 I see people are still filtering in, but we're a little bit behind schedule, so I'd just like to get moving. Thank you for joining us in this session, which has been titled, oh, let's see, Running Out of Strategic Patients, Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward North Korea. Now, because we are discussing U.S. policy, clearly it was a good idea not to invite any Americans to serve on the panelists, because Americans have been heard from. I actually mean this quite seriously, especially in Washington. We hear from the same few talking heads, myself included, all the time, and there's only so much any of us can take. So we thought that perhaps we would look beyond the Beltway. So I'm very pleased to introduce the three panelists, who I will quiz, grill, torment, flatter, what have you. Over the next few minutes, we have Professor Andrei Lankov from Kukmin University in Seoul, Andrea Berger, formerly of the Royal United Services Institute in London, now of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, which is also my organization. If I didn't introduce myself, I'm Joshua Pollack, editor of the Nonproliferation Review, which is part of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. And now, so is Andrea, although she is still hiding out in London. So we get her here when we can. And Gina Kim. Dr. Kim is from KAIDA, the Korean Institute of Defense Analysis in Seoul. I think it is a major oversight in these discussions that we do not include our South Korean allies in these discussions. And when I say we, I mean, of course, Americans. These conversations have a certain insularity to them, if you like, although we often refer to the desires of our allies and the requirements of assuring our allies. We have our own conversation about that and rarely ask our allies what they think. They become straw men or stalking horses, if you like, choose your idiom. So why not ask directly? Now I know that no one person can represent an entire country, but it's a start. So with that, if you will permit me to abuse the moderator's privilege, I'm going to try to get you all caught up a bit on the North Korean nuclear issue, just to get us all on the same page. So this will take a little longer than it ought to maybe, but I think it will pay dividends in our conversation. So let's review. North Korea first made a commitment to denuclearization jointly with South Korea at the end of 1991, start of 1992. Under a bilateral agreement with the United States called the Agreed Framework, they froze their nuclear program, including the plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon. They didn't give up any reprocessed plutonium. They sort of kept it in their hip pocket. The thinking was we would get to this issue or perhaps North Korea would collapse or what have you, but it was considered more important to freeze the operation of the reactor and the construction of two larger reactors. They also froze missile tests and space launches a few years later. The Bush administration, having determined that North Korea was circumventing the Agreed Framework at a minimum by developing an enrichment program, withdrew from the Agreed Framework in 2002 and ceased providing aid to North Korea under its terms. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003 as the United States was preparing to evade Iraq. And although it reaffirmed a denuclearization commitment in 2005, during the so-called six-party talks in Beijing, in 2006, they ended their space launch and missile test moratorium. They conducted their first nuclear test. North Korea has now conducted five nuclear tests, dozens of theater missile tests, and a handful of satellite launch attempts, two of them successful. So they have put objects in low earth orbit. This has been the Sputnik moment. It's now fairly clear that even if their space launchers would not be particularly good ICBMs, they have, with a light enough payload, the ability to serve in that role. Renewed efforts at diplomacy have taken place. This didn't happen all at once. The Bush administration in about 2007, 2008 had a serious go at a freeze. This involved a program of disablement that froze the facilities at Yongbyon and more than froze them, it actually disabled them physically. So it took a while to restore them. This course of diplomacy ended in disagreement over verification issues. The Obama administration had a go at this in 2011, 2012, which produced the February 2012 leap day deal. That was also a freeze, a freeze of missile tests, a freeze of the facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for some aid. It quickly came unwound in a disagreement over whether space launches were covered. There have been no substantive exchanges between the United States and North Korea since then, and especially since the third nuclear test, which took place on February 12, 2013, the eve of President Obama's State of the Union address. The next month, in response, the administration announced that it was shifting resources away from a European BMD program, Ballistic Missile Defense, toward an expansion of ballistic missile defense assets in Asia and the Pacific. The administration has progressively stepped up sanctions. They've designated Kim Jong-un individually as a human rights violator. And in the last year, in 2016, we've seen a step change in the sanctions regime, and this is the UN sanctions regime, not just unilateral actions. For a decade, it was focused narrowly on restricting activities that countries believed were linked to proliferation and aniloggery goods, I should add. Now it has expanded to include sanctions on North Korean export commodities, including coal and steel, and North Korea's logistical and financial sanctions, sectors, rather. So the pressure side of what has been described as a two-track policy pressure and engagement has loomed larger and larger in the Obama years. The Obama administration position was that North Korea must demonstrate that it is sincere about any future talks by freezing all aspects of its nuclear program for the duration of any such talks. That's a demand that implicitly extends beyond, beyond, to any facilities that perhaps may exist but haven't been declared. North Korea, for its part, has rejected preconditions for renewed talks and has called upon the United States to face up to the reality of the growth of North Korean strategic capabilities and end what North Korea calls the hostile policy. There have been periodic rumblings of discomfort with this approach. The last director of national intelligence, James Clapper, in public remarks last October, said, I think the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause. They are not going to do that. That is their ticket to survival. They are under siege and they are very paranoid. So the notion of giving up their nuclear capability is a non-starter with them. He also said in the same interview, we're kind of running out of gas on sanctions since we've imposed most of them that we can. Now, in the same period, by contrast, the P5 plus one group negotiated the JPOA and then the JCPOA with Iran. This was a two-step process that backed Iran away from the nuclear precipice. It's not directly analogous to North Korea since the Iranians are within the NPT. They've never produced fissile material that anyone knows about. But the concept was similar. First, there was a