any other infinite we are apt to blunder and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities 16 in matter we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our senses and therefore when we talk of the divisibility of matter in infinitum though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a hole by division yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles or minute bodies to be divided when by former divisions they are reduced to a smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses and so all that we have clear and distinct ideas of is of what division in general or abstractedly is and the relation of totem and parts but of the bulk of the body to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions I think we have no clear nor distinct idea at all for I ask anyone whether taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw he has any distinct idea beating still the number which concerns not extension betwixt the one hundred thousandth and the one millionth part of it or if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree without losing sight of them let him attend ciphers to each of those numbers such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed since a division carried on so far brings it no nearer the end of infinite division than the first division into two halves does I must confess for my part I have no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those bodies having but a very obscure one of either of them so that I think when we talk of division of bodies and infinitum our idea of their distinct books which is the subject and foundation of division comes after a little progression to be confounded and almost lost in obscurity for that idea which is to represent only bigness must be very obscure and confused which we cannot distinguish from one 10 times as big but only by number so we have clear distinct ideas we may say of 10 and 1 but no distinct ideas of two such extensions it is plain from hence that when we talk of infinite divisibility of body or extension our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers but the clear distinct ideas of extension after some progress of division are quite lost and of such minute parts we have no distinct ideas at all but it returns as all our ideas of infinite do at last to that of number always to be added but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual infinite parts we have it is true a clear idea of division as often as we think of it but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter than we have a clear idea of an infinite number by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned numbers we have endless divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts than endless addability if i may so speak gives us a clear and distinct idea of an actually infinite number they both being only in a power still of increasing the number be it already as great as it well so that of what remains to be added when consists the infinity we have but an obscure imperfect and confused idea from or about which we can argue or reason with no certainty or clearness no more than we can in arithmetic about a number of which we have no such distinct idea as we have a four or 100 but only this relative obscure one that compared to any other it is still bigger and we have no more a clear positive idea of it when we say or conceive it is bigger or more than 400 million than if we should say it is bigger than 40 or four 400 million having no nearer proportion to the end of addition or number than four for he that adds only four to four and so proceeds shall assume come to the end of all addition as he that adds 400 million to 400 million and so likewise in eternity he that has an idea of but four years has as much a positive complete idea of eternity as he that has one of 400 million of years for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years is as clear to the one as the other i.e. neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all for he that adds only four years to four and so on shall as soon reach eternity as he that adds 400 million of years and so on or if he please doubles the increase as often as he will the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions as it is from the length of a day or an hour for nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite and therefore our ideas which are all finite cannot bear any thus it is also in our idea of extension when we increase it by addition as well as when we diminish it by division and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space after a few doublings of those ideas of extension which are the largest we are accustomed to have we lose the clear distinct idea of that space it becomes a confusedly great one with a surplus of still greater about which when we would argue or reason we shall always find ourselves at a loss confused ideas in our arguing and deductions from that part of them which is confused always leading us into confusion end of section 28 section 29 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by john lock this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org chapter 30 of real and fantastical ideas number one besides what we have already mentioned concerning ideas other considerations belong to them in reference to things from whence they are taken or which they may be supposed to represent and thus I think they may come under a three fold distinction and are first either real or fantastical secondly adequate or inadequate thirdly true or false first by real ideas I mean such as have a foundation in nature such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things or with their archetypes fantastical or chimerical I call such as have no foundation in nature nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes if we examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned we shall find that second first our simple ideas are all real all agree to the reality of things not that they are all of them the images of representations of what does exist the contrary were off in all but the primary qualities of bodies has been already shown but though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness pain etc being in us the effects of powers in things without us ordained by our maker to producing us such sensations they are real ideas in us whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves for these several appearances being designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose and are as real distinguishing characters whether they be only constant effects or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings but whether they answer to those constitutions as to causes or patterns it matters not it suffices that they are constantly produced by them and thus our simple ideas are all real and true because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds that being all that is requisite to make them real and not fictions at pleasure for in simple ideas as has been shown the mind is wholly confided to the operation of things upon it and can make to itself no simple idea more than what it has received third though the mind be wholly passive in respect of its simple ideas yet I think we may say it is not so in respect of its complex ideas for those being combinations of simple ideas put together and united under one general name it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas how else comes it to pass that one man's idea of code or justice is different from another's but because he has put in or left out of his some simple idea which the other has not the question then is which of these are real and which barely imaginary combinations what collections agree to the reality of things and what not and to this I say that number four secondly mix it modes and relations have in no other reality but what they have in the minds of men there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real but that they be so framed that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them these ideas themselves being archetypes cannot differ from their archetypes and so cannot be chimerical unless anyone will jumbo together in them inconsistent ideas indeed as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others so bare possibility of existing is not enough they must have a a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them that they may not be thought fantastical as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea which common use calls liberality but this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech than reality of ideas for a man to be undisturbed in danger sedatedly to consider what is fittest to be done and to execute it steadily is a mixed mode or a complex idea of an action which may exist but to be undisturbed in danger without using one's reason or industry is what is also possible to be and so is as real an idea as the other though the first of these having the name courage given to it may in respect of that name be a right or wrong idea but the other whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it is not capable of any deformity being made with no reference to anything but itself number five thirdly our complex ideas of substances being made all of them in reference to things existing without us and intended to be representations of substances as they really are are no further real than as they are such combinations of simple ideas as are really united and coexist in things without us on the contrary those are fantastical which are made up of such collections of simple ideas as were really never united never were found together in any substance vg a rational creature consisting of a horse's head joined to a body of human shape or such as the centers are described or a body yellow very malleable fusible and fixed but lighter than common water or an uniform an organized body consistent as to sense all of similar parts with perception and voluntary motion join it with whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no it is probable we do not know but be that as it will these ideas of substances being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know and consistent of such collections of ideas as no substance ever showed us united together they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary but much more are those complex ideas so which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts end of section 29