 So, I mean I don't have a timer but you're going to have about 30 to 60 seconds to answer each one. Okay. You're putting yourself in the shoes, well you're putting yourself, send me in the shoes of yourself and send me in the shoes of the economist leader writers. Okay, one shoe each. Four day week. Very interesting idea. If you move from six days working to five days working, why can't you move from five to four? I think part of the problem in the advocacy for the four day week has been the kind of economic analysis underpinning it, which essentially boils down to we can be just as rich as we are now but work for 20% less. I don't think that's true. So you think the politicians would have to make an argument that you have to accept a lower material quality of life. Which is a totally legitimate decision to make but I think you have to be honest about that. Okay, you're also going to get 30 seconds to respond to each of these quick fires. Oh, okay, great. I think sort of neoclassical economics traditionally has an account of utility which is at odds with leisure time. It looks at leisure time as like potentially lost utility where you could have been creating value. So I think the sort of the bias built into their models is that a four day week is inferior to a five day week. Okay, AOC's Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is 70% marginal tax rate on the highest earners. So this is a kind of more extreme version of what Labour has proposed. Which is a 70% marginal tax rate on people earning, I don't know what her figure was, over $100k or something. The main problem I think is that people think it's going to raise a lot more than it would. This is exactly the same problem as Labour's plans for high rate taxation. The IFS has been very clear about Labour's plans which is that it could raise a little bit of money. It's just as likely to raise nothing. I think to build an entire democratic socialist strategy on taxing the rich is not possible. So you think you have to have a difficult conversation with the public to say we're going to have to have higher levels of tax across the... Yeah, I think so. Aaron? I partly agree. For instance, like a national care service, aging is really undiscussed as a crisis of the 21st century. You will not be able to fund a universal care service with the same principles as the NHS for an aging population by taxing the top 5%. In the next Labour manifesto, you can do lots of really great stuff for like $20 billion. You can maybe just touch the middle class a bit. But in terms of the long term structural transformation in the economy, climate change, aging, maybe automation, that's... Yeah, I agree. Green New Deal, should America be spending a few trillion a year on greening the economy, including a reasonable basic income and free healthcare for all? So there's... I have two things to say to that. The first is obviously the question of whether it's fiscally possible. As I said to you before we started the recording, the American economy is already running very close to full capacity. A massive fiscally expansion like that. That's a risk, right? There's a risk of runaway inflation and that kind of thing. So I think that's the first thing to say and there's the question of whether you can pay for it. There's another argument that the Economist has written about which essentially is a kind of political economy justification for the Green New Deal. And essentially what it boils down to is in order to affect radical change vis-a-vis the climate, what you can't do at this argument goes is rely on the stuff that Economist normally talk about. So like basically taxation of externality, so taxation of pollution. The reason why you can't do that is it kind of goes back to the thing we were talking about before which is that that can be undone very easily by lobbyists. So the government changes and the lobbyists come in and they say that tax that you progressive government put on petrol or whatever. Get rid of that because we don't like it. The argument, the political economy argument for the Green New Deal is that what you actually deliberately want to do is to create basically interest groups, lobbying groups that are in favour of you, not in favour of fossil fuels. So in other words, you create loads and loads of jobs in renewables and all that sort of stuff. And even if they're not that productive, it kind of doesn't matter because what they'll do is they'll have their own lobbyists who will argue very, very strongly in Washington to keep renewables going, to keep renewables going for decades and decades and decades. And so in the short term you have a bit of a cost because you create all these jobs that aren't particularly good and it costs us a money and blah, blah, blah. But the long term effect is you save the planet. Now, I don't know if I, I don't know what I think that argument, but I think it's a very, very interesting argument and I think it's a compelling argument in favour of the Green New Deal. Yeah, I like that. So the idea of being that, I mean what everyone says in terms of policy terms or politics terms is that the effects of climate change will be distributed very widely. Yes. And in the future and it's very difficult to mobilise people on that basis. Exactly. The benefit of the Green New Deal is it creates a bunch of people, potentially millions of people who are structurally incentivised to back green policies in the here and now. So you deliberately