freeze in activities that any activities that could have rapidly enabled fissile material production, that created space for the talks and that led to a long-term agreement. So the question in my mind is, can the Trump administration approach North Korea in a similar spirit? The signals are mixed. Secretary of State Tillerson in Seoul a few days ago said, let me be very clear, the policy of strategic patience, which means basically trying to wait them out and wait for the North Koreans to change their mind. The policy of strategic patience has ended. We are exploring a new range of diplomatic security and economic measures. All options are on the table. Breuters this morning, citing a senior American official, reported that the administration is considering sweeping sanctions aimed at cutting North Korea off from the global financial system. As part of a multi-pronged approach of increased economic and diplomatic pressure especially on Chinese banks and firms that do the most business in North Korea plus beefed up defenses by the United States and its South Korean and Japanese allies. Now, to the ears of many experts, this is not a new approach. This is perhaps a next incremental step in the Obama administration's policy for the last several years. So my question is, is a new approach possible? And what would it look like? To start this conversation, I'd like to turn to Professor Lankoff, the author of many books, editorials, commentaries, you name it on these questions. His biography is in the program which is on your mobile devices so I will not bore you with it. And Andre, I will simply ask you, in your recent publications, you have advocated a freeze stopping short of a demand for denuclearization up front. What's the advantage of that approach? Well, this is a very bad approach. Problem is, all other approaches are even worse. Because probably I would start from disadvantages. Freeze, what do I mean by freeze? An agreement when the United States and other interested parties implicitly accept North Korea as a nuclear state without openly saying so. Because otherwise, it would be kind of loss of face. So this agreement will have to be officially packaged as the first step on a very long way to denuclearization. Actually, it would be an agreement. According to this agreement, North Koreans would agree not to test nuclear weapons and not to conduct missile launches. And of course they will accept a lot of money they always demand money. They never do anything for free and probably some political concessions. And what is bad about this approach? Essentially, it creates a dangerous precedent. It will mean paying the blackmailer and of course North Koreans will keep a significant number of nuclear devices of nuclear weapons. However, what are the alternatives? Sanctions do not work and highly unlikely to work. Many of you probably, as you presume, that North Korea is a starving country on the verge of collapse. Well, it's a very poor country, but I would describe the last five years under Kim Jong-un as a period of mild economic boom in North Korea. They are growing, growing very fast because they are quietly dismantling what is left of the old Stalinist, I would say hyper-Stalinist economy and basically doing what China's did in the early 1980s without officially admitting it. And it works. Economy is improving quite fast, in spite of the sanctions. Of course, it's important that China is not supporting the sanctions, but China also faces a very unpleasant choice. China doesn't like North Korea nuclear adventurism, but they understand that in order to make any difference, they have to push really hard. And a hard pressure from China is likely to provoke a grave domestic crisis inside North Korea. They don't want to deal with a Syria-like situation in a nuclear armed country nearby, which is understandable. So they're sort of cautious. Plus, of course, they don't want unification of Korea under sole government, which is likely to be democratic, nationalistic, pro-American. So China is not going to be supportive. The sanctions are not going to work. Negotiations, wonderful. But North Korean government believe that they are under grave threat. They saw what happened in Iraq. They saw what happened in Afghanistan. And especially they saw what happened in Libya because they remember that Colonel Gaddafi was the only strongman in recent history who agreed to negotiate to surrender his nuclear weapons development program, maybe very underdeveloped, but still program, in exchange for the economic promises of economic advantages. And back then, many US diplomats said that North Korea should learn Libyan lessons. Yes, this is exactly what they did. So chances are basically, I would say, just plain zero to reach denuclearization. And if such an imperfect deal is freeze, becomes impossible. And right now I don't see much enthusiasm on the American side about such a deal, which is understandable because it's a bad deal. Others are worse, however. What will happen? North Koreans will walk to achieve the second strike capabilities. They will have it, and they will probably not stop. They will walk hard to improve their delivery system, to improve their nuclear weapons. Maybe they will be more active with proliferation. Maybe not, only time will tell, difficult to say. But at any way, it's going to be even worse. This is a painful problem. And the only long-term hope is that North Korea will gradually change or collapse, which is still possible indeed. But for the time being, they are around and likely to stay around, especially giving their economic achievements. They are likely to stay around for quite a while. All right, well, is that really so bad? Can't we live with the North Korea that has second strike capabilities? Can't we use the proliferation security initiative to try to stop any attempts to export sensitive goods? How painful is this problem that you project if we don't? Well, it's painful, but I'm afraid we don't have any choice. We will have to live with North Korea, which will have second strike capability. If they are very lucky, if negotiations start today, and if North Koreans are going to sell their second strike capability for a sufficient price, and I don't think they are going to do it right now, but if they are going, maybe it can be prevented. But most likely they will get the second strike capability and then start negotiations, and well, we don't have choice, really. Like it or not, we'll have to live with them. Well, can we live with them like that? But can we live with North Korea as a mature nuclear power? Can we just say it isn't worth it to deal with them? Let's just bind together more tightly with our allies and go from there? As I have said, we have no choice. I don't see any, or we can just keep ignoring them, but it will create even greater problems, and they will still be around. Talking to them or not talking to them, we will have to live with them. And we're obviously better off if they don't have these capabilities. Yes, or even if they have, there are some ways to control proliferation and to keep the advancement under some control. Well, the objection I always hear to this recommendation goes something like this, and I will try to do it justice, since I have mixed feelings about it myself. Me too. If we reach a freeze with the North Koreans, they will get ready for their next test, and