create vested interests. Now that sounds like a bad thing and it normally is a bad thing. Potentially in this case it's not a bad thing. Aaron, Green New Deal. No, I agree with that. I mean, you have to understand the threat of runaway climate change is very real and it could happen this century. So we can't stop climate warming, but we can certainly limit it to say two degrees. And the worry is if it gets to three degrees it can go to four degrees and five degrees and six degrees by virtue of desertification, methane hydrate, all sorts of things. So we do need to act decisively. And I think the only agent that can do that is the nation state. So I would agree and furthermore, renewable technologies are making massive improvements. And I can fully imagine us transitioning to, you know, a post carbon system in 50, 60, 70 years or for the most part anyway, you might need 10, 15% nuclear. But that's obviously not quick enough. And so there is an argument to say, well, look, for those experience curves to kick in even more with the experience curve is that you double the production of something. It's, you know, it's the cost of production falls. There's an argument to say, well, we want the experience curves. We believe in these market mechanisms such an extent would actually we need to accelerate them through quite decisive state intervention. State procurement. I think that's a good argument for the Green New Deal. Because we are the money, I think two, three percent of global energy comes from solar, right? And even if it's like doubling every two years, whatever it is, that's clearly not quick enough. So the technology's here, but you know, we need to do this in 25 years, which the market, we have to be honest, the market will not do that. All right, final question. And it was also a cover story of the Economist, but probably not under your brief. Yeah. So, no, don't worry about it if you don't feel that expert on it. Is Wangaido the future of Venezuela? Well, I know that I know that Navarra, certain contributors to Navarra have an analysis of Venezuela, which is not what the economists would argue about Venezuela. All I do know is that the Maduro regime seems pretty terrible. The question of whether you should replace him undemocratically is definitely beyond my understanding of geopolitics. So I think I'm going to leave it at that. I think my views on it are quite well documented. I think it's important to say it's important to say people in countries in the global north, liberal moxies, you know, we need to have an understanding of what the limits of impending another country's sovereignty. Clearly, there are conditions. I mean, we can all agree there are conditions where you would want to interfere clearly. A genocide. Right. The Holocaust. We should have tried to stop it. We did try and stop it. We tried our best. You know, the Armenian Holocaust. We regret that kind of adversity by, you know, that there are clearly legitimizing sort of factors to explain it. Are those conditions present in Venezuela? I would say they aren't. You know, I would say that Venezuela, even if you end up with economically mismanaged hyperinflation, all these things. And I might have a different explanation as to why that's happening to other people. But even if I was wrong, I don't see how their arguments for undermining state sovereignty. There's a very funny private eye thing that you may have seen last week about this. No. Which is, you know, basically comparing Maduro to two of these amazing like, you know, you're deliberately improvising in the country. No one wants you to stay. Yeah. You're refusing to leave you and your bunker. You didn't talk to anyone. Yeah. Like I said, it's very funny. I recommend it. Yeah. Imagine Norway all of a sudden produced this like super weapon and they became like a military hegemon for whatever reason. Even though they got like six million people and they said, wow, you've misallocated all the funding all the month funds you had from North Sea oil. You've got 14 million people very low in relative poverty. You've got millions of people using food banks. We're going to replace your government because it doesn't have our values. Right. I mean, we would say, well, that's ridiculous. Clearly, that's absurd. And it's, I look at the sort of the US interfering in Venezuela. I look at the US as a very dysfunctional polity. I see that as a kind of actually broadly quite similar, quite analogous. How would you feel about the US like air dropping aid supplies into Venezuela? And just let's say there's no subtext. It's just that. How would you feel about that? I mean, they can do what they like. I mean, would you support it? I wouldn't support it. I mean, I would say that it's, I would say it's a, it's part of a, I would say it's part of a broader strategy of sort of a color revolution, but they can do it. I mean, it's not violent. Is it? Yeah. They can do it. I mean, it's fair play to them in a way. It's like with the BBC exercising soft power through, sorry, the foreign and combat officer exercising soft power through the BBC. Every great power does it. Like what's, there's nothing strange about it, which kind of, it's why I get angry and Brits get angry like Russia doing it. It's like, friends have been doing this really well for a really long time. All right. Let's end it there. That was a very enjoyable conversation. Thanks for coming on. Thanks. I want us to debate the financial press more often.