when they're ready to do it, they'll end the freeze. They'll pocket whatever goodies they receive in the meantime, and we'll just have marked time and we'll look like fools. What do you say to this objection? It should be an ongoing agreement. You will look like fools, because you will be fools if you give them what they demand in one large package. It should be ongoing small payments or everything, or if it's some kind of political concessions, these concessions can easily be revoked. If they basically don't keep their sight of agreement. Okay, well the North Koreans have indicated that they would be willing to stop conducting nuclear tests specifically if the United States and South Korea would stop conducting the annual combined exercises. They're actually held twice a year and are happening right now. Is that a concession that the United States and South Korea should entertain? I know not, probably yes, but it's not going to be enough. Let's face it, they are not going to sell the advancement of nuclear program for such cheap price. They will demand much more in terms of political concessions and above all, money. They always ask for money. Money, you know. Or maybe it can be paid in kind, not necessary money. Industrial equipment, food, whichever. Free oil, shipments, whichever. Okay, with that in mind. Andrea, I'd like to turn to you. We just heard the following categorical statement. Sanctions do not work. And I know that you've studied this issue closely. So tell me why that's wrong. Tell me what sanctions haven't we attempted that might have a meaningful effect on the North Koreans either from a perspective of inflicting pain and coercing a change in behavior or preventing them from getting their hands on sensitive goods? Well, thanks, Josh. Let me maybe caveat Andrea's assessment that sanctions don't work. And I'll start by saying I think that assessment that sanctions don't work is really most often put forward in relation to the high level objective for the sanctions regime that we've publicly set out, which is to encourage the North Koreans to come back to the negotiating table and eventually denuclearize. And in relation to that assessment, I broadly agree that sanctions, as currently implemented, haven't materially advanced us towards that aim with North Korea. I think it's also worth having a debate about whether or not that's a realistic objective for the sanctions regime to have. It seems to me that there's emerging consensus within the expert community and indeed, as Josh was saying, within the intelligence community that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is now a vanishingly remote possibility. So setting out that as an objective for sanctions might be in itself a policy complication. A senior US official once said to me, which I thought was really a student observation, if the objective for a sanctions regime isn't realistic or feasible, then sanctions are just there to make us feel good about ourselves. And that's something that's maybe worth talking a little bit more about in this context because we seem to be at a moment of kind of life crisis in North Korea policy in the Western community, particularly as it relates to sanctions. I'll caveat this further, however, by saying that that's the high level objective for the sanctions regime, but there are subsidiary and intermediate objectives for sanctions that are also still really, really important. I'm thinking things like preventing North Korea from selling dangerous military technology overseas, which it does all the time, prohibiting and so, or preventing insofar as possible North Korea from accessing critical technology for its prohibited programs from abroad, disrupting North Korean illicit networks and activity overseas where those are taking place. Those are kind of intermediate subsidiary objectives that are really important because even if they only work 5% of the time or 20% of the time, you need them to still be there. You need those sanctions to be there for those purposes. Similarly, every interdiction is intrinsically valuable. Every North Korean network disrupted is intrinsically valuable. However, poor the implementation gaps that exist are. And that takes me on to my second point, which is actually coming to Josh's question about what additional sanctions would help improve effectiveness. And the unsexy answer is that actually really implementation of existing measures which are sweeping as we were describing the sanctions regime has expanded a lot in the last year. But it still suffers from a globally poor implementation record. And this does not just apply to China. It's pretty much across the board. I can't think of a single sanctions measure putting coal, which I think is too early to tell to one side. I can't think of a single sanctions measure that enjoys robust global implementation and enforcement that we've put up at the UN level. I can't think of one. And what that means is as I've written before that what we're creating in sanctions terms is a sieve. And we're expanding that sieve, but without taking the time to ensure that countries have the domestic legal frameworks, the internal policies in place to fill the gaps in that sieve. And that's really where we need to spend our time. Like I said, it's politically unsexy, but is the fact of the matter. Now, this takes us to briefly a conversation over secondary sanctions because there are two ways I think that you encourage countries to start filling the implementation gaps they have. And you can do that through carrots or sticks. On the sticks front, I think it's pretty inevitable that the Trump administration is gonna move for secondary sanctions. We're seeing the reporting about that today. I think there's a role for secondary sanctions in encouraging China and indeed others to take more seriously their UN obligations to implement sanctions on North Korea. I have opinions that I'd be happy to share and maybe in a response to a question about what those secondary sanctions maybe should or shouldn't look like, but I think there is a role for them. It is important, however, that we don't forget the carrots part of this because it's not always gonna be possible to sanction non-implementing countries from a policy perspective. Some of these non-implementing countries are our friends and as a consequence, we need to make sure we're talking about capacity building and those types of activities as well. Well, Andrea, let me jump in there. You're talking about the broad global picture when you talk about sanctions implementation. How much does that matter when an estimated 80% of North Korea's trade is with China? Certainly to hear President Trump, this is all about what the Chinese will or won't do and he's not alone in that. You'll hear that from a lot of people in the expert community. You mentioned China, of course, in the context of secondary sanctions, but to what extent is this just a question of finding the keys to China's heart one way or another? And let's remember that Andre has already said, they're just not gonna go that far. So do we need to have this conversation about the Tanzanese of the world? Yes, I absolutely think we do and there's two reasons for that really. The first comes back to that point about objectives, right? If we're talking about general pressuring on North Korea, then yes, China's at the forefront of that and other countries in trade terms matter less. But for subsidiary objectives, the other countries matter a lot. If you've got several countries in the Middle East buying ballistic missiles from North Korea, if you've got North Korea using whole parts of Africa as havens to conduct illicit trade through and from, it is really important to make sure that those countries are at the focus of our attention and we can't forget them in the discussion over China and I fear that too often we do. But the second point is that yes, China accounts for North Korea's access to the world both inward and outward in terms of flow of trade. There are countries beyond that. So I take for example, sanctions over iron. It's one of the things I've been looking into. A lot of that trade gets recorded as China's, the customer when in fact when you look at company level data you see that what's happening is Chinese companies are buying some of these products, turning them around probably at an increased price and selling them overseas to other countries. So there are even in just the trade space there's some of those dynamics going on that mean we have other countries that we need to be talking about. Indeed Malaysia's brought this to our attention I think in the last few weeks as well. In more than one way. Yes. Well, let me turn to Gina. We've just heard this suggestion that if we were, we the United States were to engage North Korea in pursuit of a limited agreement that they would expect, they the North Koreans would expect an end to the combined military exercises, variety of other political concessions among their other demands as I'm sure you know is an end to the Korean war armistice replacing it with a peace treaty. How do you think this process not to mention any outcome like that would be received in South Korea? Does it matter who's in office? Who's in government since we're poised to go to elections? Can we generalize about how South Korea would respond and how would act in response to this course of action? Well, South Korean government has never refused talks on, for example, a peace treaty because in 2007, after the inter-Korean summit, there was a joint statement. And it clearly stated that the two Koreas will work on peace regime on the Korean peninsula along with denuclearization efforts. And also, South Korea as a part of six-party talks endorsed a joint statement in 2004, which also confirmed the same approach, talking about peace arrangement in a separate forum. And South Korea also initiated so-called Korea formula exploring new ways to talk with North Korea in reaching out to other six-party members for seeking such an opportunity. But one thing is clear, any talks on peace treaty should be done with... I think peace treaty can be done with non-nuclear DPRK. That's very clear from South Korea's position. Because we have so many hurdles in front of us because, for example, we have different ideas about denuclearization because North Korea thinks denuclearization as a removal of U.S. umbrella from South Korea and also withdrawal of USFK from the Korean peninsula. And in 1954, when there was a Geneva meeting, North Korea actually mentioned three conditions, withdrawal of all foreign troops from the South and termination of military alliance and arms reduction between the two Koreas. I think North Korea repeats the same thing over and over and over. But this has regional implications because signing a peace treaty means ends of end of armistice treaty, right? And that may undermine the basis of UN command on Korean peninsula. And also, it can undermine the basis of the rogue U.S. alliance. Because UNC function is monitoring the armistice, so it's gonna be gone. And undermining the rogue U.S. alliance can also affect the role of U.S. forces in Japan because who's function is supporting all the logistics assistance to USFK in Korean peninsula. So I'm not sure if the U.S. government is ready to accept this kind of regional change. And another issue that I'm very concerned about is the sequence of action because verification takes very, very long time. So the question is, will we sign the peace treaty before CVID or after that? CVID being complete. A complete, verifiable, irreversible destruction of North Korea's nuclear program. And that comes from one of the UN resolutions, I believe. Yes, and the resolution clearly mentions that kind of verification. But we have seen the history of non-compliance on North Korean side because North Korea refused to apply environmental sampling, for example, and refused to open up suspected sites because it was undeclared to the international community. And we have seen so many times that North Korea under-reported its past plutonium activities. So we have that kind of concern. And we are very much concerned about the possibility, as Professor Langkwaf mentioned, North Korea may not be really committed to denuclearization because nowadays North Korean representatives speak about arms control rather than denuclearization in international fora. And they also mentioned six-party talk for denuclearization is dead. So if we are going to pursue this goal, the end point should be very much clear. That's denuclearization of North Korea's nuclear program. Then South Korea may support it. Okay, so if that principle is made clear, could North Korea support a long-term freeze that would create the space for that, or even let's say in hush tones even pursue unification before denuclearization? Well, actually, you mentioned the freeze for freeze idea. Well, plutonium moratorium cannot actually prevent North Korea from conducting R&D research and development. And it cannot stop North Korea from extracting physical materials from its nuclear facility, including HEU facility, which we don't know where it is. And it cannot stop North Korea's developing, like Professor Langkwaf mentioned, second strike capability because North Korea can continue, for example, his shield test or engine test on the ground, and we cannot verify all those activities indeed. And actually, we agree, South Koreans agreed to this idea of freeze for freeze agreement. In the past, in 1992, we actually canceled our joint military exercise, which was called Team Spirit. But that deal was totally different. At the time, we agreed to this moratorium thing, sorry, this freeze for freeze thing, because at the time we could see that North Korea could ratify MPT, and then North Korea agreed to accept IA inspection on the ground. So it was a totally different deal. But nowadays, North Korea is calling us to end our joint military exercise just before putting a moratorium on its nuclear MSL test. I see. So would you see no value to freeze? Would you see it as not even slowing them down? I'm not talking about the value of this approach. I think it's meaningful if there is any verification measure to be applied in each step, because I think verification is the key. But I'm more worried about the possibility that this kind of idea can undermine the existing sanctions regime, as Andrea emphasized, because, well, we can see that we may lose momentum of pressure in North Korea because of this, because the UN Security Council resolutions, especially 2321 specifically mentioned that moratorium is not a subject for compensation because Article 2 specifically mentions North Korea has to put moratorium on its nuclear MSL test. And Article 49 also mentions that if there is another MSL or nuclear test, there will be additional measure on North Korea. So I think, well, the South Korea's position is quite clear. If this freeze for a freeze process can be the first step of the whole package of CVID, then South Korea may support this. Well, we've now had two conservative administrations in South Korea. Everyone at this point is expecting that Moon Jae-in will probably win the election and that this will usher in some renewed version of what was called the sunshine policy. I like to call it the moonshine policy. Not to be dismissive, but just to be cute. If that means a willingness to engage and join economic activities, a willingness to have summit meetings again and to seek a reduction of tension and of course to pay a lot of money, do you think that would also be reflected, that style of approach to North Korea would also be reflected in a different attitude towards the nuclearization objective? Well, currently it's a political party is going through primary races and according to the recent survey, like you said, Mr. Moon Jae-in is the front runner and I hear lots of concerns about the possible change in South Korea's position on North Korea. But let me tell you that he had an interview in December last year and he emphasized actually three things. First, alliance, second, sanctions, third, denuclearization because he said alliance should be the pillar of our security and democracy, sorry, diplomacy. And he also mentions as North Korea's nuclear strategy is increasing, the alliance, significance of the alliance is also increasing and about the sanction, he also mentions sanction is the tool to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table and he also emphasized denuclearization should be the ultimate goal of any kinds of talk even between inter-Korean talks. So would you see more continuity than change? Yes, yes, of course because sometimes he talked about long-term goals such as visiting Pyongyang or reopening a gas and industrial complex but he also at the same time talked about certain conditions. Intensive consultation with the US, China, Japan as well before pursuing these goals and also verification of sanctions as well. And he also mentions that lifting sanctions on South Korean side will go along with lifting sanctions at the international level. So I think to a certain degree you can see a continuation of the policy toward North Korea when it comes to nuclear issues. What I'm more concerned about is China factor because these days China is tilting toward North Korea on many issues. All right, with that I'd like to open it up to the audience. Please use the microphones on the stands and state your name and organization before your question. I'll recognize you as soon as my eyes have adjusted. Go ahead, sir. Greg Tillman, Board of the Arms Control Association. I would be curious to get your reactions to the THAAD regional ballistic missile deployments underway in South Korea and we had an interesting comment this morning from Chris Ford of the Trump NSC in talking about Russia and China's reaction which of course we know has been quite vehemently opposed. But Chris Ford said that there is an easy and constructive way for them to react to help pressure North Korea to move toward denuclearization to get a grip on it in that way. Which brought to my mind of course the last time Russia and China cooperated on non-proliferation was to get the Iran nuclear agreement which we succeeded in getting, moving the threat out 10 to 15 years. There's been no Iranian long range ballistic missile tests and the US missile defense deployments in Romania and Poland were not delayed by a single day in spite of the fact that the projection was radically different now than it was when the whole missile defense deployments were made. So my question is, is there a reason for Russia and China to believe that the US would remove THAAD if they cooperated more on North Korean non-proliferation? I'd like to... Sorry, I have exactly the same question but in a different on the same subject. Go ahead. Maybe we can... Go ahead. Yes, indeed. Well, first of all, my name is Carlo Trezzain from Italy, Institute of International Affairs in Rome. Yes, I was going to raise also the question of THAAD, of the deployment of THAAD, which in my opinion is the new evolution in the, strategically, in the Korean Peninsula. Something that disturbs enormously both the Chinese and the Russians and who therefore would be more than willing to put some pressure on the DPRK to give up its nuclear programs in exchange of a removal of the deployment of THAAD. Now, there is, I think, a domestic implication in all this because indeed, I think that if the Democratic Party wins the elections in Korea, that party, you know, as let's say, the promoter of a renewed sunshine policy will probably not be very in favor of the deployment of THAAD in the DPRK. So indeed, I think that the deployment of THAAD can be a bargaining chip in view of a possible solution of the nuclear issue. I would like to have comments on that. All right, thank you. Well, so it seems to me that the questioners have asked, essentially, would China and Russia be in a position to pressure the North Koreans? What assurance would they have that THAAD would go? And I would add to this, under what conditions would the U.S. withdraw THAAD? I wish Chris Ford were here to answer that, but anyone who wants to take a swing at that, Andrea? I'll maybe start with just my initial reaction to both of those questions, which is that I think it depends where that pressuring by Russia and China would actually take the North Korean missile program to. Because that's ultimately what that is about from a defensive perspective, is trying to make sure that there's a defensive possibility against the North Korean missile threat. And it's insufficient to trade away or even suggest that you would trade away BMD deployments unless you actually see a tangible and verifiable reduction in that missile threat. So, simply doing that in exchange for Russian and Chinese cooperation that brings nothing or not enough on the North Korean front isn't sufficient. Would anyone like to add anything to that? Well, I probably would add that China, unfortunately, have very valid reasons, as I have said, not to be tough on North Korea. And probably it was an American expectation that that deployment would sort of push China to taking a hush of stunts on North Korea. But as I have said, China faces a very unpleasant choice. Actually, three options. Asia, a nuclear North Korea, which is brinkmanship and adventurism, current situation. China doesn't like it. But if they push hard, they will face a domestic crisis, maybe revolution, as I have said, Syria-like situation in a nuclear country nearby. Or unification, if it results in essentially takeover by South Korea. Of these three options, China clearly prefers the first option. And it's not going to push hard enough. And looking at what's happening with South, well, it's now China is essentially in a rather unique situation, being the country which is sanctioning both South and North Korea. And however, however, as somebody who lives in South Korea, I'm not sure whether Moon Jae-in and his left-leaning government, which is indeed likely to, yes, to emerge soon, I'm not sure whether they will take a really critical attitude to start. Because right now deployment is quite popular. Deployment is quite popular with the South Korean public, who see it as a defensive measure, and they are remarkably annoyed by the Chinese reaction. First time in, first time ever probably, I see how Korean nationalism, which is always mobilized against Japan, sometimes against United States in some quarters of the society. This time, first in my memory, it's mobilized against China increasingly. So I see it by reaction of my students, for example. So I'm not sure whether the left-leaning government will cancel deployment. Maybe, yes, but I'm not sure. To my mind, China thinks US-China relations is the independent variable, whereas its approach to North Korea can be dependent variable. So China is more concerned about the implication of a third deployment, which can have some links to more US presence and influence in this region. So that's why Chinese scholars talk about the possibility that South Korea's defense, missile defense system can be integrated into US missile defense system, and the possibility of using that, especially the radar, to monitor all the movements along the coastline of the mainland China. We have so many times defended our position to reduce any anxiety on China's side, but by saying that, that issue can be resolved once the denuclearization can be possible on the Korean Peninsula, because South Korea has little leverage on the decision of deployment of that, because that is US strategic assets, right? And we have consultation for many, many months about this deployment, and it has been intensively discussed. And there is some understanding about the importance of that, especially for a defense aspect. And we, South Koreans also developed KAMD, Korea Air Missile Defense, but the target date of accomplishing this capability is mid-2020. So it's gonna take time for South Koreans to develop our own defense missile defense system. So in the meantime, I think we need such strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula as well. And I think the liberal party may have a different opinion, but I can say that Mr. Moon Jae-in acknowledges the significance of the alliance as well as the importance of the fact deployment. But they criticize somewhat different issues, which is a procedural matter, because there was not enough consultation with other neighboring countries, especially with China. And also the government did not pay much attention to the public opinion and did not spend much time to discuss this matter openly with the leaders in South Korea. I noticed that you used the phrase strategic assets a couple of times, once to characterize that and once more broadly. And there have been calls in South Korea for the United States to station strategic assets in South Korea. But I haven't seen the meaning of that phrase explained exactly. Do you have a sense of what is meant by that precisely? Well, people are very concerned about South Korea's seeking a third option, for example, like going nuclear or something like that. But the problem here is not just about the increasing threat from North Korea. The key issue is credibility of US extended debtors. Part of it South Koreans ask for something more aggressive measures like forward deployment of strategic assets to increase the credibility of US extended debtors. If the credibility is strong, I think there is no way that South Koreans will talk about going nuclear because we made a deal in the past in 1970s, exchange of the nuclear option with US umbrella to provide it to South Korea. So, we are actually at the, in the defense side, we have discussed so many things to increase US extended deterrence through a consultative mechanism such as DSC. Deterrence strategy committee and EDSCG, extended deterrence strategy consultation group. Through this kind of dialogue, we developed tailored deterrence against North Korea. And part of it was we talk about assessment of North Korean threats and we talk about what requirements are there and what kind of assets that we need. Also, we also discuss various scenarios, not only actual use of threat, but also immediate threat and threat of use by North Korea. So, we are having all kinds of discussions as an allies. I'd like to turn back to the audience and maybe we can take one from each side. Can I just ask that you keep any comments brief and ask a question? Thank you. Ralph Casa from the Pacific Forum, CSIS and Honolulu. Brief comment and a question. On THAAD, in our strategic dialogues with the Chinese, we've provided extensive briefings on how it has virtually no impact on their second strike capability. My guess is the Chinese are using THAAD to try to pressure South Korean politics and I would agree with Andre that it's backfired. My question though is on two words that haven't been used, regime change. If we're convinced that the North Koreans won't give up their nuclear weapons and we're likewise convinced that the US and particularly this administration is not prepared to live with them, then should we be putting the topic of regime change on the table? I don't mean marching on Pyongyang, I don't mean by military means, but there are certainly economic, political and psychological operations that you could have that would be clearly stated at removing Kim Jong-un. Is that a thing we should be talking about now? Thank you. And from this side? Terrell Jermaine-Star, reporter with FoxRide Alpha as a defense national security block. Question is how destabilizing do you feel that hawkish language of the Trump administration is in the South Korea side in regards to how Pyongyang will take it? It seems to me that of any regime around the country that Pyongyang seems particularly sensitive to hawkish rhetoric and I wanted to know if that alone does complicate matters and then also how effective ultimately do you feel that that system would be functionally? Based on my understanding, many of our missile defense systems are only measured against one missile per launch. So basically it's not as if Pyongyang, if they decided to launch a missile, they're not just gonna just launch one and just wait to see what else is gonna happen, right? And so I wonder if it's more symbolic or how useful and how workable would that system be? Thank you. Okay, well, why don't we start with the regime change question? This issue of, well, subversion essentially. Can, is it feasible to subvert the regime through information penetration and other means? And what would those means be? I believe it's feasible and it's surprising how little has been done and probably I would put it in a slightly different way, not necessarily regime change, but regime transformation because right now we see that Kim Jong-un, in spite of many problems, began to basically implement what Chinese did in the early 1980s. In the long run, even under Kim Jong-un's watch, such a regime is likely to be less risky because they will be much interested in selling running shoes across the globe and it will make them less interested in, you know, creating crises and being engaged in brinksmanship. And of course, of course, regime change is also an option because in both cases we have to keep in mind that North Korea is extremely vulnerable because South Korea exists. The gap between North and South Korea per capita income gap is the world's largest gap between two countries which share land border. It's, if you believe the optimists, it's one to 14, if you believe the pessimists, it's one to 30. For comparison, gap between East and West Germany was between one to two and one to three. So it's a huge difference. And you know, just introducing information of the outside world can encourage both revolutionary and evolutionary changes inside North Korean society because people will learn about other ways of life, other ways to run society and they will definitely start ask the simple question, why not to try it? And we have two options. The current regime can basically bow to the pressure and start introducing reforms. It's what they're actually doing. They can do it even faster. And I believe that even now they are doing it exactly because Kim Jong-un is aware that people are gradually learning about life outside the borders and they can become discontent. So to counter it, he has no choice but to start some changes aimed at economic growth and improving the living standards. Or if he is not fast enough, well it might end with revolution which is probably not the most desirable option but well, at least it will solve the nucleation. Would anyone else like to chime in on that? No? Well, the other question is, how does, yes? Yes, I had something to say. Actually, one of my recommendations for the government was having multi-dimensional pressure on North Korea. We talk about dime approach. Dime means diplomacy, information, military and economy. In terms of military aspect of it, I think we have to make sure that North Korea thinks that arms race, continuing arms race is too costly. And in terms of economy, we can, we should actually tighten the existing sanctions because there are lots of loopholes now. And so we have to close that loopholes at this point because for example, we can utilize sorry, we should utilize catchall mechanism which is to bend any item that can be possibly used for developing nuclear and missile program should be bent and it should be listed on the sanctions list. Then everybody, everyone can actually bend those kind of items because I tracked all the nuclear and missile related strategic items that North Korea imported from the rest of the world for the last five years and I have a list of all those items, mostly from China. But we can actually do that by doing so, by doing strengthening sanctions, North Korea may find in a situation where they can not put investment in R&D of all the programs. And also we should continue diplomatic isolation and also we have to especially try inflow of information to North Korean society so that we can get the North Koreans know what's really going on from the outside. So multi-dimensional pressure will change the leadership's calculation about this. So what about the other gentleman's question concerning how the North Koreans react to hawkish language coming from the Trump White House? I have my own views on this, but I'd like to hear yours first. I think you cannot overdo North Koreans when it comes to hawkish language. Right. Just go to any website of North Korea and read what they write about the outside world about United States, about South Korea when the relations are relatively good. So they are not going to be surprised. Of course they will react with the usual kind of rhetoric, which sounds a bit comical. I really advise you to have a quick look, which well basically rhetoric we now unfortunately hear from Washington, but multiplied by maybe by 10, 15. So well, it's not that I like what is said here. I don't, but I don't think it makes any difference. As they are not the type of people who are going to be offended by such expressions. Can I just jump in there? I take that point fully. I think that language and indeed other types of language that are coming out right now, including mixed messages, unclear messaging about what the direction of regional policy from the United States towards Northeast Asia looks like, but also particularly on the North Korean nuclear missile issue. The Tillerson visit in my view has had all of those things, harsh statements, unclear statements, mixed statements. And the combination for me is what's concerning not just because of how that might be read or not read in Pyongyang, but actually by others in the region. I also have a concern in the longer term that actually that public messaging, that very visible signaling happens without a ongoing official dialogue with North Korea. And let's say we're going into the future in a scenario when North Korea is able to hold U.S. continental United States targets at risk with a nuclear weapon. Crisis management is gonna be pretty essential in that environment. Indeed, I think it's essential now. And without a dialogue ongoing that public rhetoric is gonna be what we have between the two countries to discern what the crisis management situation might look like. Actually it is interesting to see in our history North Korea reacted to all this negative rhetoric coming from Washington. And then there are things that they have to do something to prove their might to the outside world. And one of the favorite terms that North Korean diplomats use when they are criticizing U.S. approach to North Korea is axis of evil. And so that means North Korea is very critical about any kind of this negative dialogue, especially the rhetoric targeting the leadership because leadership is the key thing in that society. It's the axis of evil, so to speak. Yeah. So what I'm very much concerned about is the way that North Korea may react to this because according to North Korea's law on consolidating its status as a nuclear weapons estate, they have that kind of law. And article four actually mentions when there's any violation of its sovereignty, North Korea may attack, may use force against the enemy. But here, it is not clear whether violating sovereignty means violating territorial sovereignty or political sovereignty because they are very critical about U.S. hostility, which is targeting the only regime which means violation of sovereignty. So that kind of logic is very dangerous to me. The other question was about the effectiveness of that. I can take a very brief stab at that. The main advantage that missile defense will give you against a large arsenal of missiles is it will buy you some time because eventually you will run out of interceptors. So whether or not it's effective immediately is always subject to debate, but in the end you will run out of shots. And so what you have gained is the ability not to have to react instantly. But that's mainly it from my perspective. I think we have time for one more round of questions. I don't wanna hold you into the break. So from the side first. Hi, thank you very much. Sebastian Brickson-Williams from Basic in London. I just wondered if the panel could speak briefly on possible trust and confidence building measures between the U.S., South Korea, Russia, and China, and particularly on FAD. And what's stopping TCBMs happening at the moment because I can think of a couple of things like inspections of sad sites or radar systems or joint control perhaps, but perhaps there are other things I haven't thought of. So I'd be very appreciative. Thank you. Thank you. Hi, I'm Christina Vareali from the Royal United Services Institute. Yesterday we heard the phrase strategic empathy mentioned, and I wondered to what extent this can be applied to the North Korean context. It's quite easy to find evidence, whether that's from the access of evil or from somewhere else as to what, even at least initially drove North Korea towards nuclear weapons, whether that's the same reason they maintain today is a different question. But should the U.S. or any members who were involved in the Six-Party Talks take that approach with North Korea? Should we have some kind of strategic empathy? And if so, how do you communicate that to the regime in Pyongyang? Is that something they're gonna listen to or is that something they're gonna trust? So I'm really, really interested in your thoughts on that. So in a way, we've got a question about the great power interactions on one hand and the great power interactions with North Korea. On the other hand, and there's this question of can we move past ICBMs to TCBMs? I think there is a certain thematic similarity here. Who'd like to start? Maybe I'll just start with Seb's question. I thought one of the things that was most encouraging this morning from Chris's comments was at least the willingness to have a discussion with the Russians and the Chinese about the conditions in which I think he said, more interesting discussion over that could be and ballistic missile defense could be had. And that is, I think, at least a positive indication. Indeed, one of the things I've taken from so many panels at this conference is that in the midst of all this political disarray, communication's gonna be hugely important and having ongoing dialogues is gonna be extremely important between a variety of different countries. And for that same reason, I took some encouragement from that statement this morning. So at least starting there would be really useful, I think. I'm not sure necessarily that site visits and things like that are gonna have the confidence building value that the site visits might have in a broader arms control context. Partly, I think because Chinese fear is at least about the system's deployment or about where that leads, what's to come, what does it mean for broader US intent to put defensive assets in the region, et cetera. And site visits don't really help you with that longer term vision, but I think the starting point is probably to talk about it and have more communication over in what circumstances there could be a rollback in those assets. Do you wanna address the question of strategic empathy with the DPRK? Christina, I think knows a lot of my thoughts on this by virtue of having sat across the desk for me for a number of years. But I think I distinguish the Kim Jong-un period in this and that affects my willingness or decreases my willingness to have much strategic empathy for the North Koreans right now because I think a much larger portion of the reason why North Korea maintains nuclear weapons today and is pursuing them in the way that it's pursuing them is because of Kim Jong-un personally and the domestic politics around him. He relies extraordinarily heavily on the nuclear missile programs and their development for his personal legitimacy. The security situation for North Korea, it's very much about Kim Jong-un personally too. I always take note now when Kim Jong-un does things and releases handwritten notes, authorizing nuclear tests, et cetera. That type of imagery that's coming out, that type of propaganda suggests to me that this is much more about personal legitimacy than it maybe once was. Anyone else like to have a go? Probably I would agree with Andrea's remark because if you look at what the North Koreans are doing under Kim Jong-un, it usually makes perfect sense. But sometimes it looks like that he's, I would say, excessive in his overdoing menu of policies which basically you can understand. But sometimes he's giving too much attention and spending too much time like basically with the nuclear issues. He's really seriously committed to it. There's also some other policies we can basically see the same. In many cases, his personality and he's basically rational. He's by no means paranoid. I would never agree with this description as paranoid regime. They are very rational people. But sometimes, well... Even paranoids have enemies. Not basically in their situation, well, he has very little choices. But sometimes he's sort of taking with his emotions and it's not the only case when it's happening, unfortunately. One thing that I can add to that is the fact that North Korea mentions Juche quite often than before, especially from January of this year. Juche means self-reliance and North Korea calls the recent test, sorry, missile engine test as one of the major step forward with developing Juche weapons, self-reliant weapons. That means North Korea is very determined to go its own way. Okay, well, I think it's about time to conclude but I would just like to, before thanking the panel, ask the panelists to give us one last thought that they'd like to conclude on. If there can be anything you'd like, perhaps you'd like to end on an optimistic note since this has been so glum, really? Not me. No, no. I'm not surprised. I mean, you come in and advocate a policy that you call a bad policy, so anyone else? I'll start. I think for me, one of the key challenges for DPRK policy moving forward is that in our kind of, I don't wanna use pillars because pillars is a loaded term in the nuclear field but in terms of the key kind of policy line, so if you've got deterrence and assurance, let's say you've got sanctions, you've got encouraging societal change in North Korea, you've got diplomacy, pursuing any one of those significantly further results potentially now in trade-offs across other policy lines. So let me give you an example of what I mean here. Pursuing the deterrence and assurance side of things further, particularly if we get to the stage where North Korea has demonstrated an ICBM capability, pursuing that further is gonna probably irritate the Chinese to no end to the point that they might withdraw from any thinking about cooperation on North Korea rather than determining that it's more in their interest for them to cooperate. But you still need them on the sanction side if you wanna pursue sanctions further to increase the effectiveness there. At the same time, pursuing sanctions further might undermine your effectiveness in encouraging societal change in North Korea that creates expectations amongst a middle class that flow upwards. So we're at the stage where I think our knot is getting further tangled and careful nuance diplomacy is gonna be pretty important to make sure that we avoid that as much as possible. Trump administration and careful nuance diplomacy, you are an option. Gina. I think the US and the South Korea should work on in the future more detailed roadmap for denuclearization with specific timeline because North Korea offered its own idea last year in July and that offer also included such as removal of all the nuclear strategic assets from South Korea and opening up all the US bases in the Southern part and US making pledge of no use of nuclear weapons as well as no threat of use of nuclear weapons as well in demonstration of no demonstration of strategic assets around the Korean peninsula. I don't think that can be well accepted by either the US or South Korea. So we should work our own demands with a specific timelines as well. And on that note, please join me in thanking our panelists. Thank you.